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Abstract
Absolutism in Action: Frederick William I and 
the Government of East Prussia, 1709-1730
by
Rodney Mische Gothelf
This dissertation examines the operation of Hohenzollern 
government in the distant but crucial territory of East Prussia during the 
reign of Frederick William 1,1713-40 to determine what impact the 
establishment of the General Directory in late 1722 and early 1723 had upon 
day-to-day administration within the Kingdom of East Prussia. Particular 
attention is given to the role and operation of provincial and local 
government in East Prussia during the decades before and after the setting­
up of the General Directory (General-Ober-Finanz- Kriegs- und Domdnen- 
Direktorium).
This study is part of a broader historiographical tendency which 
questions both the extent and success of Hohenzollern state building and 
calls into question the validity of the traditional view which gives most 
attention to the positive role of central state structures and considers the 
establishment of the General Directory as the apex of the much-admired and 
widely-emulated Prussian administrative system. This study demonstrates 
that further governmental modifications were needed in the Kingdom 
before and after the General Directory's successful operation in the 
Kingdom in the 1720s and 1730s. The territorial and local levels were where 
the Hohenzollern rulers would find it crucial to establish their absolutist 
power. One difficulty Frederidt William I faced was that a large corps of 
loyal officials was lacking in the Kingdom which was only partially 
remedied by the end of his reign. In addition, critical administrative 
disputes continued and new ones arose between the King's administrative 
agencies. Moreover, the powerful native elites who lived in the Kingdom 
retained significant authority at the provincial and local levels and resisted 
many reform attempts by a Idng who they saw as foreign. Their enduring 
importance helps to explain the distinctive manner in which absolutism 
developed over these decades. As a result, authority in the Kingdom still 
was less than securely established by the final decade of Frederick William 
Ts reign.
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Glossary of Technical Terms
Accise:
Adeliche-
gerichtschreibei':
Amthaiiptmann:
Amt:
Briejfhnger:
Chargenlmsse:
Collegium: 
Cotnmissarius loci:
Dmynei':
Fiskal:
Generalhufenschofl:
Grundheirschaft:
Gutsherrschaft:
Excise tax that was essentially a sales tax found 
in urban areas on food and other consumables.
District legal clerk
The highest noble in a particular East Prussian 
district, also known as District Captain. Plural,
Amthauptleute.
administrative district. Plural, Amter.
Letter carrier.
Treasury used by the Hohenzollern ruler for his 
personal interests and dates from 1686. Revenue 
derived primarily from fees affixed to 
appointments based on a percentage of salary or 
by level of appointment. See also, ReJmitenlaisse.
Court.
Excise tax collector. See Accise. Term used in 
East Prussia throughout Frederick William Fs 
reign but also became known as Steuerrat.
Mill worker for drainage operations.
Attorney for financial affairs of tlie Hohenzollern 
state.
Exclusively an East Prussian tax on Junkers. 
Generally considered the first direct property tax 
to affect rural noblemen in the Kingdom.
Agricultural, economic and social system found 
primarily in southern and western states of the 
Holy Roman Empire. Tenants were leased land 
and payments to a landlord were made in cash or 
kind.
Broadly similar to Grundheirschaft except that the 
landlord was more directly responsible for his 
land and thus, essentially lived off his own land.
IX
Hochmeister:
Hofgeiicht:
Hoflmmmer:
Hufe:
Indigemtsrecht:
Kahinett:
Kabinettsrate:
Forced peasant labour, or so-called serfs, were 
used. The landlord was responsible for "police" 
functions.
The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. The 
highest official in the Order.
Provincial court for nobility.
Established in 1689 to oversee provincial domain 
administration, civil finances, tolls, licenses, and 
mines, etc. Under Frederick William 1 became 
the General Finance Directory in 1713.
Land measurement used in many provinces but 
of uniform size only throughout East Prussia. 
One hufe = 4.09 acres = 1.68 hectares. Plural: 
Hufen.
Right of the native born to hold office in that 
state. For example, someone born outside East 
Prussia in the early eighteenth century could not 
hold office in administration there.
Office containing the most important officials 
and advisors to the Hohenzollern ruler.
That group which comprised the King's Kabinett.
Konigsbeig
Tribumh
Kontrihutiom
Highest court of appeals in East Prussia for all 
territories that rested outside of the Holy Roman 
Empire.
Tax found in rural areas that affected the 
peasantry and generally, revenues went for 
military purposes.
Kriegs und 
Domanenkarnmei'
Landrat:
Primarily the King's financial authorities in the 
Kingdom but also carried out specific judicial 
functions. The agency which came to rival the 
authority of the Konigsberg Regieinmg most 
directly.
Leader of the district Landtage and therefore one 
of the most powerful local administrators in East 
Prussia. He was supposed to ensure
X
Oherappellationsgericht:
Oberbtirggraf:
Pachmohren:
Reknitenlmsse:
Regimtng:
Schulzem
Steuerrat:
Steimstempel:
Tribunal:
Veiweser:
Warthen:
implementation of edicts and a district's military 
obUgations, for example, as the head of the
Regierung.
East Prussian high court of appeals. A distinct 
court from that with the same name and located 
in Berlin.
Highest military officer in East Prussia.
Leasehold estate unfree servant.
King's private treasury.
Highest authoritative body within East Prussia at 
Frederick William I's accession in 1713. It also 
dominated most judicial institutions including 
the liighest court of the province.
Village mayor.
Local urban tax collector under Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer. See Commissarius loci.
Customary stamp tax which was attached to 
territorial letters of appointment.
East Prussian Supreme Court of first instance.
District official under Amthauptleute. The 
Venoeser carried out several of the day-to-day 
duties of local administration.
Town look-out, guard, or scout.
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INTRODUCTION
Issue and Purpose
This dissertation examines the operation of Hohenzollern 
govermnent in the distant but crucial territory of East Prussia during the 
reign of Frederick William 1,1713-40. The primary purpose of this research 
is to determine what impact the establishment of the General Directory in 
late 1722 and early 1723 had upon day-to-day administration within the 
Kingdom of East Prussia. Particular attention will therefore be given to the 
role and operation of provincial and local government in East Prussia 
during the decades before and after the setting-up of the General Directory 
(General-Obei'-Finanz-' Kriegs- und Domanen-Direktonum).
Although the subject of this study may appear traditional, the 
approach and perspective adopted are less familiar. Traditionally, 
historians have considered the establishment of the General Directory to be 
the most important central government reform during Frederick William Ts 
reign and indeed the whole eighteenth century, establishing as it did the 
apex of the much-admired and widely-emulated Prussian administrative 
system. This approach gives most attention to central government 
institutions and rests upon a belief in the strength and positive role of state 
structures.
The present study is part of a broader historio graphical tendency 
which questions both the extent and success of Hohenzollern state building 
and calls into question the validity of this traditional view. As this
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dissertation will argue, absolutism in Brandenburg-Prussia was not created 
by a single institution, even one which became as powerful and wide- 
ranging as the General Directoiy. The establishment of the General 
Directory was only one - albeit the central initiative — of a series of 
administrative reforms during the early eighteenth century directed toward 
expanding the ruler's authority throughout the Hohenzollern territories. 
There is little doubt that Frederick William 1 improved the operation of 
government at the central level. Some of these improvements may be 
attributed to the establishment of the General Directory in 1723. The impact 
of this institution, however, and its importance within government have 
been too heavily emphasised by previous historians. This is particularly 
true for the Kingdom of East Prussia in the 1720s and 1730s. The powerful 
native elites who lived in the Kingdom retained significant authority at the 
provincial and local levels and their enduring importance helps to explain 
the distinctive manner in wliich absolutism developed over these decades. 
Moreover, these were the levels at which the Hohenzollern rulers would 
find it crucial to establish their absolutist power. Their reforms of central 
administration were not in themselves sufficient. Absolutism had to be 
established and develop in the individual territories, while policy aims had 
to be translated into actual initiatives at the local level. In addition, the 
administrative changes which accompanied the setting-up of the General 
Directory, there were other significant reforms to government attempted by 
Frederick WÜHam 1 before and after 1723. This is significant, since 
absolutism was not an event but a process which extended over a far more 
extended period than Mtherto has been recognised.
The experience of East Prussia between the years 1709 and 1730 
explains both developments within the evolution of the Kingdom and its 
wider relationship to Hohenzollern absolutism. One cannot generalise 
about the way in wliich absolutism was implemented throughout all the
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Brandenburg-Prussian territories. By explaining how it came about in one 
important territory, through an examination, for example, of the unique 
corporate elite structure, economic and agrarian conditions, as well as its 
relationship with the ruler, one can see some patterns form with respect to 
the way m which absolutism was beginning to develop.^
Why study the working of Hohenzollern administration in East 
Prussia? The Kingdom has been selected for three primary reasons. Firstly, 
it was the source of the Prussian crown for the Brandenburg-Prussian rulers 
and, therefore. East Prussia had considerable symbolic importance in the 
political affairs of the whole Hohenzollern polity. Equally as important, the 
title of king brought the HohenzoUerns enhanced stature among other major 
European states and this in turn increased the territory's importance within 
Brandenburg-Prussia. At the time of Frederick WiUiam Ts accession in 1713, 
East Prussia was stiU a new kingdom as it had only been promoted from the 
status of a duchy in 1701.
Secondly, East Prussia was where Frederick William 1, while stiU 
crown prince, had attempted to intervene personally and had taken decisive 
actions in the government of the territory. This was particularly true with 
respect to the devastating plague which broke out in 1709. His involvement 
from this point onwards is important in revealing significant issues relating 
to the operation and conception of government in East Prussia. It also gave 
him considerable personal knowledge of the Kingdom and its problems.
The dynasty, moreover, in one sense enjoyed unusual freedom of action in 
East Prussia. The Kingdom, although a part of the HohenzoUern monarchy, 
lay outside the Holy Roman Empire and therefore not subject to its
^The application of it to this study has been considerably influenced by the 
approach and insights of William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century 
France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc. Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. An excellent summary of BeilTs approach can be found on pp. 335- 
39.
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authority. After East Prussia became a kingdom, the HohenzoUerns held 
the territory in fuU sovereignty, free and clear of traditional international 
obligations, notably that to the Polish King which had been abrogated as 
long ago as 1660 but remained important to East Prussians and their 
separate identity even in the first half of the eighteenth century.
Thirdly, as mentioned above, the traditional system of government 
which had for long existed in East Prussia at the time of Frederick William 
Ts accession, did not allow the ruler a particularly great role. In fact, the 
East Prussians saw Frederick WiUiam I - exactly as they had viewed his 
predecessors - as a foreign sovereign. East Prussia had a well established 
governmental system dominated by the powerful local nobUity and 
burghers who had successfully resisted almost all attempts at change by 
HohenzoUern rulers throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
When Frederick WiUiam I ascended the throne in 1713, however, he brought 
a new approach to government and was presented with formidable 
challenges which also became a source of opportunity for him to overhaul 
the traditional administrative arrangements in East Prussia.
The General Directory could not have institutionaUsed absolutism by 
itself. There were prerequisites to its successful operation both within the 
entire HohenzoUern monarchy and in the territory of East Prussia, in 
particular, both prior to and after Frederick WiUiam Ts instruction in late 
1722 for the setting up of a centralised administrative institution. Above all, 
government structures required men to run them: a cadre of capable and 
loyal administrators had to be created. There was a need for a more 
professional civil service, and this was only to develop later in the century. 
In addition. East Prussia needed improvements to its agricultural methods 
in order to increase productivity and prosperity, as well as a stable 
environment to aUow recovery after the harsh plague that had disrupted 
daily Uves so severely in the early part of the eighteenth century. Those
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who worked on farms were usually not well educated or trained in either 
agriculture or livestock techniques and were also restricted by the primitive 
equipment available to them. Finally, the most essential prerequisite was 
that the East Prussian nobility had to be reconciled to Berlin's rule and its 
resistance to Hohenzollern rulers and their authority in the territory 
overcome. As will be seen, Fredeiidc William I had to face a well- 
established tradition among the native East Prussian elite of defending 
established rights and privileges. These were frequently defended 
vigorously by the elite throughout the reign of Frederick William I: exactly 
as they had been during the reigns of his father, Frederick III /1 and his 
grandfather, Frederick William, the Great Elector.^
Tills study will pay particular attention to the day-to-day operation of 
the various authorities located in the Kingdom of East Prussia, particularly 
tire established agencies of government and traditional elites, above all the 
Junkers (the nobility) and, to a certain extent, the ruling oligarchies in the 
towns, above aU Konigsberg.
The General Directory imported a new administrative framework 
which overlaid the existing systems of government in the Kingdom, that of 
the Estates and towns. Native East Prussians dominated the established, 
traditional system of government and came to play a significant role in the 
new institutions as well. As this dissertation will argue, the Hohenzollern 
ruler was a fundamental source of authority in East Prussia, but he was not 
the only one. There were many native East Prussian officials who acted 
independently of Frederick William I, and covertly and sometimes openly
^In particular, see Karin Friedrich, ^Tlie Other Prussia: A Study of the National, 
Historical and Political Identity of Burghers in Early Modern Royal Prussia," Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1995, pp. 441-523. Friedrich is concerned, however, 
with Royal Prussia, that is, the area in the region under Polish authority. East Prussia, or 
that territory under Hohenzollern authority, was a distinct territory from its Polish 
neighbour.
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resisted his policies and innovations. As will be shown. East Prussian 
govermnent continued to be dominated by members of the powerful native 
East Prussian elites who, even if teclmically the king's royal personnel, often 
were rivals of Hohenzollern authority.
The Second King in Prussia
Government in the Hohenzollern monarchy during the first half of 
the eighteenth century remained highly personal in nature. Its effectiveness 
depended upon the King playing an absolutely central role in the day-to- 
day operation of administration. Frederick WiUiam I literaUy ruled 
Brandenburg-Prussia from his own cabinet, as this thesis wiU underline. He 
read and amiotated innumerable reports, drew up numerous instructions 
and involved himself in the smaUest detaUs, such as the aUocation of 
firewood to officials during the winter months.^ The personality and 
attributes of the King were crucial in determining the nature of the 
govermnent over which he presided.
Who was Frederick William I, the second Prussian King? He is 
perhaps the least understood HohenzoUern ruler during Brandenburg- 
Prussia's formative centuries.^ His character is puzzling and contradictory. 
Historians often cite anecdotes revealing the king's uncontrollable outbursts
^See below. Chapter Seven, p. 325.
%’here are a limited number of studies dealing with Frederick William I and his 
unusual personality (contrasted, perhaps best, with the abundant literature on Frederick 
William Fs son and successor, Frederick the Great). On Frederick William I see the 
following: The best account (wliich unfortunately ends at 1713) by Carl Hinrichs, Friedrich 
Wilhelm I. Konig in Freuficn. Eine Biograpliie. Tugend und Aufstieg. Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1943; this is supplemented to a large degree by the series of 
collected essays in Carl Hinrichs, Preussen als historisches Problem: Gesammelte 
Abhandlungen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964; the good but brief account by Gerhard 
Oestreich, Frederick William I. PreuEischer Absolutismus. Merkantilismus. Militarismus. 
Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1977; and the popular accounts by Friedrich Forster, Friedrich 
Wilhelm I. Konig von Preufien. Potsdam: F. Riegel, 1834/35, Karl Hans Hermann, Per 
Soldatenkonig Friedrich Wilhelm I. Friedbeig: Podzun-Pallas, 1982 and Robert Ergang, The 
Potsdam Führer; Frederick William L Father of Prussian Militarism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1941, and the former East German accounts by Wolfgang Venolir, Per 
Soldatenkonig: Revolutionar auf dem Thron. Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Verlag 
Ullstein, 1988 and Heinz Katlie, Per ..Soldatenkonig" Friedrich Wilhelm 1.1688-1740. Konig 
in Preufien: Eine Biographie. Berlin: Verbesserte Aufl., 1978.
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of rage sometimes lasting days at a time, and his obsessive and compulsive 
behaviour toward family, friend, and subject ahke. Some of the king's 
conduct certainly may be attributable to the so-called royal malady of 
porphyria^ or nephritic colics and also to gout, from which he also 
suffered.^ One of the best-known portraits of Frederick William I paints 
him with his much-feared lacquered cane which was more than the 
common portrait prop for the K ing / This cane became his trademark and 
one he did not hesitate to use as a motivational tool on unsuspecting 
officials from time to time. One anecdote alleged "that he had cabinets 
furnished with large sticks, placed at certain distances one from the other, to 
be more convenient, according to where he happened to be, so as to apply 
blows to those who approached him and did not gratify Ids f a n c y O n c e  a 
bench of judges was called to the Idng's chambers to be questioned about a 
sentence they recently had rendered. After questioning the group, the King 
began striking them about the shoulder and face. The judges fled spitting
^Abe Goldberg, 'The Porphyrias", in Porphyria - A Royal Malady: Articles 
Published in or Commissioned by the British Medical Tournai. London: British Medical 
Association, 1968, pp. 66-68. Goldberg summarises by writing: "Most of the porphyrias are 
hereditary disorders of metabolism. Occasionally the disease may occur without any 
apparent hereditary cause, associated with certain toxic chemicals or alcoholic poisons. 
Patients may go to their doctors because of skin manifestations alone or acute attacks of 
severe abdominal pain, paralysis, and mental symptoms or a combination of both of these 
presentations."
^Ida Macalpine, Ridiard Hunter and C. Rimington, "Porphyria in the Royal Houses 
of Stuart, Hanover, and Prussia: A Follow-up Study of George IB's Illness," in Ibid., p. 49. 
The authors' write that Frederick William I "had 'nephritic colics' at the age of 31 in an 
attack wliich brought liim to the brink of death. At 39 he had violent attacks of gout; his 
temper became uncontrollable, he was sleepless, and 'worried himself into melancholy and 
hypochondria,' had 'a fit of religious mania' and spoke of abdicating. In 1729, aged 41, he 
had his most serious attack with colic, insomnia, painful weakness of his limbs, and had to 
be wheeled about. To distract liimself from liis sufferings he painted and signed the 
pictures Friedericiis Wiîhelminus in tornientis pinxiL
^Antoine Pesne, Friedrich Wilhelm I. Oil on canvas, 1733, Berlin: Schloss 
Charlottenburg, Staatl. Sclilosser und Garten.
%rnest Lavisse, The Youth of Frederick the Great, translated by Maiy Busluiell 
Coleman, Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Company, 1892, p. 114.
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out teeth as the King followed in pu rsu it/ In another example, Frederick 
William I allegedly killed his own firstborn son by forcing the crown onto 
his head too vigorously at the crown prmce's coronation and fracturing the 
newborn's skull/® In one final example, the King issued an unusually cruel 
command whereby he forced his son, the future Frederick II, "the Great", to 
watch the execution of his best friend after the abused son's failed escape 
attempt from the country in July 1730/^ His character and reputation have 
been noted with account after account of violent and cruel behaviour of 
which these are just a few examples. His violent nature often makes for 
compelling Mstory and has been filled with anecdote after anecdote.
This violent behaviour was accompanied by deep religious belief. 
There is no doubt that reUgion comprised a large part of Frederick WiUiam 
I's character and created a curious contrast to his violent side. Mack Walker 
recounts the story of Frederick William I travelling to the Kingdom to 
investigate the corruption of native Junipers in the East Prussian Kriegs und 
Domdnenlcammer. One of the counciUors, Schlubhut, was found guilty, but 
the local court controUed by the Regiei'ung, who resented having one of their 
own condemned, intervened and so he was instead sentenced to several 
years in jail. When Frederick WiUiam I heard of his sentence, he declared 
that ScWubhut instead should be hung for his crime, an episode which 
underlines the king's Old Testament sense of justice.^^ Schlubhut retorted
Ibid., pp. 114-5.
^®Thomas Carlyle, History of Friedrich II. of Prussia Called Frederick the Great, 
Boston: Dana Estes & Company, vol. 1,190-?, p. 22. Other historians note,^iowever, that 
the first two male heirs bom to Frederick William I and his wife, Sopliie Do^hea of 
Hanover, died of natural causes as infants.
^^Ludwig Reiners, Frederick the Great: An Informal Biography, translated by 
Lawrence P. R. Wilson, London: Oswald Wolff, 1960, pp. 36-52.
l^ABB, 5:1, pp. 261-2.
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that "one did not hang a Prussian nobleman." After hearing this, the King 
ordered gallows to be built in the courtyard of the building housing the 
Kriegs und Donmnenl<ammer in Konigsberg which was an agency under the 
direct control of the King and the primary rival to the Regierung. As Walker 
writes: "The next day being Sunday, the King went to church, where he 
heard a sermon on the text, "Show mercy, that you shall loiow mercy", at 
which the King wept copiously and, no doubt, unfeignedly. On Monday he 
summoned the rest of the council to watch Schlubhut hang."^^ This is a 
classic illustration of the kings puzzling character, mingling as it did 
extremes of religion and cruelty.
The Hohenzollerns in the eighteenth century were Calvinist, as the 
family had been since it officially converted in 1613. Like his father, 
however, Frederick William 1 continued Hohenzollern support of Pietism. 
Pietism, a German form of English Puritanism, underpinned many of the 
economic, religious, and educational policy reforms introduced by Frederick 
William 1. He believed that every action he took was judged by God. This 
was as true for his personal conduct as much as it was for his devotion to 
the people over whom he ruled. As Koch writes, "the prosperity of the state 
was a sign of divine approval; given Prussia's fragility, positioned in the 
midst of great powers, the task of the monarch was that his every action be 
an example to his subjects lest divine approval be withdrawn." This was 
certainly the attitude which underlay the Idng's reforms in East Prussia.
Fritz Terveen has cited a report from the Konigsberg Regiming^ the body of 
native noblemen with the greatest authority over the affairs of the Kingdom 
at the time of Frederick William I's accession, which happens to have
^^Mack Walker, The Salzburg Transaction: Expulsion and Redemption in 
Eighteenth-Century Genrtany. Itliaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp. 80-1.
%bid., p. 81.
W. Koch, A History of Prussia. New York: Dorset Press, 1978, p. 82.
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explained their resistance to one of the king's plans to build and staff 
churches and schools in the Kingdom in early 1722. Not only is it important 
in showing the resistance of the native elite to Frederick William 1 but it also 
explains the Idng's strong sense of his religious mission. Frederick William 
Ts marginalia on one docmnent noted this religious mission as well as his 
negative conception of the East Prussians in general: "This is nothing 
[more] than the Regierung wanting to keep this poor land in barbarous 
suffering/' noted the King, who went on to say that "... if 1 build and 
improve the land and 1 do not make any Christians, so help me aU is for 
nothing...."
His religiosity was deeply affected by his education during childhood 
in Calvinist theories of predestination, most notably by his Huguenot 
teacher, Pliilippe Rebeur.^^ This upbringing created his lifelong fear of his 
own salvation. Because of the severe negative affect he believed this had on 
him, he forbade the teaching of the doctrine of predestination to his own 
children, who were also raised in the Calvinist faith.
The King lived a considerably less elegant lifestyle than not only his 
predecessor and father, Frederick 111/I, as is often noted, but also his son 
and successor, Frederick the Great. Under Frederick 111/1 the Hohenzollern 
Monarchy had acquired a large-scale court and the representational culture 
to match, modelled on those of Louis XIV at Versailles. Frederick WilHam
^^Fritz Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement: Per Wiederaufbau des 
Nordlichen Ostpreussen unter Friedrich Wilhelm 1.1714-1740. edited by Profs. Heimpel, 
Walther Hubatscli, Kaehler and Sdiramm, vol. 16, Gôttinger Bausteine zur 
Geschichtswissenschaft, Gottingen: Mustersdrmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1954, p. 93. 
"Dieses ist nidits, denn die Regierung dieses arme Land in Barbarei behalten will, denn 
wenn idi baue und verbessere das Land und idie mache keine Christen, so hilfet mir allés 
nit...." See also Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, pp. 86-92, wliich describes the 
rise of Frederick William Fs key Pietist advisor and adminisbrator for educational reforms in 
the kingdom, August Hermann Franke. See also, James Van Horn Melton, Absolutism and 
the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 46-48.
^^Carl Hinrichs, "Friedrich Wilhelm I," in Preussen als historisches Problem, p. 44.
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Ts first action upon his accession was to impose stringent economies, 
reducing sharply the number of court personnel and dismissing many from 
their posts. The royal court was a shadow of its former self between 1713 
and 1740, as the King concentrated scarce resources upon building up the 
army and the administrative structure which supported this. Frederick 
William Ts court was frugal and simple, in sharp contrast to that of his own 
father. He felt most comfortable relaxing with his key advisors and leading 
Junkers in the so-called Tobacco College, in sparsely furnished and austere 
surroundings. There they would smoke tobacco, a royal monopoly at the 
time, as well as discuss recent and past events and perhaps even official 
policy. This was a distinct difference in personal pleasure than more lavish 
rulers before and after his reign.
Much of what is described above was probably due at least in part to 
his strong Calvinist upbringing, although his reverence for military culture 
and discipline was also crucial. Certainly before Ins accession to the throne 
there was not the expectation that he would be a philosopher king like there 
was with his son, Frederick 11. Rather, Frederick William 1 was less 
supportive of such things as arts and sciences and operas, ballets, masks, 
etc. primarily, it seems, for religious reasons.^®
This should not be taken as an implication that Frederick William I 
was unintelligent or that he lacked the desire to increased education among
^^Ridiard Dietrich, editor. Die politischenTestainente der Hohenzollern vol. 20, 
Vewjfentlichungen ans den Archiven Preussischer Kulturhesitz, Kôln and Wien: Bolilau Verlag, 
1986, pp. 222-3. For example, Frederick William I noted as mudi in his instructions for liis 
successor: "Mein lieber Suxessor sey wohll versichert, das alle glück[lichen] Regenten, die 
Gott fur die Augen haben und keine Metressen, es befier zu Nennen Huhren, haben und ein 
Gottsehlidies lehben ftihren; difie Regenten wierdt Gott mit alien weldt[lichen] und 
geist[lidien] sehgen besdiütten. Als bitte id\ Meinen lieben Successor ein Gottsehliges 
Reines lehben und wandellen zu füliren und seinen Lande und Armeé mit guhten 
excempell vorgehhen, nicht Sauffen und freCen davon ein unzugtiges lehben herr kommet. 
Mein lieber Successor mus augh nicht zugehben das in seine Lender und Prowincen keine 
Komedien, Operas, Ballettes, Masckeralideii, Redutten gehalten werden und ein greu[el] 
davor haben, wiell es Gottlohse und Teuffelichts ist, da der Sahtanas sein tempell und reich 
vermeitret werden...."
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his subjects. The King listened to music and from time to time even painted. 
From his writings, one easily may get the impression that the King lacked 
basic intelligence. Frederick William 1 was, after all, a 1-dng who not only 
wrote illegibly but moreover, apparently could not construct a 
grammatically correct sentence in any language.l^ As we shall see in 
Chapter Six, these were requirements the King demanded of a would-be 
administrator and something in which he personally took a decisive interest 
with regard to a candidate's appointment. Incidentally, this example also 
underlines another important theme of this study, that of the deep personal 
involvement by the King at even the lowest level of government. In regard 
to this theme, one need only examine the manuscript material to realise that 
Frederick William I must have been a voracious reader of administrative 
documents as check marks and various notations are consistently found on 
material relating to seemingly insignificant matters. The King was 
extremely widely read in official documents and personally aware of the 
administrative issues of his reign. He was also far from unintelligent, 
despite impressions to the contrary conveyed by studies of his rule.
This was demonstrated by Frederick William I's role in the 
modernisation of education in the Hohenzollern territories. Not only did he 
work to improve agricultural techniques through research and education at 
the estate farm level but he also sought to build elementary schools with 
compulsory attendance, establishing new departments in both Pietist and 
Cameralist studies, for example. Although there was some success for the 
King in these areas of reform, there was also a great deal of resistance and 
lack of success. As will be discussed in later chapters, the reasons for these 
failures range from Junker resistance to lack of adequate funding for
i^For more on this subject, see Hermann Georg Hummrich, "Beitrage zur Sprache 
ICoiiig Frfhreich Wilhelm I von Preussen," Ph.D. Dissertation, Greifswald, Adler, 1910. 
Hummridi analyses, in quite an interesting manner, Frederick William I's use of grammar 
through his writings and marginalia, etc.
Introduction — The Second King in Prussia M
projects, to poor implementation procedures of the projects. Nonetheless, 
the issue of education was taken seriously by Frederick William
^^Wolfgang Neugebauer, Absolutischer Staat und Schulwirklickeit in 
Brandenburg-Preussen, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985; James Van Horn Melton, 
Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsoty Schooling in Prussia and 
Austria, pp. 44-50.
The General Directory in its Context
Before the establishment of the General Directory in 1722/ 23 most 
governmental institutions in the Hohenzollern monarchy dealt with the 
affairs of a single territory. There were separate administrations for 
Brandenburg, East Prussia and the other territories. Only two central 
administrative agencies with a remit covering all the Hohenzollern lands 
existed in Brandenburg-Prussia. Both were concerned with matters of 
revenue. The General Finance Directory (Genemlflmnzdirektorhim), oversaw 
the extensive royal domains, attended to agrarian matters and the collection 
of taxation. The General War Commissariat (Genemlkriegskomntissariat), 
provided essential administration for the army and the fiscal revenue upon 
which it depended throughout the various Hohenzollern territories.
As the two agencies found their responsibilities frequently 
overlapped, competition between the two to extract the limited means 
available from the same sources grew. Inevitably the divergent aims of the 
two bodies clashed. Frederick William I sought to resolve this conflict when 
in 1722-23 he merged the domain and commissariat offices into the General- 
Ober-Finanz-Kriegs-nnd-Domanen-Direlctoriurn or General Directory, by which 
name it will hereafter be designated, bringing the county and tax councillors 
in the provinces under the authority of the newly established War-and- 
Domain Chambers (Kriegs und Domanenlaimmer). Frederick William I 
wanted a central authority to oversee military and financial matters as well 
as other more general "police" functions throughout the various territories.
15
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The term police, as it is used here, incorporates more than present- 
day conceptions of law and o r d e r . I t  is employed in its wider sense, 
familiar in the early modern period — along the lines of Marc Raeff s 
explanation: "Police had the connotation of administration in the broadest 
sense, that is, institutional means and procedures necessary to secure 
peaceful and orderly existence for the population of the land (that is, 
territory)."^^ One of the primary goals of the early modern Polizeistmt, in 
the words of Gerhard Oestreich, was "to keep the community thriving so 
that the subjects may prosper in wealth and property and that everything 
hindering the common good may be prevented. The subjects for their part 
have two obligations towards the ruler, respect and obedience." The 
General Directory was seen as the strong institution through which these 
areas could be administered more effectively.
The General Directory was organised in a collegial manner. This had 
been a favourite administrative practice for Frederick William Ts 
government prior to its establishment and was repeated in that body
ail overview of the term "Polizei," through the period under consideration, 
see Hans Maier, Die altere Deutsche Staats- und Veiwaltungslehre. Munich: C. H. 
Beck'sche, 1980, pp. 92-105. In particular, this is Mater's chapter entitled "Polizeiliteratur 
und Polizeiwissenschaft bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts," which traces the term from its 
earliest beginnings through its use and meaning in the eighteenth century when its 
definition began to narrow closer to the present day definition.
^^Mai’c Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change 
tlirough Law in the Germanies and Russia. 1600-1800. New Haven; Yale University Press, 
1983, p. 5.
^^Gerhard Oestreidi, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, edited by Brigitta 
Oestreich, H. G. Koenigsberger and David McLintock, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern 
History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 155-156. Tliis is an English 
translation of Oestreich's, Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates: Ausgewahlte 
Aufsatze. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969. One of the most comprehensive 
interpretations of tlie term police, in Oestreidi's view, dates from the mid-sixteenth century 
and is foimd in the political testement of Dr. Melchior von Osse. Police for Osse "was 
identical both with the government and witli tlie object and nature of tire community as a 
whole." See, Oestreidi, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, p. 156. Raeff's definition 
of police, however, should be considered as an up-dating of Oestreidi's and is a definition 
that is, therefore, closer to the one used in tliis thesis. Marc Raeff, however, gives less 
weight to the economic aims and functions stressed by Gerhard Oestreidi.
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consistent with the king's practice. The idea of shared responsibility was 
not new in the government of the Hohenzollerns. It was increasingly used 
by Frederick WilMam I and may be directly traced to his own experiences 
while crown prince and to his father's managerial style of reliance upon 
single individuals, which was apparent throughout the government - from 
his continued use of first ministers to departmental heads to the central 
administrative officials in the territories. Although the collegial style of 
government was not unique to the Hohenzollerns, indeed it was used in 
France with more success, for example, it appears to have been mixed with a 
lack of oversight of lesser officials that resulted in governmental venaUty 
and breakdown when in place in Brandenburg-Prussia.
Offices in the collegial organisation were not headed by a single 
responsible minister at the apex of a single college or department. 
Brandenburg-Prussia had no principal head for a specific area of 
administration in this period. A group was responsible for the 
administration of a department that often covered several areas, primarily 
geographical but also of government business. For instance, it was not until 
1728, that Frederick William I established a single body to conduct 
diplomacy and advise him on foreign affairs.^^ There was a slow evolution 
towards single-function departments headed by one official with clearly- 
defined objectives and hierarchies. Therefore, with collegial government, a 
number of individuals were responsible for wide areas of government and 
reported to the King; there was not simply one minister in charge of one 
area of policy with a support staff dedicated to that function of 
administration full-time. With this form of government organisation at the
^^Peter Baumgart, "Zur Griindungsgeschichte des Auswârtigen Amtes in Preufien, 
1713-1728/' Jahrbuchfiir die Geschichte Mittel und Ostdentschlands, vol. 7 ,1958, pp. 229-248.
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very heart of Hohenzollern authority, a sense of collective responsibility 
among the college members quickly became established.^^
As this study will demonstrate, although the collegial style of 
govermnent encouraged a search for consensus among college members 
and a sense of esprit de corps, it also frequently fostered conflict among 
officials throughout the administration. Jurisdictional conflicts among East 
Prussian authorities at both the liigher and lower levels of government 
continued unabated — something which the establishment of the General 
Directory was intended to end. In fact, however, as a result of the General 
Directory, new conflicts arose between BerHn and the Konigsberg Regieiiing, 
the highest authority in the administration of the towns and countryside of 
the Kingdom at Frederick William Ts accession. As this dissertation will 
contend, this suggests that the introduction of the General Directory m East 
Prussia had significantly less impact upon the development of absolutism 
within the Kingdom than some historians have suggested.
The new conflicts added an additional dimension to the traditional 
jurisdictional disputes between civilian and military authorities. New 
questions arose relating to the legality of one authority taking control of a 
particular type of business. Which authority would judge tax offenders? 
What positions were open to non-native East Prussians? Who should 
appoint local officials? There were even jurisdictional disputes about 
jurisdictional disputes. Who, for example, should decide such clashes over 
ultimate authority, Berlin or Konigsberg? With such strong resentments and 
controversies simmering over who should govern and how government 
should function into the 1730s, it is evident that Hohenzollern authority in
^^See for example, Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of 
Prussia, p. 222, fn. 7.
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the Kingdom still was far from securely estabhshed by the final decade of 
Frederick WilHam Ts reign.
The Historiograpliical Tradition
The prevailing view among previous historians has been that the 
establishment of the General Directory in 1723 was the single most essential 
and vital initiative for the development of Hohenzollern absolutism. 
Traditional scholarship viewed the new institution of the General Directory 
as the agent of inevitable bureaucratic modernisation, which, once 
established, swept aside and superseded estabhshed agencies of 
government, in the Kingdom as elsewhere. These scholars contended that 
an inefficient and outmoded framework of territorial government was 
destroyed by Frederick WilHam I, who replaced it with a new modern 
administrative system, of which the centrepiece was the estabHshment of the 
General Directory in early 1723.
The traditional approach to HohenzoUern govermnent, for East 
Prussia as well as for the monarchy's other territories, indirectly owes much 
to the theories of the great sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). It was firmly 
established in studies of eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia prhnarily 
by the writings of liistorians such as Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917) and Otto 
Hintze (1861-1940). Both men were contemporaries of Weber and both were 
strongly influenced by his writings, which contributed to seminal studies of 
Brandenburg-Prussian government. In Weber's unfinished Economy and 
Society, the two chapters concerning "Domination and Legitimacy" and 
"Bureaucracy" constitute his fundamental discussion of administrative 
organisations.^^ It is no coincidence that his discussion of "structure of
Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
translated by Epliraim Fischoff, Hans Gerth, A.M. Henderson, Ferdinand Kolegar, C. 
Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, Guenther Roth, Edward Shils, and Claus
2 0
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dominancy" is of direct relevance and importance for his following chapter 
on bureaucracy.^^ Here, he sets out his criteria for centralisation which, 
when he discusses bureaucratisation, leads him to the notion of routinisation 
of administration and what is considered his "ideal type" of bureaucracy. 
This the historian Rudolf Vierhaus notes as requiring a modern professional 
bureaucracy, permanent appointments, guaranteed salaries, pension rights, 
secure career structures, clearly laid-down responsibilities, and employment 
under public law.^^
This approach was enshrined in the bulky volumes of the Acta 
Borussica. the major printed series for Brandenburg-Prussia's eighteenth- 
century internal h i s t o r y T h e r e  are thirty-four volumes in forty parts to 
the Acta Borussica series that cover the years 1701-1786. The original series 
was published between 1892-1980 and a reprint of the series was published 
in 1986 and 1987. There are sixteen volumes in twenty parts to the primary 
Acta Borussica series on administration that covers, very briefly, the reign of 
Frederick IB/1 and is primarily devoted to the reigns of Frederick William I 
and Frederick the Great. In addition, there are several additional volumes 
which he outside the main administrative series. These include an
Wittich, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 volumes, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968.
^^Ibid., vol. 2, p. 941
^^Eckhart Hellmuth, "Conference Report: The State in the Eighteenth Century 
Britain and Germany in Comparative Perspective. Joint Conference of the German 
Historical Institute London and the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel, held in 
Wolfenbüttel, 2-5 October 1992," Bulletin, London: German Historical Institute, vol. 14:2, 
1992, p. 31.
^^ Acta Borussica. Denkmaler der PreuEischen Staatsverwaltung im 18.
Taluhundert. edited by Gustav Schmoller, Otto Krauske, Victor Loewe, Wilhelm Stolze, Otto 
Hintze, M. Hass, W. Peters, Ernst Posner, Wilhelm Naudé, August Skalweit, Karl Heim'idi 
Kaufhold, F. Frhr. von Schrottor, Peter Baumgart, Stefi Jersch-Wenzel, Hans-Jürgen 
Gerhard, Gerd Heinrich, New General Editors of the Historischen Kommission zu Berlin: 
Wilhelm Treue, Peter Baumgart, Hans-Jürgen Gerhard, Gerd Heinridi, Stefi Jersdi-Wenzel 
and Karl Heinridi Kaufhold, 15 volumes, Berlin: Preufiischen (formerly Koniglichen) 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1892-1980 (Reprint 1986/87).
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Erganzungsband published in 1905 which contain the letters of Frederick 
WiUiam I to the Fursten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau and cover the years 
1704-1740. There are four volumes under the title of Getreidenhandelspolitik 
that were published between 1896 and 1931; three volumes in five parts are 
under the title of Handels-, Zoll- und AkzisepoUtk, and were pubHshed 
between 1911 and 1928; four volumes were pubhshed between 1904 and 
1913 covering Miinzwesen in the eighteenth century; two more volumes 
covering Miinzwesen between 1806 and 1873 were published in 1926; the first 
three volumes of the Acta Borussica project appeared in 1892 and were 
given the title of Die Preufiische Seidenindustrie im IS. Jahrhundert und ihre 
Begriindung dtirch Friedrich den Grofien; a volume on the Wollindustfie 
appeared in 1933.^^ The amount of work for the editors was immense as the 
number of volumes alone suggests. In fact, due to the work load required of 
the historians involved in the Acta Borussica project, there was a 
considerable personal health risk. Otto Hintze, for example, found that by 
the end of his stint in the project, his eyesight was so badly damaged from 
reading so much manuscript material, often in difficult eighteenth-century 
script, that it would never fully recover
The Acta Borussica is fundamentally a collection of printed 
documents and document summaries, although there are also some 
important editorial introductions. The aims of Schmoller, Hintze, and the 
other editors of the series are clear. They wanted to reveal the origins and
For more detailed information see the individual volumes themselves and there 
is quite a good summary of the volumes in Wilhelm Treue and Cosima Moller, Die Acta 
Borussica -  Denkmaler der preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. lalwhundert -  zwisdien 
Hirer Griindung im Tahr 1887 und der Reprint-Ausgabe von 1986/87, Historische 
Kommission zu Berlin, Berlin, Gerhard Baucke, Beiheft Nr. 10,1987, pp. 39-46.
^^Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. Felix Gilbert and Robert 
Berdalil, editors. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 13. Gilbert notes (p. 4) tliat 
Hintze had to give up liis professorship at the University of Berlin due to illness of wliich 
failing eyesight was a part when he was fifty-five years old.
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development of the Brandenburg-Prussian administration, military, justice, 
and economic systems.^^ Not only is this clear through their selection of 
documents and document summaries but also through the essays some of 
the editors included in the series. Hintze, in particular, published a massive 
and authoritative survey of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1740 and how it had 
evolved, especially under Frederick William I.^^ The location of this 
collection of detailed essays — at the conclusion of documents pertaining to 
the reign of Frederick William I — was intended to assess the historical 
importance of that reign and also to act as an introduction for the start of 
documents included in the Acta Borussica for the begmning of Frederick the 
Great's reign.
Schmoller and Hintze, through their work on the Acta Borussica. 
established not merely the study of Brandenburg-Prussian govermnent but 
also how the subject itself is approached. As Kurt Breysig has noted, 
Schmoller located the entire influence of government in the official acts of 
the Hohenzollerns. Schmoller reHed on these edicts exclusively for his 
research, which, upon publication, became the last word of historical 
analysis of Brandenburg-Prussia's domestic history during the eighteenth 
century.^^ Hintze collaborated with Schmoller for the colossal endeavour of 
the Acta Borussica project that began in 1887. Throughout the planning 
stages, Schmoller, Hintze, and the other editors found they were unable to 
fit all the documents they wanted into the volumes, so the decision was
similar comment is presented in the introduction to Wilhelm Treue and 
Cosima Moller, Die Acta Borussica - Denlcmaler der preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. 
Tahrhundert - zwischen ihrer Griindung im Tahr 1887 und der Reprint-Ausgabe von 
1986/87. p. 12.
^%n particular, see, ABB, 5:1, pp. 3-55, 291-326.
^Kurt Breysig, Aus meinen Tagen und Traumen. Memoiren. Aufzeiclmungen, 
Briefe. Gesprache. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1962, p. 33. Cited in Wilhelm Treue, Die Acta 
Borussica -  Denkmaler der preussischen Staatsverwalhmg im 18. Talirhundert -  Zwischen 
Ihrer Griindung im Tahr 1887 und der Reprint-Ausgabe von 1986/87. p. 10.
Introduction — The Historiographical Tradition 24
made to summarise them. Ultimately, many thousands of pages were not 
included at a ll.^  Exactly as the Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte 
des Grossen Kurfürsten and the Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des 
Grossen were intended to trace the development of Hohenzollern foreign 
policy and administration, the Acta Borussica was intended to document the 
development of Brandenburg-Prussian domestic administration and 
internal policy
Schmoller and Hintze focused on the description and analysis of 
central government and its formal institutions. As a result, Brandenburg- 
Prussia is usually viewed as the prime example of a strong early modern 
state which typifies the kind of professional government which reached its 
peak in the Enlightened Absolutism of the later eighteenth century. The 
establishment of the General Directory fits neatly into this interpretation, 
and it has helped to estabhsh this view at the very heart of studies of 
eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia.
Tliis attention to formal structures as an outlet for professional 
govermnent, efficient administration, and good civÜ administrators, in 
general, is evident in most historical scholarship since the late nineteenth 
century. Leopold von Ranke, who also paid considerable attention to the 
formal structures of administration, had earlier established the dominant 
direction for later writings. In the words of G. P. Gooch, Ranke "depicted 
the King [Frederick William 1] as the founder of the efficient Prussian 
administrative machine . "Ranl ce  himself wrote a nine volume 
"introductory survey" of the history and rise of Brandenburg-Prussia which
^Wilhelm Treue, Die Acta Borussica -  Denkmaler der preussischen 
Staatsverwaltung im 18. Tahrhundert. see in particular, p. 13.
^^Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. p. 6.
P. Gooch, History and Historians in tlie Nineteenth Century. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1962, p. 86.
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was published between 1847 and 1848. In fact, Gooch notes that Ranlce was 
the first to use the documents currently held in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in 
Berlin.^^
Schmoller and Hintze were influenced significantly by Ranke. One 
may even consider their work and views of the importance of domestic 
affairs as an adaptation of the contemporary notion of the primacy of 
foreign policy, wliich was established by Ranke and which were abundant 
in the historical writings of the day and saturated by the influence of 
Ranlce.^ ^
The attention to formal structures is exemplified by more recent 
studies, notably the well-known English language survey by Rehihold 
Dorwart, whose study covers the administrative history of Frederick 
William 1 and is very much in the tradition established by Schmoller and 
Hintze.'^® This is so both in his choice of subject and in the perspective he 
brings to the study of Brandenburg-Prussian govermnent. He comments, 
for example, in his preface that he places "constant emphasis on the part 
played by the development of a centralised, absolutist pubhc administration 
in the creation of an organically-united state of Brandenburg-Prussia."^^ 
His monograph was, in reality, a summation of the German literature and 
uncritically incorporated all its perspectives. Dorwart's work remains 
among the most comprehensive examinations of this period of
3%id.
^^For more on this see, for example, Felix GilberFs introduction to The Historical 
Essays of Otto Hintze. especially, pp. 6 ff.
^^Reinliold August Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of 
Prussia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953; reprinted by Greenwood Press, 
Westport, Connecticut, 1971.
'^ I^bid., p. vi.
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Brandenburg-Prussian history in any language and is certainly the best- 
known to an Anglo-American readership.
In another study, Hans Rosenberg has also placed particular 
emphasis upon the formal structures of govermnent and power as they 
relate to the social composition of administrators. He has been less 
impressed, however, by the formal procedures or so-called 
bureaucratisation of the Brandenburg-Prussian administration and 
administrators than Dorwart and more aware of the importance of the 
personal contribution of Brandenburg-Prussia's state servants.^^ 
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy has contributed greatly to the 
debate surrounding the notion of Germany's unique development, or 
Sonderweg. More important for this present study, however, is that 
Rosenberg has, as William Hagen has pointed out, added to the social 
history of Brandenburg-Prussia "in the sense that it focused on the social 
composition of the governing elites of the Kingdom of Prussia as they were 
transformed and realigned through the rise of the absolutist regime."^^ It is 
precisely in this way that Rosenberg differs from the work of Dorwart. In 
this way, Rosenberg has been able to establish that officials continued to 
dominate the administration and operation of Hohenzollern government 
throughout the eighteenth century, rather than being subsumed in a 
bureaucratic Leviathan. Winkler, writing on Rosenberg and his "Prussia 
book," summarised Rosenberg's conclusions the following way: "[t]he 
servants of the king become a group whose power finally is superior to that
^^Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian 
Experience. 1660-1815. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958.
'^^William W. Hagen, "Descent of the Sondemeg. Hans Rosenberg's History of Old- 
Regime Prussia," Central European History, vol. 24:1,1991, pp. 30-31. Hagen also notes (p. 
30, fn. 11) Hans-Ulrich Welder, among others to the place of Rosenberg in the Sondenoeg 
debate. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, editor, Sozialgeschichte Heute: Festschrift fur Hans 
Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag. Gôttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1974.
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of the Idng: the core of a power elite composed of high officials, the officers 
corps, and the landed Junlcers, whose most important poHtical function 
consisted in keeping liberal and democratic tendencies from holding 
sway."^
Rosenberg's view has gained a strong following, especially among 
historical sociologists.^^ William Hagen notes that Rosenberg's attention to 
the estabhshment of what he considered to be bureaucratised state 
structures led by Brandenburg-Prussian Junkers "transcended Weberian 
fears that the modern bureacratized state would block or corrupt the liberal- 
democratic self-government of civil s o c i e t y T h i s  was, in a sense, the 
framework from which Rosenberg worked.
In general, the traditional approach exemplified by the scholars 
mentioned above (except for those who follow Rosenberg) concludes that 
Frederick William I's attempts at reform in East Prussia were a striking 
success. It contends, in other words, that the King won a notable victory 
over the selfish and bhnkered territorial elites that was a natural 
consequence of the struggle between central government pitched against 
provincial authority. The future, this view contends, lay with the power of 
the monarchical state. It argues that, because Frederick William 1 believed 
he needed to estabhsh order and thus required to increase Hohenzollern 
authority in the Kingdom, he in turn reduced the scope of East Prussian 
provincial authority and interests.
^Heinrich August Winkler, "A Pioneer in the Historical Sciences: Hans Rosenberg 
1904-1988," Central European History, vol. 24:1,1991, p. 12.
^^ %ee, for example, Hans-Eberhard Mueller, Bureaucracy. Education, and 
Monopoly: Civil Service Reforms in Prussia and England. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984; Hagen, "Descent of the Sonderweg," p. 31.
46Ibid.
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Those scholars who followed more or less uncritically the 
perspectives of Schmoller and Hintze frequently exaggerate the extent, 
speed, and manner in which the Hohenzollerns estabhshed their authority 
over East Prussia. This is especiaUy so for the reign of Frederick WiUiam 1. 
His authority over the East Prussian elite was never estabhshed lilce a "rock 
of bronze,"^^ as the King himself proudly proclaimed. There was no 
conscious battle of traditional late feudalism versus new absolutism, 
whether in Frederick WiUiam Ts distinctive vision of this or otherwise. In 
general, this is a problem with older and traditional views of absolutism, 
which assumed the effectiveness of royal wishes and believed that these 
could easUy be translated into effective initiatives at the local level.
Ideas about the rapid creation of Hohenzollern authority developed 
too easUy within the traditional view because the strength and complexity of 
Frederick WUUam Ts opponents are not fuUy recognised. In short,
SchmoUer and Hintze show the operation of government using a far too 
narrow and one sided approach and assumed - rather than demonstrated - 
the ability of central administration to overcome provincial resistance and to 
intervene at the local level. This skews the true nature and operation of East 
Prussian government in this period. Officials in Berlin or Konigsberg, and 
even at more local levels, for example in Prussian Lithuania (the 
easternmost districts of the Kingdom), all had a role in the success and 
faUure with winch HohenzoUern authority was estabhshed in East Prussia. 
Until recently, research on the operation of government within Prussia for 
this period usually reinforced Schmoller and Hintze's interpretation of 
central, formal institutions and structures as the characteristics of 
Brandenburg-Prussia as an early modern nation state.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., II-Materien, Nr. 1577, fol. 197. "... ich komme zu 
meinen zweg und stabiliere die suverenitet und fetze die kroime fest wie ein Rocher von 
Bronse und lafie die herren Juncker den windt von Landtdalige...." See also, ABB, 2, p. 352.
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The evidence for this, upon which the traditional view depends, is 
the mass of documents originating from Berlin that expose and confirm the 
centralist perspective, often the same ones incorporated into the Acta 
Borussica. One particular problem with relying solely upon these 
documents is that they do not reflect effectively what was happening at the 
provincial and, even more, local levels: usually because officials in Berlin or 
Konigsberg were ignorant of them. Many of the liistorians who depended 
upon these documents did not stop to question and examine what the 
provincial authorities thought of the reforming initiatives. In other words, 
how did the East Prussians react, and did they resist and even reject BerHn's 
measures? If so, which measures and how typical was the rejection? This 
was the case with events as important as the royal coronation in 1701 and its 
recognition afterward through to the establishment of the General Directory 
in 1723 and beyond into the following decade.
Therefore, a source like the Acta Borussica is reliable and helpful only 
in finding answers to a narrow set of questions particularly about 
government at the centre, whether in Berlin or Konigsberg. Although the 
series is especially helpful in revealing the aims of policy, it is not the only 
place in which to find answers about the nature and operation of 
government in Brandenburg-Prussia, especially the provincial government 
and local administration. Much of the background to the many regulations 
stemming from Frederick William 1 is illuminated when using a wider range 
of manuscript material which can help determine not only how 
administration was intended to operate, but how government actually 
worked in practice. There is evidence to suggest that many of Frederick 
William Ts orders and regulations for East Prussia were ignored as well as 
challenged, resisted, and/ or not fully implemented.
Recent research, to which this study contributes, has demonstrated 
that Frederick William 1 was unable to hammer East Prussia into submission
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simply through the estabhshment of the General Directory or any other 
institutional apparatus, tax, or other method. East Prussian influence in the 
kingdom's own government proved enduring, as did the participation of 
the Kingdom's ehtes in administration — as this thesis will demonstrate.
Fritz Terveen*^^ and, much earlier, August Skalweit^^ published 
important monographic and archive-based studies which concentrate upon 
individual areas within East Prussia at this time. Both examined particular 
events associated with the devastation and rebuilding efforts as a result of a 
plague in 1709/10. Their work, however, does not delve into the pohtical 
disputes on the provincial level as they, too, tend to focus on the role of 
central agencies and individuals. These studies were built upon to some 
extent by Walter Mertineit in his brief but comprehensive summation of 
Skalweit and Terveen.^® Although he made use of manuscript material not 
all of which appears to have been consulted by either Skalweit or Terveen, 
he essentially focused on the person of Frederick William 1 and the Kriegs 
und Domanenlaimmei^ rather than other important and influential forces 
within the Kingdom such as the Regierung, and therefore his study remained 
very traditional in approach. One should remember, however, that 
Mertineit provides a good survey and was intended only as an introduction 
to his study of administration during the reign of Frederick the Great which 
is the primary focus of the book. It is not and does not aim to be a detailed 
study of East Prussia under Frederick William 1.
^^erveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement
^^August Skalweit, Die ostpreussische Domanen verwaltung unter Friedrich 
Wilhelm I und das Rétablissement Litauens. Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1906, in Gustav 
Sdimoller and Max Bering's, Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschtingen, vol. 25:3,1906.
^^Walter Mertineit, Die fiideticianische Verwaltung in Ostpreufiea Heidelberg: 
Quelle & Meyer, 1958, pp. 31-39.
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A few relatively recent studies which focus on East Prussia in the 
eighteenth century have questioned the traditional path Brandenburg- 
Prussian historical writing has taken for this period. Hannelore Juhr has 
recognised Frederick William Ts role in the activities of district officials.^^ 
The King's reforms at the district level, however, not willingly accepted 
or easily implemented. Change of such magnitude necessarily took time, 
especially since the local elite was so entrenched within the agencies of East 
Prussian administration. In a more recent study, James Leonard Roth has 
examined the East Prussian royal domain managers, the Domanenpachter, 
during the eighteenth c e n t u r y R o t h  shows the importance of these less 
formal royal agents who played key roles in the operation of East Prussian 
government. His research begins with Frederick William Ts innovative land 
lease program whereby the King leased the substantial royal domains at 
fixed rents and for fixed periods. Rents were assessed by potential 
productivity as well as yields in an attempt to improve royal income. Roth 
traces the individual and collective role of the East Prussian Domanenpachter 
in the agrarian and economic recovery of East Prussia and the rise of this 
group within the social order of the period.
The impact of the elite and the military was another significant 
component to the operation of government in this period and an important 
dimension of the development of society in the Brandenburg-Prussian 
absolutist state. In this regard, Otto Busch has had a major impact with his 
pathbreaking study of the militarisation of early modern Brandenburg-
^^Hannelore Juiir, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptaintes Brandenburg/Ostpreussen 
von 1713 bis 1751," Berlin: Ernst Reuter Gesellschaft, Ph. D. Dissertation, Berlin: Free 
University, 1967.
^%ames Leonard Roth, "The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the eighteenth 
Century: A Study in Collective Social Mobility," Ph. D. Dissertation, Berkeley: University of 
California, 1979.
Introduction — The Historiographical Tradition 32
Prussia.^^ Wolfgang Neugebauer wrote more recently about the standische 
hatenz, that is, combinations of formal and informal structures of 
govermnent in the East Prussian territory that were relied upon by 
Frederick William I.^^ Neugebauer is among the freshest of recent voices on 
eighteenth-century absolutism as he brings to the forefront the independent 
tradition of East Prussians and the hmits of absolutism in the Kingdom. He 
has contributed significantly through his explorations of the broader, less 
institutional nature of early modern government. Although Neugebauer's 
Pohtischer Wandel is a revision of how absolutism operated in East Prussia, 
he shows this primarily though an examination of the continued domination 
of the affairs of the Kingdom by the Junkers in a way that is reminiscent of 
Otto Hintze,
Due to the status and territorial extent of the Polish state since the 
First World War, historians from within Poland have added unique 
perspectives in an attempt to counterbalance the quite distinct German 
approach.^^ It was directed essentially at showing the Polish character of 
the region: in contrast to its German, asserted by historians of Ostforschiing 
who dominated German research centres and universities dedicated to the 
study of Eastern European history.^^ This was especially true between the
^^Otto Büsdi Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807: Die 
Anfânge der sozialen militarisierung der preufiisch-deutsdien Gesellschaft. Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter & Co., 1962.
^^Wolfgang Neugebauer, Politisdier Wandel im Osten: Qst- und Westpreussen 
von den alten Standen zumKonstitutionalismus. Stuttgart; Franz Steiner, 1992, pp. 65-86.
^^Karin Friedridi, "Fadng Both Ways: New Works on Prussia and Polish-Prussian 
Relations," German Histoiy, 15:2,1997, pp. 256-267. The following discussion of the Polish 
contribution is based upon Friedridi.
^^Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the 
Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. As Friedrich notes, Burleigh 
"analyses the use of history as an ideological weapon by the expanding institutional 
network of Ostforschung, but ignores the Polish side of the story." Karin Friedrich, "Facing 
Both Ways," p. 257, fn. 3.
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years 1933 and 1945, and more generally during the first half of the 
twentieth century. These views which resulted in years of polarisation were 
increasingly moderated, first by the Polish historians, whose "initial anti- 
German tendency of Polish works on the Baltic, combined with a Marxist, 
anti-bourgeois agenda, was increasingly overcome during the progressive 
liberahsation of the Polish historical profession from the 1970s which 
reached its climax after the political changes of 1989."^^
Other recent studies tend not to examine directly the broader role of 
government during this period, giving less emphasis to bureaucratic 
themes. In particular, Richard Gawtbrop^^ and Philip S. Gorsld^^ have 
recently advanced the argument that Pietism, virtually by itself, shaped the 
political culture of Brandenburg-Prussia and led to its formation and rise as 
an early modern nation state. There is no doubt that these studies as well as 
those mentioned earlier, have merit. However, most assert the operation 
and nature of govermnent to be dependent upon a single factor or group, 
above aU the King himself or religious leaders. The research upon which 
work like Gawthrop or Dorwart, for example, is based needs to be examined
^^Friedridi, "New Works on Prussia and Polish-Prussian Relations," p. 258. This 
approach has been adopted by several German liistorians in recent decades. Tliose 
historians who grew-up in this novel situation have produced a new generation of scholars 
who as Friedrich notes, have gone far to "introduce a new spirit into German research on 
the Prussian past...," (p. 259). In her dissertation Karin Friedrich focused on the burghers 
and to some extent, other elite in Polish Prussia, Karin Friedrich, "The Other Prussia." 
Although this dissertation focuses primarily on what would become of the Hohenzollern 
province West Prussia, after 1772, and the period just prior to the reign of Frederick William 
I, it is nonetheless an important study of the traditional elites in the wider Prussian region. 
Most importantly, Friedrich is able to incorporate more than the traditional sources to show 
the traditions and independence of tliis area as well as the importance of Poland and 
distmst of Hie Hohenzollerns through the eyes of the native elite.
^%ichard L. Gawtlirop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
^^Pliilip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and 
State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 99,1993, pp. 265- 
316. Gorski, admittedly, considers Pietism to be one of at least three factors contributing to 
the formation of the early modern state.
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in conjunction with each other and each put into context. These studies all 
contain contributing factors to the emergence and impact of government in 
Brandenburg-Prussia which makes defining one factor, as the sole element 
in Brandenburg-Prussia's development, impossible. This study will build 
upon their thesis by examining crucial manuscript material on the operation 
of government in East Prussia,
The Sources for this Study
The expansion of government under Frederick William I, who 
established several new agencies and reconstituted others and increased the 
number of administrators who relied upon written correspondence and 
reports ensure that the records for this period are especially full. These 
abundant sources, therefore, make tliis dissertation possible. This study is 
not simply a rejection of traditional perspectives and the arguments of past 
works. Rather, it builds upon them and seeks to examine government 
activity in the broadest sense of the term. Here, more than just the orders of 
the king in his cabinet at Potsdam or a Berlin ofhciaFs report stemming from 
a General Directory decision will be utihsed and incorporated. East 
Prussian government had more functions and dimensions than are 
expressed in studies which focus only upon the central administration. 
These will be more closely examined. This dissertation also examines in 
detail areas and topics which were excluded in previous studies, such as the 
significance of the numerous jurisdictional conflicts, general administrative 
confusion, and the extent and effectiveness of change in the context of the 
complex layers of the native provincial East Prussian administration.
The traditional view, moreover, was also the product of a restricted 
range of unpublished sources. Much of the manuscript evidence was not 
readily accessible, especially to Western researchers, between the 1930s and 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent unification of the two 
Germanies. As a result of recent political changes, historians can now re­
examine, in a fairly complete manner, all the relevant evidence.
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Between 1945 and 1993, the great part of the primary manuscript 
sources was located in two German state archives, one in the former East 
German town of Merseburg, the Zentrales Staatsarchiv, and the other in 
Berlin-Dahlem, the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preufiischer Kiilturbesitz after being 
moved there from Gottingen in the 1980s. Soon after the Berhn Wall fell in 
November, 1989, the documents located in Merseburg were again easily 
accessible to scholars from the West after a long period when access had 
been difficult. More important, however, was the re unification of the 
archives in 1993, restoring the situation wliich had prevailed until the end of 
World War II. This means that a scholar can now examine fairly complete 
series of documents in one place. It permits the researcher to examine not 
only what was happening on the local and provincial level but 
simultaneously developments in the central administration. Prior to 1993, 
the two sets of sources were separate and, as mentioned, the Merseburg 
material only became fully available to scholars from the West after 1989. 
The often unexpected history of the various archives within the two 
Germanies has been the subject of its own study, most notably by Kurt 
Forstreuter.^® In light of the recent events and ForstreutePs interesting and 
helpful work, his book on the history of the archives is worth updating.
Central to this study have been eight collections. Except for only a 
few items, there are a series of Findbiicher which index these collections. 
Most of the Findbiicher are hand-written although some are typed.^^ The 
collections include the records of the Etatsministerium which contain much
^^Kurt Fors^euter, Das Preufiische Staatsarchiv in Konigsberg: Bin gesdiiditlidier 
Rückblick mit einer Übersidit über seine Bestâiide. VeroffentUchungen Der Niâersachstschen 
Archivverwaltung, Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1955.
^^Like James Roth, I believe the indexes that pertain to East Prussia date from 
before World War II and thus were prepared in Konigsberg at the former state ardiives in 
that capital. See Roth, 'The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the eighteenth Century," p. 
16.
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of the day-to-day correspondence of the Konigsberg Regiertmg, which, as 
mentioned earHer, was the liighest authority in East Prussia at the accession 
of Frederick William I. The 142 subject headings that make-up this collection 
range from general topics to documents covering a particular geographical 
district within East Prussia. There are for example, orders from Berlin, 
copies of orders, reports of a variety of topics, and correspondence between 
various authorities. These are particularly important as they provide a 
sense of what was occurring between various provisional eUtes in regard to 
certain matters. These also help fill-in the East Prussian perspective on 
several of the reforms undertaken by the Idng from Berlin.
Of no less importance are the so-called Ostpreufiische Folianten which 
shed light on local administrative matters handled by the Regimmg. In 
particular, this collection was helpful in exploring what, where and when 
correspondence was sent as well as to whom. There are also records 
indicating every document and piece of correspondence that was received 
by the Regimmg organised by date. This was helpful in not only 
determining whether or not the Regierung received a document that, for 
example, may also be found in another series or the records of the 
Etatsniinisteriunijr but it is also helpful in determining other records for which 
an original does not exist anymore.
The remaining collections focus primarily on central administration. 
Repositories 3 ,4 ,5 , and 8 were helpful in this regard although they are 
relatively small in comparison to other collections. They are also the 
collections that were available to the West and have been well researched. A 
vast collection of documents focusing on central administration are found in 
the manuscript material of the General Directory and Repository 7. These 
are the major contribution of records that were for long unavailable to 
liistorians outside the former Eastern bloc. Both contain significant material 
about the workings of central administration and in particular, the less
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recognised material surrounding the operation of the General Directoiy in 
this period.
CHAPTER 1
The Kingdom of East Prussia: Geography. Economy and Society
A Kingdom within a Composite State
The extraordinary geographical diffusion of the dynasty's territories 
was an important restriction upon HohenzoUern state building in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the close of the seventeenth 
century, Brandenburg-Prussia was a conglomeration of distinct and 
physically separate territories that stretched from the Rhine River in the 
West of Germany to the Memel River far to the East. Some impression of the 
distances involved is conveyed by the fact that Konigsberg, the leading city 
of East Prussia, is today Kaliningrad wliich hes close to the Baltic Sea in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union. What made this situation particularly 
complex and potentially troublesome for the HohenzoUern rulers was that 
each block of territory had its own system of government, representative 
institutions, poUtical traditions, legal system, dialects and even languages, 
and existing and long-established authorities. These states within a state 
successfully opposed almost all attempts until the eighteenth century by the 
HohenzoUern ruler to impose his wiU on their territory and especially 
anything approaching a unified administration wliich covered aU the 
dynasty's possessions and made them a single poUtical body overseen by 
the HohenzoUern ruler. ^
8ee  below, Chapters Two and Three, for a much fuller discussion of this point.
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When Frederick William I ascended the throne in 1713, he set into 
motion a fresh series of reforms that were designed to establish 
HohenzoUern authority and to bind his widely-scattered territories 
together. The problems which this disunity posed the HohenzoUern rulers, 
and Frederick WUUam I in particular, in implementing effective reforms 
were not unique to Brandenburg-Prussia. The Hohenzollerns ruled over a 
"composite state" of the kind that was normal in early modern Europe.^ In 
fact, throughout Europe most states were composite states in the early 
modern era.^ Composite states were primarily monarcliies comprised of 
separate territories which were not necessarily geographically continuous 
like those of England and Wales, Piedmont and Savoy, or Poland and 
Lithuania. Another state's territory or a sea often fragmented countries Uke 
those autonomous areas of the Habsburg monarchy in Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands, those of the HohenzoUern monarchy of Brandenburg-Prussia 
or, indeed, England and Ireland.^ What is so important to remember in 
light of the example Koenigsberger gives, are the unusuaUy vast distances 
between the various blocks of territory that comprised Brandenburg- 
Prussian state.
East Prussia was graduaUy elevated in status after the sixteenth 
century and eventually added the title of kingdom to the HohenzoUerns' 
multitude of titles in 1701. The recognition of East Prussia as a kingdom 
was a considerable achievement and largely due to the political astuteness 
of Frederick III /1 and his advisors. The title of king brought [Frederick III /1
^See for example, J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monardiies," Past and 
Present, no. 137,1992, pp. 48-71 and H. G. Koenigsberger, **Dominium Regale or Dominium 
Politicum et Regale: Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modem Europe," in Politicians 
and Virtuosi. H.G. Koenigsberger, editor, London: Hambledon Press, 1986, pp. 1-25.
^H. G. Koenigsberger, "Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale," p. 12.
% id.
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and the subsequent] HohenzoUern rulers significantly more prestige 
amongst the other states of Europe. The reign of Frederick III/1 has largely 
been ignored by historians, being regarded as insignificant in the growth of 
Brandenburg-Prussia as compared to the reigns of the Great Elector, 
Frederick WUUam I, and Frederick the Great. The founding of a royal title in 
East Prussia by Frederick III/I and the way it was Unked to the 
HohenzoUern state wUl be examined more fully in Chapter Three. Briefly, 
however, it was a variation of a union described as aeqtie principaliter 
whereby the territory maintained its distinctive laws, privUeges, and was 
"treated as a distinct entity."^
As we shaU see in the foUowing chapter, this was the strategy 
pursued by the Great Elector after he gained complete sovereignty over East 
Prussia in 1660. After years of negotiations, an agreement was reached 
between the native elite in East Prussia and the Elector and Duke, Frederick 
WiUiam in 1663. In this period of East Prussian history we can further 
define the nature of the composite state by using the three periods in the 
formation of the German territorial state identified by Gerhard Oestreich.^ 
These, he asserts, are, firstly, the primitive or early form of du^Ust rule in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Here, there were essentially two 
levels of authority, one at the local level and the prince alone as ruler. 
Secondly, there was the first stage of the early modern state, which he caUs 
the "finance state" of the sixteenth century. This is the stage in which we 
find East Prussia in the early-eighteenth century, and wiU examine this more
J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monardiies," pp. 52-53. Elliott quotes here 
Juan de Solorzano y Pereira who wrote about the idea of aeqtie principaliter in the 
seventeenth centuiy. For sources on Juan de Solôrzano y Pereira noted in Elliotf s article, 
see p. 53, fn. 14.
^Gerhard Oestreich, Geist und Gestalt des frülimodernen Staates, pp. 277-289. See 
also, Oestreidi, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State pp. 187-198. Tlie following 
discussion is based on this work and quotations are cited from the English edition 
translated by David McLintock.
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closely in a moment. Thirdly, there was a later development of the "finance 
state" which was primarily to be found during the seventeenth century. 
Oestreich notes that this third stage which incorporates certain military, 
economic, and administrative developments, was never reached in several 
small German territories. It appears that East Prussia in the eighteenth 
century gradually resembles but does not fit completely into Oestreich's 
third type. Nevertheless, as we wiU see, there are elements that are 
consistent with its development into a "finance state."
In Oestreich's second stage of early modern state development, there 
is a connection between the word "state" and financial administration. In 
Brandenburg, the term "cameral state" emerged. The negotiations with the 
territorial estates who in East Prussia voted the duke money were 
increasingly important. This essentially amounted to the ruler seeking to 
get the Estates to levy taxes upon their inferiors. Should a tax become 
introduced or extended it was never to place the provincial ruling elite or 
other Junkers under any financial obligation. Rather, the burden fell upon 
the peasants in almost every case. The local administration in the Duchy 
(and later Kingdom after 1701) was controlled by the native Prussian 
authorities, who were responsible for collecting the taxes voted by the 
Estates. There was no princely or other central authority in East Prussia to 
ensure the financial obligations were met after the HohenzoUern ruler 
secured their assent. Otto Hintze considered this a form of "state" 
administration. The collection of taxes was exacted by "organs not directly 
responsible to or exclusively dependent upon state authority."^ In other 
words, there was an informal institution that carried out much of the day-to- 
day operation of financial administration at the local level. Moreover, such
^As quoted by Oestreidi, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, p. 192. 
Oestreich does not provide the precise citation from Hintze's writings.
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administrators were not under the authority of the central administration of 
the HohenzoUern ruler but rather, the native corporate structures of the 
province. The provincial elite were ultimately in control of finances, being 
responsible not only for tax collection but also, for transferring the revenues 
to the HohenzoUern duke. This system of administrative authority existed 
in East Prussia untU the early eighteenth century.
Furthermore, financial administration and authority was not aU that 
the East Prussian Estates controUed. They also were responsible for affairs 
of justice. East Prussia for example, had its own code of laws and legal 
system. The highest court of appeals in the territory was in the hands of the 
established elites. There was, for example, no way to appeal a legal decision 
outside East Prussia or to even the courts of the Holy Roman Empire as was 
possible in other HohenzoUern territories. The policies for education and 
reUgion were also controUed by the East Prussian institutions. These are 
further examples of areas of policy which Oestreich finds characteristic of 
the second stage of state development. At the tune of Frederick WiUiam Ts 
accession in 1713, East Prussians exercised a considerable extent of self- 
government. This situation was repHcated in varying degrees in the other 
HohenzoUern territories, as throughout Europe.
Oestreich notes that in the sixteenth centuiy this level of autonomy 
was in decline across much of Europe. It survived, however, for more than 
a century in East Prussia. The reasons for tliis provide another theme in this 
study. As we shall see, in the early eighteenth century, the Junkers of East 
Prussia retained their own local administration and legal structures, which 
they stiU dominated. The endurance of the Kingdom's native elite in a 
period when other, more central, authorities were beginning to emerge. 
Therefore, one of the patterns we wUl encounter is that of paraUel 
institutions. That is, the authority and institutions of King Frederick 
WiUiam I existed side-by-side with the rule of the East Prussian native
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authorities. At times their aims could be identified, but most often they 
were not. This study will investigate the degree to which informal, non- 
institutional methods were used in military administration during in the 
eighteenth century.^
Subsequent chapters wül explore how the manner in wliich the 
Kingdom was ruled came to be challenged by the King: something that 
marked a fundamental change in the direction and attitude of Berhn toward 
the Kingdom. Prior to this change in status in 1701, East Prussia was an 
important source of dynastic prestige and to a lesser degree resources. 
Thereafter, its importance was greatly enhanced because of the royal title 
and became the basis of Brandenburg-Prussian prestige and power, 
especially for Frederick WilHam I: this is key to this study as the second 
King tried to increase control over the Kingdom. The new status meant that 
the territory gave increased prestige and significance in both domestic and 
foreign affairs. For the King, no longer could he accept such an 
independently-governed territory that Hterally was the holder of his crown. 
The Hohenzollerns would not be considered kings with a semi-independent 
kingdom but rather, there would exist a kingdom ruled by their king. This 
would have significant consequences for the HohenzoUern influence in that 
part of Europe especially with Poland, Sweden, and other Baltic states.^ 
Moreover, for much of the first half of the eighteenth century. East Prussia
^Gerhard Oestreich, Geist und Gestalt des fmhi'tmodernen Staates. p. 286. 
Oestreich notes, however, the following: "Aber eine gleichwertige eigene stuandisdie 
Verwaltung fur das Militar wie fiiiher fur das altere Sdiuldenwesen entstand nirgends." I 
believe Oestreich is correct in stating that a provincial administration le d by the Estates 
never emerged for larger issues of the military. It should be noted that this is part of his 
third and final type of state development. However, this issue will be examined further in 
Chapter Seven.
%ir Ridiard Lodge, Great Britain & Prussia in the Eighteenth Century: Being the 
Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford. Lent Term. 1922. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1923, pp. 6-28.
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was in poor condition and Frederick WilUam I strove to remedy this 
situation for religious, economic and political reasons.
Overcoming the physical separation was a crucial factor in the 
emergence as a great power of Brandenburg-Prussia, which remained a 
composite state throughout much of the eighteenth century. This more than 
anything else, is what makes its development so unique in early modern 
Europe. The HohenzoUern name and the ruling dynasty were aU that linked 
the territories together, even as late as 1713. It is remarkable that this 
dynastic link not only survived as long as it did but actually developed by 
the mid-eighteenth century into an assortment of territories ruled over by a 
more or less centralised administration based in Brandenburg's capital, 
Berlin, wliich emerged as the nucleus of HohenzoUern authority.
A message sent from Berlin to Konigsberg, for example, normally 
took about seven days. Should a reply have been necessary, then this was at 
least another week to be received. This limited Berlin's inabiUty to react 
quickly and thus restricted the degree of control which the HohenzoUern 
ruler could exert. It also strengthened the independence in administrative 
matters of the estabUshed authorities within East Prussia by maintaining the 
relative isolation.^®
One of the factors mentioned earlier was the various language 
barriers that existed in East Prussia. It would seem that the peasant 
population primarily spoke either PoUsh or Lithuanian as their mother 
tongue. German was a second language, Imown by few peasants. AU 
official business, however, was conducted in German. The East Prussian 
Junkers appear to have spoken German although they certainly must have 
loiown some PoUsh and Lithuanian like the peasant population. AU of this
^%ee, for example. Chapter 4.
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is exactly as would be expected with the Slavic origins of the peasant 
population and then the imposition of Teutonic ruhng caste in the region. 
The Kingdom quickly rose in prominence within Brandenburg- 
Prussia after 1701. East Prussia was separated from the core HohenzoUern 
territory of Brandenburg by several hundred miles of PoUsh territory. The 
new Kingdom was approximately 3145 square miles in size and this was 
only some 117 square mUes smaller than electoral Brandenburg and the 
Mark which made up the entire territory of Brandenburg.^^ By the end of 
Frederick lU/Ts reign in 1713, after the devastating plague of 1709-10, the 
East Prussian population of approxhnateiy 440,000 slightly out-numbered 
that of Brandenburg.^^ In the late seventeenth century the population had 
been approxhnateiy 400,000 or about thirty people per square mile.l^ The 
growth of the territory was significantly hampered given the devastating 
impact of plague in 1709/10. As this was a significant event in the history of 
this period for East Prussia, this wUl be the subject of further detailed study 
in a subsequent chapter, as well as providing an important theme 
throughout this entire study.
^^Sdimoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 47. 
Schmoller states that East Prussia was approximately 672 Prussian square miles which was 
approximately 25 Pmssian square miles smaller than the electorate Brandenburg and the 
Mark. F. L. Carsten.The Origins of Prussia, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 
1954, p. 202. East Prussia had approximately 600 people per Prussian square mile. Tliere 
were approximately 2,700 homes. Franz Engel, compiler, Tabellen alter Münzen. MaEe und 
Gewielite zum Gebrauch fur Archivbenutzer^ Schaumburger Studien, Im Auftrage der 
Historischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Schaumburg, Rinteln: Verlag C. Bosendalil, Heft 9, 
1965. Engel states that one Prussian mile equals 7532 meters (4.6801 miles).
^^Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 202.
f Population figure (400,000) from Sclimoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter 
Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 66. Also in, Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 202; Square mile 
ratio (600) from Gustav Sdimoller, Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-. 
Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgesichte besonders des preussischen Staates im 17. und 18. 
Tahrhundert. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1898, pp. 570.
Land and Agriculture
By the early eighteenth century. East Prussia, was a relatively poor, 
overwhehnmgly agrarian region which exported grain and grain-based 
products through its principal port, Konigsberg, and to a much lesser extent, 
Memel in the far north, still the only sizeable ports and towns. The nature of 
agrarian production in the Kingdom determined its prosperity and also its 
social structures.
Land management was one key element in the East Prussian 
economy, based as it was upon agriculture. The quality of the soil was both 
critical and a significant limitation. Parts of East Prussia had marginally 
better quaUty soil than Brandenburg, though whether this was true of the 
inland regions of the Kingdom is problematical. It is important to 
remember, however, that most of East Prussia lay north of the 54th paraUel 
and thus farther north than any other portion of the HohenzoUern lands 
except for some parts of Pomerania and the Mark Brandenburg.^^ This 
meant that the growing season in East Prussia was far shorter.
AdditionaUy, the soil was clay based and when planting took place in the 
spring, "it could change in a very short period of time from an impassable 
mire to a brickhard surface impervious to the plough."^^ James Roth, in his 
dissertation, has shown through the use of archival material from later in 
the eighteenth century, that although rainfall was often good in the
^^Roth, "The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the Eighteenth Century," p. 36. 
Roth, however, does not account for Pomerania although it clearly was farther north.
^^Ibid., p. 36.
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Northeast of the Kingdom, there was inadequate irrigation. It appears as 
though adequate systems to irrigate the land were not developed until later. 
Most other areas of East Prussia had more mixed soÜ and land conditions. 
The Masurian lake district, in the South-East of the province, was 
dominated by swamps, while in other regions the soil contained a high 
concentration of sand.^^ East Prussia was in need of an infrastructme 
program if these conditions for agricultural production were to be 
improved. The Hohenzollerns were the only ones who could reasonably 
finance such a program but this was never given consistently high enough 
priority to re-direct capital and efforts in this direction.
In general, both farming and commerce remained distinctly primitive 
in the first half of the eighteenth century. It was probable, for example, that 
fruit was scarce except in areas open to trade routes. Fruits and vegetables 
were not grown in East Prussia and there were in most areas no windmills 
or watermills and this meant that a staple Hke corn was still being ground 
by hand using stones.^^
The northern regions of the Kingdom were able to take advantage of 
a transportation infrastructure that had developed in  the seventeenth 
century along with Konigsberg's Baltic trade, but only if the weather was
l% id„  pp. 36-37.
% id .,p .3 7 .
^%dimoller, "Die Veiwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I/' pp. 48-49. 
Sdimoller's assertion about the absence of fruits and vegetables, however, does not appear 
probable as it once did. For example, Karin Friedrich has recently quoted Hieronymus 
Roth, a seventeenth-century native East Prussian opposed to HohenzoUern influences, who 
retorted in 1660 that Poland was willing to give the East Prussians to the Hohenzollerns 
witliout much thought as if tliey were "like apples and pears." Although one may not be 
able to adequately argue from Hieronymus Roth's statement that fruits were not held to be 
as scarce as Sdimoller suggests they would have been, one can at least argue that they were 
not completely absent from East Prussian commerce and life. See Karin Friedrich, "The 
OÜier Prussia," vol. 2, p. 461. Sdimoller, however, probably underestimated the number of 
windmills and watermills as well as the ability of the East Prussians to grow vegetables. 
Nonetheless, it was likely that improvements were needed.
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good and the crops were not ruined by the severe Baltic storms.^^ Even 
with this possibility, bringing goods to market was extremely difficult and 
at times, impossible. The backwardness of transportation routes and the 
lack of adequate communications continued to be apparent in the eighteenth 
century. The importance of this consideration will be apparent throughout 
this study. As we shall see in subsequent chapters communication between 
various authorities was slow.
During the reign of Frederick William I considerable efforts were 
made to remedy this situation. Two improvements in particular brought 
about some improvement in the infrastructure, although this remained 
rather backward. First, the primary rivers that flowed into the Baltic Sea, 
namely the Pregel andV*^,to k  were made more navigable by dredging and 
widening and, secondly, locks were built at appropriate locations.^^ 
Furthermore, a system of rafts to help move materials down rivers were 
used. The situation was improved but at a tremendous cost for the King. 
Another area, however, that continued to need improvement in the early 
eighteenth century was timber and timber trade. Frederick William I 
increased the exploitation of the royal forests but this was not enough, Hkely 
in part, due to the continued lack of adequate infrastructure. In addition, 
the King took initiatives to improve the paths which were the primary land 
transportation routes. According to Schmoller, the King issued an edict on 
30 August 1720 providing for the maintenance of such paths which was 
arguably just as important as the initial clearing and building of such 
routes.^^ This went far in allowing East Prussians to develop postal routes
^^Roth, 'The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the Eighteenth Century," p. 36.
^%or a brief account, see Schmoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich 
Wilhelm I," p. 63.
21Ibid.
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with regular deliveries as well as improved trade routes. For the King, he 
now had the ability to intervene more directly in people's daily lives 
although this remained limited. The Kriegs und Dotnanenlmmmer, the only 
royal institution in the Kingdom with any tangible authority at his accession 
was now better able to ensure tax collection was received from more people. 
In addition, butter and livestock deliveries were able to be made for export 
to Brandenburg, for instance. Flax was once again being produced and at a 
level that was marketable. These improvements to the infrastructure, 
however, were not enough. New centres of trade with more production w&re. 
critical to the long-term survivability of the inland areas of the province, for 
example, many areas outside of Konigsberg. One . step the King took was 
to promote villages that had commercial growth potential. Discussions 
began in Berlin among the King's top advisors in 1722 about what should be 
done to improve this situation. Several East Prussian villages were 
promoted to new status in 1722, namely, Tapiau, Ragnit, Biala, and 
Stallupohnen. Others would be added to this list in the following years: 
PillkaUen in 1724, and Gumbinnen and Schirwindt in 1725. The theory was 
that if smaller trade zones were created they would promote local and even 
regional trade in crafts, agriculture, and other forms of commerce with the 
area surrounding the larger village or town. This, however, failed and often 
the area surrounding the town which was promoted was unable to be 
sustained.^^ Furthermore, the administration of the Kriegs und 
Donianenlmnmei' was re-organised, as w? 11 see in subsequent chapters, into 
two departments. One continued to be run from Konigsberg and the other, 
was based in Gumbinnen and catered to the eastern districts which were
^^Midiael North, "Masto, domena i okolice w  Prusadi Ksigzçcydi (Na przykladzie 
miasta i domeny Ostrôda w XVI i XVII w.)," Zaptski Histoiyczne, vol. 52:1,1987, pp. 69-78. 
This is based upon figures dted within the artlde as well as the German language summaiy 
provided following the artide.
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still unable to recover from the devastating plague that began in 1709. In 
support of these last reforms, hundreds of homes were built, trades and 
professions were supported, new citizens were invited, most notably the 
Salzburg Protestants in 1732. All of this was part of what is known as the re­
building of East Prussia, the so-called Rétablissement Although the entire 
reform effort cannot be considered a failure, it was not a success. The lack of 
an adequate infrastructure meant that neither agriculture or industry could 
thrive.
With the decline of East Prussia's economic condition yet 
maintenance of its remarkably strong social structures, the Hohenzollerns 
attempted to alter these conditions and the social status quo. The reform 
attempts begun primarily after 1640 formed the basis for the eighteenth- 
century Polizeistaat and will be examined next during the reign of Frederick 
William Ts grandfather, Frederick William, the Great Elector.
Landownership and the Domain Lands
After its spectacular sixteenth-century prosperity. East Prussia 
gradually went into economic decMne, primarily with respect to its grain 
trade during the reign of the Great Elector. A majority of the land in the 
Kingdom was royal domain. That is to say, it was directly owned and 
controlled by the Hohenzollerns themselves, who either farmed it directly or 
leased it out. In the early eighteenth century, over half of the entire area of 
East Prussia was royal domain.^^ The very large amounts of land controlled 
by the Hohenzollerns was the most important difference between this 
territory and the other parts of Brandenburg-Prussia.^^ Revenue from the 
domain was critical to HohenzoUern income and, unlike many other 
European rulers, the ruling family was actually able to enlarge their royal 
domains during this period. As we shaU see, this was achieved largely 
through measures undertaken by Frederick WiUiam I that brought back 
under HohenzoUern control the many farmsteads that had been annexed 
over the years by local Junkers. Although most early modern European 
rulers had significant lands of their own, which they farmed or leased out, 
the Hohenzollerns had an exceptional amount of domain lands. These 
estates were scattered throughout their territories, but were especially 
numerous and significant in the Kingdom.
^%oth, 'The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the Eighteenth Century/' p. 19. 
Schmoller, however, states that domain lands constituted roughly one-tliird of the total East 
Prussian territory, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 44. Tliis is 
a different figure than used by Roth who notes the percentage was as high as one-half. See 
below. In addition, see Hartmut Harnisch and Gerhard Heitz, editors, Deutsche 
Agrargeschichte des Spatfeudalismus, Berlin: Al^ademie-Verlag, 1986.
"^^ Roth, 'The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter in the Eighteenth Century," p. 19.
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The East Prussian domain farm is one example where this decline 
was felt most strongly. "Ducal management of the dom ain/' as Roth points 
out, "was haphazard and inconsistent."^^ The region's productivity varied 
dramatically throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and has 
been attributed in large part to ineffective and inadequate administration on 
the part of the HohenzoUerns at the local level to oversee the royal domain 
farms. In short, the domain lands were underutUised and ineffectively 
managed.^^ This was one of the few areas over which the HohenzoUerns 
had administrative control on the local level in East Prussia. Added 
taxation, for example, was also seen during periods of war in towns and on 
farms which made life for East Prussian peasants particularly difficult.^^ 
Plague, famine, war, and the bUleting of troops severely hampered local 
lives as well. By 1684, one in ten East Prussian land holdings were 
abandoned and Konigsberg, although exempt from many of the taxes levied 
by the Great Elector, saw port toUs and duties consistently raised to the 
point where port activity moved away from Konigsberg and westward to 
Danzig and Riga.28 In 1630, for example, some 400 ships saUed westwards 
from Konigsberg but twenty years later, the number of ships saUing out 
from the port had faUen by half to around 200.29
2% id., p. 20.
^^Frands Carsten, Geschidite der preufiisdien Tunker. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1988, pp. 37-39
28por a general discussion of the rise of East Prussia's ports in the sixteenth century, 
see Stanislaw Gierszewski, "Port w Krolewcu - z dziejôw jego zaplecza w XVI-XVH wieku," 
Komunikaty Mazursko-Warminskie, vol. 199:1,1993, pp. 53-60 and Zenon Guidon and Jacek 
Wijaczka, "Zwi^zki handlowe ziem litewskich i bialoruskich z Krolewcem w swietle 
rejestrow celnydi komory grodziehsidej z lat 1600-1605," Komunikaty Mazursko-Wamtinfkie, 
vol. 199:1,1993, pp. 21-31. This is based upon the English language summaries provided in 
Acta Poloniae Historica, vol. 70,1994, pp. 201 and 202. See also, Carsten, The Origins of 
Prussia, p. 226.
29lbid.
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Konigsberg, and to a lesser extent, Memel were East Prussia's two 
towns of any size and importance. But East Prussia, hke the Brandenburg 
heartland of the HohenzoUern monarchy, was overwhelmingly rural and 
agrarian. Broadly speaking, there were three types of land ownership in 
East Prussia. The west of the province was primarily in the direct control of 
the landed nobUity, known as the Junkers (though this designation would 
finally become established only during the nineteenth century). Sprinlded 
throughout the Kingdom were a number of independent and economicaUy 
prosperous free peasants or Colmer, the descendants of earlier colonists, who 
owned their own land or held it on favourable leases; tliis group held estates 
amounting to approximately 15 per cent of the Kingdom.^® The royal 
domain lands described a moment ago constituted a majority of the 
agricultural land in East Prussia and was directly owned and controUed by 
the HohenzoUerns.
During the eighteenth century, the domains were vigorously 
defended by the HohenzoUerns, against predatory noblemen and burgers, 
underlining their importance. On 13 August 1713, shortly after his 
accession, Frederick WiUiam I issued his famous declaration concerning the 
inaUenability and indivisibUity of royal lands. This was essentiaUy a 
declaration of intent, unifying on paper all the HohenzoUern territories. The 
achievement of real consolidation and unification would have to wait for 
further reforms and another HohenzoUern ruler.
Throughout much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it 
appears clear that East Prussian estates had been alienated to the point 
where the Great Elector calculated, in 1656, that the loss in revenue from 
these leased domains was at 1.6 million talers.^^ Roth used the term
% id .,p .  161.
^^Hans-Helmut Wachter, "Ostpreufiische Domânenvorwerke im 16. und 17. 
Jahrhundert." Jahrhuch der Albertus-Universitat Konigsberg Suppliment 19,1958, pp. 169 and
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"pawned", wliich seems unlikely in its literal sense. More probably these 
lands were leased out on extremely advantageous terms to Junker creditors. 
Nonetheless, one historian has noted that poor lending practices amounted 
to roughly one-hah of the duke Albrecht's debts in the mid-sixteenth 
century.^2 Any record of the transaction was often destroyed or otherwise 
lost. Generations of informal leases that changed hands over the course of 
time combined with poor record keeping and communication on the part of 
the individuals involved or authorities in charge of record maintenance 
contributed to the loss of a large number of domains which had been 
originally under direct supervision of the Hohenzollerns. The land then 
came into the possession of the Junker. Nevertheless, this is generally 
viewed by historians as an example of how the Hohenzollerns were willing 
to risk long-term financial stability and gain for immediate and short-term 
gain that came with immediate cash but little else. The Great Elector was 
the first to attempt to reverse this situation during the second half of his 
reign. It was, however, Frederick William I who made the greatest change 
and took a consistent approach which emphasised more the long-term 
productivity of the royal domains as a source of income to the crown.^^
In addition, in the Kingdom of East Prussia, Frederick William I 
sought to reclaim the many acres of land that had slipped into private hands 
over the years. At the same time, the King implemented measures to 
maximise revenue from the domains, as Roth demonstrates, by introducing 
more effective farming techniques and structured domain estate leases. Not
176. Cited in Roth, 'The East Prussian Domaenenpaediter in the Eighteenth Century," p. 
31, fns. 38 and 39. This actually was down from earlier in the century when losses were 
calculated to be as liigh as 2 million talers.
^^Igor K^kolewski, "Naduzycia i korupcja w administracji Prus Ksicjz^ch w  
pdowie XVI wieku." Komunikaty Mazursko-Wawti/skte, vol. 1,1993, pp. 11-20. Tliis is based 
upon the English language summary provided in Acta Poloniae Historica, vol. 70,1994, p. 
203.
^^his is the focus of Roth's dissertation.
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only were improvements made to farming techniques and equipment used 
but the King also instituted measures to lease domain estates only to 
qualified estate managers or so-called Ge«eml-Domanenpachter.^^
^^See Chapter 5, pp. 207-13.
Gutsherrschaft and Peasant Society
In the overwhelmingly agrarian Kingdom of East Prussia, the 
dominant social and agricultural system was that of Gutsherrschaft. This was 
"a system of market-orientated demesne farming based on serf labour."^ 
Gutsherrschaft was the social structure of Junker authority on the domain 
and other estates in East Prussia from the sixteenth century onwards. It 
provided the paternalistic framework on Junker estates and ducal lands 
where 80 per cent of the peasants hved.^^ This had the effect of giving the 
estates considerable autonomy within the larger East Prussian state — yet 
not to the extreme that many historians have suggested. On their estates, 
the Junkers had authority over land, legal institutions and authorities, and
^Edgar Melton, "The Prussian Junlcers, 1600-1786," in H. M. Scott, editor, Tlie 
European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries vol. 2, Northern. Central 
and Eastern Europe. London; Longman, 1995, p. 76. Tliis section is primarily based upon 
Melton's work, James Roth's dissertation cited earlier, and the following: Edgar Mellon, 
"Gutsherrschaft, in East Elbian Germany and Livonia, 1500-1800: A Critique of the Model." 
Central European History, vol. 21:4,1988, pp. 315-349; Wilhelm Guddat, "Die Entstehung und 
Entwicklung der Privaten Grundherrschaften in den Amtern Brandenburg und Balga 
(Ostpreussen)," Wissensdiaftliche Beitrage zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost- 
Mitteleuropas. Im auftrage des Tohann Gottfried Herder-Instituts. Hans-Jiirgen Karp, editor. 
Vol. 96, Marburg/Lalin: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1975; William W Hagen. "Seventeenth- 
Century Crisis in Brandenburg: Tlie Thirty Years' War, the Destabilization of Serfdom, and 
the Rise of Absolutism." Anterican Historical Review, vol. 94:2,1989, pp. 302-335; Harnisch 
and Heitz, Deutsdie Agrargescliichte des Spatfeudalismus: Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning. 
"Bauernwirtschaft und bauemeindommen in Ostpreussen im 18. Jalirhundert." Jahrbtich der 
Albertus-Universitat Konigsberg, Beihefte XXX, 1969; Arthur Kern, "Beitrage zur 
Agrargeschichte Ostpreufiens." Forschungen zur Brandenbtirgischen und Preufiischen 
Geschichte, vol. 14,1901, pp. 151-258; H. Plelm, "Zur Geschichte der Agrarverfassung von 
Ost- und West-preussen," Forschungen zur Brandenhurgischen und Preufiischen Geschichte, 
vois. 17/18,1904/1905 and; Hans-Helmut Wachter, "Ostpreufiisdie Domanenvorwerke im 
16. und 17. Jahrhundert," Jahrhuch der Albertus-Universitat Konigsberg, Supplement 19,1958,
pp. 1-186.
^^Melton, "Gutsherrschaft in East Elbian Germany and Livonia, 1500-1800," p. 341.
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general "police" functions (of the wider sense of the word) and "constituted 
a 'private law state' vis-à-vis the dynastic 'public law state/" 37
In general, the East Prussian nobility was a stratified nobility: at its 
apex stood a relatively small elite of titled families, Grafenfamilien, then the 
middling nobles and finally the numerically-preponderant poor Junkers 
who sometimes were little different from the peasants beside whom they 
worked in the fields. The Grafenfamilien, "the families of the counts and 
earls," held considerable tracts of land and dominated political office in East 
Prussia.33 However, the majority of the nobility could not be counted 
among this elite. They often worked the land personally and sometimes 
held no land at aU. In some cases they served as lesser officials in the 
provincial government especially at the local level.
Although it has been the historical tradition to consider Gutsheirschaft 
as a variation or form of Grundherrschaft, the agricultural institution found in 
Western Europe where the only possessions overseen by the Hohenzollerns 
were the Westphalian territories, a more recent study by Heinrich Kaak has 
pointed out that the two forms were actually more independent than 
previously considered and that each formed separate and varied 
traditions.39 One of the primary reasons for this was the differences in legal 
status of the peasants who worked the farms. In general, it may be stated 
that where peasant labour was in higher demand, such as in East Prussia,
37Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 43.
^^Koch, A History of Prussia, p. 47
3^Heiiirich Kaalc, Pie Gutsherrschaft: Theoriegescliiditliche Untersuchungen zum 
Agrarwesen im oselbisdien Raum. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. Kaak follows the 
discussion from tlie nineteenth century through the piimaiy works of the period through to 
the present day. See also, Henning Borcke-Stargordt, "Grundherrschaft-Gutswirtschaft. 
Ein Beitrag zur Agrargeschichte," Jahrhuch der Alhcrtus-Universitat KonigsherglPr.,
Würzburg: Holzner Verlag, Vol. 10,1960, pp. 176-212.
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the legal status of peasants was less restrictive and more closely in line with
GutsheirschaftA^
There were two fundamental types of Gutsheirschaft which could be 
found in East Prussia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
First, there was personal serfdom, or Leibeigenschaft, which existed only in 
southern and eastern regions of the Kingdom. These peasants were tied to 
an estate unless given permission to leave by the landlord. Melton contends 
that there were two types of "unfree" peasants, those in hereditary servitude 
and those in personal serfdom, "the differences between these two 
categories," he notes, "are not entirely clear."^^
There were also free peasants. In fact, approximately forty percent 
may have been free peasants, i. e., not subject to serfdom. These peasants 
were given the right to marry, enter into fixed term land leases with 
landlords, to pursue legal action, among others. In other areas of East 
Prussia, however, peasants were not subject to personal serfdom but rather, 
a form of servitude to their plot of land, Imown as Untertanigkeit 
Untertanigkeit was not unique to East Prussia but this type of servitude was 
of a harsher variety as it became hereditary, or so-called Erbuntertanigkeit.
As Edgar Melton notes, "the peasant who occupied a servile farmstead in 
East Prussia or Pomerania might remain personally free, but children born 
on that farmstead earned hereditary servility, which meant that they could 
not leave the estate without permission of the seignior."^^ Therefore,
'^^Hartmut Harnisch, "Peasants and Markets: The Background to the Agrarian 
Reforms in Feudal Prussia East of the Elbe, 1760-1807," translated by Bernd Feldmann, 
Richard J. Evans, and William W. Hagen, in The German Peasantry: Conflict and 
Community in Rural Society from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, Richard J. 
Evans and W. R. Lee, editors. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 37-70.
^^Melton, "Gutsherrschaft in East Elbian Germany and Livonia, 1500-1800," pp.
332-333.
^Ibid.,p.323.
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Gutsherrschaft forced a majority of peasants into some form of servitude but 
was by no means universal.
The form of East Prussian Gutsherrschaft probably was less oppressive 
than in other areas of Eastern Europe due in part to the consistent and 
relatively low economic position of the majority of East Prussian Junkers in 
the early eighteenth century. This was principally because the peasant 
labourers on noble estates in the Kingdom were able to negotiate better 
contracts than in other parts of the region due to a shortage of labour and 
were able to move to another farmstead after their labour contract expired 
although this number remained low. Many historians have noted the ways 
in which landlords attempted to tie peasants to their estates, but it appears 
that such attempts were unsuccessful in the seventeenth century and were 
not attempted in the eighteenth century. In addition. East Prussian 
agriculture remained extremely varied throughout the early modern period. 
Often, the Junkers themselves were obliged to carry out the estate work 
responsibihties, since they were unable to hire labourers, and a chronic 
shortage of labour persisted in the Kingdom until the late eighteenth 
century. East Prussia was struck by population losses, from the Northern 
War of 1655-60 to the plague of 1709/10, and this was the principal reason 
for the shortage of labour. Many impoverished East Prussian Junkers did 
not have a significantly higher economic standing than many of the 
peasants. The labourers also often held significant estate responsibilities in 
combination with lord of the estate such as hiring between two and six 
labourers as well as maintaining "large, well-stocked farmsteads, averaging 
sixty acres, with twenty head of livestock."
Nevertheless, it should be noted that over 60 per cent of the rural 
population were landless servants and farmworkers in East Prussia. Even
4%id.,p. 105.
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among these peasants, who were under the supervision of elites, there was 
professional and social stratification. On tins point, Edgar Melton writes 
that "the peasant with his farmstead occupied a pivotal position within the 
system of Gutsherrschaft, but it was the position of a labour broker, not a 
labourer."^ That is, some peasants were acting as the intermediary 
between the Junior and labourer. They carried out the administration of the 
day-to-day operation of the estate for the Junker or for himself in some 
cases. The Kingdom, for example, had fourteen categories for hired hands, 
"from plough team leaders at the top, to serving maids and stable hands at 
the bottom," notes Edgar M elton.^ In other words, there existed in East 
Prussia a complex series of hierarchical relationships that began at an 
estate's stable and concluded in the provincial government or so-called 
Regierutig, and even Frederick William Ts private Kammer, There was a 
mutual interdependence and together comprised a Hnked structure that 
Frederick William I was hard pressed to alter.
Each peasant on an East Prussian estate was normally allotted, on 
average, 84 acres of arable land a considerable amount in this period.^^ This 
meant that in return for the land allowance, resident peasants owed the 
estate Junker anywhere from one to ten days of work on the estate per week. 
If ten days per week were owed to the Junker then the peasant was required 
to provide at least one more worker. Such workers came to be hired by the 
resident peasant farmers. These work loads and hiring of additional 
labourers has given historians significant insight mto the peasant social
^Ibid.
^%riedrich-Wilhelm Henning, Dienste und Abgaben der Bauem im 18. 
Tahrhundert. Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1969, pp. 16-17. Cited by Melton, 'The Prussian 
Junkers," p. 331. Melton cites 85 acres or about 2 Flemish hides (Htifen) which converts to 
approximately 17 hectares.
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structure as the peasant became a "labor broker." This, then, was an 
additional layer of farm management under the authority of the resident 
peasant. Almost all estates in East Prussia relied on lured hands during the 
first half of the eighteenth century. The number of acres and days of service 
provided varied across the Hohenzollern lands wliich the following table 
demonstrates.^^
Table 1.1
Average Farmstead Acres and Required Days of Service in the Eighteenth
Century
Territory Avg.
Acres
Days of Service to be provided 
by the estate peasant/ other to 
be provided
other
Brandenburg 84 2-3 days per week n / a
East Holstein 60 4 workers every d a y /2 teams of 
horses
Avg. of 13 horses 
per farmstead
East Prussia 84 1-10 days per week n /a
Estonia 50 4 days per week 3-4 horses and 6-7 
cows
Mecldenburg 55 3 w orkers/2 teams of horses 2-4 horses and 3-9 
oxen
Swedish
Pomerania
60 3-4 days per w eek/but often 5-6 
days per week
7-8 horses and 3-4 
oxen
Although it is difficult to generalise about the East Prussian agrarian 
social structure, a few important and relevant points can be made. There 
was one fundamental factor that differentiated East Prussian peasants from 
one another, namely whether or not they occupied their own land.
Landless peasants made up a considerable proportion of the overall 
peasant population and often worked as hired hands directly for estate 
Junkers as well as far richer land holding peasants, as discussed earlier. 
Before about 1725, one-third of the estates in East Prussia relied on landless 
hired workers where the Junlcer employed them directly. It seems likely
47Ibid.
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that the number of hired hands increased during the rest of the eighteenth 
century.
Hired hands generally would work under one year contracts after 
which they were free to leave or, if both parties agreed, stay on by signing 
another contract. The types of jobs varied enormously and in turn formed a 
social hierarchy within the landless peasant population, from serving maids 
up to ploughmen. Peasant society was founded on legal contractual 
agreements, though the full extent to which the rule of law prevailed is 
difficult to determine. The numerous levels within peasant society meant 
there was a degree of social mobihty although it is difficult to measure this 
with any precision. The upper levels of the landless farm workers were 
similar, if not the same as that of the peasant land holder. A small plot of 
land and quantity of seed was offered as a portion of the higher level wages 
and extended to approximately ten per cent of the East Prussian landless 
peasant population. Although a slightly different classification and wage 
scale existed throughout the Hohenzollern territories, it should be noted 
that in Brandenburg and Pomerania approximately 50 to 60 per cent of this 
population were small landholders.
In addition, migrant workers, Tagelohnei', played a significant role 
during seasonal harvests. These workers lived in the small East Prussian 
towns and largely subsisted on earnings from the annual harvests. These 
workers were an eighteenth-century form of today's migrant farm worker 
found in the United States. Earnings often came in the form of cash, or of 
payment-in-kind, which acted as insurance against rising prices for food, 
above all, bread. Yet, payment-in-ldnd liindered modern financial methods 
from developing, especially an entirely monetary economy.
Therefore, this form of GutsherTSchaft, as it existed in East Prussia, was 
a complex agricultural and social system. The effectiveness of free peasants 
who did not hire out for labour and those that did has been studied to some
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degree. In general, a freeholder earned four times the net monetary income 
of an estate peasant. This was primarily due to the fact that the estate 
peasant had to hire labourers, pay higher taxes, pay liigher rent and had to 
support a larger number of livestock. Yet, as Melton notes, ''net production 
was nearly twice as large on the farmstead of the seigniorial peasant as on that of the 
freedholder's"^^ The reason for this is basically that the estate peasant farmer 
had more to support and the free peasant had little incentive yet could 
produce half as much and earn four times what the estate peasant earned. 
The expenses of an estate-peasant, e. g., taxes, rent, and wages, were much 
higher than on the freeholder's, and the ability to support these shows that 
Gutsherrschaft was economically efficient.
Finally, Gutsherrschaft increased productivity of the estate. It also 
expanded the "wage labor force," thus making the estate peasant a critical 
component of the rural economy. The estate peasant produced more grain 
and hired more workers than anybody else. This is a critical factor because 
the estate peasant did not necessarily produce more for market reasons but 
rather, for his household. Edgar Melton believes that this argument 
significantly expands on the traditional interpretation of the supposed 
conflict between Junker and estate peasant. The estate peasant was in a 
position of authority not only over his household but also over hired labour 
and authority was diffused down the ranks of hired labour. It was actually 
the hired labourers who carried the largest burden of work on the estate. 
The manorial estates, then, were broken down into smaller private holdings 
where as an East Prussian Junker noted in the early eighteenth century, "the 
peasant stands on his farmstead like the steward of a small estate."^^
p. 342 
^^Ibid., p. 345.
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Most of Europe's peasants in the eighteenth century paid cash toward 
rent instead of labour obligations. Much of Eastern Europe developed 
differently than Western Europe and increasingly tied the peasant closer to 
the estate until emancipation in the nineteenth century — if not 
Gutsherrschaft itself, than a variation of it.
The Urban Sector
The Kingdom's only major town was Konigsberg with a population 
in this period was between 30,000 and 40,000, which made it much more 
populated than Berlin wliich had around 10,000 to 12,000 p e o p le .D a n z ig , 
in neighbouring PoHsh Prussia, however, was even larger with around 
50,000 people.51 Konigsberg, the East Prussian capital, emerged at an early 
stage as the duchy's principal port and administrative centre. East Prussia's 
only other town of any size was another port, Memel. Around 1700, there 
were only six other East Prussian towns with populations exceeding 500 
people.^^ Moreover, there were only about two dozen towns with 
populations over 500 in the corridor of territory between Konigsberg and 
Berlin. There was no town over 500 people between Konigsberg and Danzig 
while Danzig and Stettin were the only towns over 10,000 people between 
Berlin and Konigsberg.^^ These numbers rise during the eighteenth century 
but primarily in East Prussia. Around 1800, East Prussia claimed about 
twenty-five towns with populations exceeding 500 people, a few of which
^^Gustav Sdimoller, Preussische Verfassungsr-. Vernaltungs- und 
Finanzgeschichte. Berlin: Verlag der Taglichen Rundschau, 1921, pp. 45-47. Also cited in 
Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 203, fn. 3.
'^Ijbid. Carsten cites P. Simpson, Gescliichte der Stadt Danzig, vol. 2, Danzig: A. W. 
Kaferman, 1913, p. 463, who estimates that the population of Danzig was 50,000 in the early 
seventeenth century and; A. Zimmermann, Versuch einer historisdien Entwickelung der 
markischen Stadteverfassungen. vol. 3, Berlin: F. Dummler (Trowitzsch und Sohn), 1837/40, 
pp. 93,118, who notes Berlin had a population of no more than 10,000-12,000 people.
^^Erich Keyser and Heinz Stoob, editors, Deutsches Stadtebuch. Handbuch 
stadtischer Geschichte, 5 vols., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1939 (reprint 1974). Cited in Jorn 
Sieglerschmidt, "Social and Economic Landscapes," in Germany: A New Social and 
Economic History. Vol. 2,1630-1800, Sheilagh Ogilvie, editor, London: Arnold, p. 27.
53Ibid.
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ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The population numbers between 
Berlin and Konigsberg, however, do not appear to change to any significant 
degree.^^ Although the population increase in the Kingdom is discernible 
between 1700 and 1800 the rise never met the expectations of Frederick 
William I or his successors and much of the land remained under-utilised 
and staffed despite vigorous attempts by the Hohenzollerns at repopulation 
and agricultural reform throughout the century.
Importantly, Konigsberg was politically quasi-democratic, at least by 
the standards of the seventeenth century. There were tliree constituent 
towns that made up Konigsberg (Altstadt, Kneiphof, and Lobenicht), and 
were represented by three colleges of town aldermen, three courts, and the 
guilds and crafts, i.e., commons of each of the three towns. Each of the three 
constituent towns also had their own separate councils and other 
governmental bodies.^^ Essentially, these were oligarchies that were 
comprised of self-perpetuating groups of merchants that exercised control 
over most urban affairs. Decisions were based on majority vote with the 
minority vote having the "right of contradiction" and could bring their case 
before the East Prussian diet.56 This arrangement allowed the burghers a 
great many privileges. Besides being wealthy, they were also politically 
influential and as Carsten notes, "did not hesitate to oppose the duke and 
the nobility as if they were an independent Estate."^7 Technically they only 
constituted part of the third Estate where they sat alongside the smaller 
towns. The fact that majority voting was used witliin the third Estate,
p. 28-29.
^^Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 203.
^^Hugo Rachel, Der Grosse Kurfürst und die ostpreussi.schen Stande. Staats- und 
Soziahüissenschûftlichen Torschungen XXIV, no. 1,1905, pp. 89-91; Carsten, The Origins of 
Prussia, p. 203.
57lbid.
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however, meant that the smaller towns were often overruled due to their 
fewer numbers.58 Konigsberg's burghers, though, were not able to hold out 
during the more serious tax and revenue struggles which developed 
between the Hohenzollern nobility, and quickly became victims of this 
conflict.5^
During the sixteenth and parts of the seventeenth centuries, 
Konigsberg's importance as a port in this part of the Baltic was second only 
to Danzig, which was by far the largest.^® Konigsberg developed a seaborne 
trade for the export of the major products of the area that principally 
comprised the hinterland of East Prussia but also included Prussian 
Lithuania and even north west Russia and Royal Prussia (Poland) as well as 
Byelorussia.^^ The principal exports from the region included rye, hemp, 
flax, malt, tallow, wax, potash, livestock and amber.^^ Products such as salt, 
herring, wine, tobacco, sugar, and spices were also imported tltrough 
Konigsberg.^3 This prosperous trade contributed greatly to the city's status 
and influence in the territory, though by the second half of the seventeenth 
century it was beginning to decline. Konigsberg developed as a significant
5%id.
^^Hugo Rachel, Der Grofie Kurfurst und die osptreufiischen StSinde 1640-1688. pp. 
94-96. See also Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 204.
^^Henning Graf von Borcke-Stargordt, "Grundherrschaft-Gutswirtschaft. Bin 
Beitrag zur Agrargesdiichte," Jahrbtich der Alherbis-UniversitM KmigsbergfPr., vol. 10, 
Wurzburg: Holzner Verlag, 1960, p. 176. Also noted in Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 202.
^^See for example, Gierszewsld, "Port w Ki’olewcu - z dziejôw jego zaplecza w XVI- 
XVII wieku," pp. 53-60.
^^Borcke-Stargordt, "Grundherrschaft-Gutswirtschaft. Bin Beitrag zur 
Agrargeschichte," p. 176; Guidon and Wijaczka, "Zwi^ki handlowe ziem litewskich i 
bialoruskich z Krolewcem w swietle rejestrow celnych komory grodziehsldej z lat 1600- 
1605," pp. 21-31
63ibid.
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counterweight to help balance the political influence of the nobihty.^^ In the 
late seventeenth century it had over eighty different crafts or guilds.^^ 
Wheat was arguably the most critical crop for East Prussia 
throughout its history. As mentioned, the Junkers owned and ran their 
estates which essentially made them farmers or plantation owners. The Hnk 
the Junkers had with wheat was important and in turn, an important link 
with the Hanseatic League. This region of Europe was a noteworthy corn 
and wheat producer. The port cities of Stettin in Pomerania, Danzig in 
Polish Prussia, Riga in Livonia, Konigsberg and Memel, in East Prussia 
depended on this production and export trade.^^
p. 203.
'^^Schmoiler, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 44. 
^^Ostpreussisdie Folianten, vol. 702, no. 114. Cited in Carsten, Origins of Prussia.
^^Koch, A History of Prussia, p. 35.
CHAPTER 2 
East Prussia and the Great Elector
The Link with the Hohenzollerns
The two generations which preceded Frederick William Ts succession 
in 1713 had seen little effective challenge to the quasi-independent position 
of East Prussia within the Hohenzollern Monarchy. The dynasty in Berlin 
had not contested the traditional degree of self-government which the 
native elites had enjoyed, and this was to be one factor in the resistance 
which Frederick William I would subsequently encounter as he strove to 
extend his authority in the Kingdom. Berlin's control had at times been very 
limited indeed during the first century of Hohenzollern rule in East Prussia.
Historians acknowledge that one notable example of the state- 
building which occurred throughout Europe after the Thirty Years' War was 
provided by Frederick William of Hohenzollern (1640-1688), known as the 
"Great Elector".^ In the aftermath of the war, Frederick William managed to 
develop foreign and domestic policies that enabled him to recover some 
political independence, build up a powerful army and shape his scattered 
and fragmented territories, which were spread out over eight hundred miles 
from Jülich West of the Rhine to East Prussia on the Baltic Sea, into a
^See the standard biography, Ernst Opgenoorlh, Friediidi Wilhelm. Der Grofie 
Kürfurst von Brandenburg. Bine poiitisdie Biographie, two vols., Gottingen: 
Mustersdimidt, 1971-78.
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stronger German state. Although Brandenburg-Prussia remained at best a 
minor state at Frederick William's death, he has been credited with laying 
the first foundations for its subsequent rise to great power status, which 
came about in the eighteenth century during the reign of Frederick the 
Great. Yet his achievements can too easily be exaggerated in light of 
Prussia's subsequent history. One should remember that fundamental to his 
significance is that he survived and kept the scattered territories together.
The Rule of the Teutonic Order
It is important to sketch some of the developments within the 
territory prior to the Great Elector.^ The territory of East Prussia had only 
been a duchy of the Hohenzollern rulers of Brandenburg since 1618. Prior 
to that, as far back as the thirteenth century and under the control of the 
Knights of the crusading Teutonic Order, there had been a "German" 
influence since about the year 1225. The Order essentially had received the 
opportunity to conquer the land between the rivers Vistula and Memel 
without tax or any other burdens either to the Emperor or the Pope who 
authorised their conquest of expansion into the region. This was a small 
reward for the difficulties encountered in establishing control. There was an 
initial period of strong resistance to Christianity and to the rule of the 
Teutonic Order by the pagan Slavonic tribe of Prussians living there. By 
about the middle of the thirteenth century, however, the dominance of the 
Order in Prussia was apparent, although it was not secured for another half 
a century. It was the Teutonic Order that demanded complete submission 
of the former Prussian nobility to the point where many became serfs, while 
others were deported from their native villages. Feudal obligations were 
introduced and enforced as never before in the region. This situation 
provides the origins of the position of the peasantry and nobiHty in
^Neitmami, Klaus, "Die preufiischen Stande und die Aufienpolitik des Deutsdien 
Ordens vom 1. Thorner Frieden bis zum Abfall des Preufiischen Bundes (1411-1454)," in 
Ordensherrschaft. Stande und Stadtpolitik: Zur Entwicklung des PreuCenlandes im 14. und 
15. Tahrhundert. edited by Udo Arnold, Liineburg: Verlag Nordostdeutsdies Kulturwerk, 
19^, pp. 27-79; Hartmut Boodonann, Deutsdie Gesdiidite im Osten Europas: Ostpreufien 
und Westpreuèen. Berlin; Siedler Verlag, 1992; Christian Krollmann, Der deutsche Qrden in 
Preussen. Elbing: Preussenverlag, 1935. These works form the basis of tills section. See 
also Carsten, Origins of Prussia. Chapter 5 and Kodi, A History of Prussia. Chapter 1, for a 
brief account.
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subsequent centuries, as set out in the introduction to this study. It is 
important to remember that the socio-economic composition of the Teutonic 
Order was never completely clear. There was not, for example, the total 
domination of the nobility over the peasants, or the Order over church or 
state affairs inside Prussia. All were influential in varying degrees, with the 
exception of the native Prussian peasantry. Yet these divisions did not lead 
to internal conflict or strife of some kind. Instead, the Order managed to 
expand and increase its influence over Prussia. The Duchy was unique in 
the entire Baltic region for the degree of domination exercised by the all- 
powerful nobility. It was only in the fourteenth century that the Order 
emerged as the dominant authority over Prussia.
With the internal threat reduced a new and external danger emerged, 
that of the CV\r ip^^powers, most notably Prussia's neighbour, Poland. The 
Grand Master of the Teutonic Order (Hochmeister), the highest official in the 
Order in the early fifteenth century, Ulrich von Jungingen, confronted the 
Poles and Lithuanians at the battle of Tannenberg on 15 July 1410. 
Outnumbered almost two-to-one and using outmoded tactics on the 
battlefield, the Teutonic Knights suffered a disastrous defeat. This major 
loss was combined with the start of a recurring agricultural and economic 
decline that would last into the fifteenth century. The end result of these 
series of disasters was the inabihty of the Order to make promised payments 
to the Poles after Tannenberg.
In addition, the Order faced its most serious internal conflicts to date. 
In an agreement which was intended to quell all of the difficulties, the Order 
established the Estates, the so-called handesrat in 1412. Its members were 
drawn exclusively from Prussia's urban and rural elite and primarily were 
charged to vote appropriate taxation in order to pay the Duchy's debts to 
the Poles. When this body was established, it was hoped that it would also 
alleviate some of the internal divisions starting to affect the Order's
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coherence. Although the problems continued, and even worsened, the 
handesrat survived in recognisable form into the eighteenth century as the 
Duchy's Estates. The territory, however, became divided in 1466. At the 
Peace of Thorn in October 1466, after the notably unsuccessful 'Thirteen 
Years' WaP with Poland, the Order had ceded sovereignty over many areas 
to the Polish King. In particular, Poland received Pomerellia, the 
Kulmerland, Marienburg, the area surrounding Christburg and Elbing, as 
well as the Bishopric of Ermeland. The Order secured the impoverished and 
less productive areas of Pomesania and Marienwerder but most 
importantly, the significant block of territory of East Prussia. In addition, 
the leader of the Order, the Grand Master, was obligated to swear allegiance 
to the Polish King as the territory became a Polish suzerainty as a result of 
the settlement. For approximately the next forty-five years, there was a 
continual struggle for full sovereignty of East Prussia between the Order 
and Poland.
After the Margrave Albrecht of Hohenzollern was elected Grand 
Master in 1511, he refused to swear his allegiance to his uncle, the Polish 
King, John Sigismund. This was by far the strongest act of defiance by the 
Order since the war that ended in 1466. The resistance faltered, however, 
and by 1521 negotiations between the two sides began. During the 
following four year period, the settlement talks required Albrecht to travel 
to Germany where he came in contact with Luther, Erasmus, and other 
leaders of the Reformation.^ Albrecht's slow acceptance of the Reformation, 
which by this time had been spreading throughout East Prussia, meant the 
dissolution of the Order. One of the main objectives of Poland had been the
%ernliard Lohse, "Albrecht von Brandenburg und Luther," in Erzbischof Albrecht 
von Brandenburg (1490-1545): Bin Kirdien- und Reichsfürst der Frühen Neuzeit. edited by 
Friedhelm Jürgensmeier, Franlcfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1991, pp. 73-83; Peter 
Walter, "Albrecht von Brandenburg und Erasmus von Rotterdam," in Erzbischof Albrecht 
von Brandenburg (1490-1545). pp. 102rll6.
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destruction of the Teutonic Order wliich meant there was now more latitude 
for compromise. The King of Poland proposed that in return for the 
dissolution of the Order, East Prussia would become a Polish duchy with 
Albrecht as its hereditary ruler. Although this was not acceptable to all the 
Knights of the Teutonic Order, it was the basis for the settlement that was 
adopted in April 1525.
This improved the political standing somewhat of both the former 
Grand Master, now "Dulce of Prussia" and the territory in foreign affairs. It 
also gave significant new authority to the East Prussian elite to the point, 
one may argue, that they were directly involved in foreign policy objectives. 
This is also the start of the relationship between the Duchy's ruling elite and 
the King of Poland. The Estates could now state their grievances directly to 
the King which they would do not only under the Duke but also with future 
Hohenzollern rulers.
The Hohenzollerns took the title of Duke essentially by default and 
by the failure of heirs. Through a series of deaths and subsequent regencies, 
the Hohenzollern ruler of Brandenburg became regent, and then Duke of 
East Prussia from 1618 onwards. It was in tins year that John Sigismund, 
Elector of Brandenburg, formally became sovereign ruler of East Prussia (as 
Duke). Therefore, in the reign of the Great Elector, there was still a sense of 
novelty about the links between East Prussia and Berlin, forged only a 
quarter century before. The independent minded Estates that we have seen 
develop, particularly during the sixteenth century, would play important 
part in the history of the territory for the next hundred years.
The Rule of the Great Elector
The Great Elector attempted to estabhsh supremacy in his territories 
mainly tlirough administrative means when he became the Hohenzollern 
ruler after his father, George William, died in 1640. Frederick William 
exerted influence by strengthening the role of the military and raising taxes 
— increasing his troops to 22,000 men, and securing in the principal 
territory of Brandenburg, in 1653, the right to raise taxes without the consent 
of the Diet. At first this was for six years but it became permanent, 
primarily due to a subsequent war between 1655-60. These years of conflict, 
the so-called 'War of the North' with Sweden and Poland as its largest 
combatants, were also important in the history of East Prussia. The Great 
Elector first fought in alliance with Sweden and defeated the Polish army in 
1656 at the battle of Warsaw. Although he was a vassal of the Pohsh King, 
he recognised that he would probably lose East Prussia altogether should he 
fight on the side of Poland, Therefore, he aided Sweden and after victory 
was secured over Poland, he allowed the Swedish King, Charles X (Charles 
Gustavus) to use East Prussia as a Continental base from which to prepare 
for future battles. In addition, the Great Elector shared in the territories 
revenues much as he did with the former overlord, the King of Poland.^
When war broke out between Poland and Sweden again later in 1656, 
both sides were in need of Brandenburg-Prussia's support. It was in this 
second period of the war that Frederick William was able to negotiate for 
full sovereignty over East Prussia. Sweden agreed to the Great Elector's
%liis was secured through the Treaty of Konigsberg in January 1656.
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demand in return for his support but complete recognition of his full 
sovereignty was not guaranteed by either Warsaw or Vienna. It was 
Imperial politics and Vienna's need for Frederick William's vote as Elector 
of Brandenburg in the Imperial election of 1657 that finally brought the 
Great Elector to have his army fight along side of the Polish King, John 
Casimir. The Habsburgs were able to exert sufficient pressure on the King 
of Poland that he finally agreed to recognise full and hereditary sovereignty 
of the Hohenzollerns over East Prussia. This was secured by the Treaty of 
Wehlau in September 1657. The war, however, ended with the Peace of 
Oliva in 1660. The Great Elector, although delighted about securing full 
sovereignty over East Prussia was less than pleased with the Oliva 
settlement which forced him to relinquish Vorpommem to Sweden.
Within East Prussia, however, Frederick William's efforts met with 
uneven success. Although Ms legal supremacy in these lands was formally 
recognised, de facto authority proved considerably more difficult to 
establish. East Prussians were not eager to surrender autonomy to which 
they were accustomed. The situation of succession in the Duchy and 
tensions between Frederick William and the Estates was reported
by Lisola, the imperial envoy to Poland who was also the negotiator 
between the elector of Brandenburg, East Prussia's Estates and the King of 
Poland, John Casimir (ruled 1648-68), In one report, Lisola commented on 
the intertwining of the issues of religion, sovereignty over East Prussia and 
the relationship between the Estates of East Prussia, its Duke and the Polish 
King. There was, Lisola, wrote:
"strong aversion against the Elector in the whole Duchy of Prussia, not just among 
the Catholics but also among the Lutherans and the common folk ... they all plan 
rebellion as soon as possible, mainly because of religion, and because the Elector 
aims at gaining sovereignty over Prussia, to subject it to the arbitrary power of liis 
ministers from Brandenburg and to abolish all privileges... the fifth reason is the
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fact that the Elector joined the Swedish party without the consent of the estates, 
thereby provoking the revenge and the hahed of the Poles against them/'^
Twelve years earlier in 1648, however, the Peace of Westphalia 
restored peace to Germany, after a generation of fighting. The settlement 
strengthened the position of princes and weakened imperial authority, 
acknowledging that a German ruler had sovereignty within his or her 
territories, known as Landeshoheit.^ With the treaties of Osnabriick and 
Münster, moreover, German princes such as Frederick William, at last 
secured legal recognition of the right to conduct their own foreign policy, de 
jure recognition of what they had for long possessed de facto7 It should be 
said this was true only to the extent that German rulers did not work against 
the interests of the Emperor, though this restriction was in practice of little 
importance.
Following the conclusion of peace at WestphaUa in 1648, the Great 
Elector possessed more territory than any other prince of the Holy Roman 
Empire except the Habsburgs.^ However, East Prussia lay outside the Holy 
Roman Empire and was not subject to imperial authority in any way and 
was accustomed to having autonomy in local affairs. Unlike Brandenburg 
and the other western territories, the Thirty Years' War had not affected East 
Prussia, which had been largely isolated from the fighting and consequent 
devastation. The Duchy was accustomed to enjoying considerable
Vota [pseud, for Onno Klopp], Der Untergang des Ordensstaates und die 
Entstehung der preufiischen Kônigswürde, Mainz: Kirchheim & Co., 1911. Cited in 
Friedrich, "The Other Prussia," p. 450. Lisola's reports of 1656.
^Midiael Hughes, Law and Politics in Eighteenth Century Germany: The Imperial 
Aulic council in the Reign of Charles VI. Woodbridge: Boydell Press (The Royal Historical 
Society), 1988, pp. 16-17.
^Ibid., p. 17.
A. Beller, "The Thirty Years War," in The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 
4 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 354.
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autonomy in local affairs, and resisted many of the changes attempted by 
the Great Elector.
Rehgion was one particular realm within which Frederick William 
was not entirely successful in exerting his influence. Although German 
princes were officially granted more influence over the rehgious complexion 
of their territories after the Peace of WestphaHa, this did not ensure that 
their subjects would meeldy accept their influence. In East Prussia, the 
Hohenzollerns met with resistance when attempting to enforce their own 
religious preferences on the territory.
The Reformation in East Prussia was part of the secularising carried 
out by Albrecht von Hohenzollern in 1525, and so preceded that in 
Brandenburg. The Hohenzollerns' of Brandenburg themselves accepted the 
Lutheran Reformation after 1539 with the accession of Joachim II. 
Brandenburg became primarily Lutheran with the Rhineland territories of 
Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg developing as the only Calvinist enclaves.^ 
Elector John Sigismund (1608-1619), however, secretly converted to 
Calvinism in about 1606, two years before he became Elector, w M e his 
youngest brother, the Margrave Ernst (1583-1613) was the first to openly 
practice the Reformed religion in 1610. ^ ® This conversion was central to 
Brandenburg-Prussia's Second Reformation. Throughout the later sixteenth 
and first half of the seventeenth century, the Hohenzollerns attempted to 
impose their distinctive brand of Calvinism onto their Lutheran subjects. 
With considerable determination, they supported and encouraged Calvinist 
campaigns to convert their subjects but not by force - which is an important
%ee the recent study by Bodo Nischan, Prince. People, and Confession: Tire 
Second Reformation in Brandenburg. Philadelpliia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994. 
See also, Reihnold A. Dorwart, "Church Organization in Brandenburg-Prussia from the 
Reformation to 1740," Harvard Theological Revtezv, vol. 31:4,1938.
^^Nischan, Prince. People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in 
Brandenburg, p. 83.
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distinction: especially at this period. What is surprising, however, is that 
Calvinist rulers left most of their population Lutheran. The East Prussians 
with the strong aid of Polish King Sigismund III always were successful in 
preventing Calvinism from gaining a foothold in the territory. The 
Hohenzollerns themselves converted to Calvinism from Lutheranism wlule 
many of the territories over which they ruled remained Lutheran, including 
Brandenburg and East Prussia.
East Prussia was acquired as an hereditary possession (subject to 
polish suzerainty) in 1618, a gain which approximately doubled the amount 
of territory under Hohenzollern control. In addition, Brandenburg and East 
Prussia were linked more than ever.^^ The commitment of East Prussians to 
Lutheranism, however, was strong and the Hohenzollerns' attempts to 
change this were resisted from the start. Konigsberg became a hotbed of 
anti-Calvinist writings by the Lutheran clergy wliile other areas of the 
Duchy showed equally strong signs of re s is ta n c e .N o t only did the clergy 
resist but so too did most other groups within East Prussian society. It was 
this lack of grass-roots support that prevented the successful conversion of 
East Prussia.
The East Prussian elite was also a major obstacle to any successful 
conversion to Calvinism. Its power was seen in a major series of political 
gains. The Junkers had forced Duke Albrecht in 1542 to allow the nobility to 
select the four highest officials in East Prussia, known as the Oberrate. In 
1566 their influence was apparent in the adoption of a new "constitution" 
which confirmed the traditional right to place only native East Prussians in 
positions in central and local government. Moreover, if the Estates believed
11Ibid., p. 169.
12t u j
based.
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that their rights were not being respected by the Hohenzollerns, they had 
the right to appeal to the King of Poland. The Hohenzollern ruler held the 
title but little else within the Duchy. The Estates strengthened their position 
even further when, in 1609, they secured confirmation of the right to ratify 
all decrees affecting the status of the territory. By the point at which John 
Sigismund became ruler of East Prussia in his own right, the Duchy had 
significantly strengthened control over its own affairs.
The Struggle with the Estates
East Prussia's sense of its religious and political distinctiveness 
remained as strong a generation later, as the Great Elector was to discover.
In East Prussia as in the other territories, the Hohenzollern ruler attempted 
to modify the existing social hierarchy in order to extend Hohenzollern 
authority and also to fill the power vacuum created by the Reformation.
This was not a particularly easy task since the Hohenzollerns did not 
possess a royal crown until 1701, and thus lacked the symbols of majesty 
which the kings and queens enjoyed and exploited in France or even 
England. In addition, the ruling family of Brandenburg-Prussia were 
relatively impoverished. Most importantly, however, even during the first 
half of the eighteenth century, the Hohenzollerns did not rule over a 
coherent block of territory, as for example, was the case in France. Instead, 
they ruled over a group of separated territories which were widely scattered 
across Germany and Western Poland.
Although the Great Elector acknowledged limitations upon his 
authority within his principal territory of Brandenburg, outside the 
Electorate his power was even more limited, being shared with influential 
Estates and other local authorities in the various territories. Previous rulers 
had often made concessions to the Estates and local authorities, and even 
foreign powers, in order to support the Hohenzollern court. Frederick 
William and subsequent Hohenzollern rulers attempted to strengthen their 
role as territorial princes and recover what previous rulers had pawned, 
traded or sold which left the Hohenzollerns financially and administratively 
weak. This is what Carsten has called the "complete disintegration of public
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jurisdiction and administration in Brandenburg and Pomerania." One 
example of how tliis was attempted in East Prussia was with the royal 
domains. Although the Great Elector could not reclaim the unfavourable 
land leases under contract in East Prussia, he attempted to ensure that there 
was better supervision over his domain lands. There was protest from 
within East Prussia as one might expect but since most aU of the Great 
Elector's changes were "procedural" and did not alter the "formal 
structure" of native territorial authority, there was little claim that long­
standing traditional rights were taken. It appears, however, that this did 
not improve control or production to any significant measure. In general. 
East Prussia was only different until the fifteenth century. Thereafter the 
territory also began to decline both politically and economically, coming to 
resemble the other Hohenzollern lands.
The East Prussian Estates held two basic objectives that they sought 
to secure from Frederick William in the 1650s. They first wanted to obtain 
the Elector's formal confirmation of their local and Estate authority. Second, 
they sought recognition of their privileged status in the social order. Both 
aims were conservative, as the East Prussian nobility sought to maintain the 
status quo. Frederick William, however, seized the opportunity presented 
by the war of 1655-60 to take control of wider issues facing a territory like 
the Duchy of East Prussia. External enemies such as Sweden, Poland and 
even Russia now threatened East Prussia's vulnerable position and there 
was a need to protect the Duchy from external threats. Frederick William 
and the nobility recognised at mid-century that they were mutually
^^Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 100.
^%oadiim Krause, "Die kürfürstliche Verwaltung im Herzogtum Preufien am Ende 
des 17. Jalirhundert," Ph.D. Dissertation, Bonn: University of Bonn, 1973, p. 87. Cited in 
Roth, "The East Prussian Domaenenpaediter in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 32-33.
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dependent, whether they liked to admit it or not. This dawning recognition 
provided the basis for their negotiations.
In the seventeenth century, and particularly in the post-Thirty Years' 
War period, the competitive states-system demanded a stronger military, 
especially for a state lilte Brandenburg-Prussia with extended borders and 
vulnerable and attractive territories. Frederick WilUam believed 
Brandenburg-Prussia's political credibility was derived from the strength of 
its army. The Great Elector's familiar quotation underlined this: writing in 
his Political Testament, "Alhances are indeed good, but forces of one's own 
are still better, upon them can one safely rely, and a man is of no 
consideration, when he himself is poor and has no troops; I myself have 
become considerable by my own efforts in accordance with this precept."
What many members of the nobility did not take seriously enough, 
however, was that although they were politically strong, they were widely 
scattered across the various territories. In any case they pursued essentially 
provincial interests and never estabhshed the ability to combine with their 
counterparts in other provinces, in order to jointly resist changes in 
territorial government which were imposed by the Hohenzollerns and 
which would have reduced their roles. Had they achieved this, it would 
have made the unified Estates a threat equal to that posed by any foreign 
power. Geographical separation lay at the heart of this failure to co-operate. 
Indeed, the geographical diffusion of the nobility prohibited, to any large 
extent, any unified and concerted resistance to changes imposed by the 
Hohenzollerns from far-away Berlin.
The nobility proved to be relatively secure in their own estates from 
any outside influence, electoral or otherwise. A Junker from the Kurmark,
^^Richard Dietrich, editor. Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern Vol. 20, 
Ver'ôjfenfîichungen aus den Archiven Pimssischer Ktilhirbesitz. Koln and Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 
1986, p. 191.
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expressed the situation throughout the Hohenzollern lands when he wrote 
that the nobility wished to see "the threads in the hands of him who governs 
us, and he must pay due regard to what we want, for we shall make things 
hot for him if we cannot see where he puts our m o n e y . . . . "  While East 
Prussia remained a Polish fief, it was "all too well mixed with all internal 
affairs of Poland."^^ Many of the reasons for this have already been 
explored in the discussion of the territory's early history. What is important 
here is that the landed nobility of East Prussia looked to the Polish 
aristocracy as a model for which to strive - they did not look to 
Brandenburg. Tliis was a potential thi'eat to the Duke because of the 
influence and aspirations of PoÜsh nobles. The poverty and wealcness of the 
Polish szlachta was more apparent to contemporaries. Some magnates were 
powerful, but most nobles were independent and exerted influence, no 
more. East Prussians also looked to Poland for support as the Duchy's 
Estates did not recognise Frederick William's full sovereignty as Duke even 
though this was conceded to him after the war of 1655-60 in the treaties of 
Labiau and Wehlau and confirmed by the peace at Oliva in 1660.^^ Polish 
recognition meant that the East Prussian Estates could no longer count on 
Warsaw's support if their privileges were threatened. The Estates, however, 
continued to look to the Polish King for support and resisted the Elector 
who resorted at times to military force to get his way.^^
It is important to remember that from the early thirteenth century, 
Poland had had enormous influence upon what became the realm of East
l^Hititze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze^ p. 42.
l^SdimoIler, 'D ie Verwaltung Ostpreu6ens unter Fiiedridi Wilhelm I," p. 43.
^%adiel, "Der GroGe Kurfürst und die ostpreussischen Stande/' pp. 26-27. Cited 
in Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 209-10.
l^Ibid., pp. 207-209.
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Prussia and on tire people, especially the members of the Teutonic Order. 
Poland's influence had been formaHsed over East Prussia in 1454 with an act 
of union. Although this introduced new laws in the territory, it also left the 
most important economic, political, and administrative authority to the East 
Prussians themselves.^^ In short, it is not surprising to find that throughout 
the reign of the Great Elector, the Duchy's Estates continued to look to the 
Polish King for protection of their rights that were under attack from an 
unfamihar and what they considered "foreign" Hohenzollern ruler. 
Frederick William's representative, Otto von Schwerin, reported the 
following to his master in regard to the East Prussian Estates in  1661: "Your 
Electoral Highness would not believe to what extent the Polish crown is 
dear to their hearts, and how they all seek their good in this connection, so 
that they insist on maintaining some recourse to Poland."^^ The significance 
of this comment is also crucial because it was only a year after the Great 
Elector secured full sovereignty which was difficult for the Estates to accept 
as will be demonstrated in the subsequent section with respect to the 
Konigsberg leader, Hieronymus Roth. In 1677 and 1678, the Polish King, 
John Sobieski, reconfirmed the Hohenzollern sovereignty over East Prussia 
mainly because the Polish King was too busy fighting with the Turks and 
Tartars in the South and could not risk the diversion of attention and 
resources to get further involved in any clash with the Hohenzollern 
Elector.^^ Thereafter, Frederick William did not have to contend with the 
Polish King directly about the status of the Duchy.
Native East Prussians fuUy controlled their territory's admiiiistration. 
This was a fundamental tradition and right, and had been firmly fixed when
^%riedrich, "The Other Prussia," pp. 44-56. 
^^Quoted in Ibid., p. 460.
^^Ibid., p. 463.
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Frederick William became their new Duke in 1640. It should be made clear 
that this was also the situation elsewhere in the Elector's lands. The 
Indigemtsrecht, or 'right of the native born', a statute that stipulated that 
only natives, usually noblemen, of the province could hold office in the 
government of that territory, is the best example of the type of privilege to 
which East Prussians were accustomed and in which Hohenzollern 
government acquiesced. This was the foundation of the continuing degree 
of East Prussian independence and self-government: it was a formidable 
obstacle against any extension of Berlin's control, as tliis thesis will 
demonstrate. Native noblemen could be guaranteed to resist any 
centralising initiatives, and to uphold the traditional privileges of their own 
territory. Native East Prussians, for example, were the only ones permitted 
to serve in the Konigsberg Regierung, the highest authority in urban and 
rural East Prussian government at Frederick William Ts accession in 1713.
In addition, the so-called Ziinfte or guilds of Konigsberg held exclusive 
control over trade and commerce.^^ The Ziinfte, are another example of 
where the Indigemtsrecht privilege was applied. The East Prussian Estates 
regarded this privilege in 1657 as "the whole country's but, above all, the 
indigenous nobility's greatest benefices."^^
hîdigenatsrecht was of crucial importance to the East Prussians. But 
naturalisation could be used as it was in Brandenburg, for example, as a way round this. 
The degree to which this was used in East Prussia appears non-existent for their traditional 
institutions. A detailed study of its evolution and implimentation in East Prussia has not 
been undertaken. For some useful comments on this process in a Polish Royal Prussian 
context, see Zbigniew Naworski, "Indygenat W Prusach Krôlewskich (1454-1772)," 
Czasopismo Prazono-Histoiyczne, vol. 35:1,1983, pp. 31-58.
^^Hugo Rachel, "Handel und Handelsrecht von Konigsberg," Forschungen zur 
Brandenhurgische imd Prtiefiische Geschichte, vol. 22,1909, pp. 113. See also, Carsten, Origins 
of Prussia, p. 203.
^^Urkunden und Aktenstiicke zur Geschichte des Kurftirsten Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Brandenburg. Berlin: Reimer, vol. 15,1894, p. 402. Cited in Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. 
Aristocracy. Autocracy, p. 53.
Chapter 2 — The Struggle with the Estates
The Great Elector held a quite distinct view of how the Duchy should 
be governed, and he expected to have more effective control over the 
territory than the East Prussians, who were used to the former and much 
looser arrangement with an additional link to Poland, wished him to 
exercise. The Great Elector held a notion of rule, grounded in his view of 
sovereignty, that clashed with that of the Prussians. In 1661, he faced the 
"'unusual and unheard-of demand by the Estates that they be freed of their 
obligation as subjects if he did not respect their immunities and rights." 
Frederick William could not understand why he had to recognise the 
traditional rights of the East Prussians in order to secure their compliance, 
since these rights went counter to his ideas of sovereignty.
Although the Estates played a very important role in the government 
of the Duchy, the most important administrative body was the Regiertmg, 
which was intended to oversee the King's interests in East Prussia. The two 
most important matters which it supervised were the administration of 
justice and the royal domains. In fact, the Regierung saw itself as the 
principal East Prussian authority. It was also the principal vehicle for the 
upholding of native control over the Duchy's government. Tlirough its 
distribution of responsibilities to other authorities in the territory. East 
Prussian and personal interests prevailed. The power and privileges which 
this conferred acted as the basis for the East Prussian elites' control over 
government and administration. Even after 1713, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, Frederick William I found it very difficult indeed to overcome 
the Indigenatsrecht, and this was a critical factor limiting his authority in the 
Kingdom.
^^Radiel, "Der Grofie Kurfürst und die ostpreussischen Stande, 1640-88." Cited in 
Friedrich, "The Other Prussia," p. 456.
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This then, was a primary obstacle to any increase in Frederick 
WiUiam's authority in East Prussia. The Duchy was governed primarily by 
the "all-powerful" Regimentsmthe within the Konigsberg Regiert/ng. The 
four High Councillors, the so-called Obermte, who made up this group often 
ruled without the Elector's signature and were the "liighest officials of the 
duchy." ^ 7 In short, they were the elite among the local noblemen.
According to Schmoller, the Regimentsmthe had unlimited power.28 During 
the peak of their power, nobody was permitted to talk to the Duke / Elector 
without their permission and no one was allowed to write to him without 
the stamp/seal of the Knnzlei' on the document.^^ Part of the reason why the 
Hohenzollern rulers, as Dukes of East Prussia, were so politically weak was 
that the Obermte, although technically appointed by the Hohenzollerns, 
were in practice appointed by the other local native elite in the Duchy.
The nobility also dominated the board of district councillors {Landmt 
or Landmtskollegium) which controlled public administration. According to 
Otto Hintze, these district officials "behaved and ruled" similarly to their 
counterparts in Poland, the so-called Starosixj {starostiva)?^
Important decisions were made by three Estates; representatives of 
which made up the "smaE Consilium." The small Consilium comprised the 
four Oberrdte, the Hauptleute of the four most important Àrnter, and the 
mayors of the three separate urban communities that together made up the
27carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 205.
^^Schmoller, 'D ie Verwaltung Ostpreufiens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 43.
^^Ibid.
^^Otto Hintze cited in Walter Hubatsdi, Frederick Hie Great: Absolutism and 
Administration. London: Tliames and Hudson, 1975, p. 325. For an account of the Polish 
nobility in tWs period, see Robert Frost, "The Nobility of Poland-Lithuania, 1569-1795," in 
The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, vol. 2, Northern. 
Central and Eastern Europe, H. M. Scott, ed.„ London: Longman, pp. 183-222, and in 
particular, p. 199.
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major port and administrative centre of Konigsberg. Decisions were by 
majority vote and the nobility significantly outnumbered the representatives 
of the burghers, i.e., the three mayors. Although outnumbered, they stiU 
had influence and limited the authority of the Junkers.^1
One other important reason why the East Prussian Junkers did not 
completely dominate the territories' important decisions was because of the 
importance of Konigsberg as a trading centre. Konigsberg was not just the 
largest port in East Prussia but it was also far larger than any port in 
Brandenburg when that territory actually secured a port of any size in the 
mid-seventeenth century. Konigsberg's commercial importance that of its 
r./ burghers was widely recognised. Both the East Prussian Junkers as well 
as the Hohenzollern rulers accepted this and therefore shared their influence 
with the burghers of Konigsberg.
Frederick WilHam was only allowed to bring a few of his personal 
friends and reform minded Beamte into the province. He was never able to 
influence the affairs of the Duchy as his support never reached a majority. 
Those continually looking to the King of Poland for support constituted 
about half of the opposition of the landed interests.^^ Thus, Frederick 
William's authority in the rural areas was as limited, exactly as it was in 
Konigsberg. The nobility controlled the rural areas and constituted the 
second Estate. The clergy did not constitute a separate order in the tri- 
cameral East Prussian Estates. As the influence of the towns declined, the 
power of the Junkers rose. Some of the reasons for tliis was due to the 
Reformation which resulted in the elimination of the clergy from the Estates.
^^Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 205.
^^Sdimoller, 'Die Verwaltung Ostpreufiens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 44.
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In order to maintain the tri-cameral system, the Junkers were divided into 
upper and lower nobility
The first estate consisted of twelve Landràte or local officials who 
were given life appointments by the ruler who was instructed as to the 
choice he might make by the local nobility This group constituted the 
leading families of the Duchy. Until 1660, any dissenting Estate could take 
an appeal to the King of Poland.^
The period of war between 1655 and 1660 took a toll on East Prussia 
because it was substantially fought in the Duchy. Between one to thirteen 
cities and 249 to 260 market towns and villages were burned. Throughout 
East Prussia, 500 to 23,000 people were killed and another 5,300 to 34,000 
were taken prisoner and carried into captivity. An additional 8,000 starved 
on the resulting epidemic,^^ In the 1670s, the war with Sweden would take 
equally as great a toll. Tins was a considerable loss for the province as the 
total population was between 350,000 and 450,000.^7
^^Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 165.
^^Radiel, "Der Grofie Kurfurst und die osptreufiischen Stande 1640-1688," pp. 86- 
87. Cited in Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 204.
^Rachel, 'Der Grofie Kurfurst und die osptreufiischen Stande 1640-1688," pp. 206- 
207; Schmoller, Preussische Verfassungs-. Verwaltungs- und Finanzgeschichte. p. 62.
Rachel cited in Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 204.
^^Schmoller, 'Die Verwaltung Ostpreufiens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 45; 
Slawomir Augusiewicz, "Najazdy tatarskie na Prusy Ksiqtçce (1656-1657. Legendy i fakty," 
Koimmikaty Mazursko-Wawtinf,kic, vol. 3,1995, pp. 233-247. All tire liigher figures except for 
the number of villages destroyed are attributed to Schmoller while the lower figures and the 
liigher figure for the number of villages destroyed correspond to the researcli of 
Augusiewicz cited in the English language summary in Acta Poloniae Historien, vol. 74,1996, 
pp. 216-17.
^7carsten, Origins of Prussia, 202, fn. 4. The following topic based on pp. 207-210. 
Carsten states the following: "Using the death figures from 1688 to 1699, the earliest known 
ones, F .W.C. Dieterici, 'Über die frühere und die gegenwartige Bevolkerung...',
Mittheilungen des statistischen Bureau's in Berlin, iv, 1851, p. 230, estimated the population of 
Prussia as over 500,000 at the end of the seventeenth century. But this figure is almost 
certainly too high.... O. Belire, Geschichte der Statistik in Brandenbtirg-Preussen, 1905, p. 198, 
working backwards from the census figures of 1740, estimated the population as 358,000 in 
1688."
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The years of war between 1655 and 1660 critically impacted the 
future of East Prussia. As noted earlier, the war established complete 
Hohenzollern sovereignty over East Prussia. The peace agreement was 
guaranteed by Sweden and Poland in the treaties of Labiau (with Sweden) 
and Wehlau (with Poland) which were confirmed by both states at the peace 
of Ohva in 1660. After 1660, there was common recognition of full 
Hohenzollern sovereignty over East Prussia by Brandenburg's neighbours. 
The East Prussian Junkers, however, did not formally recognise 
Hohenzollern sovereign authority until after the meeting of the 1661/3 Diet. 
The crucial significance here is that from this point forward, if the East 
Prussian nobility found their privileges threatened, legally they had been 
deprived of an appeal to the King of Poland, and thus they could not play 
the Brandenburg-Prussian Elector off against their former overlord.^^ This 
does not mean that they did not try, as it is clear the Estates did attempt to 
do this into the 1670s. Almost as soon as the inlc was dry on the treaties in 
1660, Frederick William began trying to levy taxes directly in East Prussia 
and raising Konigsberg's port duties. To enforce vigorously this newly 
secured full sovereignty, Frederick William established the War Chamber, 
the so-called Kriegslcammer. Through this agency the military now enforced 
and collected taxation for the Elector.
From this point forward there was a decline which lasted through to 
the early decades of the eighteenth century. The East Prussian population 
suffered considerably, both from the ravages of armies and from natural 
disasters which devastated the land and the population. Between 1660 and 
1662, harvests failed. Add to this the burdens of increased taxation wliich 
were becoming increasingly difficult to meet and the added impositions of 
administrative corruption. The population grew frustrated and blamed the
3%id.
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Duke/Elector for their difficulties. The Estates were not consulted either by 
Sweden or Poland about the recognition of Frederick William's sovereignty 
and the Estates initially refused to recognise this, until the Diet of 1661-63, as 
noted above. They continued to believe they held their traditional authority 
and that it would be recognised by Poland.
Encroachment by Berlin upon areas of the Duchy's authority began 
during this period, but encountered considerable resistance by the native 
East Prussian elite. The years after the signature of peace at Oliva in 1660 is 
often viewed as the start of the Hohenzollerns' effort to establish their 
authority in the province. This period is significant for two reasons. First, is 
that the long dormant and previously ineffective military administrations in 
East Prussia were now revived to oversee virtually aU aspects of the taxation 
that was levied in order to support the Hohenzollern army in East Prussia. 
The Estates were no longer entrusted with financial administration, which 
was now given to the new territorial military Kommissariat who were under 
the Generalkriegskommissartat located in B e rlin .S o ld ie rs  were used to cany 
out the montlily collections, if necessary, forcibly This became an 
established foothold of authority which was later exploited by Frederick 
William I to circumvent the local authorities, especially when it came to 
financial matters in the Kingdom. However, it was very rare that a 
Hohenzollern ever was able to impose a pohcy on East Prussia against 
determined local opposition, as later chapters will make clear.
The second reason why the peace at Oliva in 1660 was important was 
that many East Prussian authorities did not, in the end, recognise these new 
bodies (the provincial Kommissariat and the Generalkriegskommissariat) since 
they were staffed by non-native East Prussians. Centuries-old privileges
^^See Appendix A, p. 352. 
^% id.,p.208.
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were firmly embedded into the East Prussian traditional elite's government 
and society. In other words, the new institutions were a way round the 
Indigemtsrecht.
The consequence of these two factors was the development of 
competition between the new agencies under Berhn's direct control and the 
province's traditional authorities.
The Duke summoned a Diet in May 1661. He intended this meeting 
of the Estates to be a forum for the East Prussian authorities to recognise 
formally his sovereignty. The Diet, which lasted two years, in fact became a 
gathering in which the Estates spelled out their demands for recognition of 
their established privileges and sought redress of their grievances, namely, 
troop withdrawal and the heavy taxation in the form of excise and tolls 
which was used to support these troops and was viewed the native ehte as 
damaging to the East Prussian economy. In addition, the early 1660s saw 
successive crop failures and grain prices soared. As noted earlier, this was 
particularly true in the 1660s. The combination of these factors meant that 
resistance against the Hohenzollerns grew and the Elector "was pilloried as 
the greatest tyrant and enemy of the p e o p l e . S i n c e  the East Prussian 
nobility did not yet formally recognise the Elector's sovereignty, they 
continued to believe that their traditional rights, where violated, would be 
protected by Poland. At one point during the sermon with which the Diet 
opened, the preacher, who was presumably chosen by the Elector/Duke, 
declared forcibly that privileges were nothing more than private laws.^^ 
Such statements, as well as others, only inflamed the Estates still further.
particular, the price of corn rose drastically. Urkunden & Aktenstiicke. IX, 
Number 1, p. 139 (October, 1660). Cited in Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 209.
^^GStAPK, Ostpreussischen Folianten, no. 672, fols. 19,23-26, Konigsberg, 1661, 
Landtags-Predigt, Bey der Zusammenlmnfft der Gesambten Loblidien Stande des 
Hertzogthums Preussen ... gehalten Durch christia Dreiem...." See also Carsten, Origins of 
Prussia, p. 210.
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The 1661-63 Diet in East Prussia is comparable to some degree to the 
well-known Brandenburg diet of 1652/ 3. The traditional historiography 
approaches both these meetings as a compromise between the ruler, 
Frederick Wüham and the Estates by wliich the ruler was granted limited 
taxation over the territory in return for accepting the Junkers' dominance in 
the countryside. This traditionalist view is most notably seen in the writings 
of Francis L. Carsten and Hans Rosenberg.^^ In brief, they both view the 
"compromise" between the ruler and the social elite as permitting the 
elector to raise and support his standing army with the tax revenue 
generated with the Estates' permission. This, in turn, necessitated its own 
administration which was the precursor to "bureaucratised autocracy" 
which was to emerge by the later eighteenth century.^ Although the 
present section is based to some degree on this view, there are others, as we 
shall see that provide a more complete explanation. For example, the 
peasants, it is suggested, became even more oppressed and operated in a 
more than ever restricted environment after the Thirty Years' War under the 
Junker. It was the elector who had given his approval in return to this 
supposed increase in domination at the local level. This view has been 
challenged by William Hagen who, in a study of Brandenburg, has modified 
the conclusions of both Carsten and Rosenberg.
WiUiam Hagen has correctly noted that the compromise theory 
which applied to the core Hohenzollern territory of Brandenburg, has 
prevailed because of the historical writing tradition which focuses on what
^^Cai’steii, Origins of Prussia and Rosenberg. Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and 
Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815.
^O tto Hintze, "Die Hohenzollern und der Adel," in Regierung und Verwaltung: 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Staats-. Rechts- und Sozialgeschichte Preussens. Gerhard 
Oestreich, editor, Gôttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupredit in Gottingen, 1967, p. 39; Hintze, Die 
Hohenzollern und ihr Werk: Fünfluindert îalire vaterlandischer Gesclùchte. Berlin: Paul 
Parey, 1915, p. 205. See alsoHagen, "Seventeenth-Centuiy Crisis in Brandenburg: D ie  
Thirty Years' War, the Destabilization of Serfdom, and the Rise of Absolutism," p. 304.
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he calls "the pohtical liistory and sociology of the central government and 
the corporate nobility."^ Hagen argues for the Brandenburg province in an 
essentially similar way to the argument advanced here as well in the first 
chapter through more detailed local studies, that a clear majority of peasants 
were socially and financially in better condition than both Rosenberg and 
Carsten believed. Hagen further argues that there was distinctive 
stratification within the peasantry of Brandenburg. This study endorses 
Hagen's modification in tliis respect, and will expand on tliis theme in the 
subsequent chapters that focus on the early eighteenth century and the reign 
of Frederick William I in East Prussia.
In East Prussia, however, the grievances put to Frederick William 
during throughout the diets of 1661/3 were more sharply focused and 
forcibly articulated than in Brandenburg, and focused squarely on 
fundamental notions of government. Throughout the 1640s and 1650s, the 
East Prussian Estates had been able to frustrate most all of Frederick 
Wilham's attempts to control the territory. One particular initiative was 
that of taxation. Frederick William as Duke responded to this resistance by 
placing military forces around Konigsberg and increasing the number of 
officials who staffed certain of the Berlin-controlled tax collection agencies 
located in the Duchy, principally the Kommissariat The landed Junlcers, for 
example, forced their own tenants not to pay the primary rural/land tax, the 
excise, while all mills not on royal domain land or otherwise not directly 
under the Duke's immediate control were pressured not to charge the excise 
on the services which they rendered.
In a relatively short period of time, the Estates were able to 
demonstrate to Frederick William that they could continue to disrupt 
severely the operation of government and in particular any tax schemes of
'^Ibid., p. 305.
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which they disapproved. In addition, to force corrective action on the Great 
Elector's behalf would have taken considerably more resources of personnel 
and money than he had at the time. Frederick William was forced to pull 
away the number of soldiers and Kommissariat officials in the territory. In 
addition, virtually all taxation aside from the excise was reduced to pre- 
Thirty Years' War levels.^^
The resistance continued, however. The Diet only came to an end in 
1663 after the arrival the Great Elector in person, who was preceded by a 
sizeable military force which now posed a significant direct threat. It was 
not used for any tiling beyond intimidation, as a compromise was reached 
before the use of force became necessary.
The continuation of the excise, together with general concern over the 
powers the Elector/Duke would hold if they recognised his sovereignty, 
began to split the opposition. Naturally, since the excise was only collected 
in the tovms it impacted primarily upon the burghers, who were most vocal 
in their resistance. Their leader in Konigsberg, Hieronymus Roth, remained 
firm in his belief that since the East Prussians had never been under the 
direct rule of any sovereign, the Polish King could not "cut off a free people 
without their consent."^7 More importantly, the Estates continued to look to 
days past when they complained to the Polish King that the Hohenzollern 
Duke "had left them 'with merely a shadow of the ancient happiness that 
our forefathers enjoyed on the basis of their liberties.'"^^ Again in 1661, 
while "negotiating" with Frederick William on an agreement, they were also 
writing to the King of Poland asldng again to be PoHsh subjects.
^^Carsten, Origins of Prussia, p. 211. It is assumed Carsten means the Tliirty Years' 
War as he simply states "pre-war rates."
47Ibid., p. 213.
^^Quoted in Friedridi, "Tire OÜrer Prussia," p. 448. The following topic is based on 
Friedrich, pp. 449-460.
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Roth continued his protests on behalf of the Duchy throughout the 
three-year long diet. He also represented the voice of Konigsberg against 
Frederick Wilhain. His essential argument was the fundamental one. He 
believed that in 1454 the Estates of East Prussia voluntarily subjected 
themselves to the rule of the King of Poland. Therefore the Hohenzollerns 
as Duke were acting illegally especially since Frederick William had 
unilaterally broken the agreement wliich established Poland as the protector 
of East Prussia's rights. The Estates were, in other words, saying that their 
approval to any transfer of sovereignty was essential for it to be entirely 
valid. When the Duchy became a hereditary possession of the 
Hohenzollerns', this changed their status without their consent. Not only 
did Frederick Wüliam not re confirm their traditional rights and privileges 
but he broke the hnk to their centuries-old protector, the King of Poland. 
Roth and the Estates, therefore, eventually were forced to agree to the 
Duke's demands.
One of the fundamental changes that Frederick William made to his 
administration of East Prussia was the introduction of the office of territorial 
governor {Statthalter) in  1657. The first governor to be appointed was 
Boguslaw Radziwih (1620-1669) in October 1657. He not only oversaw the 
Great Elector's interests in Konigsberg but also Warsaw where he was able 
to utilise his Polish-Lithuanian family's influence. Radziwill was born in 
Danzig but later lived in various places tliroughout the region and travelled 
widely as a teenager, for example to France, England, and the Netherlands 
where he studied, before settling in Konigsberg. In addition, he fought with 
his regiment on the side of Sweden during the first part of the 1655-60 war 
which was problematic for him and the Polish side of his family who were 
of royal lineage in the Kingdom.^^ Radziwill was also responsible for
^%<i*ollmami, Altpreufiisdie Biographie, vol. 2, pp. 530-531.
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ordering the military into Konigsberg during the 1663 diet. Although tliis 
last point made him particularly unpopular within East Prussia, it was not 
the most important factor for resistance to his appointment. More 
importantly, he was an unacceptable choice as governor to the East Prussian 
ehte because he was born outside the Duchy. Thus, his appointment by the 
Great Elector was in deliberate disregard to the Indigemtsrecht.
Furthermore, liis appointment as governor was an attempt by Frederick 
William to estabhsh a permanent ducal presence in a territory that was 
physically remote from the core territory of Brandenburg. Its capital, Berhn 
was where Frederick WiUiam, even though Duke of East Prussia, was 
required to spend most of his time. The personal presence of the ruler was 
crucial in the seventeenth century when political authority was personal and 
individual but which was now removed. By appointing a loyal official such 
as Radziwhl, the Great Elector attempted to bridge the gap in his personal 
authority within East Prussia. The East Prussian Estates viewed RadziwiU's 
appointment as a thieat to then leadership and authority in the territory.
The issue of an East Prussian governor became the most significant threat to 
traditional authority in the Ducliy and therefore was resisted strongly by the 
Estates, who complained vociferously. RadziwiU, although disliked for his 
religious orientation - he was a Calvinist - probably found that the dislike of 
him was more due to his title and role, rather than to liim personally. The 
Great Elector was now actively and directly involved in the affairs of the 
Duchy, and the post of governor liighlighted the fact that the province was 
not independent. That is, Frederick William was the reigning Duke and 
their sovereign, but - more crucially - he was usually absent: Brandenburg 
was still the most important Hohenzollern territory. These issues were 
particularly important to the East Prussian elite, who could not accept his 
near-permanent absence and the down-grading of the Duchy which this 
implied. This was especially so since all correspondence, including their
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grievances, was now required to go through the governor in Konigsberg.
No longer was the re, even a direct hnk to their Duke in person, nor to the 
former suzerain, Poland's King. They were made to feel threatened that 
they would soon no longer be recognised as the liighest authorities in East 
Prussia.
The burghers, who were numbered in the thousands, appear to have 
resisted the final decision to recognise the Hohenzollern Duke to the end 
and complained that such a decision could not be made by such a small 
number of noblemen. In addition, the two noble-Estates agreed to a tax 
which would be levied in the towns and was therefore opposed by the 
burghers. After first seeking protection from the Polish King, then trying to 
defend parts of Konigsberg from the Elector's blockade and likely attack, 
and the subsequent arrest of Roth for treason, the organised burgher 
resistance collapsed. Frederick William contributed substantially to his own 
success but his subordination of the Estates also resulted from the lack of 
support from the Polish King and the Polish nobility who were unorganised 
in their opposition to what was happening to their counterparts in East 
Prussia. The Estates felt abandoned by Poland, which had firstly handed 
over sovereignty, and secondly was preoccupied at this moment with its 
own domestic problems.
In the end, the first two chambers of the Estates were willing to grant 
the excise for a further three years only on the condition that excise 
administration would be restored to the control of native East Prussians, 
that is to say, the Estates themselves. When the Great Elector agreed that 
this settlement was satisfactory in mid-1663, some portions of the burgher 
Estate continued to object unavailingly to the settlement of the issue.
The consequences were broadly similar to those of the Brandenburg 
diet of 1652/53 and it is for these reasons that it has been viewed as a 
compromise. In practice rather little had changed and the Estates were
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more protective than ever of their position and rights. Yet the Elector was 
now able to support a peace time army in the Duchy by means of taxation. 
This was acceptable only as long as the Estates were not asked to support 
the army for wars outside of the territory, especially when it concerned 
disputes in Germany and within the Holy Roman Empire. The East 
Prussian Estates did not believe they should have to support wars which 
did not directly affect them, that is to say conflicts in which Frederick 
William engaged as Duke of East Prussia (and not as Elector of 
Brandenburg, or Duke of Cleves, etc.) The War of 1655-60 was clearly an 
East Prussian war, as the support of the Estates attested. This issue again 
came to the forefront in 1672 when the Great Elector went to war against 
Louis XlV's France. Two years later, the Elector occupied Konigsberg by 
mihtary force and imposed taxation through intimidation on the town. As 
Carsten boldly notes, "the days of burgher independence were over."^®
This verdict is, however, exaggerated. There was undoubtedly a major 
breakthrough for Hohenzollern authority in East Prussia but the burghers 
continued to enjoy a monopoly in commerce and retained a measure of 
political independence well into the eighteenth century. The landed Junkers 
were still in the same position and due to the need for peasant labour 
detailed in the previous chapter, with respect to Gutsherrsdmft, the peasants, 
although many were oppressed, were as a group less oppressed than has 
traditionally been argued.
The reason many see the 1670s as a period when the Great Elector 
finally defeated the Estates of East Prussia is because financial 
administration, after the period when it returned to the Estates after the Diet 
of 1661-63, was once more in the direct control of the Elector tlirough the
^^Cai'sten, Origins of Prussia, p. 221.
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GenemlkriegskomviissariatP^ This is significant because the 
Kriegskommissariat was filled with non-natives and was thus under the direct 
control of the Elector. The Kommissariat (as the agency that operated within 
East Prussia came to be known) was of critical importance to the Great 
Elector during periods of warfare when financial resources were crucial. 
Even in periods of peace, the KriegsJœmmissariat officials remained in place 
albeit with a more limited role.
It is in the last years of the Great Elector's reign that one can begin to 
see growing administrative rivalry between Berlin and Konigsberg. The 
Kommissariat remained consistently loyal and obedient to the Elector and 
would not recognise the authority or obey the orders of the Regierung or any 
other traditional East Prussian authority. Conversely, the Regierung, and in 
particular the Hauptleute, who traditionally controlled local government and 
administration, refused to recognise the authority and instructions of the 
Kommissaiiat
Moreover, one can also begin to see how Hohenzollern authority, 
especially when it came to financial matters, began to supersede and take 
over portions of the authority of the traditional East Prussian elites. This 
was particularly so in central government. Local government, however, 
remained clearly in the hands of the traditional elite. The consequences 
were seen in the contrasting situations which prevailed in the government 
of the Duchy's towns and in the rural hinterland. The Great Elector had 
managed to increase his authority significantly over particular 
administrative agencies which operated in the urban area of Konigsberg. In 
the more rural areas, Frederick Wilham was able to establish his authority in 
one important area in particular, tax revenue collection, but in general, these 
gains were more modest than that which occurred in the Konigsberg area.
^^Also known as the Kriegskammer or Kommissariat
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yIn addition, the Estates, although not rendered useless, were divided that no 
united opposition was attainable.
In the end, both the urban burgher elite and the urban and landed 
nobility lost some of their traditional political independence but retained 
much of their social privileges and status. Their loss of pohtical 
independence and, to a large degree, financial authority, was less complete 
since they retained a monopoly of administrative positions in most agencies. 
The Junkers could iU-afford to oppress the peasants and disrupt a social 
structure that had for long existed and which only recently has been 
recognised as more efficient than traditionally believed.^^ jji this sense, 
their self-interest was paramount. It is possible that the Junkers were more 
closely aligned with the peasants and burghers during the 1660s and more 
concerned about working out a compromise with them than they were with 
Frederick William.
The reign of the Great Elector had seen an attempt to extend and 
realign power within East Prussia. The struggle between the nobility and 
Frederick William's new authority was not an all-out war of annihilation 
against the n o b ili ty F re d e r ic k  William was instead attempting to 
establish a new and quite different political structure which inherently 
mandated that the nobility should give their whole loyalty and service to 
the Hohenzollern ruler and abandon traditional hnks with Poland. When 
the Great Elector was blocked in his attempts by the traditional territorial 
elites, the Elector attempted to set up parallel authorities to those of the 
Duchy's established eUtes. The Hohenzollern army was crucial to such 
success as he achieved. It removed many of the internal and external threats 
to Hohenzollern authority. The army "served as a Idnd of iron hoop which
^^Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in Brandenburg," p. 335.
^^Schmoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreufiens unter Friedridi Wilhelm I," p. 46.
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forced the various formerly separate territories together to form a larger 
centrahsed state/'M The weakness of the Elector in the 1640s was based on 
noble fear of losing their traditional rights and privileges, especially 
financial control over East Prussia. Frederick WiUiam established better 
control of these lands wliich were geared to bring in more revenues, which 
they only modestly succeeded in doing, and more significantly the Domain 
Kammer had the goal of being entirely ii^dependent on the ObeiratenP^ It 
was occasionally through a sizeable military presence, often placed in the 
separate territories that Frederick William was able to force his policies 
through. By 1661, Frederick William's authority was not unquestioned, but 
certainly more effective than it was in 1640. Nonetheless, the situation 
might have been very different had the King of Poland and / or the Polish 
nobility have decided to defend the East Prussian Estates.
By the end of Frederick William's reign, the Junkers continued to 
possess all powers on their own estates and retained their influence in the 
territorial assembly, yet the state was becoming only slightly more 
financially secure with increased tax revenues. In 1688, the Great Elector 
was nowhere near an absolute authority in East Prussia as the local elite 
continued to dominate the operation of territorial govermnent. The 
Duke/Elector had extended his powers over taxation, that was aU.
54lbid.,p.45.
55lbid.
CHAPTER 3 
East Prussia. Frederick Ill/L  and the Plague
Frederick III/I and East Prussia
Frederick HI/Ts reign (1688-1713) often has been characterised by 
liistorians as a stagnant period in a series of reigns considered to be an 
inevitable progression toward domestic administrative consolidation and 
eventually, international power which began with the Great Elector, in 1640 
and ended during the reign of Frederick II, the Great. The reign of Frederick 
III/I, in stark contrast to this progression, has been seen particularly as a 
reign dominated by court favourites and by apparently trifling gains, such 
as the opportunistic improvement of the Hohenzollern status among other 
European rulers with the recognition of a royal title based upon the territory 
of East Prussia. The heavy reliance on a single minister and court favourites 
has been seen as a significant break to that which the Great Elector worked 
to establish, more centralised administrative institutions. In short, the years 
between 1688 and 1713 are seen as a pause in the development of a strong 
monarchy.
After he ascended to the throne in 1688, Frederick IE/1 continued the 
trend, from rule by privy council toward rule through cabinet and collegial 
government. Leading administrative historians have cited Frederick III/Ts 
importance in terms of his commitment to these institutions, but have
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mentioned little else. His reign, however, was critical to the rise of the state 
and growth of absolutism for another critical reason. Namely, Frederick 
lU /I's political achievements in having the Duchy of East Prussia elevated 
and recognised as a kingdom of the Hohenzollerns by other European 
monarchies as well as by the East Prussian elite was critical in the rise of 
Brandenburg-Prussia. His reign should not be passed over as simply a 
period of rule by favourites or important for the Hohenzollerns' solely on 
the international scene. Tlie fact that the title was recognised by the East 
Prussians, albeit with much resistance, was a significant acliievement in a 
reign that went far to further set the foundation for the development of 
absolutism.
There is little doubt that the two ministers of Frederick III/I played a 
principal part in his reign, which as a result, can be divided into two distinct 
periods. First, were the years of Eberhard von Danckelman and second, the 
period of Colbe von Wartenberg.^ Consideration of their wider political role 
has more important significance than usually recognised particularly with 
regard to relations with East Prussia. Frederick III/Ts reign helps explain 
why the crown was secured, how it was secured, and why its location and 
establishment were important for Brandenburg-Prussia as a whole and for 
East Prussia in particular.
The internal circumstances that confronted Frederick III/I in East 
Prussia around the turn of the Eighteenth Century were not only formidable 
but also potentially dangerous for his sovereign power over the territory. 
This was, however, only a part of the challenge he faced. The external 
circumstances must also be considered. Both the Great Elector and 
Frederick III had for long sought a royal title not so much from within
^Carl Hinridis, "Kronpriiiz Friedrich Wilhelm I. Ostpreufien und der Sturz 
Wcirtenbergs," Altpreussische Forschungen, 16,1939, pp. 207-245; See also, Dorwarl, The 
Adminishative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 24.
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Brandenburg-Prussia but rather, from outside powers, namely the Holy 
Roman Emperor. A royal title needed external approval especially from the 
Holy Roman Empire. Frederick III/ Ts efforts began in earnest four years 
prior to his crowning of 1701. It was in 1697 that Frederick III once again 
recognised his position among the second tier of European Powers and this 
drove his ambitions. All around the Hohenzollerns there were formerly 
minor rulers gaining significant royal titles. This was part of the late 
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century vogue. For example, by the e;«-'^ ly 
'^e' '^^of the century, Frederick III saw his brother-in-law rise to be King George I 
of England, the Duke of Brunswick became the Elector of Hanover and the 
Elector of Saxony became the King of Poland. The Hohenzollern ruler 
recognised the international recognition that came with a royal title.^
After the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, Frederick III began a concerted 
effort to improve his position within Europe and employed subsidies to gain 
those ends. He felt shghted after the conclusion of peace at Ryswick 
particularly because he was not paid the complete subsidy amount he was 
promised for his efforts principally on behalf of the Holy Roman Emperor 
and William of Orange. The amounts were simply not paid and/ or were 
withheld. In addition, Frederick III beheved he should have received the 
principality of Orange as well as the guarantee of a royal title.^ In regard to 
the Orange lands, it was not until the death of William IB of Orange in 1702, 
that the Orange Succession was resolved. Frederick III/I was granted 
sovereignty over the lands as he was his closest living relative to the late 
William of Orange. At the time, this raised the issue of Fredericl&uccession
Vto the English throne wliich he had a claim, and on this point Hintze writes
^For several other examples, see Johann Stephan Pütter, Historische Entwicklung 
der heutigen Staatsverfassung des deutsdren Reichs. vol. 2, Gottingen: Vandenlioeck & 
Ruprecht, 1788, p. 389-90.
^Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ilir Werk. p. 272.
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that the English essentially looked elsewhere.4 As the lands were near 
France, it was Frederick's desire to keep these lands after 1702 that assured 
Brandenburg-Prussia would stay in the war to its conclusion. As the war 
pitted most all of the German states with Spain and the Netherlands against 
France, it was the inability of Brandenburg-Prussia to negotiate with the 
stronger powers that demonstrated Frederick Ill's position among the lesser 
German rulers. There was, however, an uneasy break between Berhn and 
Vienna for the year after the Ryswick peace. AU diplomatic ties were 
broken.
The Emperor, in November, 1700, again sought Frederick Ill's 
support with the offer of a subsidy treaty. A multitude of other minor 
events came together to aUow Frederick III to exploit this subsidy treaty to 
its fullest. Although the agreement on subsidies were at the heart of the 
agreement, other factors were involved. There was even mention of 
Frederick's conversion to Catholicism in order to keep a better balance of 
power within the Empire as well as the region, i.e. Poland. This, however, 
was not pursued for long although in Ught of the manuscript material, it 
appears noteworthy.^
Between the Peace of Ryswick and the subsidy treaty of 1700, there 
was a significant change within the Brandenburg-Prussian administration. 
Eberhard von Danckelman, who was Frederick IE's chief minister, was 
dismissed in disgrace soon after liis return from Ryswick. The lack of 
success earlier in the year at the peace negotiations — it was suggested he 
was not strongly enough in favour of a royal title and therefore did not push 
as hard as he could have to make this known to the other participants — as
% id.
^Max Lelimann, editor, Preussen und die katholisdie Kirdie seit 1640. in 
Publicationen aus den K. preussisdien Staatsardûven. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1878,1, pp. 367- 
384. Tliis section is entitled: 'Die Krone."
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well as his being linked to court intrigues and financial corruption all 
became too much for both Frederick III as well as for his wife, Sophie 
Charlotte who exercised considerable influence over policy decisions. Those 
surrounding the Elector, above aU the Electress, were able to persuade him 
that Danckelman had usurped many of his powers as a ruler. Other factors, 
such as the example of Louis XIV of France was important as an ideal of 
personal monarchy.
There is no doubt he had extraordinary authority for an advisor in liis 
position and whether these were recognised as appropriate until it became 
politically advantageous to use the charges of corruption and usurpation of 
Frederick HTs authority against Danckelman is open to debate, but it seems 
likely. Nonetheless, in Frederick III/ Ts Testament of 1688 he warned 
(seemingly himself) not to give too much authority to one individual which 
no matter the intentions of Danckelman appears to have been the case with 
him. Perhaps here he was thinking not only of his own reign but also that of 
liis father, the Great Elector, who initially found himself in a similar difficult 
position with the favourite Schwartzenberg.^ However, with Danckelman, 
there was, in general, full discussion of most affairs with the principal 
administrators and often with the ruler. Danckelman, it appears was able to 
manipulate final pohcy decisions witliin such pohtical discussion. Or, one 
might say, a powerful minister was anathema to a king - who wanted to rule 
personally, on the model of Louis XIV after 1661.
Frederick III/ Ts reign was one of unusually high expenditure at court 
when compared to his Hohenzollern predecessors. This was an additional 
reason foreign subsidies were sought by Frederick HI. One example that 
WÜ1 be elaborated on below was the coronation in Konigsberg in 1701. 
Subsequent costs after 1701 for the new royal Berlin Court meant
^Sdiwartzenberg had been removed by 164 L
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tremendous financial hardship during the last decade of Frederick III/Ts 
reign. There was a continuous need to raise money for expenditures of the 
court even before the royal title was gained. Danckelman was a voice of 
moderation. It was likely he was able to limit spending to some extent but it 
was clear he was unable to control all finances, especially the personal 
expenditures of Frederick III. Finally, Berlin traditionally was pro-hnperial, 
and as such would enter wars on the side of Vienna in the period. This was 
particular the case during the years of 1688-1714.
As the reasons why the royal title was secured as well as how it was 
secured have been discussed, it is now important to consider the internal 
factors and operation of govermnent both in Berlin and East Prussia during 
this period which often focused on the Berlin court. Danckelman was a 
competent administrator and advisor to Frederick HI. Yet, it was his 
inability to deal effectively at Ryswick on the one hand and operate within 
the Berlin court on the other that he was able to succeed with Frederick III^s 
confidence. This was also the basis for his later dismissal. He was, 
nonetheless, apparently hard working on aU matters.
Danckelman's concentration on the administrative affairs at court in 
Berlin and other international matters were what allowed the East Prussian 
govermnent to be left to the traditional provincial elites. East Prussia, one 
should remember, was remote from the wars of Louis XIV, In addition, 
Brandenburg-Prussia was neutral in the Great Northern War until 1714.
This is important in showing that the traditional patterns of authority could 
reassert or re-establish themselves.
The fundamental problems Frederick III confronted in his 
administration and finances date back to the first years of the seventeenth 
centuiy. In 1604, the Hohenzollern ruler John Sigismund, had made the 
Privy Council the primary central organ of Brandenburg's governmental 
administration, and some form of the privy council lasted more or less as the
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technical centre of government and administration in Brandenburg for 
approximately the next one hundred and twenty years: until the creation of 
the General Directory, in effect. The privy council had been established at 
the start of the sixteenth century to deal with foreign affairs, that is 
Hohenzollern dynastic affairs which fell outside Brandenburg but within the 
Holy Roman Empire. Hohenzollern territorial affairs in the seventeenth 
century grew in importance. John Sigismund hoped that a privy council 
would bring order among the anticipated territorial gains, namely Cleves, 
Mark, and Ravensburg (secured in 1614) and East Prussia (in 1618). ^  The 
privy council played an important organisational and governmental role 
during the sixteenth centuiy but to consider it as "the principal instrument 
of centralisation of the administration of the Hohenzollern possessions" as 
Dorwart claimed, is probably an exaggeration.® The privy council did not 
convert "the individual states, Einzelstaaten into first a united state, 
Gesamtstmt and then, in the eighteenth century, into a unified state, 
Einheitsstaalf' in the way that Dorwart suggested.^
The Great Elector re-invigorated the privy council after a dormant 
period during the Thirty Years' War when the war council, Kriegsrat^ 
assumed precedence in government. After 1640, matters of importance also 
continued to be decided upon in his own chamber, or so-called Kabinett, 
with just his few closest advisers. With other less important matter, 
however, the collegial system was developing and this system became a 
gradual trend within central administration in the early modern period.
During the first nine years of Frederick EI/Ts reign, Danckehnan 
took control of the privy council which, as noted, was the theoretical main
^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederidc William I of Pnissia. p. 9. 
®Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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administrative body which linked and ruled over the far flung territories. 
Under the Great Elector, the privy council had been reorganised in 1651 to 
divide the business affairs into quasi-departments. With this development, 
many of the decisions were left to council members although, the most 
important decisions, continued to be considered by the Hohenzollern ruler 
from within his own Kabinett "The privy council was becoming a judicial 
tribunal while the offices of finances, war, and foreign affairs, were 
becoming separate from the council."^^ Danckelman attempted to alter the 
privy council administration in the 1690s wliich allowed him to place 
himself in control. Govermnent adrninistration in Berlin began seeing a 
division of labour. It was by no means a bureaucracy. Tins government 
organisation made the privy council a consultant to the top council 
members. That is, the actual council members decided finally on all 
suggestions at their departments before passing on the recommendation to 
the ruler. Frederick HI/Ts privy council covered most other areas. The 
administration of central affairs remained in this structure until the 
establishment of the General Directory in 1723 under Frederick William I.
In 1698 government business took up  three or four hours of 
Frederick's day which was an increase from ten years before at his accession. 
This is partly due to the fact that after Danckelman's fall in 1697, he was set 
on being personally more involved with his administration. Soon, however, 
the elector found himself overwhelmed. In March, 1698, he commented to 
his daughter, Sophie, that there was "daily so much to do that there was 
either none or hardly any time left."!^ This is often used to represent his 
lack of drive and stamina that was so evident in his father, son, and 
grandson. Frederick III /1 had serious health problems that often made him
^®Frey and Frey, Frederick I: The Man and His Times, p. 74. 
lllbid., p. 85.
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physically weak and this is perhaps a better reason for his lack of stamina. 
Whatever the reason, the traditional view is that this provided an 
opportunity for a new minister to emerge and gain the confidence and 
ultimately, the upper hand of Frederick. This, however, was not easy as 
Frederick III was involved with his administration on a day-to-day basis.
In addition, it does not totally account for his achievements.
Frederick III/ Ts detailed and regular attention to matters of 
government was carried out in the mornings when he was given an account 
of that day's letters and dispatches by his secretary. Frederick most often 
delegated detailed questions of business to certain courtiers who would go 
off and work on the matter and report back to him in the privy council. 
Afterwards he would personally preside over the privy council. Here the 
King would meet with a few of his select advisers to consider major issues of 
state. This would normally last no more than an hour and after he would 
go back to his chamber and give his orders for the day. Aside from 
occasional casual talk before dinner with his prime minister or his early 
evening entertainment in the Tobacco College, his routine varied little. This 
daily pattern was maintained as much as possible even when travelling. All 
of this meant that Frederick III was working on and was involved with the 
day-to-day operation of government as it was then executed in the 
Seventeenth Century.
Under such an administrative arrangement, however, the court 
became filled with jealousy and in-fighting in order to win Frederick's 
favour. The English representative in Berlin, Thomas Wentworth (Baron 
Raby) wrote that "revolutions happen daily in the council of our little court, 
for what is advised one day and agreed on by one party of councillors is
^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Pru^ia. p. 7.
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obstructed and altered by the next day by another party."13 This often 
paralysed the court and ultimately government. Sophie Charlotte noted that 
her husband had "the strangest court in the world." 1^
Colbe von Wartenburg (1643-1712) emerged as a principal advisor to 
Frederick 111 after the fall of Danckelman. Wartenburg was a native of Hesse 
and first entered Brandenburg administration in 1688. He had the 
confidence of Frederick 111 until the crown prince, Frederick William I took 
the initiative in an investigation that uncovered serious administrative 
corruption in which Wartenburg was imphcated.l^ However, soon after 
Wartenburg's emergence he quickly dismantled many of the administrative 
structures that Danckelman established within the privy council in order to 
eliminate the administrative structures that had set himself and Frederick 
111/1 at an disadvantage. All of this, not coincidentally increased his 
personal power. In fact, he went even further and by directing Frederick 
Ill's regulation of 22 July 1698 "eliminated the privy council completely 
from political matters." With the fall of Danckelman, the privy council
stopped being the central point of policy formulation. Wartenburg saw his 
chance to gain considerable influence over Frederick III. He placed others 
within his clique in the position that Danckelman's circle formerly held and 
thereby filled the top ranks with his supporters.
ISprey and Frey, Frederick T: The Man and His Times, p. 71, 
l^lbid.
^®Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 225. 
Dorwart notes of Wartenburg: "A man of no administrative talent, he advanced himself by 
means of the boudoir, by flattery, and by diverting the court from boredom. He did not join 
the intriguers of 1697 but when Danckelman fell, it was Wartenberg to whom fell the mantle 
of the first minsiter. Never a member of the privy council, he directed Brandenburg policy 
for tliirteen years from his office of lord liigh chamberlain. By getting the royal title for his 
master in 1701...."
l^Ibid., p. 28.
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Frederick III, in 1698 was ruling from his Kabinett when he relegated 
all important issues to a Staatsconferenz, a few councillors who formed a 
cabal, Colbe (Count Wartenburg), Albrecht (Count Barfuss), Fuchs, and 
Schmettau.l7 With it and primarily through the Staatsconferenz, however, 
Wartenburg gained Frederick's confidence and proceeded to dominate 
affairs of the state with an annual salary of over 100,000 talersT^ The cabal 
now reviewed aU reports and decided the business of importance. As 
Dorwart notes, it was by a regulation of 2 December 1699 that this body was 
restricted more to important "state affairs"
In addition, the Staatsconferenz was slowly becoming more dedicated 
to foreign matters. One of the unexpected developments in this period of 
Frederick Ill's reign was the administrative rise of Fleinrich Rudiger von 
Ilgen. It was Ilgen who emerged as one of Frederick William Ts most, if not 
the most, trusted advisors in the early decades of the eighteenth century. 
But during the reign of Frederick 111, he was from the late 1690s onward 
more and more entrusted with important matters, and in particular those of 
international politics. By 1702, Ilgen, along with Wartenburg, were the two 
most trusted advisors to Frederick 111. Both were able to meet with the new 
King directly and not through secretaries or other advisory councils or 
individuals.^®
Wartenburg procured from Frederick a written statement that 
declared he would never be held accountable for his official actions. This
l^Ibid., p. 15.
l®Robert Freiherr von Schrotter, "Das preussische Offizierkorps unter dem ersten 
Konige von Preussen," Forsdmngen zur brandenburgishen und preussisdten Gesidtte, vol. 26, 
1913; p. 110. Cited in Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, Frederick I: Tire Man and His Times, p. 
86. For all officers in 1711 /12, see Forster, Friedrich Wilhelm I. Konig von Preussen. vol. 1, 
pp. 54-70. Compare to the salaries under Frederick William I, pp. 179-191,
^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 28.
20Ibid., p. 29.
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was out of fear of the consequences Danckelman suffered. Frederick 111 
clearly valued W artenburg's role as advisor and this was most evident when 
Wartenburg received the order of Black Eagle. He was only the second to 
receive tliis with Frederick 111/ Ts own son, the crown prince and future 
Frederick Whham I being the first. Most all of Wartenburg's personal 
success was gained without a solid administrative or political basis and 
ultimately his authority derived from Frederick in /T s personal support.
Frederick III/I ruled through this group that was led by Wartenburg. 
The group met and decided away from Frederick who communicated with 
them via private secretaries. Therefore, there were no established channels 
and secretaries became important to the function of government. 
Wartenburg exploited this link to his advantage by communicating his 
views directly to Frederick and by-passing the otlier officials altogether. 
With important matters, this meant the group was by-passed and 
Wartenburg gained primary influence with the King. The established 
departmental organisation became abandoned by Wartenburg's personal 
link with the King. The role of the privy council declined even further in 
this period and was further usurped by Wartenburg. The privy council 
continued to meet but the King's group in the Staatsconferenz, decided on 
important matters. Those not connected with the members of Staatsconfei^enz 
did not accept this quietly.
The international scene, however, kept the Staatsconferenz busy. In 
particular, Frederick Ill's quest for a royal title w <k$ at the forefront in the 
last years of the century. Negotiations in regard to a royal title came to their 
peak in 1700 when it became apparent that France was not going to accept a 
negotiated settlement of the Spanish Succession question, but that Louis XIV 
would uphold Charles ITs (of Spain) will which awarded the Spanish 
throne to the French Bourbon claimant. In such an event, the Habsburgs 
would need Brandenburg-Prussia's support in a struggle with France. It is
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at tlùs point that another subsidy treaty was proposed to the Hohenzollern 
ruler. The decision to support the Emperor and thus Austria apparently was 
not a unanimous decision among Frederick llTs principal advisors although 
Wartenburg was in favour. In particular, Bartholdi, Ilgen, and Fuchs 
initially raised questions about the likelihood that the Emperor would agree 
to grant the royal title to Frederick 111. In addition, the title would cost 
Brandenburg-Prussia too much monetarily as well as politically. Frederick 
III took care with his response to their concerns and paid particular attention 
to the issues of Brandenburg-Prussia's "dignity" as well as the financial 
restitution that would need to be paid to the Emperor.^^ Droysen notes that 
this document put an end to any opposition to the prospect of seeldng the 
royal title.^^ Frederick IE's commentaries on why he believed 
Brandenburg-Prussia not only deserved recognition but indeed had the 
right to hold a royal title has the tone of little thought to future 
Hohenzollern rulers. Frederick III stated his case that of course he would be 
king but at the same time he would as always be a good "Vasal des Reichs."^^ 
He mentioned nothing about how this would be guaranteed especially for 
future Hohenzollern rulers.
^^Several pages of Frederick Ill's response in facsimile form as well as a complete 
transcription of the response can be found in Eduard Heyck, Friedrich 1. und die 
Begründung des preufiischen Konigtums. Bielefeld und Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1901, 
found between pages 32-33. Frederick III notes, for example, on page 14 of his response: 
"Meine meinung ist auch dafi ich vohr alien Dingen des Keysets approbation versichem 
will. Ich wil auch respecta meiner Chuhr und im Reich habenden Lande mit meinen Mit 
Churfürsten in Collegial versamlungen nichtes neues pretendieren Es müste aber die 
Konigliche Dignitet auf Freufien, weil Ich alda Souverein bin fundieret, und bey den 
Preufiischen Landtstanden daliin gebradit werden, dafi dieselbe als aus eigenem Bewegnüô 
Midi ersucheten die Konigliche würde anzunehmen,...."
^^Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der Preufiisdien Politik. vol. 4:1, "Friedrich I. 
KOnig von Preufien," Leipzig: Beit und Comp., 1867, pp. 214-217.
^®Heyck, Friedrich I. und die Begründung des preufiischen Konigtums. document 
found between pp. 32-33, this dtation from page 15 of Frederidc's response to his advisors.
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Nevertheless, the Emperor as well as the European states not in the 
Holy Roman Empire agreed to recognise the royal title. It was on 6 August 
1700 that a courier delivered two dispatches to Frederick 111 from Vienna 
containing the final agreement of all the involved party states. The first 
package contained a contract for Frederick III to sign from the Western 
states binding him to his intentions and restitution. The second dispatch 
contained the Emperor's approval for the royal title.^^ In exchange for the 
royal title, Frederick was required to contribute ten thousand men in 
support of the impending war with France, the War of Spanish Succession 
(1701-1713/14). He was also required to pay over one-hundred thousand 
talers to the Emperor as well as drop all claims to subsidies promised to him 
in the past. In all future elections within the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick 
111/1 was to support the Habsburgs. Finally, he was not entitled to use the 
the King "of" Prussia but rather King "in" Prussia. Although this was a 
technical distinction it had supporters from various sides. For example, 
Poland was still in possession of Polish Prussia which had historical roots to 
the Hohenzollern portion of Prussia. The accepted title distinguished to 
some degree that Frederick 111/1 was King in East Prussia and not King of aU 
of Prussia, including the Polish region. In another view, this was a slightly 
more precise term within the Empire. It defined the Hohenzollern title as 
pertaining to only that part of Brandenburg-Prussia that rested outside the 
jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire. In particular, this was because 
kings could make titled nobles, wliich the Emperor wanted to uphold as a 
Habsburg monopoly within the Holy Roman Empire, therefore
p. 39. Heyck writes that "und am 6. August ritten die Kuriere mit zwei 
hodiwiditigen Sdireiben aus den Hioren Wiens; in dem einen lehnte die Wiener Regierung 
den Beitritt zu dem Vertrage der Westmadite ab, das andere ktindete dem Kurfürsten von 
Brandenburg die Zustimmung des Kaisers zur Annahme des koniglichen Titels an." No 
other information is available about these documents.
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Brandenburg-Prussia secured the title and associated privEeges only within 
East Prussia.
The Royal Title and Coronation
The negotiations with the Emperor and other Continental states were 
no doubt the most critical aspect in Frederick Ill's quest for a royal title.
There was, however, another side to the issue of the royal title which is often 
not mentioned by historians in discussions of the title. That is the East 
Prussian view of not only the prospect of a title but also of the negotiations. 
Outside the territory, the East Prussian elite presented tlieir objections to the 
Emperor while inside the territory, there was public objections to the change 
in status. Tlierefore, Frederick 111 had considerable objections and resistance 
to gaining a royal title from both outside and within Brandenburg-Prussia.
The East Prussians were no less resistant during the reign of 
Frederick IB than they were under his father, the Great Elector. Frederick 
Ill's negotiations with Leopold 1 were conducted without the direct input of 
the East Prussian elite. They, in turn, had little or no influence on the 
negotiations.^^
Moreover, as Frederick 111 was able to win over the support of the 
Emperor, as well as the other Northern powers, he was clearly unable to win 
over the support of the East Prussians. There is no doubt that for 
generations many East Prussians considered the Hohenzollerns heretics as 
they were Calvinist and therefore their rule over East Prussia illegitimate, no 
matter the title they held. In short, the house of Hohenzollern was 
considered foreign and of the wrong religion.
This matter went beyond the issue that the Hohenzollerns had 
converted to Calvinism from Lutheranism while most East Prussians
^^For the following section, see Friedrich, ^The Other Prussia," pp. 497-523.
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remained Lutheran. There was also the issue of sovereignty that was 
established centuries before. Frederick in considered the East Prussian 
threat serious and recognised that he needed the East Prussian elites' 
support for the title as well as that of the Emperor and other states. These 
issues had to be resolved if Frederick 111 was to successfully have the title 
recognised within his own state.
Frederick 111 sent one of his strongest native East Prussian supporters, 
Christoph von Dohna, to try and persuade the other East Prussian elite that 
Frederick Ill's quest for a title was the right course for them as well in 
probably late 1700 or early 1701. The fact that a member of the Dohna 
family was involved in this matter is not surprising. Not only was the 
Dohna name one of the most prominent family names in East Prussia in the 
eighteenth centuiy but it had been for prior centuries. Several members of 
the Dohna family had been crucial agents of Hohenzollern power in East 
Prussia.^® Dohna had enough success to be able to report back to Frederick 
in  that a majority of the Regierung, including the four Oberrate and Biirgmve 
of Konigsberg, would recognise his title should he receive it. In addition the 
Landràte also pledged their support of recognition. As Karin Friedrich 
acknowledges, however, one cannot say how strong this support was, as on 
several previous occasions all the East Prussian ehte groups mentioned 
above objected to the question of recognising a Hohenzollern title of King 
for East Prussia primarily because of the religious question as well
^^See, for example, Volker Press, "Das Haus Dohna in der europaischen 
Adelsgesellschaft des 16. mid 17. Jalirhunderts," in Reformatio et Reformationes: Festschrift 
fur Lothar Graf zu Dolma zum 65. Geburtstag. edited by Andreas Melil and Wolfgang 
Christian Schneider, Darmstadt: Tedinisdie Hochsdiule Darmstadt, 1989, pp. 371-402.
Press notes briefly, however, that the relationship with the Hohenzollerns was increasingly 
strained during tlie course of Frederick William I's reign, because, he writes "die familiHren 
Beziehungen waren gegenüber der Staatsmadit zuriickgeti'eten, in Preufien war sogar der 
Hof verkümmert, eine Basis jenes Verbindungsnetzes, von dem die Dohnas getiagen 
worden waren." Tliis is an important proposition tiiat will be followed-up in subsequent 
chapters.
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as the issue of Hohenzollern sovereignty. As short as only a year prior to 
the coronation, the East Prussian elite protested and refused to pay the 
contribution tax being levied in the rural areas. In addition, they protested 
the Great Elector's plans to build new Calvinist churches in the primarily 
Lutheran East Prussia. The opposition to Hohenzollern influences, political 
and religious, were for long a point of contention between Berhn and 
Konigsberg. In response to Karin Friedrich, it must be suggested that no 
matter how weak or even short-lived the support was for the royal title, 
Frederick 111/1 did receive the support he needed when it counted most 
from those who held sway over the internal affairs of the new Kingdom.
The East Prussian response was particularly strong and enduring 
after the title was granted and the coronation ceremony. The expensive 
ceremony was especially abhorrent as was the act of Frederick 111 crowning 
himself. Much has been made of this act by historians as primarily a 
testament to the secular nature of the title. There was more, however. For 
example, the influence the Swedish rulers had on the Great Elector and 
Friedrich HI. Frederick Ill's coronation was a "spectacle of Baroque 
glorification" and an imitation of Charles XII's self-coronation as King of 
Sweden in 1697. In addition, the ceremony was executed in such a manner 
as to "enhance the status of the monarchy
The coronation itself appears to have been steeped more in political 
significance than religious. The event took the air of an elaborate religious 
event, however. Religion had played a significant part of most other
^^Friedridi, "The Other Prussia," p. 499. Friedrich notes tliat "[tjhe influence of the 
Swedish model not only Frederick HI, but also on his father, has usually been 
underestimated. Remarks by the Great Elector, such as "ich schnarch die brüder (von 
Konigsberg) jetzt an auf schwedische Manier, ob schon mir nicht allzeit wohl dabei 1st", 
have been neglected (Jôrg Jacoby, Bogustaw RadziwiH. Der Statthalter des Grofien 
Kurfürsten in Ostpreufien. Wissensdiaftlidie Betràge no. 40, Marburg: Herder-Institut,
1959, p. 151.) Friedrich goes on to cite primary sources that describe tire East Prussian 
corronation sent back to Berlin by the British diplomat, Lonl Plantamour.
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coronation ceremonies in Europe. In all but a few, the ceremony and actual 
crowing was performed by a member of the ruler's church. Frederick 111 
found himself in an awkward position during the planning stages of the 
ceremony. He was Calvinist and the crowning was to take place in 
Konigsberg which was by and large Lutheran. There was no way he could 
accept the crown from a Lutheran and there was no way in which the East 
Prussians would accept the title given under Calvinist authority. When in 
the end Frederick 111 crowned himself as King and his wife, as Queen, he 
skirted the issue. In addition, he attempted to show all of Europe as well as 
the new Kingdom itself that he was not only the new King but also the 
source of authority. The Hohenzollerns while Dukes in East Prussia had 
virtually complete sovereignty already and the title changed, some argued, 
little in practice.^® Dohna, who later became involved in a debate through 
pamphlets on whether the title was legal, noted tliat the light of a sovereign 
duke is "to answer to no one under the sun except God."^®
Karin Friedrich has explored the resulting propaganda debates and 
concluded that the native nobility were less and less able to resist the image 
of Frederick 111/1 that had been created. In one of the first published 
narratives of the coronation, which had more than one reprinting, Johann 
von Besser established what was to become the standard interpretation of 
the ceremony and its implications for future Hohenzollern kings:
 ^ Ibid., p. 501. See also, whom Friedridi quotes, Peter Baumgart, "Die preufiisdie 
Konigskronung von 1701, das Reidi und die europaisdie Politik," in Preufien, Europa und 
das Reidi. Edited by Otto Hauser. Koln, Wein; Bohlau, 1987, p. 79. "Kings who receive 
their power from the estates of the realm wear their royal insignia only after being anointed 
.. but your Majesty, whose royalty was not founded on the will of the estates... but on the 
example of the most ancient Idngs, on its own foundations, did not have to consider sudi a 
tiling, as You previously possessed already the full set of Regalia due to Your sovereignty." 
Tliis is a quote from Johann Christian Lüiiig in 1701.
^®He went on to use Bodin and Pufendorf as support to liis argument. See 
Friedrich, ''The Other Prussia," pp. 507-8 who dtes Franz Lüdtke, Polen und die Erwerbung 
der preufiisdien Kônigswürde durch die Hohenzollern. Bromberg: Richard Krahl, 1912, 
Anhang, p. 10.
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"Since once upon a time, Prussia was a kingdom,... it was jealous of its neighbors 
who where monardis; its people, like the children of Israel, were moved by the 
gloiy of neighboring kingdoms, wailing 'give us a king so that we can be like 
others'... but all this has been helped by Your Majesty's coronation. Prussia has
become not only royal Prussia, but a kingdom itself."®®
The native East Prussians were made to feel important, in fact, 
superior, which permeated the Estates and urban elites in Konigsberg. In 
short, the mythical Borussican kingdom was used to legitimate the new 
Hohenzollern royal title. As a result, much of the former resistance as weU 
as the nobilities' attempts to seek refuge from the Polish King were "no 
longer mentioned," according to Friedrich.®^ The official portrayal of 
Frederick IB /1 was as a Prussian.
There is little doubt that this was the case. Friedrich has linked well 
these ideas with the events and ideas that were occurring in Polish Prussia.
It seems clear there was an impact on both Polish Prussia and East Prussia, 
One must wonder, however, m light of the following chapters, the actual 
extent that the Hohenzollerns were able to reduce resistance to their rule in 
the Kingdom through these types of portrayal. It had certain value in 
legitimising the new crown but as we shall see in the remaining chapters, 
resistance flourished. Therefore, the Hohenzollern m yth that was promoted 
has its place in this study but it must be seen in light of other factors as well.
In order to receive the support of the native clergy, Frederick IB 
arranged for two local religious officials to become bishops in order for them 
to perform the post-crowning "anointment." Frederick IB /1 noted after the 
ceremony that the role of religion in the ceremony was important in gaining 
the recognition as a "real" Idng within Europe, yet it really had little
®®Ibid.,p.511. 
® I^bid., p. 512.
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religious significance.®^ In addition, Frederick 111/I commented that his 
crown was equal in stature to any of those of Europe.®® To Frederick I I I /l i t  
was the achievement and recognition of the royal title that was important 
and not how it was fulfilled. That is, aU monarchs ranked the same in status. 
Power, however, was another matter.
There were complaints, resistance and outright obstruction to the 
royal title. Many of these came from within East Prussia but a significant 
number came from outside, principally from Poland.®^ It was not until 1764, 
a full sixty-three years after the crowning that the last diet (Sejm) in Poland 
voted recognition of the Hohenzollern title over East Prussia. ®® This was, 
significantly, long after the end of the union with the Electorate of Saxony 
who were rivals of Brandenburg-Prussia. The Polish King had recognised 
the title in 1701 and the diets were unable to unite and mount a significant 
objection themselves.®^ Within East Prussia, however, these objections
®%aumgart, "Die preufiisdie Kônigskrônung von 1701," p. 79. See also Friedridi, 
"Tlie Other Prussia," p. 501.
®®Baumgart, "Die preufiische Kônigskrônung von 1701," p. 75. See also Friedridi, 
"The Other Prussia," pp. 502. Baumgart notes: "damit in stimma zioimen S[eine]r 
ChurfilrstUchen Diirchlaucht tind anderen europaischen Konigen, in specie denen K'ônigen von 
Schweden, Denemarck und Pohlen in der Tihilahir und anderen ehrenhezeigtmgen kein imterscheid 
mehr hestehe."
®%or those inside East Prussia, see Friedridi, "The Other Prussia," pp. 504-23. 
Although it is outside the scope of tliis study, Friedridi traces the literary and in general, 
written accounts of protest against the Hohenzollerns. In general, it is sufficient here to 
note that this opposition was significant and wide-spread across the new kingdom.
®®Ibid., p. 502.
®^Part of the reason for this might be because of bribes given to them by Frederick 
III/I as well as the fact that King Augustus II of Poland had shown signs that he wanted a 
stronger monardiy against tlie dids. Uierefore, some of the diets looked to Frederick III/1 
for support against this from occtpiig — presumably because Frederick III/1 would be 
opposed to a stronger Polish king in the region as well. See Ibid., p. 503.
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appear to have been less prevalent starting after the middle of Frederick 
William Ts reign or roughly after 1730.®^
After the conclusion of the East Prussian coronation in 1701, affairs in 
the central administration were in the forefront again. Back in Berlin, the 
former privy council leaders worked to restore "the point of control of all 
government and administration to the council or to a commission selected 
from it by the Elector."®® This they failed to do and Wartenburg's 
domination over central affairs appears to have increased as he was named 
prime minister. Wartenburg was now structurally supported in an 
established administrative organisation.
Wittgenstein, who controlled all domam land, including the vast 
amount in East Prussia, and General Field Marshall Wartensleben were 
representative of the type of corruption that occurred in the uppermost 
levels of Hohenzollern administration. Wartenburg, Wittgenstein, and 
Wartensleben, known collectively as the - 3-W's - were able to place their 
interests ahead of the other advisors at court. In addition, they were able to 
block the interests of other principal advisors, for example, Ilgen. They 
regarded the territories. East Prussia for example, only as a source of 
immediate revenue and constantly levied taxes there to help with the showy 
undertakings at Frederick 111/Ts Court that ranged from Frederick WiUiam 
Ts three week wedding celebration, to the coronation of his father as king on 
18 January 1701, to the palace in Berhn for Sophie Charlotte.®^ All of these 
were expensive and severely strained royal finances and pushed the King 
into debt. The brealdng point came in 1709.
®^This is consistant with this study wliich will suggest in the following chapters 
that Frederick William I was only beginning to establish his autliority after 1730.
®®Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 28.
®®Roth, "The East Prussian 'Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 37.
East Prussia in Crisis. 1709-1713
By 1709, East Prussia experienced a major cris i s with a plague 
epidemic and the onset of a famine.^® Although Frederick William 1 had 
been involved with matters of state prior to 1709 - primarily with regard to 
royal domain affairs and the military - the plague in East Prussia was the 
most important event to involve Frederick William 1 personally, and 
especially with those matters which concerned the Kingdom. Up to this 
point, the government in Konigsberg, and more particularly, the East 
Prussian Domain Board, were struggHng with a financial crises and were not 
able to receive guidance from Berlin.'^l Not only was Berlin pre occupied 
with the War of Spanish Succession but also, within East Prussia, the 
problem existed that so many people were dying within such a short 
amount of time, that there was not just economic and social disruption but 
virtually complete breakdown. Therefore, not only was there a lack of 
effective administrative structures between officials in Berlin and East 
Prussia but also, there was a breakdown of many existing structures and 
agencies within the territory itself. Even the local officials, including the 
domain officials fled infected areas. One of the solutions sought by the 
remaining Domain Boards was to levy more and more taxes on the 
remaining domain peasants who were less and less able to meet their 
financial demands.^2 jf East Prussia was not losing its peasants to the
^®The best account of the plague can be found in Wilhelm Salim, Geschichte der 
Pest in Ostpreussen. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905. In addition, see the following: 
Roth, T h e  East Prussian 'DomaenenpaechteP in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 37-38; 
Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, g?. 17-19 and Skalweit, Die ostpreussische 
Domanenverwaltung unter Friedrich Wilhelm I und das Rétablissement Litauens, p. 10.
^iperveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 17.
42lbid.
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plague or famine, then the outright desertion of farmsteads was adding to 
the population depletion. As Roth notes, there was a drop in the 
productivity on the domains and as a result the territory's tax revenues fell 
which in turn, caused a cycle of deterioration to both the general 
infrastructure but more crucially to the East Prussian domain.^®
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the opinion of Otto Hintze, it 
was the period of Wartenburg that the crown prince, the future Frederick 
William 1, took the initiative to consolidate authority under his own 
direction.^ This primarily focused on domain administration, a matter of 
the affairs of state that he would devote much time to reforming after his 
accession in 1713.
The plague that began to spread in about 1709 in East Prussia is the 
most important factor in this regioris history in the early eighteenth century. 
It was what defined the territory for generations afterwards. Families were 
destroyed or at best, fled and became separated, virtually all farming was 
destroyed, government in the infected areas had broken-down as 
government officials fled. It was virtually total social, economic, and 
political disintegration.
Although the precise origins of the East Prussian plague are 
uncertain, it is traceable from Western Europe through Warsaw and Poland 
from about 1702.^ After it took hold in East Prussia, starting in about 1709, 
it reached Konigsberg by August of that year but was most devastating in 
the eastern districts of the province until about 1711. The Poles took strict 
precautions with regard to burning anything associated with an infected 
person and having a four to six month quarantine period. In addition, there
4®Roth, 'The East Prussian 'Domaenenpaediter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 37. 
'^Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ilir Werk. p. 267.
^Salim, Gesdtichte der Pest in Ostpreussen. pp. 35-43.
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was a complete break by Poland with East Prussia. Bridges and roads were 
destroyed, boats were destroyed on rivers flowing between the two, etc.^® 
The concern soon after 1708 also was shared by East Prussians who placed 
their own restrictions on links with Poland as the plague was becoming 
more widespread there. The harsh winter of 1708/ 9 and subsequent poor 
harvests fostered the spread of disease. One official noted in his diaiy that it 
was only on 15 May 1709 that the first ship arrived into the Konigsberg 
harbour after an unheard of hard winter there. The official goes on to note 
that "the ground still had been so full of ice at that time that no grass could 
appear and around the day after Easter (Pfingsten) no flowers had been 
seen."^^ As a result, poor nutrition from a lack of adequate food, combined 
with diseased water, generally poor hygiene, the air and most of all rodents, 
all combined to help the plague's spread. Finally, the plague was not the 
only epidemic that affected the region in these years. Tremendous losses 
were also attributable to typhoid, dysentery and small pox, Konigsberg 
implemented strict measures with regard to quarantine although the degree 
to which these were followed outside the city is not known.
More than 241,000 people died as a result of the plague and famine, 
which was more than a tliird of the total East Prussian population.^® Eighty 
percent of these deaths were in the north east province of Prussian
"^ I^bid., p. 36. On 21 July 1708 the Amthauptmann inRagnit reported the following: 
"Die Brücke darneben ist in Stücke gehauen und in den Fluss geworfen. Item so sind auch 
die Nebenwege vergraben," Sahm cites GStAPK, EM 107b which is a relatively large 
assortment of manuscript material that relates specifically to matters of the plague.
4^Ibid.,p.41.
^®Sahm, Geschichte der Pest in Ostpreussen. p. 150. Sahm calculated that in 1709 
total deaths reached 58,338; in 1710, the total was 173,508; and in 1711, 9325 people died as a 
direct result of tlie plague. Similar figures of total deaths cited in Terveen, Gesamtstaat und 
Rétablissement, p. 18; Skalweit, Die ostpreussische Domanenverwaltung unter Friedrich 
Wilhelm I und das Rétablissement Litauens. p. 10; Roth, "Tlie East Prussian 
'Domaenenpaediter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 38.
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Lithuania, the region which contained most of the royal domain peasants.^® 
This directly affected the court in Berhn since this was the area where the 
crown's workers and production most suffered and was the source of its 
income from the domain/ peasants in East Prussia.
The plague reached Konigsberg in the middle of August 1709.^® In 
Konigsberg, by March of 1710,18,000^^ residents had died from the plague 
while 6,500 fell sick and another 8,437 fled.^^ As soon as the plague began to 
spread westward from Lithuania, the domain councillors fled from 
Konigsberg.^® The administration quickly lost control over the local domain 
officials, who kept for themselves the grain surpluses sent to East Prussia as 
rehef for the starving peasants.®^
The East Prussian government was paralysed as a result of the 1709 
crisis of plague and famine.®® For many years prior to the crisis, the 
Konigsberg govermnent, i.e., the Regierung, and more particularly, the East 
Prussian Domain Board was not able to receive assistance from Berlin.®®
This was partly due to inadequate administrative structures that were 
comphcated by Berlin's pre-occupation with the Spanish Succession War. 
And the instructions they did receive were often not in East Prussia's best
^®Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 18; Roth, "The East Prussicui 
'Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 38.
®®Sahm, Geschichte der Pest in Ostpreussen, p. 48.
®^Schmoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreufiens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 46. 
®^Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 18.
®®Roth, "The East Prussian 'Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 38. 
®%id.
®®Sahm, Geschichte der Pest in Ostpreussen. passim.; Terveen, Gesamtstaat und 
Rétablissement, pp. 17-19; Skalweit, Die ostpreussisdie Domanenverwaltung unter 
Friedrich Wilhelm I und das Rétablissement Litauens. p. 10; Roth, "The East Prussian 
'Domaenenpaechter' in tlie Eighteenth Century," pp. 37-38.
®®Ibid.,p.37.
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interests but rather for the immediate interest and need of the Berlin court. 
The Domain Boards were forced to levy more and more taxes on the domain 
peasants in order to cover the King/s debts and court. The peasants were 
less and less able to meet these demands.®^ The central government in 
Berlin was quite unable to respond adequately to the crisis.
Communication with East Prussia had always been particularly 
difficult. The plague made connections even more difficult. As Terveen 
notes, the poor traffic network "virtually cut off [East] Prussia from the rest 
of Europe let alone one another's nearby neighbors."®® This was only 
improved in the eighteenth century primarily through improvements to the 
transportation network in order to exploit more fully the resources of the 
area, namely linseed, flax, yarn, hemp, smoking tobacco and snuff and 
coarse salt.®® This poor communication network allowed more control of 
govermnental administration by local nobihty.
The plague and famine that followed after 1709 gave the crown 
prince and his party the opportunity to move into the offensive against the 
Wartenburg regime, whom for long the crown prince had been opposed.®® 
The principal ministers, namely Wartenburg, Wittgenstein, and General 
Field Marshall Wartensleben focused attention on East Prussia, as 
mentioned, on ways to bring in more tax revenue. These plans were often 
not well grounded. "Wliile most govermnents were setting aside resources 
to cover an emergency or catastrophe," writes Michaelis, the government of
® I^bid.; Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 17.
®®Ibid.,p. 13.
®®Ibid.
®®Carl Hinrichs, "Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm I., Ospreiifien und der Sturz 
Wartenbergs," Altpreussische Forschiingen, 16,1939, pp. 207-245.
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Frederick III/1 "did nothing."®^ The issuing of directives for immediate gain 
by Berlin was to show them to be writing a prescription for disaster.
Frederick William I, as crown prince, became leader of an opposition 
party (Kronprinzpartet) in Berlin during the plague crises of 1709/10 and this 
party, helped assure Wartenburg's fall.
Wartenburg's position was not filled after his fall. In addition, it was 
at this time that more and more responsibility devolved upon the crown 
prince. This was in part because of his father's declining health and in part 
because his father simply wanted to prepare his son for the task he faced.
On 16 February 1711 and after two years of unsuccessful harvest 
resulting in further east Prussian devastation, famine, and plague, the 
Dohna commission was appointed by the King named after Count 
Christoph Dohna, a member of one of the most prominent East Prussian 
noble families. An initial investigation reported little and left more 
questions unanswered about the causes and continued effects of the plague 
than it answered. The crisis became too large for Frederick III/1 to ignore.
The King took action to start this royal enquiry after the initial 
provincial authority's self investigation placed blame on deep poverty, over­
burden due to military and tax obligations, and loss of capital from the 
Hoflmsse that was never traced. This initial report had four signatures. 
Ironically one of the signatories was Wittgenstein who was against the 
commission in prmciple and in the subsequent report to the King would be 
accused of "personal enrichment at the expense of the state."®^
Dohna was an early ally of the crown prince and he personally went 
to express his support to Frederick WEHam after the disaster became loiown
®^Wilhelm Midiaelis, "Die Staatskrise Preufiens in den Jaliren 1709/10. Der Ruin 
des Landes, seine Ursachen und der Reformbeginn," Geschichte in Wissenschafl und 
Unterricht, 24:3, Mardi 1973, p. 157.
®%id., p. 159.
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and shared his opposition to Wartenburg. Dohna had been made a Real 
Privy Councillor after aiding in Danckehnan's fall but left his position in 
1702 because of his opposition to Wartenburg's regime. It was in this period 
that he started his close alliance with Frederick William I.®®
After the Dohna Commission was appointed, it was sent to 
Konigsberg to take over authority of local administration until the situation 
could be brought under control.®^ This group was also to investigate the 
causes of the disaster in East Prussia. From Konigsberg, the Commission 
reported to Berlin that there were two reasons that were increasing the 
disaster's effects. Those peasants who were surviving the famine and 
plague were looting and acquiring property of plague victims and often 
would then become infected themselves. This, the commission thought was 
the minor cause and a result of the "low cultural level of the Lithuanian 
peasants."®® The commission found that the plague was a "convenient 
excuse to cover up the complete disorganisation of provincial and local 
administration." ®®
When the commission tried to examine the domain estate account 
books for 1709-1710 that were left behind by the fleeing Konigsberg domain 
councElors, it was able to find records for only three of 79 estates. Whether 
or not these accounts had ever been submitted was difficult to determine 
since the board's registry was partially eaten by mice. This then was the
fn.29.
®®Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 227,
®^erveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 19.
®®Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement pp. 19-21; Skalweit, Die ostpreussische 
Domanenverwaltung unter Friedrich Wilhelm I und das Rétablissement Litauens, pp. 11-18. 
Cited in Roth, "Tlie East Prussian 'Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 38.
®®Ibid.
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state of the domain administration, a critical source of revenue for the House 
of HohenzoUern in East Prussia at the accession of Frederick William I.®^
Another important conclusion found Wittgenstein involved with 
much of the corruption as noted above and it subsequently led to his and his 
supporters' fall. Kameke became Wittgenstein's successor but only as the 
president of the Hoff<ammer^  ^and Schattilhoesens.^^ He was later made Stmts 
und Kriegsmeistei^ under Frederick William I but dismissed in 1718 "in the 
highest disgrace"^® as a result of the Kléement intrigue.
This, then, was the general condition of the government in East 
Prussia at the accession of Frederick William I in 1713. The Dohna 
Commission had made a reasonable attempt at finding the causes of the 
plague and the reasons for its continuation. However, the government 
remained inactive in paralysis, unstable and incompetent. To have stability 
and competence in the territory, the East Prussians would pay, what was for 
them, a high price. And for the King, Roth notes one last important result:
The Hohenzollern s were unable to exploit their landed patrimony in the 
province because they lacked an effective administrative apparatus to 
prevent local noble officials from misappropriating domain revenues. Tliis 
situation was tolerable only because the rulers' expectations relative to the 
domain and its potential were low. The reign of Frederick William I
marked a significant change, both in attitude and in action.^^
®7lbid.
®®Under Frederick William I the name changed to the General Finance Directoiy
®®Michaelis, "Die Staatskrise Preufiens in den Jaliren 1709/10," p. 159. The 
Sdiattule was primarily found in the core Hohenzollern temtory of Brandenbuig and was a 
tax received from each Âmter in the form of payment-in-kind.
7®Ibid.
^^See Chapter Six, p. 253.
^^Roth, 'The East Prussian 'Domaenenpaechter' in tlie Eighteenth Century," pp.
38-39.
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A large portion of the blame for the rapid collapse of East Prussia 
after the plague first struck and its enduring impact rests with the continued 
exploitation and corruption of Wittgenstein and Wartenburg. In late 1710 
and early 1711, the crown prince successfully used his influence to curb 
some of the problems Frederick William I saw at court. His experience of 
witnessing corrupt favourites taking control of large areas of government 
was seen by the young Frederick William as an abdication of kingship. The 
King subsequently noted as much in his instructions to his youthful 
successor, the future Frederick the Great. Frederick Wilham I explained:
Your finances must be managed by yourself and alone and the command of the 
army ordered by yourself and alone and the two matters arranged alone; then 
you shall have authority in the army through command and the love of your 
officers and civil servants because you alone have control of the purse, and you 
shall be respected and admired by the entire world by you being such a wise
and honourable ruler. May Almighty God help you. Amen.^^
Although Frederick William I had close personal advisors none were 
as powerful as those under previous Hohenzollerns. Frederick William 1 
saw himself as his best personal advisor. Moreover, no particular minister 
or favourite, except possibly Heinrich Rudiger von llgen, ever secured the 
dominant position under Frederick William 1 that various men had enjoyed 
at Ms father's court.
At the level of central administration in Berlin, Frederick William 1 
embarked on a more centralised approach to administration and 
government in general beginning in 1709. TMs was a change in a long 
standing Hohenzollern attitude toward administration especially in East 
Prussia. Frederick William 1 was not, however, able to significantly alter the 
traditional administrative workings and what he did accomplish occurred
73written, Potsdam, January 22,1722.Dietrich, editor. Die politischenTestamente 
der Hohenzollern, Berlin: Bôhlau, 1986, p. 224.
Chapter 3 — East Prussia in Crisis. 1709-1713 136
slowly. In East Prussia, at least, the King merely alerted the East Prussian 
nobihty, who were to find their territorial authority subject to change. In 
short, Frederick William 1 was not yet king.
Frederick William Ts personality was important but such 
overwhelming attention by historians to this facet of Brandenburg-Prussia 
in this period leaves much of his reign open for investigation. His personal 
will and own actions alone could not have completed this development and 
nor could he change Prussia into a body with a Prussian GeistJ^ The army, 
cameralism, the Junkers, Pietism, the ruler's drive and abilities to change, 
better communications, etc., all came together under Frederick Wilham 1 and 
appear to be shaped initially by the events of 1709/10.
Frederick Wilham 1 grew up being instilled with values of "Prussian 
growth" and "Prussian development" especially since he was often exposed 
to government affairs from an early age/S For almost ten years before his 
accession to the throne, Frederick Wihiam 1 took part in the highest levels of 
HohenzoUern government, mihtary and finance. Much of what Frederick 
Wihiam 1 learned about kingship came relatively early in his youth while 
still crown prince. He was introduced to the day-to-day operation of 
Brandenburg-Prussian government starting at age thirteen when in 1701 he 
began to attend meetings of the high level advisory to the King, the so- 
called Geheime. Rat (Privy Council), and became a formal participant a year 
later. Here the Crown Prince was witness to the deficiencies of central 
administration and its inability to effectively operate at the territorial and 
local levels. In 1703, he began to take part in the Geheime Kriegsrat (Privy 
War Council), an agency established by Frederick Wihiam Ts grandfather.
regard to this point and Pietism, see Richard L. Gawthrop, "For the Good of 
Thy Neighbor: Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Spener, Franche, 
Frederick William I)." Ph. D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1984, p. 2.
^^Gerhai'd Oestreidi, Frederick William I. Preufiischer Absolutismus. 
Merkantilismus. Militarismus. Gottingen: Mustersclimidt, 1977, p. 12.
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the Great Elector, which oversaw all military treasuries as well as all matters 
surrounding supply and administration of the army. Also at age thirteen he 
was given his first practical military experience when he took command of 
his own company of cadets. The active involvement in high-level 
operations of government and military on a day-to-day basis was to prove 
valuable experience for him in the administration, financial, technical, and 
tactical aspects of managing and controlling the military after he would 
become king. He was introduced to the responsibilities of personal financial 
management when he received the austere palace located South-East of 
Berlin, Schlofi Wüsterhausen as a Christmas gift from his father in 1698 (age 
9). Although this palace would provide a lifetime of comfort to Mm, it also 
obliged him at a relatively young age to personally manage Ms household 
budgets, the structural maintenance, and a staff wMch were aU necessary for 
the smooth operation of Ms household. He gained wMle a young prince, 
therefore, an exceptionally intense level of exposure and involvement in 
Mgh level governmental, military, and financial matters wMch were to 
influence Ms actions as king. He had become weU-versed in the details of 
kingsMp and the decision maldng process due to Ms close personal 
involvement in the matters of the Hohenzollern government.^^ This was not 
an education that was forced upon him but rather, an upbringing that 
developed and instilled a umque knowledge for detail.77 As crown prince, 
Frederick William 1 saw "the practical fundamental weakness that a new 
Prussian monarchy f a c e d . " 7 8  Frederick I I I / 1  did not oversee his own 
financial affairs and left these in the hands of Ms leading mimsters who
^^Wolfgang Neugebauer, Die Hohenzollern. vol. 1, Anfange. Laiidesstaat und 
monarcbische Autokratie bis 1740. Stuttgart: Kolilhammer Verlag, 1996, pp. 192-197 passim.
77oestreich, Frederick William I. Preufiisdier Absolutismus. Merkantilismus. 
Militarismus. p. 26.
78lbid.
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frequently took improper advantage of their position. For example, 
Oberkammerhen Reichsgraf Colbe von Wartenberg sought the crown 
prince's support in intrigue but Frederick William I often was able to avoid 
becoming involved.7^
7%id., p. 27.
CHAPTER 4
Frederick William Ts First Decade. 1713-22
The East Prussian Regiertmg, 1713-1722
Administrative reform during Frederick William Ts reign was a 
continuing process and not a single event. A series of significant 
innovations in government were introduced tliroughout the reign. The 
supervision over the collected revenues from the territorial domain 
administrations shifted away from the Hoflmmmer to the new coUegially 
organised General Finance Directory on 27 March 1713. In tlie very next 
year (1714) there was an important change in the control over the East 
Prussian Kommissariat In 1716, the so-called Waldburg Reforms estabUshed 
a Kommissare for the Kingdom's urban affairs which was staffed almost 
exclusively by officials who were born in East Prussia. And in 1723, aU the 
Hohenzollern's lands experienced the administrative changes that 
accompanied the setting-up of the General Directory. The King estabhshed 
a department for foreign affairs in 1728, the so-called Auswiirtiges A m t 
Smaller changes followed, for example the addition of central 
administrative departments for Religious and judicial affairs, both in 1738.
Within East Prussia itself, the King continued the policy he began in 
Pomerania and divided the East Prussian Kriegs und Domanenkamma' into
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two administrative units in February 1723.^ One agency was located in
Konigsberg and held administrative jurisdiction over the Kingdom's
Western regions. The other agency was based in Tilsit in the eastern district
of Gumbinnen and covered the so-called Lithuanian and Polish districts in
the east of the Kingdom.^ This administrative re-structure was a practice
used with other agencies outside the Kingdom and first adopted at the start
of Frederick William Ts reign.^ None of these innovations — not even the
setting up of the General Directory — on its own fundamentally altered East
Prussian administration. Their cumulative effect, however, was to change
permanently both the institutional framework of government and the way
in which it operated. The reforms which Frederick Wilham I attempted to
impose upon East Prussia were occasionally stringent, but they were not 
yalways full implemented. The outcome and results of such reforms wiU be 
the subject of subsequent chapters. This present chapter will examine the 
operation of government during the first decade of Frederick William Ts 
reign: coincidentally the ten years before the setting up of the General 
Directory. In particular, by highhghting the continuing importance of the 
East Prussian Regierung, the traditional nature and functioning of 
government in the Kingdom will be demonstrated. It will also clarify the 
impact of the King's reform efforts upon the established ehtes of the 
territory.
The native East Prussian elite governed more or less completely at 
Frederick Wüham Ts accession in 1713. The innovations attempted by the
^GStAFK, Gen. Dir., Ostpreufien, H-Materien, Nr. 1843. ABB, 4:1, pp. 55-64. TMs 
follows the separation of financiM affairs under the General Finance Directory in East 
Prussia in 1714 which were subsequently reunited prior to the establislunent of the General 
Directory in 1723.
^See Map, p. viii, and Appendix F, pp. 380-84.
%ee the material cited in the first footnote.
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Great Elector had had little permanent impact, and the Kingdom's native 
elites had consolidated their power during the reign of Frederick III/L^
Their authority was institutionalised principally in the Konigsberg Regierung 
whose members often governed without reference to Frederick Wihiam 1 
and the royal authorities in Berlin.^ They made up the supreme governing 
body in East Prussia at Frederick Wilham Ts accession. The Regierung was 
integral to the operation of virtually every aspect of govermnent. The 
advances against local administration made by the Great Elector, 
particularly in financial affairs, had often been supervised by or associated 
in some way with the Regierung.^ The Regierung also continued to supervise 
a number of agencies that were responsible for royal domain lands, 
exercised authority over many civil, fiscal, and mihtary affairs, as well as the 
selection of administrative personnel, and most significantly, over affairs of 
justice.7 In practice, they supervised officials and their work at almost every 
level of government witliin the Kingdom.
The two most important matters supervised by the Regierung were 
justice and the Domain Board.^ Its members, the four Regierungsrate or 
Oberrate, came from the four so-cahed Oberrate Hofaniter,^ namely the
'^See Chapters 2 and 3.
^See Appendix A, p. 352. Organisational chart detailing Central and East Prussian 
government between the acession of Frederick William I in 1713 and the establislunent of 
the General Directory in 1723.
^See above. Chapter 2.
7see Appendix A, p. 352.
^Some affairs, however, were under the authority of the district captains, 
Hauptamtmamter, for example, the judicial magistrates,
^Sometimes these officials are called Ober- und Regimentsrate, although since the 
late seventeenth centuiy, the nomenclature Obervat became customary. Also known as 
Hofdmter See Richard Eydtkuhnen Ecker, "Die Entwicklung der Koniglich Preufiisdien 
Regierung von 1701 bis 1758," Ph. D. Dissertation, Koniglichen Albertus=Universitat zu 
Konigsberg i. Pr., Konigsberg: Buch= und Steindruckerei Otto Ktimmel, 1908, pp. 9-10.
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Landhofnieister, the Oherburggi^af  ^ , the Kanzler, and the Obertmrschall. In 
extraordinary cases, the Regierungsrate were "obliged" to call in and 
question the Hauptleute of the four oldest and highest ranking East Prussian 
districts: Amt Brandenburg, Amt Schaaken, Amt Fischausen, and Amt 
Tapiau.^® In addition to the Hauptleute, the Regierungsrate in certain cases 
consulted the mayors of the three towns that made up the city of 
Konigsberg: Altstadt, Kneiphof, and Lobenicht.^^
The nobility of East Prussia were usually not as wealthy as Junkers of 
other Hohenzollern territories. One might expect that since East Prussia had 
marginally better soil than Brandenburg and Pomerania, and since the 
Kingdom was largely an agrarian based economy, that the East Prussian 
nobility would have been more prosperous. In addition, the East Prussian 
Junkers had been liable on occasion to direct taxation (unlike elsewhere) and 
this worsened their financial position. There was, however, a larger lesser 
nobility. In addition, the continuing practice of partible inheritance 
maintained relative poverty.
Prospective members for the Regieiimg would only be considered if 
they were noble and most importantly, of East Prussian birth.^^ A broader 
point here is not merely the influence of the Indigemtsrecht but also the 
traditional mode of government through local noblemen. Although the 
office of Regierungsrate conferred considerable political and social prestige, it 
was a post that brought no salary but with fees, perquisites of office and so 
forth, as will be discussed later. It remained an authoritative bastion of
p. 9.
^^See the discussion of the Generalhufenschofi below, pp. 143ff.
^%cker, "Die Entwicklung der Kôniglich Preufiischen Regierung von 1701 bis 1758,
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native views and a fundamental source of authority weU into Frederick 
William Ts reign. An East Prussian Junker believed he was the natural ruler 
of the territory, he had a duty to assist in its governance, and this idea was 
supported by noble control over the powerful Regierung that was filled only 
by men of similar East Prussian native birth. The Regierung as the highest 
territorial authority generated respect through its corresponding elevated 
standing within East Prussian society. To a member of the Regierung, his 
social pre-eminence was directly related to his administrative position: 
each reinforced the other. A Regierungsrat saw hhnself first and foremost as 
the upholder of law and order.
It was not until the 1730s that a reduction in the power of the 
Regierung can be detected. Before this time, Frederick William 1 attempted 
to check the authority of the Regierung by elevating that of a rival 
administrative body; the royal Kriegs und Domanen Kammer and, 
presumably, by the Kommissariat.^^ This was a characteristic strategy of 
would-be absolutists all over Europe. It was, however, only partially 
successful. The native East Prussian ehte remained a political and social 
force at least until the end of Frederick William Ts reign because the 
Kingdom's Junkers were able to retain much of their administrative 
authority and income, and in particular, to maintain social and 
administrative dominance. East Prussian government and society were 
based on the arrangement that the Junkers were in complete control of rural 
affairs and the administration of justice, while local burgers controlled 
urban affairs, particularly in the towns which made up Konigsberg.
The status of the Junkers came from their dominance over 
government, which in turn enabled them to collect and control taxation. 
They themselves traditionally were totally exempt from paying direct
^^See below, Chapter Five, pp. 213ff.
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taxation except in certain wartime years which set them even further apart 
from those who did. Their status was partly diminished through the 
introduction of the Generalhufenschofi in 1715, a tax on the nobility but one 
that only kept them in check to a certain degree. The Generalhufenschofi was 
part of a larger round of reforms outlined in 1715 by Karl Heinrich 
Erbtruchsefi und Graf von Waldburg, a former high ranking officer in the 
Hohenzollern army, who set out Ms proposals in a report to Frederick 
William Waldburg was a Generalleutnant and Anithauphnann in Amt 
Angerburg. After serving in the Saxon army, he joined the Brandenburg- 
Prussian service in 1705 shortly thereafter he was badly wounded in 
Flanders and left the army altogether. He retmned to East Prussia where he 
took over the Verweserschaft in Amt Marienwerder and Riesenburg in 1711. 
His rise in Frederick Wihiam Ts favour seems to have begun during the 
plague of 1709/11 when he was one of the very few native East Prussian 
officials to protest against the disorgamsation and corruption in territorial 
admimstration. One of the projects he carried out for the King was the 
introduction of the Generalhufenschofi. He went on to become the first native 
East Prussian to head the Kriegs und Domanenlmnmer in 1721. In short, he 
emerged as one of, if not, the most important native East Prussians to work 
with the King on many of Ms most significant reform projects in the 
Kingdom.^^ Many of the reforms in wMch Waldburg was involved and 
especially the Generalhufenschofi were resented by the East Prussian nobihty. 
Complaints about tMs tax continued from its introduction weU into the 
1730s.17 successful introduction and implementation therefore was 
slow in its reahsation and never met the imtial expectations of Waldburg or
15ABB, 2, pp. 294-295.
^^Krollmann, Altpreufiisdie Biographie. Vol. 2, p. 747. 
^^Neugebauer, Polititischer Wandel im Ostea pp. 71-72.
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the King.
Historians have traditionally explained Brandenburg-Prussian 
government by dividing it into four broad functions: military, fiscal, judicial, 
and general administrative. Tins approach to the actual operation of 
Hohenzollern government in East Prussia can be misleading, since there 
was considerable overlap both of personnel and of function between these 
various areas of policy. The individuals who carried out their duties in one 
of these areas were often involved in at least one other at the same time and 
responsibilities frequently overlapped. Some individuals, especially those 
at the local level of government, had responsibilities covering virtually all 
the judicial, fiscal, mihtary, and administrative affairs of their area. In the 
eighteenth century, moreover, salary was not related to rank but was 
instead tied to the number of positions held. An official's remuneration 
therefore comprised all the separate salaries attached to each separate 
position held.l®
These arrangements encouraged neglect and even corruption, since 
so many of the day-to-day functions of govermnent were controUed by one 
nobleman. According to Weih, "[t]his, it might be added, was the main 
reason why so many ministers occupied such an odd assortment of 
positions, for the assignment was primarily made because of the emolument 
which went with the position with the minister's previous occupation or 
experience."
Throughout Frederick Wüham Ts reign and particularly during its
^^Herman Weill, Frederick Me Great and Samuel von Cocceji: A Study in the 
Reform of the Prussian Tudidal Administration. 1740-1755. Tlie State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin for the Department of History, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1961, p. 12.
^^Ibid. See also, Adolf Thiesing, "Die Geschichte des preussischen 
Justizministeriums," in 200 Tahre Dienst am Redit: Gedenksclirift ans Anlass des 200- 
jalirigen Gründungstages des Freussisdien Tustizministeriiims. edited by Franz Gürtner, 
Berlin: R. V. DeckeTs Verlag, 1938, p. 32. This is the same Franz Gtirtner who was the 
Reich's Minister of Justice for Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
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early years, the Regimm^s administrative roles altered by a series of edicts 
and other instructions. These changes, however, were gradual and often 
had little effect in practice on the Regierung's actual operation. The 
Regierung slowly altered not merely its institutional, i. e., formal, structures 
but also its informal networks and agencies as weU as its administrative 
practices. The informal as well as formal governmental roles of the 
traditional East Prussian elites — the Junkers and, to a certain extent, the 
urban authorities — were crucial to the day-to-day operation of 
govermnent, and to the evolution of society in the territory.
The historian Wolfgang Neugebauer has recognised this wider 
interpretation, drawing attention to the 'latent Estates govermnent,' or so- 
called stiindische Latenz, tlnough which East Prussia was governed.^^ 
Standische Latenz was a combination of formal and informal structures of 
government in the East Prussian territory upon which Frederick William 1 
relied. Institutional structures were accompanied by personal networks. 
Neugebauer gives most emphasis to the independent tradition of Prussians 
and the limits of absolutism that this broadened interpretation of 
government reveals. These combinations of formal and informal structures 
of govermnent in the East Prussian territory not only existed but were relied 
upon by Frederick William 1. One notable example was continued Junker 
control over estate peasants. As the government of Frederick William 1 only 
contained several hundred officials for all the Hohenzollern territories, it 
was critical that other networks of authority be utilised. On the East 
Prussian Junker estate, virtually all functions traditionally associated with 
the state were carried out by the Junker lord. These included the 
administration of law and order which included enforcement of the law and
7®Neugebauer, Politisclier Waiidel im Osten. pp. 65-86. Also, see Edgar Melton, 
"Tlie Prussian Junkers, 1600-1786," p. 92 whose translation of the term Standische Latenz is 
used here.
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exactment of justice, selection of the local preacher and, particularly after the 
fmalising of the Cantonal System m 1733, military recruitment, training, 
maintenance and discipline. Neugebauer in fact places considerable 
emphasis upon the traditional nature of East Prussian government and 
administration in explaining the achievements of Frederick WÜÜam 1 and 
his predecessors. Therefore, absolutism developed in the territories outside 
of Brandenburg in an environment which contained a complex array of 
diverse and independent powers.^^
The King's "'core bureaucracy'" for central government, as Edgar 
Melton notes, was relatively small and numbered less than a thousand for 
all the territories during the reigns of Frederick William I and Frederick the 
Great. 77 This left Frederick William I dependent in practice upon the local 
Junker at the provincial an d /o r local level. This was especially true in the 
remote East Prussian territory. As the Kingdom was far from Berlin, the 
considerable distance highlighted the difficulties of efficient govermnent as 
directed from Brandenburg's capital. Frederick William Ts effort to sustain 
the operation of East Prussian govermnent left the King no other option 
than to utilise and often leave in place existing authorities and traditional 
political and social structures. The obstacles to the establishment of a new 
tier of government forced Frederick William I to rely on established elites.
As a result of the King's wide-ranging administrative reforms, not 
only Hohenzollern authority grew in this period. Traditional East Prussian 
authority also increased. Many areas of central authority were 
'strengthened' which, in turn, allowed native East Prussian influence in the 
territory also to increase. In a sense, the centralisation and de centralisation
7^Neugebauer, Politisdier Waitdel im Ostea pp. 65-85.
^^Melton, "Tlie Prussian Jmikers 1600-1786," p. 92. Melton notes that this was 
particularly tlie case during the Silesian Wars of Frederick the Great.
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went hand-in-hand. Frederick William I had to permit a enhancement of 
native authority not only to increase his own authority but simply to have 
government work.73 This suggests that Frederick William Ï recognised the 
limitations upon his authority and tried to circumvent these.
Edgar Melton argues that "Hohenzollern absolutism went hand-in- 
hand with an increase in the power and activity of the nobility at the local 
and provincial l e v e l s . "  74 % agree that one way in which Hohenzollern 
absolutism developed was by increasing the power of the Junipers, but 
believe that Melton overstates the extent to which Frederick William 1 held 
sway over the Kingdom in the early part of his reign. This developed over a 
rather longer period — an argument that will be developed below.
7 ^ I b i d .
74lbid.
Frederick William Ts Early Administrative Reforms and their Impact in East 
Prussia
One of the first decrees issued by the King, dated 3 April 1713, 
restructured his Privy Council, which had been crucial to the operation of 
Hohenzollern government under Frederick III/1. Frederick Wilham I did so 
in a way that placed his closest principal advisers, the so-called Real Privy 
Councillors, in a position which would give them more direct supervisory 
authority over the various territories ruled from Berlin.7^ All military, 
ecclesiastical, feudal, financial, judicial and other matters in every 
Hohenzollern territory were assigned to a particular Real Privy Councillor, 
who had a broad oversight of such affairs, rather than direct personal 
control over them.7^ East Prussia was assigned to Heinrich Rudiger von 
llgen, who, born a commoner,77 started his career as a Cabinet Secretary 
under the Great Elector and became under Frederick William I "as close as 
any one official to being a principal minister for the state." 78 The great 
mathematician and philosopher Leibniz first recommended to the Great 
Elector that llgen be recruited for Hohenzollern administration in Berlin, 
llgen had studied law and political science and trained for the diplomatic 
service in Minden. His rise witliin Hohenzollern administration was swift
7%'he decree is printed in ABB, 1, no. 131, pp. 384-385. See also, Dorwart. The 
Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 40
26Ibid.
77Rosenberug, Bureauaacy. Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience. 
1660-1815. p. 85.
^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 227,
£n. 28.
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under the Great Elector. He started as a secretary to the head of peace 
negotiations with France in 1678, Franz von Meinders. The next year, he 
became Privy Secretary m the Privy Council Chancery. He then moved to 
become privy Kammersekretar in 1683. It was, however, under Frederick 
III/1 that llgen was appointed as a Privy Councillor and took a leading role 
in regard to foreign affairs. In the words of Dorwart, "he was the only 
surviving figure, after 1697, from the reign of the Great Elector who had a 
clear understanding of Brandenburg's foreign policy."79 Though 
Wartenburg was believed to exercise considerable and perhaps dominant 
influence over foreign policy during the reign of Frederick III/1, llgen also 
wielded considerable influence at court over diplomatic matters and 
especially the negotiations for the royal title. This did not go unnoticed by 
the new King who promoted llgen in 1701 to Real Privy Councillor, 
ennobled hhn, and sought his advice personally thereafter on matters of 
state. After the fall of Wartenburg in 1711, llgen became the most influential 
official. His loyalties, however, were devoted to the crown prince and he 
did not seek to become a chief minister in the manner of Danckelman or 
Wartenburg.^®
Frederick Wilham Ts accession was quickly followed by a significant 
reform affecting the Hoflcammer. It had originally been estabhshed and 
organised to supervise the territorial domain boards (Kammern). Although 
the Hoflmmmer was thought to be the agency that linked ah civil financial 
matters of the various territories, its officials were not able to achieve that 
goal.^1 The Hoflcammer, however, was transformed into the General Finance 
Directory on 27 March 1713 and given collegial authority in the central
79lbid.
^®Ibid.
^^See, for example. Ibid., p. 116-117.
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administration. This was an attempt by Frederick William I to cut costs by 
having the numerous sub-authorities act not as separate and autonomous 
agencies but as bureaus supervised by the head of the General Finance 
Directory, who was a Real Privy Councillor and directly responsible to the 
King. As will be seen below, this was one source of the General Directory 
set up in 1723.
Frederick William I chose another close ally from the time of the 
Kronprinzpartei, Ernst von Kameke, to head the enlarged General Finance 
Directory. Prior to this appointment, Kameke had a long career in 
Hohenzollern administration dating back to the reign of Frederick III/1 
when he had been postmaster general and a Real Privy Councillor. In the 
latter position, he oversaw the affairs of the domains, forests, and hunting in 
all the Hohenzollern territories. This had given Kameke the opportunity to 
witness at first hand much of the disorganisation and corruption associated 
with that reign and particularly the ascendancy of Wittgenstein. Kameke's 
observations and his subsequent expressions of disapproval to the crown 
prince, the future Frederick William I, brought him closer to the crown 
prince's clique and contributed to the dismissal of W it t g e n s t e in .^ ^
In Ins new position, Kameke went so far as to draft budgets for the 
territorial agencies, such as the Kammern, for the first few years of Frederick 
William Ts new reign. In particular, the General Finance Directory was 
meant to unify all civil sources of revenue, including those of domains, 
mint, customs, forests, and postal affairs. Except for postal affairs, the other 
agencies were to submit their budgets and accounts quarterly.
A second department was added to the General Finance Directory 
and Johann Andreas Kraut was placed at its head. Kraut was specifically to 
oversee the East Prussian Amter as well as the financial administration in the
37ibid., p. 124.
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territories of Mors, Lingen, and Tecldenburg as well as the affairs of amber 
excavation along the Elbe River and in East Prussia. The former three 
territories made up of what was loiown as the 'Orange territories' or those 
territories that were gained by Frederick III/1 as a result of succession 
inheritance in 1706, to which Gueldres was added in 1714. Kraut, too, 
reported to the Privy Council with matters concerning these territories.^^
This remained the formal institutional structure of central 
administration until 1723 when the General Finance Directory was merged 
with the General War Kommissariat to fonn the General D i r e c t o r y . ^ 4  The 
setting-up of the General Finance Directoiy, therefore, can be considered a 
fundamental reform for the development of a centralised financial 
administration, particularly when viewed in the light of the later changes of 
the 1720s and 1730s. The General Finance Directory is conventionally and 
currently seen as a precursor to the establishment of the General Directory 
which is considered the peak of administrative centralisation in eighteenth- 
century Brandenburg-Prussia. The establishment of the General Directory, 
however, probably has as much to do with the General Finance Directory's 
conflicts with the General War Koînmissariat as it does with any logical plan 
to centralise further the financial affairs of the Hohenzollerns. This will be 
considered more fully in subsequent chapters, which will also examine its 
relationship with pre-1723 East Prussian institutions.
The War and Domains Chamber (Kriegs and Domdnenlcammer) was 
intended to work in conjunction with the General Finance Directory and 
equal status to it within central administration. Tlie War and Domains 
Chamber, however, often found itself at odds with the General Finance
p. 127. See also p. 61 for a brief description of the Orange Tribunal wWch 
refers to the Orange Succession.
^See Chapter Six.
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Directory. Importantly, the War and Domains Chamber had been 
marginally more successful operating among resistant traditional authorities 
in the territories. Although they had a relatively minor presence in East 
Prussia in 1713, the War and Domains Chamber nonetheless were 
responsible for several financial agencies and discharged a wide range of 
duties. This was primarily acliieved tlirough the subordinate authorities 
which were known as the Kammern or Kommissariaten. These provincial 
administrative structures have often been regarded by historians as the 
primary mstitutional structure to which authority shifted away from the 
Regierung and in favour of royal officials.^ This was the ultimate result, but 
it did not occur overnight. The transition came about after many years of 
political in-fighting and produced some unexpected results. Kammern 
officials directly reported to the estabhshed rival of the General Finance 
Directory, the General Kriegs Kommissariat.
The office of Kommissariat had been in existence smce well before the 
Great Elector. It was founded for the Brandenburg-Neuburg army in 1609 
for use in Jtilich.^^ Four Kommissariaten originally acted in an official 
capacity as the quartermasters to each regiment there. Their duties 
included: mustering, ordnance supply for the artÜlery, Vivres, munitions, 
weapons, all staples of the magazines, and fortification materials.^^ The 
Kommissariaten began, primarily in the 1630s, to spread into the territories of
^Eduard Rudolf Uderstadt, "Die ostpreufiisclie Kammerverwaltung, ihre 
Unterbehorden und Lokalorgane unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich II. bis zur 
Russenokkupation (1713-1756)," part 1, "Die Zentralbehorden," Altpreufiische Monatsschrift, 
vol. 50,1913, pp. 586-603 passim; Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick 
William I of Prussia, pp. 175-180.
^^Siegfried Isaacsolin, Geschichte des preufiische Beamtenthum vom Anfang des 
15. Tahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart. vol. 2, p. 161.
^^Ibid. Although he does not define Vivres, Isaacsohn presumably means the food 
and fodder for the army to carry with it, as distinct from the grain, etc., which went into the 
magazines.
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the Elector. This was, however, to be an extended process.
The Kommissariaten were from an early point established as the body 
that collected the Kontrihution, the rural tax with military origins that was in 
place by the accession of the Great Elector in 1640. The Kommissariat would 
take on significant importance during the Thirty Years' War, 1618-48. In a 
sense, the Kommissariaten were the glue of the Brandenburg-Prussian 
military establishment. They oversaw the many small yet important details 
which were essential and crucial for mounting a war effort: the provision of 
men and food, the collection of revenue, as well as the general problems of 
supply. Therefore, they developed into an institution that was used 
principally to collect military taxation. Yet they were active in more areas 
than simply military tax affairs as they also were involved in duties of 
finance and limited oversight of military revenue collection. These officials 
became more and more involved in tax-coUection from organising a war 
effort. They were rendered more important and their role expanded as the 
size of the army expanded under the Great Elector.
The Kommissariaten, however, were not introduced mto East Prussia 
until approximately the mid-1680s. As wÜl be discussed below, many of the 
duties carried out by the Kommissariaten in other territories at this time were 
left with the traditional East Prussian authorities, namely the 
AmthauptleuteA^ Therefore, the Kommissariaten did not become established 
in East Prussia during the seventeenth century. The primary obstacle to the 
Kommissariat was that the East Prussians had established structures for 
revenue collection. This was due to the strong entrenched authority of the 
Amthanptlente who carried out many of the duties of Kommissariaten officials 
in other territories. It was not until the two years between 1714 and 1716
passing mention is made in the traditional liistorical interpretation of tiiese 
reforms, see, for example. Ibid., p. 162 and Sdimoller, "Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter 
Friedridi Wilhelm I," pp. 40-71.
Chapter 4 — Impact of Early Administrative Reforms _____________
that the Komtnissariat were f  «yA in the Kingdom.^^ The Amthauptleute^ 
however, did not have the same ties to nor were they as dependent upon the 
Hohenzollern ruler as the Kommissariaten, whose loyalty and reliability were 
therefore stronger.
There is no doubt that some primary military revenues in East 
Prussia, as in other territories, had been in the control of the Hohenzollerns 
since the reign of the Great Elector.^® Control over the KontiihuHon, the 
rural tax, had for long been essentially in the hands of the four Obeiraten of 
the Konigsberg R e g ie ru n g .The individual Amter were, more or less, in 
charge of supplying that which the regiments supplied themselves in other 
territories. Day-to-day mUitaiy administration in East Prussia was thus 
rather de-centrahsed. The Regierung and the three Estates in Konigsberg 
discussed, authorised and appropriated military supply, procedure, and 
revenue. Many of the day-to-day functions concerning these 
responsibilities were carried out by the Amthauptleute. This was in contrast 
to the rather more direct administration which prevailed in Brandenburg.
The issue of tax collection became particularly acute in the early years 
of Frederick William Ts reign. Even though the Regieiimg acquiesced in and 
supervised some preliminary land survey's required for the successful 
introduction of the Generalhufenschofi, a direct tax upon the nobility in East 
Prussia, actual revenue collection proved far from easy for the King. This 
new tax was introduced by Waldburg, who was both a native East Prussian 
and loyal to the King. It was the first such tax successfully levied upon the 
notoriously independent-minded East Prussian Junkers. In addition to
^9lbid., pp. 50-55.
^®See Chapter One.
^^Isaacsohn, Gesdiichte des preufiische Beamtenthum vom Anfang des 15. 
Talirhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart. II, pp. 181-82.
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being principally a property value tax on the nobility, it was one in wliich 
the East Prussian Junkers had very little influence or voice. The excise and 
Kontiibution were the two traditional revenues which supported the East 
Prussian government.
This has long been considered by liistorians as one of the young King 
Frederick William Ts early successes in reforming the nobility and in 
particular, the East Prussian Junkers. This is especially the case since the 
Generalhufenschofi is the origin of Frederick William Ts rochei' de bronze 
statement noted in Chapter One.^7 The Generalhufenschofi, as iimovative and 
forward-looldng as it was for the time, could not reform the territorial 
institutional structures, poor revenue-collecting infrastructure, hnprove the 
King's treasuiy, and subject the nobility to so significant a direct tax all at 
the same time. For the King, however, no compromise was possible.^^
The Generalhufenschofi was severely resisted by the East Prussian 
Junkers for decades after its introduction in 1714. For this was the first tax 
to be directly assessed on the East Prussian nobility. This challenged the 
nobility's assumption that it provided military service, rather than direct 
taxation which the common people paid. It was a tax that certainly must 
have proved difficult for Frederick WÜHam I to collect as it was based on the 
value and estimated productivity value of noble-held land. The fact that 
estates had been traded, sold and otherwise transferred made the job of 
determining who owned how much land difficult to determine and thus 
revenue collection virtually impossible. In addition, Frederick William I 
also had to control the obstinate opposition of the nobility against the tax .^
^TcStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., H-Materien, Nr. 1577, fol. 197.
^^See also Rudolf Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: 
Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," in Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe, p. 275.
^^erveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement, p. 23. See also, Michael Erbe, 
Deutsdie Gesdiichte 1713-1790: Dualismus und Aufgeklârter Absolutismus. Stuttgart:
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Frederick Wilham Ts great survey of the land to determine the 
property holders and the values took years. Many of the Junlœrs who were 
in possession of these Hohenzollern domains treated them as if they were 
their "private property" and they had security over these lands since they 
were in almost total control of the official administrative positions.'^ To 
give one an impression of the changes undertaken, the tax assessment of the 
Gra/Dohna increased from 2,000 Gulden to 6,000-7,000 Gulden annually 
Dohna as well as other members of his family had been a close aUies of 
Frederick Wilham I and indeed an integral part of his govermnent in 
various capacities. The introduction of this tax, however, strained the 
family's relationship with the King.^7
Although many historians appear to beheve this was one of the 
King's successes with respect to East Prussia,^® far too little is Imown about 
the actual introduction of the Generalhufenschofi and its exact results. What is 
Imown is that it was resisted throughout much of Frederick Wilham I's 
reign. This was important in relation to reforms after 1714 and wiU be 
touched upon in subsequent chapters devoted to post-1723 reforms of 
Frederick Wüham I. One further point about this tax was that it was linked 
to the ahodialisation of the province. Frederick Wüham I urged thereafter 
that the noble estates which according to feudal law was more simÜar to 
present day trusts, had been simply loaned by the sovereign ruler 
(Landesheirn) to the possession of the entire noble famüy, were to be
Verlag W. KohUiammer, 1985, p. 149.
'^^Carsten, Geschichte der preufiischen Tanker, p. 32.
^^Sdimoller, Preufiische Verfassungs-. Verwaltungs- und Finanzgesdiichte. p. 102.
^^Volker Press, "Das Haus Dohna in der europaischen Adelsgessellsdiaft des 16. 
und 17. Jalirhunderts," pp. 398-400.
'^^Hintze, Hohenzollern und ihr Werk. pp. 295-6, views its introduction as the higlv 
point of Frederick William Fs endeavours.
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transferred to the nobleman's ownership.^^ One practical result for the Kmg 
edso benefited the army as it meant that a monetary payment (based on the 
nobleman's number of horses) was thereafter made to his Kriegslcasse rather 
than the customary provision of an actual horse or service. The nobility 
were afterwards free to sell off an estate or include it in an inheritance 
contract.^® East Prussia was the last territoiy to have this officially 
introduced (in 1732) as a result of decades-long resistance to its introduction 
in the other territories.^^ Furthermore, since it was based on a territory's 
natural wealth. East Prussia, one of the poorest territories and most resistant 
to reform, would naturally be among the last to have seen this introduced.
In 1717, Frederick Wihiam I formally abolished the feudal bond for all the 
territories except East Prussia which were not made allodial until 1732. The 
delay was because the liltely revenue generated was projected to have been 
less than that of the other territories in relationship to the high level of 
resistance among the Junkers. Thus, taxation was only one aspect. The 
basis of a noble family had been its link to an estate. These reforms 
threatened this relationship for all members of a noble family except for the 
Junker who would be named sole owner. In theory there was nothing to 
stop traditional system by having the Junlcer owner maintain the family link 
through inheritance contracts which some apparently drafted. This practice, 
however, does not appear to have been popular during the eighteenth
^^Victor Loewe, "Die Allodifikation der Leheiumter Friedridi Wilhelm I," 
Forschtmgen zur Brondenburgischen und Preufiischen Geschichte, vol. 11:2,1898, pp. 41-73 
passim; Büsdi, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alien Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 84.
^®Hintze, Hoheiizollern und ihr Werk. pp. 295-6; Robert Berdalil, Tlie Politics of the 
Prussian Nobility: The Development of a Conservative Ideology. 1770-1848. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 23.
73.
^^Ibid.; Victor Loewe, "Die Allodifikation der Lehenunter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p.
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c e n t u r y O n e  may suggest that the Generalhufenschofi went far for 
allodialisation to be introduced into the Kingdom which occurred relatively 
late in Frederick William Fs reign, in 1732. Due to the tax and improved 
administration, the King was better able to maintain a close watch on land 
transactions even if he was not able to control the transactions directly. And 
Otto Busch noted that it was only after years and indeed decades of 
opposition from the nobihty that the sums to be paid were firmly set for the 
various provinces. In the case of East Prussia this was ten talers in 1733 
which was a smn well below that of other provinces and one might add, 
four to six years later than other provinces were assessed.^^
The increased role of the Kommissariat after 1716 had an impact on 
revenue raising in East Prussia, There was a change in the methods of 
collection which will be discussed subsequently, but first, under Frederick 
Wihiam I there were new practices and what the King had hoped would be 
better accountability. He brought the Kommissariat under closer supervision 
from Berlin and this was partiahy responsible for improved accountability 
and helps expimn their increased involvement in East Prussia.^^
The most significant reforms of the Kommissariaten had been carried 
out during the reign of the Great Elector. This point has been stressed by 
historians and has been particularly emphasised by Rudolf Braun in his 
comparative study of taxation in Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia.^^ Braun
^^Ibid.; Robert Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility, p. 23.
^^Büsch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807, p. 84. Büsch 
cites Konrad Bornhak, Preufiische Staats- und Reditsgesdiichte. Berlin: Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 1903, pp. 153ff. In addition, see the discussion of the relationship of the nobility to 
the military in Chapter Five, pp. 216-18 and Chapter Seven, pp. 329-42 of this study.
^^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 25.
^^Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and 
Brandenburg-Prussia," pp. 243-327. Two additional examples can be found, for example, in 
the writings of Gustav Schmoller, Otto Hintze, and F. L. Carsten. See, in particular, 
Schmoller, Preussisdie Verfassungs-. Verwaltungs. und Finanzgeschichte. p. 142,159;
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severely overstates his own point about the extent to which the Great 
Elector was able to establish his authority over the East Prussian territorial 
elite, the Junkers. "The traditional governmental bodies of the provincial 
territories," Braun comments, "were gradually stripped of their rights, 
functions, and obligations; they saved only part of their judicial 
functions."^^ This clearly was not the case for the Duchy and then Kingdom 
of East Prussia up to and even throughout much of the reign of the Great 
Elector's grandson, Frederick William I. The East Prussian Junkers were 
able to maintain many of their rights and functions because of the inability 
of the Hohenzollern rulers to overcome the isolated and firmly established 
nature of government in the Kingdom.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Great Elector did attempt to 
introduce such structures throughout the various far-flung Hohenzollern 
territories. The Great Elector was able to fix two distinct branches of the 
Kommissariaten with separate duties and responsibilities. Having two 
branches of Kommissariaten allowed the Hohenzollerns after the Great 
Elector to build upon the two functions over which they had more control, 
the control over the actions of individual mercenary commanders and the 
practical and logistical minutiae of supporting and servicing the troops. The 
collection of taxes for this military was undertaken by the 
Kriegskommissariaten. The other, non-military, tax collectors, the so-called 
Land- or Kreiskornmissariaten, were nominated by the Regierung in 
Konigsberg and then traditionally received rubber-stamp approval by the 
Hohenzollern ruler. These Kommissariaten were woridng in the sole interest
Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und IH Werk. pp. 188-254, and F. L. Carsten, "Die Entstehung 
der Jimkertums," in Moderne PreuEische Geschichte 1648-1947. Otto Büsch and Wolfgang 
Neugebauer, editors, vol. 1, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981, pp. 276-7, 278-81; See also 
Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, pp. 202-228.
^^Braun, "Taxation in Britain and Prussia," p. 270. See also Carsten, The Origins of 
Prussia, pp. 202-228 upon wliich Braun appears based or at least accepts Carsten's 
argument without reservation.
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of the East Prussian elite even though their appointment was subject to the 
approval of the Hohenzollern ruler.
As explained in chapter two, the Great Elector was able to expand 
slightly the jurisdiction and authority of these Kriegskommissariatett as long 
as it pertained to military affairs but he had little impact on the entrenched 
system of appointments for the Landlcomrnissariaten who represented the 
interests of Konigsberg and not Berlin.
Frederick William I ordered the Regierung to complete and report 
upon its revenue collection on time. In addition, the Kommissariat was to 
work directly with local Âniter officials who were themselves to inform the 
Kommissariat about their revenues and financial affairs. This attempted 
reform makes clear that Frederick William I was serious about securing 
what he believed to be his fair share of East Prussian revenues.^^ What was 
at issue here was a minor debate about when the Kontribution was 
"surrendered", i. e., handed over to the King's government. The Regierung 
suggest that by the fifth of the month following collection whereas Frederick 
William I demanded it sooner — by the twenty-first of the month during 
which it was collected.
At various points during tins period, then, two systems of 
administration can be seen working side by side. They were simultaneously 
in conflict with each other. On the one hand the Kommissariat was 
attempting to work its way into local supervision over the Âmter, while on 
the other hand, the Regierung^ as the traditional authority over the local 
administrators, was actually collecting the revenue. Moreover, it was 
working with the local Àmter in many of the same ways the Kommissariat 
was now ordered to follow by Frederick William I. Duplication and ill-
^^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 25, fols. 3-3 Rüdcseite and fols. 11-13 Rückseite, 24 July 
1724. In addition, see ABB, 3, p. 152,12. The records are incomplete as to when they were 
actually collected and turned over to officials of tlie Kommissariat
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defined roles often led the traditional authorities to clash with the newer 
royal administrators. The consensus among historians has for long been 
that the East Prussians and in particular, the Regierung, were steadily to lose 
their predominant authority over the Kingdom at every new reform 
measure introduced by the King. This study questions that view. The 
jurisdictional disputes and their aftermath make clear the limited extent to 
which this was true. The major reasons for the disputes and Frederick 
William Ts lack of success with respect to reform in East Prussia are 
examined in the next section.
Patterns of Conflict. 1713-1722
The issue of administrative and legal reform was at the root of the 
numerous jurisdictional clashes between the traditional territorial and 
military authorities and the emerging royal government. The conflict 
between the established governing bodies and the new institutions set up by 
Frederick William I in the Kingdom is often understated. The members of 
the Regierung helieved they had a great deal at stake and disputed a wide 
range of reforms to long-standing functions and privileges which favoured 
them. The process by which the crown secured the upper hand was far 
from complete by 1723. Contrary to the verdict of Dorwart, the reforms of 
Frederick William I were not in operation by that date and in fact took a 
much longer period to become established.^^ Dorwart articulated the 
prevailing view when he commented that "... by 1723 they [the new, and 
presumably, royal institutions] were fully formed; the jurisdiction of each 
was fixed; and the period after 1723 reveals a lack of complaints and orders 
dealing with conflicts of competence and with the encroachment of one 
office upon the jurisdiction of a n o t h e r . " A n d  according to Koch:
[t]he provincial diets, tlie strongholds of the Junkers, were allowed no other 
function than implementing the King's ordinances. But to ensure that even at that 
level no obstacles would be placed in his way, he deprived the diets of their 
administrative effectiveness by appointing Ws own officials at all administrative 
and executive levels of his kingdom."^^
Otto Hintze commented that the government of Frederick William 1
^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 34. 
^^Ibid., pp. 34-35.
^^Koch, A History of Prussia, p. 82.
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"marked the perfection of Absolutism."^^ Hintze also noted that under the 
government of Frederick William I the territorial ehtes, "in all provmces, 
except Cleves and Mark were reduced to only a semblance of their 
traditional form.... And not only with respect to the political meaning but 
also the administrative effectiveness of the Stande under Frederick William I 
was ended."^^ This was simply not the case and all of these historians have 
overstated the speed at which Hohenzollern absolutism developed and 
became established, particularly in East Prussia.
The eventual integration of East Prussia's local nobility into the 
Kingdom's royal government was the result of an extended process. There 
were significant tensions between the East Prussian Junkers and Berlin 
which went well beyond the rather widespread obstruction to central 
authorities and were not only due to local sentiment and particularism. In 
addition, a distinctive lack of loyalty to Berlin was evident not simply 
during the first two decades of Frederick William Ts reign but actually 
continued throughout the 1730s. Certain links between the King and 
officials in Berlin and the East Prussian ehtes were strengthened. This was 
particularly evident in the recruitment of officers in the military.
Officers' commissions, which were available on an increased scale, 
were distributed by the King to members of the East Prussian elite, and in 
this way Frederick Wilham I and the Kingdom's Junkers gradually became 
reconciled. Frederick Wilham I was only able to maintain a hst of all 
noblemen in the Kingdom on a regular basis after about 1738 which were 
recorded in his so-caUed Vassallen Tabellen. This was an extended process, 
however, as commissions were only slowly accepted. For example, there 
are accounts of resistance to mihtary service among the nobility around the
^^Hintze, Die Hoheiizollern und ilir Werk. p. 280. 
^^ibid., p. 281.
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start of Frederick the Great's reign in 1740.^^ In particular, their grievances 
referred to the mandatory enrolment of younger sons of the nobility into the 
recently established military cadet academies. This apparently was not the 
rejection of state service {Staatsdienst) as such, but the rejection of being 
compelled to attend the academies coupled with the inability to gain 
permission for foreign travel or s t u d y . F o r  government administration, 
the degree of local sentiment was unusually strong and the closer links 
which were to be seen later in the century were certainly not evident before 
1723. The same tensions that characterised Frederick William Ts first 
decade continued thereafter and these wiU now be discussed.
The East Prussian Kammer and Kommissariat administration was at the 
centre of the most significant change in East Prussian govermnent in the 
early years of the new reign. Indeed, plirases such as "radical new order" 
and "most important new innovation" are used by Terveen to describe the 
king's decree of 25 September 1714. Tliis edict altered the superior authority 
over the East Prussian Kammei  ^and Kommissariat's administration, which 
passed from the control of the East Prussian Regierung to officials in BerMn.^^
As a result of this decree, the Kammer administration, for the first 
time, was freed of its princip . dependence upon the Oberraten (i.e., 
Regierung) and the Geheime HofJaimmer.^^ Instead, from 1714 onwards, the 
East Prussian Kammer administration was instructed that, in all but 
exceptional cases, it should refer directly to the Berlin-based General
^^Carsten, Gesdiidite der preuCischen Tunkeiy pp. 44-45.
p. 44. Furthermore, the king dedared that "nach hohem Gefallen entweder 
in Militâr- oder Zivildiensten employieren konnte." Although tliis was not a particularly 
new tactic on hehalf of the Hohenzollerns, it had yet to be successful. The fad that 
Frederick II reiterated it here shows this. It should be noted that significant changes in this 
regard did occur under his rulership.
’^^ erveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement p. 23.
^^Ibid.
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Finance Directory.^^ The General Finance Directory now was leJ by 
Christoph, Btirggrafund Graf zu  Dohna. He was a native East Prussian with 
many years of military service eld established loyalty to the King. He had 
earlier been a significant supporter of Frederick William I, when the crown 
prince worked to oust Danckeiman. Dohna advanced his administrative 
positions in both domestic and foreign affairs after 1713.^^ In the first point 
of his instruction, Frederick William I declared: "The two presidents are 
dependent only upon His Royal Majesty himself, the General Finance 
Dhectoiy, and the Graf von Dohna; they should take no note from the 
Regierung or from anyone else in the world."^^
It appears that the East Prussians separated issues of military 
organisation and finances from their traditional rights and privileges with 
respect to govermnent administration. In 1716, the Waldburg reforms 
established a Komrnissare, who was to oversee urban affairs. The tax 
responsibilities of the Kommissariaten were to be soon transferred to the 
reconstructed Steueiraten who acted in urban areas in exactly the same way 
as the Kriegs- und DomanenJcammef' were supposed to operate in the 
countryside.^^ One should remember that rural affairs continued to remain 
largely under the direct supervision of the East Prussian Regierung. East 
Prussian towns had seen the Kommissariat prior to 1716, as mentioned 
earlier, but their only functions had been billeting of troops and the excise, i.
^^Krollmaiui, Altpreufiisdie Biographie Band I, p. 142. See also, Dorwart, Hie 
Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 227, fn. 29.
^^ABB, 2, p. 47. Berlin, 25 September 1714. "Die zwei Prasidenten haben keine 
andere Dependeiiz als Sr. Konigl. Majestat selbst, das Generalfinanzdirektorium und den 
Grafen von Dohna, sonst von keine Regierung und Niemanden in der Welt." See also 
Terveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement p. 23.
^^Julir, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," p. 119. See also, ABB, 5:1, p. 261.
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e., taxation matters. The Kommissariaten superseded the duties of deputies 
from the nobility and took charge of military taxation until 1722.^^ This 
appears to show a moderate increase in Frederick William Ts authority 
during the early years of his reign. The Idng's action was really only a 
continuation of an initiative which his grandfather, the Great Elector, had 
unsuccessfully attempted several decades earlier.
The military treasury, the so-called General Kriegs Kommissariat, was 
responsible for the collection of taxes in the rural areas which made up most 
of East Prussia. The Kriegs- and Stenerlcommissar and the Landrat supervised 
fiscal administration at the territorial level for the Kommissariat which in 
turn was under the overall authority of the General Kriegs Kommissariat 
located in Berlin. These local administrators were the "executive arm" for 
the central college of the General Kriegs Kommissariat, whose instructions 
they were supposed to carry out.^^ This was another of Frederick William 
Ts early reform wliich slowly and over a longer period of time altered the 
traditional administrative order in East Prussia yet at first was within areas 
of government and the military which he already controlled.
^^Juhr, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751,"p. 137.
^^Dorwart, Tlie Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 148.
The Règlement of 1716 and East Prussia
Though the above mentioned initiatives were undoubtedly 
important, there was one group of reforms introduced in 1716 which 
became the basis for many of the later political struggles during Frederick 
William Ts reign. These higlilight the fundamental issues at stalce for the 
King and for the East Prussian Regiemmg, On 6 May 1716, httle more than 
three years after Frederick WiUiam Ts accession, he issued a. Règlement or 
regulation to the Kommissariat in East P r u s s i a . T h e  essential point of the 
decree was its declaration of the administrative supremacy of the 
Kommissariat over the Regierung. It was to have sole supervisory authority 
over aU commercial affairs, manufacturing, general military matters and the 
drilling, billeting, and provisioning {Proviant) of soldiers, in addition to the 
collection of the excise and Kontribution taxes, accounting and auditing 
affairs (Rechnungssachen) and the establishment of colonies.^^ It was both a 
confirmation as well as a notable expansion of the Kommissariat's 
administrative authority.
The Konigsberg Regierung viewed the Règlement of 1716 with the 
inevitable suspicion of a long-established provincial authority for a 
newcomer. For centuries, the East Prussian Regierung had been the sole 
administrative agency for the territory, dealing with almost every matter of 
concern. Suddenly, the King was attempting to reduce not only that role 
but, moreover, their traditional native rights, the so-caUed regalia. With this
^^GStAFK, EM 121 e. Nr. 16, fols. 9-12 Rückseite, Berlin, 6 May 1716. "Règlement 
für das Commissariat im konigreidi Prenfien."
7% id. See also ABB, 2, p. 228.
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Règlement, the King delegated the Kommissariat superior to the Regierung. 
Ludwig von Ostau, a member of the Regierung, noted as much when he 
complained on 29 July 1716 that within the document it is "insinuated" that 
the Kommissariat has, in a sense, the upper hand/^  Ostau had moved up 
through the ranks of the East Prussian government. He had begun his 
career as Hatiptmann to Neuhausen and Labiau in 1693. By 1706, Ostau was 
Landesdirektor and Hauptmann in Amt Brandenburg, East Prussia, one of the 
four most prestigious posts but below the Regierung. On 13 May 1710, 
Frederick III/1 had approved the recommendation for his appointment as 
Preuefiischen Kanzlers. This appointment was imposed over the initial 
recommendation of the Regierung, who had nominated Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Canitz.^^ Canitz, however, was instead appointed to the Prussian 
Tribunal, the Kingdom's supreme court. Ostau's final appointment was in 
1718 as president of the Prussian Commercien Collegiums. He died nine years 
later on 2 November 1727.^^ Ostau's career nonetheless flourished and he 
was firmly entrenched in the traditional East Prussian system and may be 
regarded as representative of the Regierung as a whole.
Before continuing the discussion of the further importance of the 
Règlement of 1716, it is necessary to sketch the way m which appointments 
were made in early modern Brandenburg-Prussia. There were several ways 
in which administrators were appointed, as will be demonstrated in
^^GStAPK, EM 121 e. Nr. 16, fol. 19,29 July 1716, draft response to Règlement of 6 
May 1716, signed by Ostau,
^^ABB, 1, p. 103, fn. 2. Bom in 1656, Canitz became a district captain in Lotzen in 
1684. Four years later, he switdied to the Tapiau district and thereafter he became the 
Landesdirector and district captian oiA m t Brandenburg. He moved further up the ranks of 
East Prussian administration after 1706 when ho became Obermarschatt in May 1706 and 
Oherburggiafin 1711. He died on 22 January 1719.
^^ABB, 1, pp. 102-103, in particular, p. 103, fn. 3. In 1706, he became Landesdirector 
and district captain in Amf Brandenburg, immediately after Canitz's tenure in these 
positions.
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subsequent chapters. The transfer of an office through purchase was not 
unheard of in East Prussia but this appears to have been limited to the most 
high-ranking Junkers. In addition, there was nepotism, the succession of 
son, nephew or other relative, which was fairly common for many posts and 
a critical way in which recruitment of officials was carried out. There was 
not the negative connotation with nepotism as a method of administi ative 
recruitment as there is in the present day. Nepotism was one of the few 
ways in which administrative training could take place as a result of 
universities continuing their focus on religious and legal training and the 
absence (until 1770) of qualification examinations for potential 
administrators.^^
There were important aspects of the implementation of the Règlement 
of 1716 which appear to be consistent within the conventions of eighteentlv 
century administrative practices, that of simple opposition to any 
iimovation. For example, after the Règlement was sent to the Regierung in 
1716, Ostau and the other Regierung members continued to question likely 
"colhsions," that is to say clashes of authority between the Regierung and 
Kommissariat as a result of the Reglement's ill-defined sections winch 
concerned how and when edicts were to be dispatched {expedition). There 
was immediate disagreement about which authority was responsible for the 
publication of the Règlement itself. Frederick William I had to respond 
several times over a period of months to this basic issue: these affairs, he 
declared, were now under the sole control of the Kommissariat.^^ The 
Regierung was concerned about the infringement of their rights by the King
^^his is a topic that is equally important in the section covering local 
appointments in chapters.
^^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 16, see for example, fols. 25-26 Rückseite, 13 July 1716.
®®Ibid,, fols. 27-47 Rückseite. In particular see, fols. 4045 Rückseite, Declaration of 
25 January 1717.
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over this edict. The monarch, in their view, had attempted to move the 
location of authority from the Regierung to the Kommissariat. This concern 
revealed the fundamental tension between the old and new authorities.
This was, at first sight, a classic administrative struggle for supremacy. It 
was also an early example of the Idnd of more intense conflicts which would 
multiply subsequently.
This order was an early and direct attempt by Frederick William 1 to 
remove some of the Regierung's most prized privileges and functions. In 
addition, it also sought to undermine the Regieaimg by reinterpreting and 
destroying the compromise arrangement which had evolved under the 
Great Elector, by which the Estates, or Stande, maintained overall 
administrative control, but were subject to the overall supervision and thus 
direction of the Kommissariat.^^ It was now laid down that the Regierung 
was to authorise and execute all decrees from the Kommissariat.^^ In 
addition, regulations and citations, together with other formal instructions 
and documents, were to be drawn-up by the Regierung but needed to be 
authorised by the signature of the Kommissariat president. If a dispute 
arose, the King declared that the Advocatum Fisci, the local soUcitor to the 
treasury, was to judge. The Advocatum Fisci had traditional strong ties to the 
Hohenzollerns.^^
Berlin's authority was not everywhere extended. Frederick William 1
®^ For a traditional view of tins, see, Otto Hintze, Regierung und Verwaltung: 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Staats-, Rechts- und Sozialgeschichte Preussens. Gottingen: 
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, band 3,1967, p. 328. For a more recent interpretation with 
emphasis on Brandenburg, see William W. Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in 
Brandenburg," pp. 302-335.
^^GStAPK EM 121e, Nr. 16, fol. 9 Rückseite, Section I; See also, ABB, 2, p. 372. But, 
as before, the Regierung was able to retain the same authority as the Geheimer 
Staats=Collegium which was located in Berlin.
^^Ibid., fol. 10, Section V.
^Ibid.
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also confirmed the Amtlmuptleute as overseers of local troop billeting and 
provisions or repast, so-caUed Sbidus, This was in addition to their 
established judicial authority over the nobility and the peasantry, Kolmer as 
well as the hereditary serfs of their district(s). They also had supervision 
over tax affairs and police functions, in the wider sense of the term .^
At first reading, Frederick William Ts Règlement of 6 May 1716 may 
appear to be only a confirmation of the limitations of the Kingdom's 
traditional authorities, particularly in financial matters. Those parts of the 
instruction which dealt with the ordering and collection of fees, among 
other matters, indeed, curbed local initiative. In these cases, the 
Amthauptleute had to work alongside the rural tax collectors which were 
under the direct authority of the Kriegs und Domanenfmrnmer, the so-called 
Commissarius Loci, as well as the magistrates of the towns.^^ The orders, 
once again, were to be issued by the Regierung, but the signature of the 
Kommissariat president was needed to give force to them.^^
This is precisely how Frederick William 1 was able to expand slowly 
the authority of the Kommissariat. The traditional structure of the Regierung 
remained in place, but it came to be overlaid and thus supplanted by the 
superior authority of a new institution, which was under Berlin's direct 
control. In this way continuity in estabhshed structures of government 
masked the new realities of governmental control in the Kingdom. This 
Règlement, in particular, highlighted the increased significance of the 
Kommissariat during the reign of Frederick William 1 and its administrative 
supremacy in a growing number of important matters within the Kingdom. 
At least two dispatches between Konigsberg and Berlin crossed in
^^Hintze, Regierung und VeKvaltung, p. 323-4.
^^his is discussed more fully in Chapter Five.
^^GStAFK, EM 121 e. Nr. 16, fols. 10-10 Rückseite, Section VI.
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delivery over this Règlement in 1716. A message sent from Berlin to 
Konigsberg normally took approximately seven days to arrive. Tins 
partially explains why many issues raised by Frederick William Ts edict 
were not quickly resolved. Around two weeks was the usual time it took 
for a despatch to be sent and a reply received. This case appears not to have 
been different except that the Regiernng issued messages without first 
waiting for a response. Perhaps tins is an indication about how concerned 
and iyfpatient the Regierung had become over this issue. The urgency 
indicates that they wanted to communicate as quickly as possible. In 
addition, they also believed the King would consider their views, but they 
were to be disappointed. It was very unusual for messages to cross in this 
way. Tliis reveals the hope, and even belief, of an established 
administrative agency that it could persuade the King to change liis mind. 
The fact that the Regierung wrote again, itself extraordinary, reveals their 
fears and the pressure they were under. The Regierung throughout this 
period normally waited for a response before engaging in further 
correspondence with Frederick William 1 on the same issue.^^
The correspondence between the Regierung and Berlin continued 
throughout 1717 over the "collisions" and how each side believed there 
could be a resolution. The Kommissariat and Regierung complained more 
and more about perceived intrusion in the other's affairs. In a royal 
declaration of 25 January 1717, Frederick William 1 stated his intention, for 
the second time at least, that "all of the misunderstandings [should] 
thoroughly be done away with", and that all colleges would serve in "good
°”Ibid. See also, ABB, 2, p. 377. 6 May 1716. Hiere appeal' to only be a handful of 
cases such as this.
^^GStAPK, EM 121 e. Nr. 16, fols. 40-45 Rückseite, Declaration, 25 Januaiy 1717. See 
also, ABB, 2, pp. 502-505.
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harmony and direct their energies to the common goal."^® His words were 
completely disregarded by the Regieinmg in Konigsberg.
hi March 1717, a dispatch to the King by an official, P. Schrere, 
returned to the question of administrative innovation. The writer noted that 
during his forty years of service to the Hohenzollerns, all decrees from the 
Wiirklich Geheime Rate (Real Privy Councillors), had not required to be 
authorised by means of the seal of the Kommissariat.^^ In fact, since the 
Règlement requiring that documents officially pass through the Kommissariat 
was announced on 6 May 1716, many documents which were supposed to 
be co-signed and sealed by the Kommissariat had not been.^^ In other 
words, the king's instructions were simply being ignored and flouted in 
East Prussia. To skirt around the issue, the Regierung listed several excuses 
and even suggested that the Kommissanat seal was damaged and could not 
be used. This was surely a transparent He. There is no evidence that the seal 
was damaged. The Regierung held that not only was the 1716 decree an 
invasion of their traditional authority but also, that it was an inefficient 
means to govern and administer the territory. This latter claim was in fact a 
more serious objection. East Prussian government and authority were 
threatened by grid-lock. Since each and every document issued by the 
Regierung, however routine or trivial, needed the approval of the 
Kommissariat and even the affixing of its seal, governance would not only 
slow due to the extra time required but in all likelihood might grind to a 
halt.
The real issue of course was the Regierungs fear that it would lose its
^^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 16, fol. 36 Rüd«eite. See also ABB, 2, pp. 507-508, Berlin, 
25 January 1717. "Declaration einiger Punkte des preufiischen Commissariats Règlements."
^^Ibid., fol. 47,17 March 1717, correspondence from P. Sclirere to Frederick William
I.
^ I^bid.
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ultimate authority over territorial affairs in the Kingdom and would be 
relegated to the status of a secondary authority. According to the 6 May 
1716 decree, a document was unofficial unless it had the Kommissariat seal 
and was signed by officials from that body and from the Regierung. That the 
seal and thus the arrangement for joint signatures were not utilised, 
demonstrates the fact that for some time and to a large extent government in 
East Prussia continued to operate in established ways. The Regieinmg 
continued to appeal to the King in the name of tradition. Its members still 
were more loyal to the traditions of the East Prussian elite and Kingdom 
than they were of the new structures imposed by the crown. The fact that in 
practice they continued to operate as they had in the past is important and 
demonstrates not only where their loyalties rested but also underlines the 
extent to which Frederick William 1 was unable to impose liis authority by a 
simple assertion of royal will. The King was now confronting the same 
powerful social and administrative structures and traditions that, most 
notably, liis grandfather had encountered before him.
The conflict and rivalry between the Kommissariat and Regierung was 
not limited to the higher levels of East Prussian government and to relations 
between Berlin and Konigsberg. Much of the poUtical strife between them 
took place at the lower provincial and local levels. In these areas as well, 
Frederick WEham 1 attempted to rule personally and directly, though tliis 
attempt was bound to end in almost complete failure. As in the higher 
echelons of govermnent, the debates and conflicts set in motion by the 
Règlement swiftly reached the more local levels of East Prussia.
The Regierung continued to express its concern about other sections of 
the 6 May 1716 Règlement to Frederick William 1. Each section of the decree 
addressed a precise issue of the Kingdom's government and
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administration.^^ Aside from asserting a predictable concern for the 
supremacy of traditional administrative authority, the Regierung also 
advanced the argument of efficiency. It noted that "now, and for some 
days, the Kommissariat has been prolonging the Regierung's work."^^ Tliis 
issue is best summed up in the words of the members of the Regierung 
themselves on 26 October 1716:
"That wliich so far is totally dear, is that the Kommissariat have not pretended about 
their cognition. We suggest to Your Royal Majesty in all submission... that you 
will consider making the choice... not to extend their department further, therewith 
allowing dependence on continuing greater confusion."^^
It is clear that Frederick William I allowed the Kommissariat to expand 
their detailed role in the territory in later years, although tliis may not have 
been deliberate. The Regierung attempted to dissuade the King from using 
the Kofmnissariat as he planned as well as from expanding upon decreed 
authority. The Kommissariat, as it appeared to the Regierung, were 
overstepping their declared powers. Frederick William 1 did little to restrain 
the Kommissariat, save in a few particular cases. It was inevitable that there 
would be a series of such clashes, as the Kommissariat tried to define its own 
role.
To what extent was the Kommissariat consciously going beyond 
Frederick William Ts decree, not only to resolve particular cases but as a 
deliberate attempt to curb the Regierung's authority in the territory? In 
addition, to what extent was the King aware of the Kommissariaf s expanded
issue, for example, of "CAwr und Wahl" of the Magistrates in East Prussia.
Tliis is expressed here in GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 18, fols. 7-8 Rückseite. It is more relevant to 
the Kommissariat's role in conjunction with the Amthauptleute. The Regierung and 
Kommissariat continued to clash over this point into late 1719. For example, see ABB, 3, pp. 
210-11, "Bericht des Preufiischen Commissariats," Kônigsberg, 20 November 1719.
^^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 18, fol. 9.
^^Ibid., fol. 11.
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role in East Prussia and was it quietly sanctioned and even explored as a 
potential source of future policies for the territory? In other words, did 
Frederick Wilham I — consciously or otherwise — set in motion a confhct 
between the two bodies and their personnel? The Regierung began to argue 
that not only was the Kommissariat's new role causing confusion, but that 
they were also acting as if they possessed more authority than had actually 
been granted to them. This is especially true in the individual Àmter, for 
example, Insterburg.^^ The Regierung claimed that the Kommissariat were 
"pretending" to have more authority than they actually had been prescribed 
and were ever widening the competence of their office.
The opposition of the Regierung to the Kommissariaif s increased role 
was three-fold. First, that authority was expanded in the affair of the excise 
collector in Kreutzburg-Kalau, a man named Hintz. Second, in the affair of 
a handworker in Marienwerder, who attacked a pharmacist and his mother, 
there was another increase. The third and final increase was in the affair of 
the towns of Riesenburg and Marienwerder. Tlie Regieinmg suggested they 
would not permit the Kommissariat to continue obstructing their authority in 
these cases, which they believed were firmly in their jurisdiction and 
confirmed by the King through previous edicts. They argued that their loss 
of traditional authority, which was reducing the effectiveness of royal 
government in the Kingdom, was a secondary consequence of Frederick 
William Ts decrees.
Administrative infighting of this Idnd continued to break out during 
the next few years.^^ During the few years prior to the founding of the
fols. 26-28. See also, EM 121 e. Nr. 19, pp. l-4a. Relation from the Regierung, 
28 December 1716.
^^Ibid., fol. 26 Rückseite. See also GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 19, fols. l-4a.
^^here are several similar cases of jurisdictional conflict not detailed in this study. 
For example, see ABB, 3, pp. 149-52, "Schriftwechsel mit der Preufiisdien Regierung und 
dem Commissariat", 12 March through 24 July 1719; p. 164, "Immediatbericht des
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General Directory in 1723, the jurisdictional disputes ranged from the 
selection of personnel to royal domain affairs to tax collection 
responsibilities to judicial authority. The King continued to recognise the 
Regierung's authority over judicial affairs which were interfered with by 
Kammer officials. After Frederick William 1 restated that the Regierung was
to hold complete jurisdiction over judicial matters within the Kingdom, the 
Kammer and Regietning apparently continued to quarrel over whether there 
was justification for the Regierung to have made a complaint.^®® The 
following year, however, the Kammer objected to the Regierung's apparent 
interference in royal domain affairs which were supposed to be under the 
authority of the Kammer. The Regietimg notified the King that they were not 
aware that his authority had been given to the Kammer in this matter. What 
was happening was that the Regierung continued to operate in all matters of 
govermnent administration that it had previously controlled, and only 
rehnquished jurisdiction or authority when specifically ordered to do so by 
the King. The Regierung was forcing the Kammer and Frederick William 1 to 
sustain royal authority on a case-by-case basis. When the Regieinmg 
reported back to the King on 27 February 1719, that they were unaware of 
their jurisdictional transgression, Frederick William 1 revealed his sentiment 
in favour of the authorities under the direct control of Berlin when he noted 
in the margin of the Regierungs report: "I support the Cotnmissariat and the 
Kammer against the Regietung and against all. Frederick William."^®^
Generalkiiegscommissariats", Berlin, 26 April 1719; pp. 169-70, "Erlafi an die Preufiische 
Regierung", Berlin 20 May 1719; pp. 364-5, "Erlafi and die Preiifiisdie Regierung", Berlin, 12 
September 1721.
^^Ibid., pp. 48-49, "ErlaJS an die Litthauisdie und die Deutsdie Kammer in 
PreuCen", Konigsberg, 27 June 1718. Precedence is cited bad< to May 1715.
^®%id.,p.49.
^® I^bid., p. 142. "idr suttenirje] Comissa[riat und] Kammer ge[ge]n Regierung und 
gegen allés FW."
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These years saw a perceptible hardening of the royal attitude. By 
1721, Frederick Wilham Ts attitude and approach had become more 
unyielding and assertive than it was at his accession in 1713 or at the time of 
the Règlement in 1716. For example, on 28 October 1721, the King bluntly 
ordered the Regiei'ung not to meddle in the affairs of the Kommissariat 
This order did not suggest any particular intrusion and only related to those 
affairs that belonged to the Kommissariat It was brought about by a 
specific incident no doubt communicated by the Kommissariat although the 
details are not clear. The King was not so accommodating where the 
Regierung's complaints were concerned. Yet, no matter what the king's 
attitude was, he was unable to terminate the administrative confusion in 
East Prussia.
By 1721, the Wiirklich Geheirnen Etats Minister Grafen von Truchess von 
Waldburg had been iU for some time. The Regiernng apparently saw the 
absence of the king's highest East Prussian official as an opportunity to 
regain some of its lost authority, and picked what appeared an opportune 
moment to continue the clashes with the Kommissariat. In the Regierung's 
response on 4 November 1721 to Frederick William Ts late October 1721 
order (asserting the supremacy of the Kommissariat), its members declared 
that their involvement in Kommissariat affairs was by no fault of their own 
although they did not deny that it had occurred. They continued by stating 
that what was not knovFhy the King was that the Kommissariat has 
encroached into one of their affairs first.^^^
Clashes between the Regierung and Kommissariat thus continued long 
after 1716. Five years after the 1716 Règlement, the Regierung were
^O^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 30, fol. 2.
^^Ibid., fol. 1.
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unreconciled to their loss of power and status. In effect, they continued to 
pursue an administrative guerrilla war against the new authority of the 
Kommissariat Tliis underlines that the absolutist intentions of Frederick 
William 1 were often of hmited impact in practice.
Reform and Legal Inaction. 1713-1722
Law was one of the principal functions of government in the 
eighteenth century. The administration of justice was as large, if not larger, 
than those areas of state activity previously discussed, notably taxation and 
supplying the army, and also one of the primary functions carried out by 
the Regierung in East Prussia. Its importance, in the eyes of the members of 
the Regierung as well as the King, was partly due to the significant profits it 
generated. Upholding a basic level of law and order was important, but — 
as elsewhere in Europe — most punishments took the form of fines rather 
than imprisonment, and thus were a welcome source of income to the state 
and its servants.
There is also a relevant wider point. The early modem period, for 
most historians, is the period at which the traditional judicial style of 
government is replaced by a more modern, administrative mode as the tasks 
and functions of govermnent expanded. This evolution was still in its 
infancy in the early decades of the eighteenth century. In the words of 
Samuel E. Finer, "law had a particular, indeed a paramount, sanctity 
The most important "reinventions" of the early modern period was 
probably Roman law "whose study ... provided the first subject-matter that 
differentiated universities from clerical s t u d y - h a l l s . " ^ 0 6
^^Samuel E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, vol. 3, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 1298.
^^Quotation cited from the review of Finer in Edward N. Luttwak, "How Bean, 
Lentil and Chick-pea ruled: Finer's lucid catalogue of human governments," Times Literary 
Supplement," vol. 4926, August 29,1997, p. 6. Furthermore, several other places of study 
appear during Frederick William Ts reign. For example, the king introduced and 
formalised military instruction in 1714, established youth cadet academies in 1717, and 
founded a chair of cameralist studies at the Universities of Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder
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In general, the administration of justice in East Prussia was not 
modernised in the early eighteenth century and had a structure and an ethos 
that were quite independent and distinct from that of the central 
government based in Berlin. For the East Prussian Junkers, authority over 
the administration of justice was vigilantly protected from Hohenzollern 
reform initiatives. It must be remembered, moreover, all Hohenzollern 
territories had their own legal frameworks. At Frederick Wilham Ts 
accession, the Konigsberg Regierung was the key institution through which 
justice was administered in the Kingdom. There were four distinct levels of 
courts located throughout East Prussia. The territory had its own high court 
of appeal located in Konigsberg, the Oberappellationsgericht, which was 
distinct from the court of the same name located in Berlin. In addition, 
Konigsberg held the Kingdom's supreme court of first instance, the so- 
called Tribuml. In ordinary civil cases, there were three basic paths of 
justice each with a separate court. If the case related to a business or was in 
some way commercial in nature and between non-nobles, the district Amt 
was the court of first instance with the board {Kammei') acting as appeal 
court. In other cases involving both nobles and non-nobles, the Regierung 
became the civil court. If a Junker brought a case, then the Amt was the 
court of first instance with the Regierung acting as appeal court. From here it 
was possible for a final appeal to the Oberappellationsgericht.
Further centraHsation of judicial affairs were not in the vanguard of 
Fredericlc William Ts administrative reforms in East Prussia. "No effort was 
made," writes Dorwart, "nor is it likely that an effort would have succeeded 
against territorial opposition, to create, before 1713, a uniform, supreme 
court for the united state (Gesamtstaat), a court which would have been the 
next logical and accepted instance above the superior courts of the
in 1727.
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territories."^^^ Few measures were ever attempted, and it would have been 
so widely resisted by most East Prussians who staunchly opposed almost all 
the attempts made by the King to meddle in their legal affairs that failure 
was almost certain, Frederick William Ts reform efforts stopped short of 
attacking the judicial independence of the Kingdom. In particular, no 
attempt was made to interfere with the civil justice dispensed by the East 
Prussian Regierung, Frederick William 1 impHcitly acknowledged that there 
were limits to his administrative and political power. In theory, the 
Oherappellationsgericht, gave Frederick William 1 supreme control as he was 
King in East Prussia. That supreme control of justice, which any definition 
of sovereignty would have encompassed, lay beyond his practical reach. 
Given the centrahty of law to government and the key role of judicial 
matters, noted earlier, Frederick William Ts exclusion is extremely 
significant especially for a King with such an Old Testament sense of justice. 
This has not been addressed in a direct manner by historians. The King 
appeared to make an implicit decision or admission that his authority in 
East Prussia was limited and that he could not secure direct administrative 
control over the legal system. Frederick Wilham 1 was able to reform areas 
of government administration as has been shown, but he was not able to 
make progress in ah areas in which he desired to reform. He left the 
Regierung the profitable and powerful administration of justice while 
subjecting some other areas of their control to the Kommissariat.
A  few initiatives were attempted, however, at the very beginning of 
Frederick Wilham Ts reign. First, on 21 June 1713, a mere four months after 
he came to the throne, the young King published his Allgemeine Ordnung die 
Verbesserung des Justizwesens beti'ejfend.^^^ Since East Prussia still remained
^^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 58. 
ABB, 1, pp. 515-533. Berlin, 21 June 1713.
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on the fringes of the Hohenzollern Monarchy and had its own strong 
judicial institutions and traditions, this edict remained a dead letter there. 
Second, the King sought to reform judicial training. He established a legal 
faculty at the University of Halle on 18 June 1714.1®^  Clearly this would 
stimulate the estabhsliment of a more standardised legal system throughout 
the Hohenzollern territories. Again, however, one must remember that East 
Prussia had its own legal structures in the form of the Regierung which was 
staffed exclusively by members of the native elite. Moreover, the Kingdom 
had its own university at Konigsberg. East Prussia was not ignored, 
however. Justice in the Kingdom was closely scrutinised by Geheimer 
Justizrat Samuel von Cocceji at Frederick William I's instigation — a sign of 
the King's royal intentions.
In April 1717, Frederick Wilham 1 estabhshed a commission to 
investigate and present suggestions for reform of the judicial affairs of the 
Kingdom. Samuel von Cocceji was instructed to lead this enquiry and was 
sent to Konigsberg in August 1718. His mission was unsuccessful, but tliis 
did not hinder his subsequent rise to prominence first under Frederick 
WiUiam 1 and then under his successor, Frederick the Creat. Judicial reform 
was always notoriously slow and difficult at this period, and Cocceji's 
failures reflected this. It is perhaps because of this reality that his report to 
Frederick Wilham 1 not only detailed the prevaihng abuses but also put 
forward ways to institute future reform. In the end, this report had httle 
impact and the control of traditional authorities over the Kingdom's legal 
system largely continued, unhindered by Frederick Wilham 1. Instead, the 
King began to use individual appointments to extend royal influence, rather
109The university at Halle was a relatively new university as it was established by 
Frederick William Ts father in 1694. It was also the favourite institution of liigher learning 
for the Hohenzollern rulers. It was, for example, also a key location for the study of Pietism 
and Cameralism, both of wliich were highly influendal on the Hohenzollerns' religious, 
administrative, and economic attitudes in this period.
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than seeking to alter the fundamental structure of East Prussian judicial 
institutions. By appointing officials who were or would become loyal to 
him alone, Frederick William I avoided many of the complications and 
resistance aroused by efforts to change administration structures. The King 
noticed the ^ a le  of the changes Samuel von Cocceji thought were necessary 
ostensibly committed to implementing them,^instead worked to extend 
his control through the existing legal structures. This effectively condemned 
judicial reform to failure, and instead the Regierung continued to hold the 
upper hand. In 1721, he published his Revidirtes Landrecht des Herzogthurns 
Preiifiens.^^^ This report essentially set out the obstacles to reform witliin the 
existing legal system as well as a broad proposal for a codification of the 
Kingdom's laws. Again, any reform of judicial affairs in East Prussia 
clashed directly with the estabUshed and powerful rights of the native elites, 
and — predictably — nothing was achieved. Cocceji would go on to have a 
successful career under both Frederick WilHam 1 and Frederick the Great.
He is considered the primary driving force — as well as a significant 
compiler — behind the development wliich culminated in the Allgemeines 
Landrecht Prior to this achievement, however, he served as chief of justice 
in Brandenburg-Prussia under Frederick William I after his appointment on 
5 November 1737. He later headed another commission to study potential 
judicial reform in 1739, which lead to his Novum Systema Jurisprudentiae 
Naturalis et Romanae which was pubhshed on 21 May 1740 shortly before the 
death of Frederick William 1.^ ^^  The Icing's reforms did little to change the 
judicial structures in the Kingdom even though both Waldburg and Cocejji
also, ABB, 3, p. 312. Erlafi an Cocceji, Berlin, 15 March 1721; Sdiriftwechsel 
über die Ànderung der Justizpflege in den Preufiischen Àmtern, pp. 418-428,1 December 
1721-30 January 1723.
^^^Based on Hattenliauer, Allgemeines Landrecht fur die PreuCischen Staaten von 
1794. p. 871.
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noted several times there was a need to improve the slow, expensive, and 
unreliable state of justice in the territoiy
Occasionally, the nature of a particular case meant that it had to be 
considered by two separate courts — one overseen by the Regierung and one 
overseen by the Komrnissariat. Judicial clashes, in other words, inevitably 
arose as a consequence of the 1716 Règlement and the Regierung sought to 
defend its established position against the encroachments of the 
Komrnissariat. Hie attempt by the King to supervise some of these judicial 
issues caused the Regierung to appeal, claiming this restricted their 
traditional rights as well as causing confusion and unnecessary disputes.
For example, cases that normally would be heard by the Regierung in 
Riesenburg and Marienwerder, were now heard by the recently established 
authorities of the King and Kommissariat in Konigsberg. This was seen by 
the Regierung as an hifringement of their traditional rights and the fact that 
they were seen to be taken over by the Kommissariat made the matter aU the 
more irritating for the East Prussian elites. The King was able to claim 
jurisdiction due to the two towns' long-standing relationship to the 
Hohenzollern family which had been established by treaties. Although 
these two towns were considered East Prussian since 1466, they were 
located outside the geograpliical borders of the Kingdom but nonetheless 
were possessions of the Hohenzollerns. They were traditionally overseen by 
the administrative agencies for the district surrounding Konigsberg even 
though they were nearer to the district of Mohrungen. A case such as this
3, pp. 57-58, "Instruction Coccejis zur Verbesserung der Rechtszustande in 
Preufien", Berlin, 30 Juli 1719; pp. 115-121, "Schreiben Coccejis an Plotho. Zustaiid der Justiz 
in Preufien", Berlin, 1 January 1719; p. 312, "Erlafi an Cocceji. Bearbeitung des Preufiisdnen 
Landrechts", Berlin 15 March 1721; pp. 313-316, Erlasse an die Preufiische Regierung. 
Einführung des neuen Preufiischen Landrechts, Berlin, 15 and 25 March 1721, and; pp. 364- 
5, "Erlafi an die Preufiisdie Regierung. Publicirung des Landrechts", Berlin, 12 September 
1721.
^^^See, for example, GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 19.
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appears fairly unusual. It reveals, however, that the King was wiUing and 
determined to work his way into East Prussian affairs in even the most 
minor of cases, here using the town's special status. Even in such small 
cases Ins success was limited.
The absence of a separate Hohenzollern judicial apparatus in the 
Kingdom meant that the Regierung was the natural and traditional supreme 
legal authority. As a result of the cases mentioned above, the Kommissariat 
tried to claim jurisdiction under the two town suspectai status and history in 
several future cases. By precedent the Regierung retained jurisdiction, but 
the claims advanced by the Hohenzollerns were now upheld.^^^ On 31 
January 1717, Frederick William I ordered that the Regierung's demand for 
jurisdiction over the two cases be refused. The Kommissariat was to have 
superiority in this jurisdiction.^^^ A separate court presumably had to be 
established by the Kommissariat^ though detailed information on what was 
done cannot be discovered. Tliis, however, was not the end of the dispute. 
There is evidence of at least one other long-standing contested case which 
lasted into 1717 and was not resolved until late in that year.^^^
In late October 1716, the Regierung complained about the "great 
confusion" concerning judicial affairs which would inevitably result from 
the king's Règlement concerning judicial reform in East Prussia of 6 May 
1716.11^ Again, the Regierung predictably blamed the Kommissariat for 
delaying or otherwise obstructing justice. This case involved the town of
114ibid.  ^fols, 3-4a and 12-15 Rückseite.
fols. 17-19 Rüdçseite. 
ll^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 21.
ll^GStAPK, EM 121 e. Nr. 18, fols. 3-12 Rückseite, 26 October 1716.
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Tilsit located in the north east of East Prussia.^^^ Its details remain rather 
sketchy. We know it concerned a formal complaint by the widow of the 
Landgraffen who held high posts within the Kingdom and who alleged that 
the Regierung was obstructing or deliberately delaying action in regard to a 
trial in which she was involved.^^^ This case already had lasted over four 
years and was being further prolonged by the added procedural 
responsibilities which were placed upon the Kommissariat, together with its 
other delaying tactics which appear to be deliberate.^^®
The fact that this case had lasted four years was not in itself unusual. 
Many cases took far longer to be decided, with the risk that defendants 
might go bankrupt and be unable to pay any damages awarded. Lawyers 
would try to have the case thrown out on a technicality, or to prolong the 
trial for as long as possible.^^^ What is surprising was that the Kommissariat 
was involved and contributed to further delays.
The case's subject matter was in itself relatively insignificant. What is 
important and interesting, however, is that it became the source of a major 
debate concerning the role of the Kommissariat in East Prussian affairs and in 
particular, its ascendancy over the Regierung. The case itself appears to have 
quickly lost any importance it may have had. It became submerged by the 
broader issue of jurisdictional disputes between old and new authorities in 
East Prussia.
It is clear that the Regierung resisted even the smallest intrusions into 
its own judicial competence. It successfully upheld its traditional judicial
^^^Ibid., fols. 1-1 Rückseite, Waldburg's Rescript to tlie Magistrate of the town of
Tilsit.
^^^Ibid., fols. 1-1 Rückseite.
^^®Ibid., fol. 3 Rüd^seite.
2, p. 114. In Waidburg's report to Frederick William I, he notes that cases 
have even lasted thirty years.
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rights and privileges by articulating more fundamental, general, and 
universal justifications for its own supremacy, rather than fighting case by 
case. In addition, the Regierung became concerned by the Kommissmiat's 
efforts to appoint a new judge in Insterburg, the district in which the town 
of Tilsit was l o c a t e d . T h e  Regiemng believed that it alone had the right to 
recommend such appointments, which traditionally had been within its 
preserve. In addition, the King attempted this in a remote region of East 
Prussia presumably because it might be easier to succeed there than in the 
Regierung's own stronghold of the Konigsberg area. The Regierung 
continued its argument by noting tins and the disruption to judicial affairs 
that it claimed would continue throughout the territory as long as the King 
continues to intrude in their affairs. They asked that their departments 
remain "free," that is to say not subject to interference by Berlin or its 
agencies.^ ^^
Such clashes were in practice inevitable, but now, it appeared as if the 
King was also trying to undermine the Regierung's control over judicial 
appointments. The Regierung may still have controlled the administration of 
justice, but control over individual appointments was apparently being 
sought by the King in Berlin. The extent to which Frederick William I was 
successful will be examined later. The Regierung, however, continue to 
protest that these changes represented unnecessary confusion and that the 
traditional East Prussian Collegial system should be left alone. More 
specifically, they argued that the Kommissariat should not meddle in judicial 
affairs in general or in specific private disputes such as the case noted earher
l^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 18, foi. 6. See also, fols. 7-7 Rückseite. 
^^^Ibid., Point 6.
^^^See Chapter 5.
l^GStAPK, EM 121e, Nr. 18, foi. 6.
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concerning the widow in Tilsit.^^^
In East Prussia, as in the other Hohenzollern territories, Frederick 
William I made little or no concerted attempt to reform judicial 
administration. The King did, however, send Graf Karl von Waldburg to 
East Prussia after his accession to investigate the complaints (Gravamina), 
with which Frederick William I was presented on his trip to the territory to 
accept the oath of allegiance by the Estates.^^^ Waldburg's report detailed 
the poor condition of justice in East Prussia, and "emphasised the 
connection between these abuses and the low state of monetary credit in the 
province." That is, the economy was so unstable that credit was not 
available due to such low repayment levels. Therefore, few would loan 
money because of low interest rates, particularly since it was notoriously 
difficult to recover debts through legal means. The repayment of debts 
could in practice not be enforced through the courts. As WeiU notes, "[i]n 
numerous instances, a debtor taken to court would either be freed on a 
technicality, or would contrive to prolong the trial for years."^^^ It should 
be noted that Waldburg's report focuses on the relationship between judicial 
inequalities and monetary credit in the Kingdom.
The King never supported an East Prussian law code although 
Cocceji did attempt to revise some aspects of the Kingdom's legal structures 
between 1718 and 1723 in a "patch work" effort which in practice had no
126ibid., fol. 7.
1, p. 522. Cited in Weill, Frederidc the Great and Samuel von Cocceji. p. 
16. Frederick William I, commenting on the poor state of justice at Inis accession, wrote: 
"ich mus leider so starg sprechen weill die schlimme Justiz gen himmell schreiet..,."
^^%ee Waldburg's report in ABB, 2, pp. 107-122. Cited in Weill, Frederick the 
Great and Samuel von Cocceji. p. 16.
^^ I^bid.; See also, ABB, 1, p. 114.
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i m p a c t . O n e  of their recommendations for reform included a new 
Hofgerkht that would be under the authority of the East Prussian Kammer 
and would have been the court of first instance for all noble cases. This 
would have meant the elimination of a primary function of the established 
elite as well as a substantial source of revenue. The Regierung protested 
loudly against these reform proposals claiming, among other tilings, that the 
new Hofgericht would be overwhelmed in a very short time due to the 
number of cases it was likely to expect. Not only was this an infringement 
upon their established authority, the Regiemng claimed, but the more widely 
separated system of courts throughout the Kingdom — which was present 
under the traditional legal structure — allowed for a more even distribution 
of the case load. Should such a legal reform have been undertaken by 
Frederick William I it would have constituted a direct challenge to the 
Regierung’s authority. No legal reforms of this kind were undertaken and 
indeed the King declared his approval for the traditional legal structures 
which kept matters of justice in the hands of the estabhshed eûtes during his 
travels through the Kingdom in 1722.^^^
Justice in East Prussia, therefore, continued to be administered 
through the Kingdom's own estabhshed legal structures which were 
completely independent of any court in Berhn. Legal jurisdiction, therefore, 
was central to the Regierung's overall authority and was part of its 
complaints about the 1716 decree. Although its judicial authority had not 
been directly attacked, it was being indirectly undermined. The King's 
actions occasionally challenged the Regierung's control of East Prussian 
justice but this assault was not concerted or consistent. When this 
happened, the Regierung let their opinions be heard. It is clear that Cocceji's
130weill^ Frederick the Great and Samuel von Cocceji. p. 17. 
^^^Uderstadt, '"Die ostpreufiische Kammerverwaltung," part 3, p. 73.
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lack of success was due to factors beyond his control. Frederick William I 
did not provide sufficient financial resources to provide judges of quality 
and insulate them from the temptations of c o r r u p t i o n , a n d  this 
contributed to the persistence of old ways among the Kingdom's judicial 
system.
5:2, pp. 670-671 and ABB, 6:2, p. 615. Cited in Weill, Frederick the Great 
and Samuel von Cocceji. p. 18. One can infer more of this point from the latter document 
than the former document in the Acta Borussica.
CHAPTERS 
Local Government in the Kingdom. 1713-1723
Continuity and Change within Local Government
The East Prussian noble district captains, or Amthauptleute, were a 
crucial element in the day-to-day workings of govermnent through the final 
decade of Frederick William Ts reign. They were a part of the local, 
traditional structure of power and authority in the Kingdom. Not only did 
they hold socially and politically prestigious positions but more 
importantly, the Amthauptleute, in the words of Juhr, "attended to all 
branches of administrative affairs in their district."^ They supervised the 
economic matters of the domain lands, military affairs, matters of taxation, 
church and school affairs, legal matters, and held a key role in supervision 
of town administration, among other duties.^ Though some Amthauptleute 
were paid, this depended on the particular post or individual circumstances 
as will be demonstrated. The District Captains, in other words, provided 
expertise that was crucial for the day-to-day operation of East Prussian
%uhr, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/Ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," p. 34.
^Uderstadt, "Die Ostpreussische Kammerverwaltung. Hire Unterbehôrden und 
Lokalorgane unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich II. 1713-1756," vol. 3, pp. 55ff. See 
also, ABB, 4:1, pp. 317-318.
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government and as a result, enjoyed considerable political and social status 
within the territory.
The Amthauptleute s central role made them the inevitable target of 
many of Frederick William Ts reform efforts for East Prussia. The King 
perceived their power, like that of other territorial eUtes, as a threat and an 
obstacle to his own authority over the Kingdom. Also, this was a position 
dominated by the local funlters, whose loyalty correctly was beheved to lie 
with Konigsberg and not Berhn.
The King wanted to bring the Amthauptleute under more direct 
control. In particular, he wanted more control both over their appointment 
and actions. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Frederick 
William Ts efforts to reform the local territorial ehtes, and especially the 
Amthauptleute, were only partially realised during the first half of his reign. 
Although factors such as structural reforms within central administration in 
Berlin and more effective enforcement of administrative decisions on the 
provincial level led the King slowly to implement measures that restricted 
the District Captain's regional or local power, his aims were often very 
different from what he actually achieved in practice. Only in the reign's last 
decade, after other reforms had been successfully introduced, was the King 
able to see his policy concerning the Amthauptleute tlirough to an effective 
conclusion. Moreover, some of the policies of this period can hardly be 
considered as part of the planned introduction of a modern bureaucracy. 
They were rather the consequences of highly personal and often, arbitrary 
rule by the King. It is clear that other, non-institutional traditional 
structures continued to play their part in the regional administration of East 
Prussia in the early decades of the eighteenth centuiy. Many informal and 
long-standing practices among the East Prussian Junkers were unaffected 
by Frederick William Ts reforming efforts.
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It is important to understand the distinct pohtical and social 
environment within which the East Prussian elites operated. In general, the 
Kingdom's nobility were rather less wealthy than their counterparts in the 
other Hohenzollern territories. Like the other provinces, the Kingdom was 
an agrarian based economy. Nonetheless, there was a larger lesser nobility 
and smaller noble elite in East Prussia than in the other territories. As will 
subsequently be discussed more fully, this was partly due to the fact that 
East Prussia had partible inheritance combined with few career 
opportunities for lesser nobles who were often landless and existed in real 
poverty.
The stratification of the East Prussian nobiUty resulted in an elite of 
titled families, Gmfenfamilien, followed by middling nobles with quite large 
amounts of land and a corresponding degree of political and social 
influence.^ These two groups enjoyed significant career opportunities. In 
contrast, the lesser East Prussian Junkers were, as was noted, impoverished 
and little different from the peasants which they worked beside in the fields. 
This group often worked their land personally (should it have been theks) 
or served as lesser officials in the provincial government. The lack of 
opportunity for lesser nobility was a grievance often expressed by the East 
Prussian elite to the Hohenzollerns. Carsten who has also examined the 
manuscript material of the Ostpreufiische FoUanten covering the reign of 
Frederick William Ts grandfather, the Great Elector, notes that in 1682 the 
Oherstande, i. e., nobihty, complained that their pursuit of knightly virtues 
was hindered by their poverty. In addition, most East Prussian nobihty 
found that instead of Uving by "books and swords", they had to "seize the
^See above. Chapter One, pp. 57-69.
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plough and other peasant work".^ As a result of these financial restraints, 
many Àmter were unable to send their representative deputies to the 
Convocations-Tagen that discussed district matters.^ The complaints that the 
East Prussian nobility made about their poverty were also closely associated 
with the larger framework in which they operated, namely Gutsherrschaft.
In addition, one addition factor that was common in the early eighteenth- 
century Kingdom was that military careers were impossible for lesser East 
Prussian Junkers. It was only after the accession of Frederick the Great in 
1740 that army cadet schools were further expanded. This permitted the 
impoverished lesser Junkers from East Prussia to send their sons to the 
cadet corps and thus secure a miÜtary career, hitherto impossible because of 
the costs involved. Prior to this and under Frederick William 1, however, 
the Kingdom's lesser nobility had a more difficult career path. The 
acceptance of a military career among the East Prussian nobility, however, 
must be questioned in light of their resistance throughout the reign of 
Frederick William 1 and into the first years of rule by Frederick the Great.^ 
Poverty was due to the size of individual estates, reduced family 
income and the backward and poor agrarian system. Furthermore, many 
lesser nobility were not in control of the land that they worked. The number 
of landless Junkers in the Kingdom during the reign of Frederick William 1 
cannot be given, as historians have focused only upon the group which held
^Carsten, Gesdiichte der preufiischen Timker. p. 38. See also GStAPK, OF, Nr. 717, 
30 July 1682, fol. 229.
^Carsten, Geschichte der Preufiische Tunker. p. 38.
^ABB, 5:2, p. 776. The editors of the Acta Borussica have noted that in 1718,1727, 
and 1738 there were similar examples of disquiet. See also Busch, Militarsystem und 
Sozialleben im alten Preussen, 1713-1807. p. 82.
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la n d / We do know, however, that during the eighteenth century the total 
number of peasant farmers working on Junker-held land were in decline, as 
was the size of the farmstead, particularly the further away it was from 
Konigsberg/
There is another explanation for the general noble poverty. This 
partly relates to partible inheritance and the variances in wealth, social and 
political status among the East Prussian elite in the early modern period. It 
was a consequence of repeated divisions of a father's inheritance, in the 
past, which ensured most Junkers had small estates. The effect of such 
inheritance practices could, however, be mitigated in practice. Family lands 
in East Prussia were not necessarily divided among sons of noble families. 
Although in theory partible inheritance applied, the beneficiaries — almost 
always sons — made an agreement to keep the lands together but to divide 
the mcome which resulted. In this way some family patrhnonies were kept 
together, at the price of some sons (and more daughters) being worse off. 
These differences in wealth, however, were accompanied by a gain in 
cohesion and family unity. Otto Hintze, F. L. Carsten, and Edgar Melton 
have noted the potential benefit for the more impoverished family members 
which meant that even the lesser and poorer Junkers held privileges and 
rights in the Estates. Therefore, they could come together and rally behind a 
particular family member who was nominated for an administrative 
position in the territory. Once selected, the new office holder was expected 
to reward those members of his family who helped him attain his position.
^FriedrldvWilhelm Henning has shown for a period late in the centuiy, however, 
that nobility continued to farm their own land. See, Henning, Herrschaft und 
Bauernuntertanigkeit. pp. 107ff.
^Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning, Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgesdiichte 
Mittel- und Qstdeutschlands. edited by Johannes Hoffmann, Series A, Nr. 42, 
VeroffentUchungen der Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa an der Universitat Dortmund, 
Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 1985, pp. 269-270.
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As noted by Otto Hintze, the local conditions which existed at the end of the 
seventeenth century are reflected in an anonymous memorandum sent to 
the official in charge, von Fuchs. The author of the memorandum warned, 
that if someone in East Prussia obtained the position of district councillor or 
an administrative chief, "then his uncles and brothers-in-law are in clover; 
and all the little Junlcers around are expected to serve the Lord district 
councillor and Lord Chief as an idol."^
The Amthauptleute had held considerable authority over many of the 
Kingdom's affairs and possessed considerable political and social influence 
throughout the seventeenth century. The role of lesser Junlcers is elaborated 
upon by Hintze tlirough the same anonymous East Prussian who also 
described the influence of the East Prussian nobility in provincial affairs 
near the end of the seventeenth century:
[T]hey themselves [had] taken over the entire board, all good has come to 
an end in the land, and the sovereign must at all times negotiate with these 
district councilors about his rights, even his very bread; so long as this goes 
on, tlie Elector will be ruler more nomine than omine. All the wliile the 
district councilors send the ball over to the liigh councilors and the High 
Councilors play it back to the district councilors; and anyone who does not 
tag along with this, even His Serene Higliness, will have to pay for i t .... If 
His Serene Higlmess hands over œconomica to the charge of these people, as 
it is in the hands of the Starosty in Poland, then we will have everything we 
want or need.^^
^Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Gescliichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Brandenburg. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, vol. 16, p. 1058. See also, Hintze, "The 
Hohenzollern and tlie Nobility," p. 45. A slightly different passage is in Carsten,
Geschichte der preufiischen lunlter. p. 37. For a different English translation than that 
which is used here, see Carsten, A Histoiy of the Prussian lunkera. p. 29. See also, Melton, 
"The Prussian Junkers, 1600-1786," p. 81. Melton uses Hintze's English edition quotation.
^^Quoted by Hintze, 'The Hohenzollern and the Nobility," pp. 44-45. See also, 
Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 227, and Julir, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes 
Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713-1751," p. 38. Juhr gives less importance to the 
continued impact of the Amthauptleute and tends to follow the more traditional 
historiography and at one point notes that these Junipers (i. e., Amthauptleute) had "virtually 
no sovereign control." Compare to Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 
76, "Hence no weight was to be given to the fact that the candidate for office might be "the 
brother, cousin, brother-in-law, or any other in-law or client of the sponsor."" See also, 
ABB, 3, pp. 577-78 and ABB, 5:2, pp. 432,537,564,614 and ABB, 7, p. 649 for tlie 
Rosenberg's quote.
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Though the Amthauptleute held authority in the later half of the seventeenth 
century, during the reign of Frederick William 1 they faced a serious 
challenge to their position. The attempt by Frederick William 1 to establish 
his authority over local elites only produced limited results for him in the 
early and middle years of liis reign, and certainly achieved far less by liis 
death in 1740 than he had expected and hoped. As a result, these officials as 
well as their subordinates retained a significant degree of independence and 
the development of absolutism was impeded and restricted.
The representatives of the nobility at the local level, the 
Amthauptleute, remained an integral force in East Prussian administration 
until surprisingly late in Frederick William Ts reign. Even Rotli notes that 
"[e]ven though the district captains held little more than sinecure positions 
after the General Domanenpachter assumed most of the their administrative 
functions [throughout the 1720s and 1730s], they still had the force of 
tradition to support them."^^ The district captains were a troublesome 
target for Frederick William I, and it was for this reason that there was close 
attention paid to them on ahnost every aspect of their position throughout 
Frederick William Ts reign. The manuscript material suggests that the 
traditional influence of the Amthauptleute on East Prussian affairs had a 
substantial life that lasted long after Frederick William Ts accession.
When a Hohenzollern became ruler it was traditional to visit East 
Prussia and aU the other major territories to receive the traditional oaths of 
allegiance from the representatives of the territory and to hear any 
grievances which the provincial authorities might have. It was on this visit 
that perhaps the most often quoted words of Frederick William Ts were
^^Roth, 'The East Prussian 'DomaenenpaechteT in the Eighteenth Century," p. 121. 
Roth appears to base the issue of sinecure incorrectly upon Busch, Militarsystem und 
Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 131.
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expressed, to the effect that his authority would be established hke a "rock 
of bronze" The second part of the King's statement, however, is less 
familiar and reveals that he planned to allow the Junkers to continue to meet 
in their Estates: "... One allows the Junkers to make wind in the Landtage. 
One lets them sound off if they come around to One's own way [of 
thinking]...."^^ In other words, Frederick William 1 was explaining that the 
East Prussian Junkers could vent their complaints and grievances against 
him in the provincial Estates (Landtage), smce the King considered that these 
local agencies did not represent any challenge to his own administrative 
control and were thus a valuable safety valve.
Yet these same Estates had possessed significant powers. One of the 
most important functions of the Landtage had been to vote supply 
(Bewilligungsrecht). The traditional historiography suggests that this 
function was forfeited (Einhiifiten) by the East Prussian elites in the early 
years of the eighteenth centuiy and iu this case the established view appears 
to be correct.^^ The leader of a district Landtage, the Landrat, was selected by 
that district's members. It was the responsibility of the Landrat to oversee 
many of the district's militaiy obligations as well. Although these 
responsibilities and functions had altered in the course of the reign of the 
Great Elector,^^ the Landrat remained a protector of a district Junker's 
traditional or innate rights.
^^See above. Introduction, p. 28.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., II-Materien, Nr. 1577, fol. 197. See also, ABB, 2, p. 352.
^^Neugebauer, Politisdier Wandel im Osten. p. 65. See also Isaacsolm,
Gescliichte des Preufiischen Beamtenthums. Ill, p. 167. Isaacsolm comments: "Dafi er hier 
stets lebendig blieb, dafi der Gang der Maschine durdi kein Staubchen, kein Hindernifi in 
irgend einem Theile gestort wiirde, das war eine zweite Aufgabe der 
Departements=Minister."
^^See above, Chapters Two and Tliree.
Chapter 5 — Continuity and Change within Local Government_______ 201
As we have seen, many of the military tax collection responsibilities 
of the Landràte were taken over by the Kommissarmten officials/^ Yet the 
changes in their administrative jurisdictions were not accompanied by a 
major alteration in the political and social position of the Landrate. We can 
trace their limited movement through the instructions of Hohenzollern 
rulers in which they set down the administrative, military and social 
hierarchy in a Table of Ranks, the so-called Rang Règlement. These tables 
were issued by Hohenzollern rulers from time-to-time, often at the start of a 
new reign. They set down the official order and hierarchy of posts in the 
Hohenzollern monarchy and applied to all provinces. Therefore, one Table 
of Ranks took account of provincial variations. A post with the same title 
and provincial status did not necessarily have the same level of rank within 
the Hohenzollern Table of Ranks. Often, a post in a more important 
territory would hold higher ranlc over the same post in a less important 
Hohenzollern province. The higher one's ranlc, the more political and social 
influence one wielded. In other words, one's place in the Table of Ranks 
was a measure of one's political and social importance. Frederick III/1, for 
example, in liis Rang Règlement of 15 April 1705 placed the East Prussian 
Landrate at number forty-two in a list of approximately one hundred and 
thirty-one.^^ This is thirty places ahead of the Landrate and Kommissariaten 
from the other territories who were less important including Brandenburg 
which is strÜdng testimony to the new importance of the new Kingdom.^^ 
Although the East Prussian Landrate maintained the same position a year
^^See above, Chapters Two and Three.
^^GStAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 42, fol. 4. See also, ABB, 1, pp. 410-419 where the 21 April 
1713 Rang Regîementhâs be published; it can also be found in Rudolf Maria Bernhai d 
Stillford, Ceremonial-Buch für den kôniglich Preussischen Hof  ^Abschnitt 1-Xll, Berlin: R. V. 
Decker's, 1877, p. 13.
l^ GStAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 42, fol. 4.
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later, their status actually improved withiu all the ranks of the Kingdom due 
to the addition of the Grand Maître de la Garde Robe and the elimination of the 
East Prussian Tribunalsrdte from the lis t/^  In other words, their net gain 
taking all posts from all territories remained the same but their rank 
improved when considering only the posts of the East Prussian territory. 
Almost two years later, they again rose in their rank to position number 
forty when several other positions were lowered.^®
The trend continued tlirough the first decade of Frederick William Ts 
reign. In April 1713, the new King increased the rank of the Amthauptleute 
significantly by twelve places, advancing them to position twenty-eight.^^ 
This rise was an accidental result of Frederick William Ts wider preferences 
and not a deliberated enliancement of their position. This is especially 
interesting since it is clear that the Amthauptleute were not part of the 
'higher' levels of central administration or the King's court in Berlin. It was 
in this Règlement that we see Frederick William Ts effort to eliminate the 
superfluous pomp associated with his father's court, which the new King 
detested. Positions that were largely ceremonial under Frederick III/1 were 
lowered in rank or dropped altogether from the list in favour of those 
functions Frederick William I considered more important, namely military 
positions and important administrative posts. Incidentally, these reforms of 
ranks by Frederick William 1 were part of his streamlining of court and 
administration in order to support his growing military system. This was 
the source of the established verdict upon Brandenburg-Prussia in this era, 
that it was the "Sparta of the North."^^
^%tillford, Ceremonial-Buch p. 18-19. Rang Règlement of 6 June 1706.
^%StAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 42, fol. 18.
^^Ibid., fol. 30. Rang Règlement of 21 April 1713.
^%or a comparison of expenditures between Frederick William I and his 
predecessor, see Forster, Friedrich Wilhelm I. K onig von Preussen. vol. 1, pp. 54-70 which
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The rank of several other East Prussian officials, such as the four 
Oberanithaiiptleute, was also increased significantly. Their positions were 
maintained at this status until at least the time of the introduction of the 
General Directory in January 1723. This is evident from the order for the 
East Prussian Regierung to re-publicise the Rang Règlement of 13 April 1713 
again in 1722 and even in 1723.^^ Furthermore, all of the royal officials 
operating in the Kingdom, those administrators (in other words) who were 
under direct control of the King, occupied a very lowly place in the order of 
rank. For example, Kammer officials were listed at forty-six in rank for all 
officials in 1713 which was second from last, being only ahead of the 
members of the Queen's entourage.^^ In the Acta Borussica. however, a 
document is included from 1721 that pertains specifically to the order of 
rank for East Prussia. In this document, the Kommissariat and 
Domanenfmmmer officials, that is to say the royal agents, were placed at the 
same rank as the President of the East Prussian Tribunal and Hofgericht who 
was third from the top. This appears to have only been a temporary and 
unsuccessful attempt by Frederick William I to insert tins group of his own 
officials so h i g h l y I t  proved very short-lived. As noted earlier, he 
ordered the Rang Règlement of 1713 to be re-issued in 1722 and 1723.
The wider point here is that the position of the Landrate as well as 
most other posts occupied by the East Prussian elite, may have had their 
administrative role reduced but their official political and corresponding
highlight the reign of Frederick III/1 and pp. 179-191 which illustrate the reign of Frederick 
William I, pp. 179-191.
^^GStAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 42, fols. 36-37 Rückseite. The king's order of 24 December
1722.
^%tillford, Ceremonial-Buch p. 33.
^^ABB, 3, pp. 327-331, "Rangreglement für Preufien," Berlin, 25 March 1721. The 
editors note that this was originally contained in manuscript material of Repository 7 (Nrs. 
41 and 42) now held in tlie Berlin archives although these documents were not found and 
thus, could not be examined.
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social, status was stable and even enhanced at times during both the reigns 
of Frederick III /1 and Frederick William I. Whether this was a deliberate 
raising of their status cannot be determined with any certainty. The general 
evolution within the order of ranks, however, is significant. We have seen 
how particular judicial and court offices fell while particular administrative 
and military posts rose. This may be interpreted as the King's deliberate 
preference for posts that carried out specific functions, above all military 
administration, rather than other social and/or political factors. Whether or 
not their enlianced status was intended as some sort of "consolation prize" 
for their reduced administrative role is not entirely clear.^^ Nevertheless, 
their long-standing liigh rank was consistent with Frederick William Ts use 
of territorial officials. In light of evidence presented here, one can see that 
the continued official presence and high ranking of East Prussian officials 
had more to do with their continued influence and authority in the territory. 
At the same time Frederick William I selectively enhanced other positions 
which were either relevant for positions outside the Kingdom or the sphere 
of influence of the established elite.
The Landrate were among the highest members of the Landtage and 
were the representatives of the Amthauptleute (of which group they were 
members) in the Landtage. They originally numbered twelve, a number that 
lasted throughout the seventeenth century and into the early eighteenth 
century. By the time of Frederick William Ts accession, however, the 
number of individuals who held the title of landrat had declined to four. 
This was primarily due to the fact that the other Amthauptleute were not 
replaced when the incumbent died and had not been replaced during the
^^Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen, "The Recruitment and Training of 
Administrative and Teclmical Personel," in The Formation of Nation States in Western 
Europe, ed., Charles Tilly, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 515.
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reign of Frederick III/1/^ That is, some functions were combined under one 
official or "retired" altogether. During the Huldigungslandtag of 1713, 
Frederick William I approved the appointment of two new Landrate. Their 
appointments, however, were approved without any day-to-day 
administrative responsibilities but brought the total number of Landrate to 
six.^ ® No more were named during Fredericlt William Ts reign primarily 
because there no formal meeting of the Estates was held where and when 
this normally was carried out. Four Landrate stood out from the rest and 
comprised the elite within the Landtage. This group of four in practice held 
the highest status. These four were known as Oberhauptmdnner and came 
from the districts of Amt Brandenburg, Amt Schaaken, Amt Fischausen and 
Amt Tapiau.
The elite status of the Oberhauptmanner incxQasQd during the first half 
of the eighteenth century. Even within those Amthauptleute who remained, 
there was a clear hierarchy. The administrator for the Amt Brandenburg 
was, in practice, superior to the others. This position traditionally brought 
with it the position of Landrats director who oversaw the entire Landtage. In 
addition, this position, as well as those of the Amthauptrndnnei' of Schaaken 
and Fischausen were given to military o f f i ce r s .The  remaining six Landrate 
eventually all died without being replaced, thus saving the customary 
salaries (eingezogen),^^ and this was the usual number during the reign of 
Frederick William I.
^^Neugebauer, Politischer Waiidel im Osten. p. 69.
^^Uderstadt, "Die ostpreufiische Kammerverwaltung," pai't 3, pp 135-136. 
^^Neugebauer, Politischer Wandel im Osten. p. 69.
^^Quoted in Neugebauer, Politischer Wandel im Osten. p. 69-70; Johannes Voigt, 
Geschichtliclie Notizen über den Herren=Stand. Konigsberg: Privately published, 1840, p. 
23 "Die noch übrigen sechs Landrathe liefi man nach und nach aussterben, ohne dafi ihre 
Aemter wieder besetzt wurden. Hire Besoldungen wurden eingezogen."
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The position of Landrat was a post that had slightly more real work 
than other Amthauptleute, but this did not mean that actual authority rested 
with some other official; it did not. These positions remained important 
because of their status and the men who filled them. Nor was appointment 
to them based solely upon the wishes of Frederick William I. The Regierung 
had enduring influence over many of these appointments until the 1730s. 
The positions under the Amthauptleute, the Amt Verweser and Amt Schreiber, 
were part of a strong administrative infrastructure that had for long existed 
in East Prussia. Both of these positions were under the authority of the 
individual Amthaupttmnn for whom they worked. Otto Busch has argued 
that from the start of Frederick William Ts reign, the position of 
Amthauptleute was offered as sinecure especially for elderly or incapacitated 
officers.^1 This was not strictly the case and will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. For purposes of this chapter, it is important to remember that 
these positions generated income as well as wielding political and social 
influence within the ranks of East Prussia's traditional elite.
^%üsch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 131. Tliis 
point is also mentioned in Neugebauer, Politischer Wandel im Osten. p. 69.
The Domanenpachter
The royal domain lands were central to Frederick William Ts reforms 
of the Kingdom. The King's initiatives, however, did not affect Junkers who 
already held such lands. Rather, the reforms revamped the way in which 
the King leased out those lands which he still controlled directly which had 
been run by the Kingdom's established authorities. His aim was to 
maximise revenue, for example, by improved farming methods which 
would lead to higher yields and rents. This was achieved primarily through 
the rather slow but eventually successful introduction of new domain estate 
managers, so-called Domanenpachter, as well as implementation of new 
"procedural rules, instructions, guidelines, and directives, designed to 
guarantee that the estates of the royal domain be operated exactly as the 
crown desired."^^ Many of the regulations were incorporated into Frederick 
William Ts Instruction for the General Directory in 1723 and based on a plan 
drawn up by one of the King's advisors, Friedrich von Gorne, in 1719. The 
King followed-up the initial plan with additional regulations for the 
operation of the domain leasing scheme in 1725 and 1728 which reiterated 
the legal regulations for the domain estates. One final regulation of 1731 
must also be mentioned, the detailed instruction for the introduction and 
implementation of improved farming methods, the so-called Haiishaltungs- 
Reglements or Magdeburg farming procedures.^^ Within around a dozen 
years, from 1719-1730, the King had reorganised and implemented the way 
in wliich the Hohenzollerns had for long managed the domain leases.
^^Roth, "The East Prussian 'DomaenenpaechteT in the Eighteenth Century," p. 54. 
^^Ibid. See Chapter Two.
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This was characteristic of Frederick William I as we have seen. He 
sought to circumvent the established authorities in the Kingdom and tried 
to recover lost ground by working through a new group of officials and 
administrators. The manuscript material suggests that he was conscious of 
the role of the traditional authorities in local affairs. From conceptualisation 
in 1719 through its introduction in the 1720s, the new scheme essentially 
was not in effective operation until 1730. Yet, there is no doubt that the 
political and social integration of the General Domanenpachter started during 
Frederick William Ts reign, albeit not at the expense of the political and 
social status of that group of traditional native nobility whom they were 
intended to emulate in form and function. Frederick William I developed 
an effective parallel institution to counterbalance and eventually supplant 
the traditional authorities' administration of the crown's estates. The royal 
domains were legally an area of Hohenzollern authority. Yet, in practice, 
the local elites had, through the years, taken control and only slowly were 
the Hohenzollern rulers — primarily Frederick William I — able to regain 
them. The rise of the East Prussian Stande in earlier centuries had allowed 
the local nobility to increase their influence over most aspects of land 
management.^ As the Hohenzollerns increased their authority over the 
territory, they were for long unable to manage the domain lands effectively 
and directly, and therefore to draw maximum profit from them. Instead, the 
Hohenzollerns continued to lease entire estates to local noblemen 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This continued to limit 
the ruling dynasty's personal influence in East Prussia. In 1609, the East 
Prussian Estates demanded and received from Duke Albrecht additional 
power over the affairs of the territory. One important element of this
following discussion is based largely on Rotli, "The East Prussian 
'DomaenenpaediteT in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 30-35.
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increased authority was that East Prussian Junkers had been granted 
priority over non-nobles in the allocation of domain leases. These noblemen 
were often the administrative officials for the district in which the estates 
leased were located. Potential candidates were drawn from lists prepared 
by the supreme territorial authority that represented East Prussian interests, 
the Konigsberg Regierung. Thus, in effect, tliis control over domain lands 
exemplified the Regierung’s control of virtually every aspect of fiscal and 
judicial affairs on the local as well as provincial level. Tliere was a tradition 
of privileges and authority over territorial affairs by native East Prussian 
Junkers which stretched back over a century at the time of Frederick 
William Ts accession.
In addition, the practice had become established by which the 
domain estates had been used as collateral by the impoverished ruler for 
loans from his nobility; for the lease pledges or contracts, the so-called 
Verfandung, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.^ The term 
Verfiindungf however, can also incorporate the meaning 'pawn', because, as 
James Roth explains, "the usufruct was lost while the loan was in effect."^^ 
This became a serious problem, even though early Hohenzollern rulers 
made some progress to correct the domain mis-management and faulty 
loans. During the reign of Frederick William, the Great Elector, in 1656 the 
total debt from such pawnings totalled 1.6 million taler: a high figure but 
one which actually was a reduction from that of previous years.^^ 
Nevertheless, the rulers up to this point facilitated such pawning of their 
domains in order to bring in much needed revenue. Moreover, as Roth has
^Kqkolewski, "Naduzycia i korupcja w administracji Prus Ksi^zçcydi w  pc^owie 
XVI wieku," pp. 11-20. Tliis is based upon the English language summary in Acta Polcmiae 
Historica, vol. 70,1994, p. 203.
^^Roth, "The East Prussian 'Domaenenpaediter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 31.
% id .
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noted, "their willingness to give up the use of the domain shows how 
unimportant the domain had become as a regular and direct source of 
sovereign revenues
Significant reforms began with the Great Elector although as was 
discussed in Chapter Two, his efforts did little to enhance HohenzoUern 
authority within the Duchy. He was able to establish rudimentary mihtary 
supervision in East Prussia to support his standing army. This was the 
foundation upon which Frederick William I, two generations later, built as 
he strove to expand many of the fragmentary authorities, especially with 
respect to the royal domain lands, into parallel institutions to those 
controlled by the established East Prussian elite. This was an identical tactic 
to that employed by the King towards the power of the Regierung as 
discussed in the previous chapter.
The General Finance Directory had a significant impact upon the 
development of the domain lands in East Prussia. Frederick William Fs 
authority was more direct and complete over domain affairs than almost 
any other sphere of the Kingdom's poHtics. Initially, this had been 
facilitated by the establishment of the General Finance Directory. At least 
on paper, the King took full control of the East Prussian domain board from 
the noble-dominated Regierung on September 26,1714.^^ This significantly 
reduced the authority of the provincial government in domain financial 
matters and in the process, removed "stmnbhng blocks" to rational and 
regular exploitation of the royal d o m a i n s . I n  short, the King tried to break 
the link which had been forged during previous centuries between the 
ruler's domains and the provincial ehtes. Moreover, the introduction of the
3%id.
2, pp. 46-48.
^%oth, ^The East Prussian "Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 42.
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General Directory improved the administration of the royal domain affairs 
in some measure after 1723.
The decree of September 1714 initially changed very little in practice, 
because the influence of the Amtimuptleute was entrenched so firmly at both 
the local level of govermnent and over the domains. The King had few 
officials among the various regional and local tiers of government who were 
able to oversee the introduction of the decree and implement it effectively. 
What is clear, is that in the area of the royal domains, control shifted in 
favour of the King less slowly than in other parts of the administration 
areas. Royal domain land constituted about one half of all East Prussian 
territory and the King, from Berlin, increasingly possessed a wider presence 
in East Prussia simply by being able to make more decisions about these 
lands.
There was a clear if at times elusive social hierarchy within the 
administration. The titles of the various positions are as diverse and 
imprecise as social definitions or labels. The implication here is that certain 
posts, for example, the Gemral Domanenpachter, were hoping to use their 
positions as a path into the social status of the nobility. Many titles were 
included in the royal Table of Ranks but several were not which only added 
to the disorder.^^ The general lease program, a priority for Frederick 
William I, estabMshed a variety of titles for the non-noble leaseholder, the 
General Domanenpachter. These leaseholders of royal domains, as a group, 
constituted a hierarchy which incorporated the titles of the administrative 
nobihty. As a result, the respective titles for the General Domanenpachter and 
the Kingdom's lunkers are similar and therefore confusing. The General 
Domanenpachter could become an Amtmann, or an Oberamtmann, or an
41See footnote 17.
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Amtsrat. Tliese were govermnent titles that sounded close to those of the 
administrative nobility who also operated at the local level.
Such a wider royal presence, however, did not necessarily translate 
into enhanced pohtical or social control or lead to an immediate 
improvement in the administration of domain affairs. What it did provide 
for the Hohenzollerns in East Prussia, in the medium and longer-term, was 
an excellent bridgehead from which to work outwards, to achieve greater 
control over East Prussia as a whole. The King may have wanted the district 
captains to submit completely to his authority but he was not necessarily 
able to force the Anithauptleute from their high social position. Indeed, as 
wÜl shortly be seen, this was probably not Frederick William Ts goal at all. 
The Anithauptleute, more than any other group however, handled the crucial 
day-to-day functions that directly linked them to peasants and funiters on 
the estates and to members of the nobility in more elevated positions.
The East Prussian domain administration remained hampered by the 
enduring effects of the 1709/10 plague during the early decades of the 
eighteenth century. Many of the deserted farms remained abandoned 
throughout much of Frederick William Ts reign. Tills brought with it 
drastically lower revenues and production from both the noble and domain 
lands upon which the East Prussian economy was based.^^ The area to the 
east of Konigsberg was, in particular, badly hit by the plague. This region 
which includes the districts of Memel, Tilsit, Ragnit, and Insterburg had 
suffered earher devastations, for example, the seventeenth-century 
invasions by the Tartars This left the royal domains with two-thirds
^^The lower revenues and production also may have forced down rents. Tliis also 
may have been the case due to a lack of lease contracts for the domain estates and/or 
under-utilised noble estate lands due to the general labour shortage.
'^^Recent Polish historiography, however, has questioned the destructiveness of the 
Tartar incursions argued previously. For example, see Augusiewicz, Skwomir, "Najazdy 
tatarskie na Prusy Ksi^zçce (1656-1657). Legendy i fakty," Komunikaty Mazursko-
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fewer peasant labourers by the end of the Great Elector's reign than they 
had in 1610.^ In addition, the War of 1655-60 also took a considerable toU 
on the Duchy, and the lasting effects of these devastations and the plague 
contributed to the Kingdom's slow recovery during the eighteenth century.
Wamtijikie, vol. 3,1995, pp. 233-247. This is based upon the English language summary in 
Acta Poloniae Historica, vol. 74,1996, pp. 216-17.
^Mack Walker, The Salzbvug Transaction, p. 74.
A Consolidation of Tunker Power
The plague crisis also served to increase the already-considerable 
control exercised by the East Prussian Junkers. Many of the domain estates 
abandoned during or immediately after the plague crisis were confiscated 
by the influential and wealthy nobles who remained, and this only added to 
their financial potential as well as extending their control over the land.
This had the effect of removing altogether royal control from the vanished 
estates and, in general, substantial parts of East Prussia.
Frederick Wilham I needed to enhance his own control at the local 
level in order to carry out the plaimed improvements to the royal domains. 
His actions have to be considered a serious attempt to challenge the prestige 
and leading authority of the Anithauptleute and might have resulted in 
further administrative and governmental breakdown in a territory which 
brought the Hohenzollerns the liighest prestige as a Kingdom. This was 
something that Frederick William I could not risk, given his continuing 
dependence upon the Anithauptleute as the principal figures in local 
government in the Kingdom. District Captains, as a group, "were the only 
tenuous Hnk between central monarchical authority and that part of the 
population subject to direct patrhnonial authority of the noble landlords."^^ 
Roth explains that, there was a need by the Hohenzollerns to have the 
established agencies continue their dominance over the day-to-day 
operation of administration that Frederick William I, perhaps as well as 
previous rulers, were willing, if not forced, to concede their own authority
'^Roth, ^The East Prussian Domaenenpaechter' in the Eighteenth Century," p. 202.
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outside the royal domain land administration.^^ Frederick WüHam I could 
not immediately replace this link. His continuing dependence upon the 
Amthauptleute in the wider government of the Kingdom here Hmited the 
capacity for direct action on the domain lands.
On the private estates of the Junkers, the District Captains' 
responsibilities were complex and wide-ranging — here more than ahnost 
anywhere else in East Prussian affairs their authority was complete. 
Frederick WiUiam I, at times, did not break down the traditional structures 
into clearer divisions of responsibility, or as some may say, a protean 
bureaucracy. Rather than attacking established ehtes and attempting to 
destroy their social positions, as earher generations of scholars believed, the 
King coaxed them into mihtary careers and actively encouraged the East 
Prussian ehte to improve their own professional development by becoming 
mihtary officers. As noted above, Frederick WiUiam I made no attempt to 
decrease the social standing of the East Prussian Junker. On the contrary, he 
eventuaUy sought to enhance it. East Prussian Junkers recognised the 
immediate advantages of the military for themselves as well as for the 
economic weU-being of their estates. Presumably, there had been a strong 
mihtary ethos among the Junkers, hke other nobihties of the period. They 
viewed association with Frederick WiUiam Ts armed forces differently than 
posts in his government. The East Prussian Junkers appear to accept their 
intended role in the mUitary sphere sooner and more easUy than in the 
King’s reform of govermnent.
Much of the explanation for this was due to the powerful position of 
the East Prussian Junkers which had developed most notably during the 
reign of the Great Elector. The Junkers had gained increased social status 
and personal power at the local level, especially through their virtuaUy
46ibid.
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complete authority within the boundaries of their own estates, and this was 
combined with a high measure of provincial self-government. The latter 
further complemented their status and power through the domination of 
East Prussian local administration by noblemen from the same district. This 
had the effect of allowing many local officials to participate in important 
provincial-wide decisions. The estate Junker, whether a local district official 
or not, held important economic, social, and political power at many levels 
of East Prussian society and government.
The extension of Junker authority into the mihtary and over their 
peasants were to be the next stages in the evolution of the East Prussian 
nobihty. On this point, one must agree with Otto Busch who noted that "the 
mihtary system as a social system became an expression of the pohtical 
circumstances between King and nobility The process, however, was to 
prove an extended one. Tt was only during the reign of Frederick Wilham T 
that tliis was advanced and the reign of Frederick the Great that the 
relationship matured. Crucial to this integration of the Junkers into the 
HohenzoUern armed forces was a subsequent reform introduced by 
Frederick WUliam T, the Canton Règlement of 1733.^®
This Règlement fostered the final stages of the evolution toward 
HohenzoUern absolutism. Prior to 1733, there was less incentive for the 
nobihty to accept the military just as there was httle incentive to accept 
monarchical authority. What the Canton system did was to raise the status 
and authority of the local nobleman even further. Tt placed the 
responsibUity of recruitment solely in the hands of the local estate Junker.
Tn short, it produced a more secure means by which the King was able to
^^Büsch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 79.
'^ F^or a fuller discussion of East Prussian nobles and military command, see below, 
the section "East Prussian Junker as Military Commander," in Chapter Seven.
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raise, maintain, and train an increasing peasant based army wluTe at the 
same time recruiting, maintaining, and training an officer corps comprised 
exclusively of the nobility. Tt offered a career and some income to an 
increasing number of noblemen: it should be remembered that the size of 
the Brandenburg-Prussian army almost doubled between 1713 and 1740.^^ 
East Prussia does not appear to be at the forefront of Frederick 
William Fs military reforms, which the Kingdom's nobility may not have 
accepted as late as 1740.^^ In that year, Gmf von Manteuffel noted that the 
Junkers there were ready to revolt.^^ Tt is clear, however, that in general the 
Junkers became an important part of an army that virtually doubled in size 
during the King's reign. One may find it difficult to deny that the new 
mihtary system evolved in direct relation to Prussia's society and economy
^^Jany, Geschichte der Preufiisdien Armee. I, p. 660, In order to demonstrate tlie 
growth of the army under Frederick William I, Jany provided the following table:
February 1713 June 1715 June 1731 June 1731
Infantry 21746 35134 48967 52391
Garrison and Freikompagnien 
Troops
4841 3650 4720
Cavalry 7737 9914 15876 17842
Artillery 527 505 1208 1208
Engineers - - 41 41
In the pay of Holland 5096 - - -
New Garrison Troops 69742
6804
76202
4832
39947 
(excluing the 
Red 
Grenadier 
Battalion)
45553 
(excluding the 
red and white 
Grenadier 
Battalion)
76546 81034
^%ee, for example, Jany, Geschichte der Preufiischen Armee, I, p. 427.
^^ABB, 5:2, p. 776. As cited above, the editors of tlie Acta Borussica have noted that 
in 1718,1727, and 1738 there were similar examples of disquiet. In addition, see Busch, 
Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen, 1713-1807, p. 82.
Chapter 5 — A Consolidation of Tunker Power_____________________ 218
and indeed became the component which integrated these into a coherent 
whole.^^
One of the most important functions of the Juniper was his role in 
military recruitment, especially after the introduction of the canton system 
which slowly developed throughout Frederick Wilham Ps reign. On the 
estate, the Junlcer was also recruiter and commanding officer. Before the 
formal estabhshment of the Canton system of 1733, the HohenzoUern armies 
were based on irregular recruitment and largely consisted of a mix of 
mercenary forces with Prussian subjects who were often forced into mihtary 
service. Tn particular, this was the case for peasant farm labourers. The 
recruitment for East Prussia had, from the reign of the Great Elector until 
the early eighteenth century, been left to both royal officials loyal to Berlin 
and local territorial elites. Since the officials loyal to Berlin often did not 
have the manpower to recruit in the local and distant districts, this was left 
to local officials.
The size of the Brandenburg-Prussian army increased notably after 
the turn of the eighteenth century. Frederick 111/1 contributed significant 
numbers of his mihtary forces to the support of the Holy Roman Emperor 
during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14). As a result, there 
was a need to increase the size of the Brandenburg-Prussian army.^^ Once 
Frederick WiUiam 1 ascended the throne there appears to have been a 
continued drive to increase the size of the mUitary establishment. The only 
link between the East Prussians and the other territories, then, was through 
the HohenzoUern ruler. It was the Hohenzollerns who ruled over their
^^Ibid., p. 84. It should be noted as well that Busch provides a familiar discussion 
demonstrating the HohenzoUern rulers' belief that the nobility were the natural leaders and 
officers in the military ranks. See pp. 89-93.
^^Ibid., p. 14. See also. Max Jahns, Geschichte der kriegswissenschaften 
vornehmlich in DeutscMand. Munich and Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1890, pp. 1547-1549.
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territory independently of his rule over other territories that were a part of 
the Holy Roman Empire, and in particular, Brandenburg, which held the 
title of Elector for the Empire.
The Appointment of Local Government Officials
Frederick Wilham Ts enduring concern with district captain 
appointments indicates his involvement in and attitude toward local 
administration within the Kingdom. It is important to remember that 
control over the various levels of government was often sought through 
individuals rather than through institutions, both in the localities as at the 
centre. In practice. East Prussian district captains were appointed as they 
were in other provinces: the nobility selected a candidate and then sent his 
name to the ruler for approval. The HohenzoUern rulers had always to 
approve ofhciaUy the candidate, but hitherto this had been a matter in 
almost all cases of confirming the Regierung's choice.
The manner in which this was carried out became clearer as Frederick 
WiUiam Ts reign went on and, indeed, changed to some degree, with the 
King securing greater influence over these appointments. Yet he never 
achieved complete control. On occasions there were lists of potential 
candidates and even at times an appointment was promised for the next 
vacancy: even where this was to a specific district. A hst of potential 
administrators was maintained both in Berlin and at the Regiefimg in 
Konigsberg, but appears more often to have been sent to Berlin as were 
letters of promise', that is to say, formal letters promising the reversion to a 
post. As this was an important aspect of East Prussian affairs during 
Frederick WUUam Ts reign, it wUl now be examined.
Though manuscript material shows that District Captains were 
appointed the traditional way for much of Frederick WiUiam Ts reign, it is 
also evident that the King did secure increasing personal control and was 
gradually able to influence and sometimes overrule the East Prussian
220
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Regierung, The appointment process is important in demonstrating the 
growing degree of personal involvement of Frederick Wilham I in the King's 
government throughout the 1720s and 1730s.
During his reign the traditional appointing procedures came to be 
modified. The manner in which one actually secured positions such as that 
of district captain varied sufficiently to suggest that these were matters in 
which central government was deeply interested but also lacked full 
authority. The ways in which East Prussian officials were appointed was 
crucial to the functioning of government and became the means by which 
Frederick Wilham I sought to extend his power throughout the Kingdom, 
The individuals who were placed in the lower and therefore more local 
levels of provincial administration, such as the Regiei'ung's subordinate 
officials and especially those under the Kammer, had a considerable impact 
on East Prussian affairs. The way in which locals secured these positions of 
relative influence makes clear the transformation that East Prussian 
government went through in this period.
The administrative documents printed in Acta Borussica suggest that 
the King had a firm hand over the official appointment process in this 
period.^^ Yet manuscript material not included in the Acta Borussica. or 
surveyed by its editors, reveals a notably different picture. Unpubhshed 
documents not only reveal more about the context of the rise and fall of the 
East Prussian Junkers but also approach Frederick Wilham Ts approach 
with respect to their selection and appointment.
Appointment to certain posts remained in practice beyond the King's 
power, while throughout Frederick WiUiam Ts reign there was considerable 
continuity in methods of appointment. Some traditional appointment
example, ABB, 2, pp. 333-335,18 March 1716, "Personal des preufiischen 
Tribunals vor und nadi seiner Wandlung"; See also, GStAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 10.
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processes were simply ignored by the King, for example, promoting from 
the ranks of existing officials or appointing these men to new positions. 
Instead Frederick William I chose to select officials in other ways. There 
was never a single established method of appointment for the 
Amthauptleute, his deputy the Amt Verweser, or the legal clerk, the 
Adelichegerichtsschreiber. Only general guidelines existed for these groups.^^ 
A large proportion of the surviving archive records held in Berlin clearly 
demonstrate that appointments rarely progressed in a uniform way.^^
There ahnost always seems to have been a dispute or the rejection of a 
chosen candidate, even though many of these clashes were of relative little 
importance. Reasons for this were numerous, and appointments appear to 
be largely based on custom and tradition and the influence, royal or 
otherwise, which could be brought to bear. As a result, Frederick WiUiam I, 
like previous HohenzoUern rulers, was unable to control totally who gained 
office, whether they were qualified or not.
Posts were usually vacated by reason of death, or less frequently 
through promotion. One should note that during Frederick WiUiam Ts 
reign there was no retirement age and little chance of a pensioned 
retirement: officials served untU they died, or became so infirm that they 
could not carry out their duties. In many cases, the appointment to a district 
captain position was itself a form of army pension should one have had a 
distinguished military career.^^ In return, the amount of work which was 
expected was sometimes minimal as their subordinates, in particular, the
^GStAPK EM 15a, Nr. 10, fols. 1-6. For 1740, see ABB, 6:2, p. 14.
^^As a result of the transfer of manuscript material from the former central archive 
of the DDR located in Merseburg, all relevant records are now held in the Geheimes Staats 
Archtv Pretifiischer Kulturhesitz in Berlin, this includes Repository 7 and the material of the 
Generzd Directory.
^^Büsch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 131.
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Verwesern, were expected to carry out the actual tasks of their 
AmthauptmannP^ Tliis may have been less true in East Prussia than in other 
parts of the HohenzoUern Monarchy* Appointments for the Amthauptmann 
position were not aU given as sinecure positions by Frederick Wilham I, 
however, and this wiU be discussed more fully later in this chapter.
The King worked to refonn those areas that he reahsticaUy could, in 
order to improve his own authority and the proUtabUity of Ihs domain 
lands. The results of these changes, however, were mixed. To a large 
degree, Frederick WUUam I appears to have slowly buUt a base of reUable 
support among administrators below the level of Amthauptleute. The lesser 
officials whom he selected and later promoted were often drawn from 
native East Prussians who were already working for those members of the 
nobihty who served as district captains. Frederick Wilham I in this way was 
seeking to extend his institutional reforms, that were limited to central 
institutions, by creating a tier of reliable native individuals in posts below 
the central agencies and repeatedly in a fashion that did not disregard the 
East Prussian Indigenatsrecht and in this way extend his own influence.
The surviving evidence makes clear that the appointment process 
remained surprisingly informal until relatively late in Frederick WiUiam Ts 
reign. UntU the reign's mid-point it was usual either for one official to 
nominate another to a post or for an existing lower level administrator to ask 
for a new and more elevated position. This former method appears to have 
been the primary way in which newcomers were selected. By the final 
decade of Frederick WUliam Ts reign, the methods had become more formal, 
and ranged from selection by a higher authority who consulted a pre- 
established waiting Ust, to asking Frederick William I directly who should
58ru;Ibid.
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be appointed, or to have the King confirm a candidate apparently suggested 
to him.
In some cases there was clear nepotism. Some Junker families held 
administrative positions over extended periods and treated them as their 
own and therefore transferable and in practice hereditary. Many of these 
posts carried a salary, although this was not always paid. Appointments 
were traded and official posts were put up for sale. This was done not by 
the King, but rather by the current holder of the post. So, despite the rules, 
there was in practice venaHty. These practices seem to have slowly declined 
as the reign progressed. The King's increased personal involvement and an 
increased use of established short lists for potential candidates suggests that 
in general appointments were made after more formal procedures.^^
Certain appointments made by Frederick William I during the early 
years of his reign were quite exceptional and did not conform to any 
established or new procedure. These appointments were not of typical 
Junkers, but were instead drawn from the families of the Kingdom's noble 
ehte. These were few in number but were important and wiU be discussed 
here before the more usual procedures are examined. In December, 1717, for 
example, the King ordered the Regierung to name the Obristen Prinz 
Friedrich Ludwig von Holstein to the next available position among the 
ranks of the Amthauptleute, i. e., to the Amthauptmannschaft^^ The former 
Amthauptmann, Groben, had died after a period of illness. Nowhere in this 
order to the Regierung, however, did Frederick WÜham I specify a particular 
location or district. The King only stated that Holstein was to be appointed 
to the Amthauptrnannschaft which could have meant anywhere in East
^%ee, for example, GStAPK, Rep. 7 ,18a, 19 October 1721 and Rep. 7 ,18h (1686- 
1740), 30 August 1727.
^^GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol. 4 ,1(?) December 1717 (Pres. 9 December 1717), 
signed by Frederick William I.
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Prussia. This document is held with other Amt Rastenburg material simply 
because he was appointed as Amthauptmann for that district as it happened 
to be the next post which became vacant. Tliis type of appointment became 
increasingly common after 1730, but had been relatively rare during the first 
decade of Frederick William Ts reign. It was also unusual because princes 
were relatively rare, especially in the HohenzoUern lands and Holstein 
seems to have been a representative of an earUer strategy of creating a 
dynastic elite.^^
In fact, Holstein was appointed very quicldy. It appears that 
Frederick WilUam I intended Holstein for the next vacancy. The Instruction 
of 9 December 1717 suggests that the King loiew of Groben's illness. One 
likely explanation is that the Frederick WiUiam I received updates about 
GrobeiTs condition via the vast network of spies. This would have allowed 
the King time to prepare the order for the next candidate, Holstein, even 
before Groben's death. While the royal message was on its way from Berlin 
to the Regierung in Konigsberg, another letter was on its way to the 
Regiei ung from Amt Rastenburg. This message reported that the Landrat and 
Amthauptmann von Groben had recently died after a an extended period of 
Ulness.^^ Although it is reasonable to assume that Frederick WilUam I might 
have been aware of Groben's Ulness when he sent out his order to the
^^Krollmann, I, p. 286. Holstein was bom in Beck Kr. Herford (located in present 
day Nordrhein-Westfalen) on 25 March 1653 and died in Konigsberg on 7 Mardi 1728. 
Holstein's military service was not limited to Brandenburg-Prussia as he travelled to France 
and England in 1685 after serving in several battles in the region, including Stettin where he 
was badly injured in 1677. In addition, he negotiated neutrality for East Prussia in the 
Nortliem War.
^^Ibid., fol. 5,5  December 1717, J. V. Gunther to Regierung (appears to have been 
received in Konigsberg no later than 8 December 1717).
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Regierung, there is, unfortunately, no direct evidence to suggest that the 
King's order was prompted by Groben's impending death.^^
Due to Frederick WiUiam I's notorious network of spies and 
informers, however, it was lUœly that this was not simply a coincidence. If 
the King did have advance warning about Groben's likely death through his 
private information service then this would go far to help explain just how 
far and deep the King's own informal methods of governance penetrated 
into a traditionally minded territory Uke East Prussia. It needs to be borne 
in mind, however, that East Prussia was particularly difficult to govern from 
Konigsberg, far less from Berlin, due to its lack of a communication 
infrastructure. Fritz Terveen has noted that East Prussia was virtually cut 
off from BerUn because of this.^^
There are other cases where Frederick WUliam I appears to be 
informed of developments before he is formally notified by the Regierung. 
For the Amtimuptleute or Veiweser, notification of the title holder's death was 
not always regular. In addition, the agency through which such 
correspondence first pasf in almost aU cases was the Regiei'ung. This was 
particularly the case for appointment made to those positions directly below 
the Amtimuptnmnn, for example, the Verweser or Adelichegerichtsschreiber, 
both support personnel for the Amthauptleute.^^ The King, in one case, 
intervened on behalf of one of his royal Grenadiers and that soldier's
^^GStAPK Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Konigsberg, 9 December 1717. Other documents in this 
fascicle, dated 29 September 1717 and 11 November 1717, show the intention to give 
Holstein the next available vacancy.
^%erveen, Gesamtstaat und Rétablissement p. 13. See Chapters 1 and 2 for more 
on tliis point.
^^Examples are numerous. A partial list of several examples that cover a range 
tliroughout Frederick William I's twenty-seven year reign can be found in the following 
manuscript material located in the GStAPK, EM 15a, Nr. 10,17b, Nr. 4 ,17b, Nr. 7, 96b, Nr. 
5, EM 96b, Nr. 13, EM 96b, Nr. 21, EM 103, Nr. 21, EM 103b, Nr. 48, EM 103b, Nr. 49, EM 
103b, Nr. 50, EM 103b, Nr. 22, EM 119b, Nr. 59, EM 126b, Nr. 5, EM 130b, Nr. 68, EM 130b, 
Nr. 69, EM 137b, Nr. 61, Rep. 7, Nr. 18a, Rep. 7, Nr. ISh, 1686-1740,
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mother.^^ Clearly, this was a case that had for Frederick William I a long­
standing and personal interest. After all, it concerned a member of his own 
most cherished regiment. The King seems to have left the Regierung and its 
subordinate agencies to their own devices in most cases. This is consistent 
with the broader theme of this study that the King used indirect action 
through the Kommissariat to weaken the Regierung, rather than confront it 
directly. It was the Kommissariat who interfered in areas traditionally 
controlled by the Regierung. Frederick Wilham I directly interfered with the 
Regierung only where appointments to posts in the Kingdom were 
concerned.
Frederick William was far more active, as would be expected, in the 
selection of lesser officials in East Prussian agencies over which he had more 
control, above all those subordinate to the Kriegs und Dotnanenlmmmer.^^ 
Only after 1725 does the Kriegs und DomanenJcammer begin to produce 
correspondence and other documentation with regard to those officials 
under the Amthauptleute in cases when it appears Frederick William I was 
directly involved.^^ The King's marginaha noted at the bottom of the 
General Directory's draft letter of appointment for an individual named 
Canitz simply noted the word, "senden", thus giving royal approval for the 
appointment. The names presented for appointment, however, appear to 
follow the traditional pattern of coming from the Regiemng in Konigsberg. 
There are several examples of this; the appointment of the Rittermeister 
Friedrich Winckelman in Amt Balga in 1725, Captain Georg Ernst Kalau von
^^GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 4, fol. 52. 29 April 1715, Frederick William 1 to the East 
Prussian Regierung.
^^GStAPK, General Directorium, Ostpreufien, 1-Bestallungssachen, Numbers 1,2,3, 
72,79, and 85.
^^See, for example, GStAPK, GD, Ostpr., 1, Nr. 174, fol. 18.
% id .,fo ls. 17-19.
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Hoffe from Amt Neuhausen and Laubiau in 1727, and a person named 
Tettau in Amt Lÿck in 1731 all followed this pattern/®
In the case of the Venveser of Amt Mohrungen and Liebstadt, Fabian 
von Kunheim, who died on 29 December 1720, the Adelichegerichtsschreiber, 
Rudolf Major, briefly described the circumstances of Kunheim's death/^ 
Marginalia appears on tliis document which refers to other correspondence. 
These notes suggests that there was another candidate who wished to be 
considered for the position. This matter, however, already had been 
referred to a leading member of the Regierung, General Field Marshal Graf 
von Dohna, and additionally, through other channels, sent up for his 
decision.^^
One particular note in the margin, possibly in Ludwig von Ostau's 
hand, explains that the Amtslmmmer had already recommended a 
replacement and once again this was someone who held military ranlc. 
Lieutenant Colonel von Reichau, who had asked to be considered. The
GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 178. Here, the Regierung presents a candidate 
and it is approved in December I'^S. The other cases can be found in the same repository 
under repository numbers 179, fols. 1-2, and 180, fol. 1. Tettau is another family of 
prominance in East Prussia. Not much more is known of this particular candidate so a 
precise determination of liis background is not known.
^^GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 41,31 December 1720. See also fol. 39, because on 1 
March 1721 tliere is another document regarding the Adelichegerichtschreiberhut tliis appears 
to deal more with Kunheim's will than replacement.
%StAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 41,31 December 1720
^^Ludwig von Ostau was bom (location uncertain but presumably in Konigsberg) 
on 6 October 1663 and died in Konigsberg on 2 November 1727. Ostau emerged as one of 
the leading native elite officials during Frederick William Fs reign. He was a Swedish and 
Polish major as well as being appointed Kammerherr in Kurbrandenburg in 1690. In 1696, 
he became Hauptmann of Labiau and Neuhausen and was promoted to Hauptmami of Amt 
Brandenburg and Landratsdirektor in 1706. He became Kanzler sa\d Privy Councillor in 
1711 and president of the highest court of appeals in East Prussia (under the authority of the 
East Prussian Regierung), the so-called Oberappelhtionsgerichte. In the last decades of 
Frederidc William Fs reign, he became influential in attempting to reform the East Prussian 
legal system with Samuel von Cocceji. He had married into another of the most prominant 
East Prussian families when he married Marie Kasimire Eleonore Grâfin von Schlieben. See 
Ecker, Die Entwicklung der Kôniglich Preufiischen Regieurng von 1701 bis 1758. p. 101, fn.
1. Ecker dtes manuscript material, namely, GStAPK EM 121b. Tlie documents 
surrounding Ostau have not been located and may be missing. See also, Krollmami,
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Atntskammer, an agency not under the direct authority of the Regierung and 
at times its rival, had actually submitted this recommendation to Dohna, the 
would-be Verwesei"'s immediate superior, the Amthauptmann7^ This, in fact, 
was confirmed some five weeks later by the Regierung who reported to the 
King that as Kunheim had recently "departed," the Amtslcammer had again 
recommended Reichau. From this document alone, the Regierung did not 
act as if this process were out of the ordinary. Unfortunately, the existing 
docmnents do not shed further light on the role and contribution of 
Reichau's supposed superior, the Amthauptmann, Field Marshal Graf von 
Dohna in this appointment. Dohna was certainly informed about the 
appointment but what role he played in Reichau's selection cannot be 
precisely determined. There is no evidence to suggest that Dohna had any 
direct input. Yet it is difficult to believe Dohna did not exercise influence in 
the selection of his own subordinate.
This decision reveals the problems a historian faces in reconstructing 
the process of selection. Dohna had influence if not control over the 
decision and exercised considerable authority in general both inside East 
Prussia and with the King. This is significant because the official being 
appointed was in rank just under Dohna and would, in practice, carry out 
many of his day-to-day duties, including the administration of justice. 
Dohna's involvement in the selection process seems, to say the least, highly 
likely. In addition, the five weeks the Regierung took to report a conclusion 
on this matter may be considered a quick tum -around time, suggesting that 
influence was brought to bear. Often the appointment process lasted 
several months. Once a candidate emerged via the various channels.
Altpreufiisdie Biographie, p. 484. The deatli of Ostau is given brief mention in ABB, 4:2, p. 
383, fn. 2.
7%StAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 41. 31 December 1720.
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however, the Regierung normally would ask for Frederick William I 
approval.
Approval was granted in this case, and the King ordered that Reichau 
should have a yearly salaiy of 100 Rt.^^ The dates of the relevant documents 
suggest that the King has already been informed of this matter and had 
already made a decision. Frederick William I wrote to the Regierung on 29 
January 1721, almost a week before the Regierung first wrote to the King.^® 
This appears to be another case where correspondence c r o s s e d .T h e  
reason for this is unclear. It is clear that there were in practice two linlcs or 
paths of authority to the King. The Regierung, the first, appeared not to have 
been aware of the second, the Amtskammer, an emerging parallel authority in 
the Kingdom especially in matters concerning the royal domain lands and 
their administration.
After the first two decades of Frederick WiUiam Ts reign the King 
began to have more influence (although never complete control) over 
appointments made in the Kingdom and thus over parts of the 
administration. This was an incremental and extended process. He began 
to push men into the lower ranl<s who slowly rose to higher posts, thereby 
strengthening royal control. The situation in 1740 was different from that 
which had prevailed at his accession, but there was only gradual and 
limited change before the 1730s. Control over the appointment process, 
therefore, was crucial at the very level where much of the day-to-day 
operation of government functioned and touched people's lives.
^^Ibid., fol. 42. 5 February 1721.
7% id.,fol43.
^^See previous chapter. Not normal post but rather, sealed special (presumably 
diplomatic) post that was almost always used.
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After Prinz Friedrich Ludwig Holstein's appointment, there was 
some question on the part of the Regieimng about whether he had to take the 
oath of office. Before this appointment, there is no manuscript evidence that 
this oath was a matter of concern either for the Regierung or the King. It 
became an issue because Holstein himself traditionally administered oaths 
in the Kingdom. The Prinz let it be known, that he could not administer the 
oath to himself and that a Verweser could do the job.^^ After seeldng a 
decision from the King, the Regierung asked whether or not the oath was 
even necessary in this case.^^ The King replied that Holstein was required 
to take the oath of office hke all other appointed members of the 
Amthauptmunnschaftfi^ Holstein, in Frederick William Ts view, should not 
be a loyal impostor and instead should prove his allegiance through the 
taking of the oath.®  ^ The oath was of more concern to the Prussian King 
than the issue of a lesser official administering it.
Holstein's appointment is an interesting case. Although this may 
well have been the first time Frederick Wüham I took such an active role and 
nominated somebody in advance for the Amthauptrnannschaft, the speed and 
ease with which this appointment was made is striking. Nowhere did the 
Regierung protest against the King's initiative even though it was not made 
in the standard way. Only two other nominations resulted from Frederick 
William Ts personal initiative in this period, one being another Holstein.®^
14.
14.
^^GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol. 10. 9 Februaiy 1718, Regierung to the king. 
^^Ibid., fol. 10. 9 February 1718.
^®GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50. 19 March 1718. See also, GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol. 
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50. 19 March 1718. See also, GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol.
®%or other early appointments like that of Prinz von Holstein, see GStAPK, EM 
17b, Nr. 5, where Friedrich Ludwig Hertzog zu Holstein was appointed as a succesor to the 
Amthauptrnannschaft OÎ the most prestigious of all Amts, Brandenburg. In addition, GStAPK,
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One possible reason for this was the liigh esteem the King held for the 
Holstein family. It was a lineage that not only served Frederick William 1 
loyally within East Prussia but throughout the HohenzoUern territories and 
even m foreign states where they carried out diplomatic functions. Tlie King 
did not begin to put forward candidates on a significant scale until the well 
after 1723. The reason for this was part of the wider context of changes 
during the late 1720s and early 1730s which are discussed in the next 
chapter.
There was a second reason why this was an unusual and strildng 
case. Not only did an official of lower ranlc administer the oath to Holstein 
but moreover, the King appointed a prince — the leading title within the 
Heirenstand — to the lesser ranks of the Amthaiiptfmnnschaft. The fact that 
Holstein held such high social standing is a plausible explanation for the 
lack of protest from members of the Regierung, if in fact they were hostile to 
this appointment in the first place. There is no evidence to suggest that they 
were. Holstein's whole career, however, suggests that his loyalties rested 
more with the HohenzoUems than with the native East Prussian elite. Tliis 
is further supported by his possession of an Imperial Princely title. Not 
only was he entrusted with several liigh positions within the HohenzoUern 
military establishment but he also was appointed governor of Wesel and 
Minden at different points in his Ufe. During the plague of 1709/11, 
Holstein's ideas about policy, which mirrored those of Berlin and, in 
particular, the crown prince brought him into opposition to the Standischen 
authorities in Konigsberg.®^ He was to Frederick William I, perhaps, only
Rep. 7,29 April 1719 where Gehard Friedrich Schach von Wittenow was to receive the first 
available Amthauphtiannschaft position.
®®The details surrounding this title are unclear.
®^Krollmann, Altpreufiisdie Biographie, p.286.
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second in importance to Karl Heinrich Erbtmchsefi und Gmf von  Waldburg as 
an advisor.
Holstein did not receive any salary, nor is there any evidence to 
suggest that he bought the office. In fact, there is no evidence that the Prinz 
even paid the customary sum of approximately thirty Rt. into the 
Rekrutenkasse.^ The King was perhaps motivated rather by the desire to 
insert a loyal subordinate into the Atnthauptmannschaft. This was attractive 
for both Frederick William I and for Holstein himself.
A detailed examination of Amthaupttmnnschaft and Venveser 
appointments from 1713 until the early 1730s demonstrates that, although 
the King was always able to notify the Regierung that particular individuals 
were to be considered as candidates and — by implication — had his 
support, this practice did not become dominant during his reign. Of 
particular interest are those appointments made between 1723 and 1733, 
which numbered at least eighteen and where the evidence enables the 
origins of the appointment to be determined. On five occasions (out of 
eighteen) Frederick William 1 preempted the Regierung's nomination. Of 
this five, all were appointments for the position of Amthauptleute and there 
were no appointments for the position of VerweserT''  ^ On the other hand, in 
the remaining thirteen cases, the Regierung made suggestions for
This raises the question, which will be considered in the following diapter, of 
under what circumstances offices were bought, or payments made to accompany. 
Furthermore, one should remember that payments made into the Rekrutenkasse were made 
by all levels of established officials in the kingdom during Frederick William Ts reign.
®®Several appointments lack suffiencent manuscript material to determine with any 
amount of certainty. East Prussian districts that lack sufficient data do, however, reflect the 
overall findings of districts with complete or almost complete data. The recent availability 
of more manuscript material at the GStAPK help determine more of the origins of certain 
appointments.
®^ For tlie Amthauptleute see the following material located in the GStAPK: EM 96b, 
Nr. 5, fols. 47,51 and Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, ms. 164,223,229; Rep. 7, Nr. 50,8 September 1719; 
Gen. Dir., Ostpr., II, Nr. 163,2 March 1726.
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appointments which were accepted by Frederick William I.®® The vast 
majority of these appointments, at least ten (out of fifteen), were of 
Amthauptleute.^^
The first decade of Frederick William Ts reign (1713-23) had been 
even more strongly dominated by the Regierung. There are twenty-six 
appointments that can be reconstructed from surviving manuscript material. 
On a mere five occasions, three Amthauptleute appointments and two for the 
position of Venveser, the King took the initiative/® The remainder were 
made at the instigation of the Regierung,^^ During the decade before the 
establishment of the General Directory in 1723, nineteen per cent (in fact 
slightly more) of appointments were made by the King. Between 1723 and 
1733, however, this figure rose somewhat to almost twenty-eight percent: 
not a significant increase. Royal influence was far from preponderant. Most 
of the appointments during Frederick William Fs first decade were 
requested by the Regierung. Although there was a clear shift of control over
For Amthauptleute see the following material located in the GStAPK: Gen. Dir., 
Ostpr., I, Nrs. 159 (22 June 1723), 161, 165, 223,225 (14 and 16 June 1723), 226,227; EM 17b, 
Nrs. 5, fol. 1, Nr. 6, fols. 2-9, Nr, 7; OF 14702, vol. 4, fol. 134,8 April 1723 and vol. 11, fol. 66, 
16 June 1723. In addition, see Mülverstedt, "Verzeichnifi der Amtshauptleute, 
Erbamtshauptleute, Amtsmanner, Landrichter, Landschoppen, Ober-Kastenherren, 
Kastenherren, Fischmeister, Jagermeister, Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," passim. 
For Verweser see the following: Gen. Dir., Ostpr., 1, Nr. 178,26 November 1725; EM 96b, Nr. 
5, fols. 57-57 Rückseite; EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 87.
®%ee Appendix D, p. 355.
^®The following materials can be found in GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, January through 
June 1719; EM 17b, Nr. 4, fol. 47 and Nr. 6, fol. 2; OF 1269, fol. 28; EM 137.For the Verweser 
see the following: ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-9; Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
®^Mülverstedt, "Verzeichnifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptleute, 
Amtsmanner, Landrichter, Landschoppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenherren, Fisclimeister, 
Jâgermeister, Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," passim; In addition, the following 
manuscript material located in GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., 1, Nrs. 161,227 (for 1726), 229; 
Rep. 7, Nr. 50, 20 January 1714,5 December 1717,15 January 1718,1 April 11718,12 July 
1718, 8 September 1719,23 September 1719,27 November 1719, 7 May 1720,19 July 1720; 
EM 17b, Nrs. 5, fol.l; EM llOg, Nr. 31, fols. 4-5; ; EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol. 2 and Nr. 24, fol. 3,25 
August 1718; EM 137b, Nr. 18, fol. 7,25 August 1718; OF 1269, fol. 15,12 July 1718, fol. 21 
and fol. 29 Rückseite, 25 November 1719.
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appointments in favour of the King after 1723, his authority was still far 
from dominant. The Regierung appears to have maintained its influence in 
this area, albeit at a reduced level. The following table 5.1 shows the 
resulting totals:
Table 5.1
Appointments in the Kingdom, 1713-1733
1713-1723 1723-1733
AmthaupMann Venveser Total Amthauptniann Venoeser Total
Regierung 13 8 21 10 3 13
Frederick
WilhamI 3 2 5 5 0 9
Total 16 10 26 15 3 18
The most common means of appointment throughout Frederick 
William Fs reign was nomination by either the Regiei'ung or Amiskammer, or 
both. The choice of a suitable candidate appears largely to have been a 
matter for the higher echelon of the provincial authorities. Special orders 
were sent to the East Prussian Regierung on 23 June 1710,2 June 1724, and in 
July and August 1740 which set out the formal requirements for 
appointments, but these do not tell us very much. The first mentioned, of 23 
June 1710, simply noted that the Regierung were to recommend "Subjectus" 
for the royal service.^^ This usually occurred after the death of the previous 
holder and suggestions went to the King, either via Frederick William Fs 
prhnary advisor in the period prior to the General Directory, or after 1723, 
through the official in the General Directory responsible for East Prussia. 
For most of Frederick William Fs reign, Creutz was the individual who 
advised both the King and then the General Directory on these matters.^^
^^See Appendix D, p. 355.
% StA PK  EM 15a, Nr. 10, fol. 1.
^^Appointments lesser in rank to a Stadtschriher were general at the discretion of the 
Regierung and although disputed from time to time by the Kriegs und Domanenkammer in the 
territory, Frederidc William I almost always appears to have sided with the Regierung.
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Creutz served as an auditor in the regiment of Frederick WilUam while he 
was crown prince. Soon after Frederick William I ascended the throne he 
made Creutz a Real Privy Councillor and controller general of all civil and 
mihtary treasuries. In effect, he held the highest financial post under the 
King.^^ He was appointed as head of the General Finance Directory in 1719 
and became head of one of the four departments when the General 
Directory was set-up in 1723.
Appointment procedures were extended and sometimes compHcated 
by the necessity of paying the requisite levy to the King for support of his 
private military ventures, above aH the regiment of tall gfxmdiers. There was 
almost always a payment either to the King's Reh'utenkasse or to his 
Genemlchargenkasse.^^ Payments into the Rekmtenlmsse were not only 
involved for local govermnent officials, but were made by the full-spectrum 
of established East Prussian officials during this period. Payments were 
regular and uniform across Brandenburg-Prussia and most importantly, 
necessary before a candidate was confirmed in his post. The contribution to 
the recruiting treasury was essentially a tax for potential office holders. This 
is not venal office, of the kind that existed elsewhere in Europe, above all, in 
France. It was rather a leading example of Frederick WÜHam Fs fiscal 
opportunism, levying a tax upon a captive force of would-be administrators, 
and his avid search for revenue to support his military establishment. This
ABB, 1, pp. 322-4; see also, Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick 
William I of Prussia, p. 236, fn. 27. As Dorwart notes, Creutz appeared to have the trust of 
the king with regard to supervision over tlie most important financial matters of the 
Brandenburg-Prussian state: he was used as "the king's watchdog to supervise the 
activities of the heads of the royal treasuries." If this was true, it helps explain why he was 
not, for example, appointed to the General Finance Directory when it was established in 
1713, the most visible and highly prestigious financial post.
^^ABB, 3, pp. 429-430,9 December 1722; Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of 
Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 156. Dorwart suggests tliat the Recrutenkasse was started 
by Frederick William I probably not before 1716. There is nothing in the manuscript 
material for East Prussia that would contr adict tlris date.
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system also suggests the anticipated income of officials, which potentially 
was considerable. Although salaries were not always paid, administrators 
received fees and perquisites from most offices.
The Relcrutenkasse represented the King's highly distinctive personal 
goals in two principal ways. First, Frederick William I's obsessive 
preoccupation with the recruitment of soldiers and with upholding the 
army's primacy within the Brandenburg-Prussian state. In particular, he 
was determined to secure funding for his regiment of giants, a corps of 
grenadiers all of whom were taller than six feet four inches. The financial 
resources for the recruitment and maintenance of the grenadiers came from 
the Reh^utenlcasse.
Second, contributions made to the Rekrutenîmsse were the only way 
for individuals to secure an office or administrative duty, short of actual 
ownership, and the payment followed the actual appointment, winch was 
made in the usual way. Payments to the Relcrutenlaisse were thus the way 
appointments were finaÜsed. This was also true for promotions. Yet there 
is no evidence for East Prussia at this time wliich suggests competition 
among candidates, with the highest bidder securing appointment.
In practice Frederick Wilham 1 fixed standard salaries and therefore, 
payments to the Rekrutenlaisse for most positions. This was usually a fee that 
was calculated as a percentage of the first year salary; if there was no 
established salary, it was simply a fixed sum. This meant, for example, that 
an Amthaiiptmann who received an annual salary of 500 Rt. made a payment 
of 250 Rt. into the Relcrutenlcasse. Those who did not receive a salary were 
still obliged in almost every case to pay the Rekrutenkasse contribution and 
did so based on the salary rate prevailing for similar positions.
The Chargenlaisse was a similar type of treasury to the Reh utenlmsse 
and collected revenue that was expended on general military purposes. It 
was normally a significant portion of the successful candidate's first year
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salary. The Chargenlaisse, however, was merged into the Relcrutenlaisse in 
1722. For East Prussian appointments between 1716 and 1722, the successful 
candidate almost always had to pay into the recruiting treasury. Only in 
rare instances did those appointed pay to the Generalchargenlcasse prior to the 
merging of the two treasuries in 1722. The candidates retention of the 
payment receipt was critical to the confirmation process as well. The receipt 
acted as the new official's ticket that was shown for the formal appointment 
docmnent to be issued. This letter, too, required a fee to be paid as there 
was a customary stamp tax attached to the letter. This Stempelsteuer was also 
put towards military purposes by the King. Both of these treasuries and the 
income generated in this way were under the jurisdiction of the General 
Kriegskommissariat
There were other methods of appointment that did not change during 
Frederick William I's reign and must be mentioned. These are important in 
showing the nature of East Prussian government and shed considerable 
light on the social and political mobihty, in particular, of the Amthauptleute, 
and the greater prestige of one Amt over another. They also reveal the 
extent to which certain principles of Frederick William I were not adhered 
to, in practice, for example payments to the Rekrutenlaisse could be excused 
in individual cases while Amthauptmannschaft positions were bought and 
sold. These practices did not weaken the King's declared high interest in the 
affairs of the territory. In this context three specific areas are relevant: The 
sale of Amthauptmannschaft positions, trade in such positions, as well as 
appointments based on nepotism or similar customs.
In each of the five positions of Amthauptniann sold or transferred 
between 1716 and 1720, Frederick William I personally approved the 
transaction.^^ The records of these sales and transfers reveal Httle or no
^^GStAPK Rep. 7, Ni\ 50, Spring 1716 tlrrough 22 January 1718, Finckenstein 
purdiased Amthauptmannschaft irom  Dobreginki; 25 August 1718, Schlieben to Graf von
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hesitation on the part of the King winch is likely due to the fact that all five 
positions involved favoured individuals in the King's government. A 
typical response from Frederick WUHam I normally took no longer than a 
few days. For example, Oherst-Lieutenant and Reichsgraf Friedrich Ernst 
Bernhard von Finckenstein asked to be allowed to buy the 
Amthauptmannschaft from General Major and Reichsgraf Bogislmis Friedrich 
von Donhoff in July 1720. Frederick William I noted liis approval in the 
margin, simply as: "Guht FW."^^ In general, this was how the King 
responded, deciding upon suggestions and requests and signalling his 
assent upon the documents.
The Finckenstein-Donhoff case does not state the sale price. Similar 
examples, however, reveal that prices were approximately 5000 Rt.^^ The 
manuscript material does state that Finckenstein paid 30 Rt. into the 
Generalchargenlmsse Finckenstein's payment had more to do with his 
confirmation to the position than with the sale. In a similar case, Friedrich 
Christoph Finck Graf won Finckenstein asked for permission to purchase the 
Amthauptmannschaft position from Geheime Rat Johann Friedrich Dobrzenld 
in 1716. This sale was apparently finalised on 22 January 1718.^®^
The sale of offices, such as in this case raises two important questions 
which cannot be answered with precision. First, although the sale of offices
Wallenrodt; Gra/von Dohna to his son; 27 November 1719, Graf von  Waldburg to Graf von  
Lehndorf; and 19 July 1720, Graf von  Finckenstein from Graf von Donhoff (also 22 July 1720, 
28 August 1720, and 22 July 1720).
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,19 July 1720, Frederick William I marginalia next to 
section of request that asked if Finckenstein may purchase the postion.
^ I^n addition, see, GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpreufien, I, Nr. 223,25 March 1726, Draft 
document from the General Directory to Frederick William I. Document stated that the 
General Directory wanted to inform the king that Kammerherr Canitz paid 5000 Rt. for the 
Amfhaupttnamtschaft to Sehesten. See, also, GStAPK, Gen. Dir,, Ostpreufien, I, Nr. 223, 23 
July 1729, From Samuel Friedrich von Canitz in Sagenwalde, p. 35 Rtickseite.
lO^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50. 28 August 1720
^^% id.,4Mayl716.
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was not exactly an appointment or sufficiently widely practised to call in 
question the belief that Frederick William I introduced a merit-based 
administration tliroughout all the territories, the five transfers through 
purchase were equal to one-third of all the Amthauptleute appointments 
made between 1713 and 1723 and again, may be a result of the favoured 
status of the individuals whose families were involved in royal govermnent. 
The transfer of positions through purchase became more widespread after 
1725.
A second point is that the subsequent path which the payments took 
is not clear. These were transactions between one official and his successor, 
sanctioned by the crown. If Frederick William I sold appointments to raise 
income, then the payments must have reached his own coffers in a 
roundabout way. East Prussian Junkers who purchased an 
Amthauptmannschaft appear to have paid their predecessor and not Frederick 
William I. In fact, one can state with certainty that posts purchased in this 
way were treated as a returnable deposit type of investment by the 
purchaser. This raises serious doubts, then, about the extent to which the 
sale of positions in East Prussia raised any revenue directly for Frederick 
William I other than payments to the Relcrutenlmsse of the kind discussed 
earlier. It clearly did not. For example, in the district of Sehesten in the 
south eastern portion of East Prussia, Canitz purchased his 
Amthauptmannschaft for 5000 Rt. in 1717. When he went to sell his position 
in 1726, he expected to receive this amount for the sale.^®  ^ It is worth 
underlining that the position had not appreciated at all in value and he did 
not even receive an inflationary increase. Furthermore, it should be
l^^GStAPK Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 223. Altlrough tliis chapter focuses on tlie 
years prior to the establishment of the General Directory in 1723, Canitz's case covers both 
pre- and post-General Directory periods as he gained the appointment in 1717 and 
reliniquished it in 1726.
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mentioned that this example comes from 1726, a year after Frederick 
William Fs instruction that the sale of such positions should not be 
sanctioned.^®^ Wliat is important here is that Canitz considered tliis 5000 Rt. 
his "capital." This was especially important to him when he was essentially 
dismissed from his position. Frederick William I either did not remember 
approving the sale, even after his decree that they were not allowed, or else, 
the General Directory took it upon themselves to go ahead and approve the 
sale. Canitz wrote to the King and expressed the hope that Frederick 
William I would approve the sale of this post since his original purchase was 
some eight years before the no-sale decree and that he demitted office while 
still alive, rather than dying in his post. If the sale were not permitted, 
according to Canitz, then he stood to lose his 5000 Rt. investment.
Ultimately, it appears Canitz was allowed to recover his money.
The permanent transfer of a post was another frequent occurrence 
although — like the sale of an office — it was still an unusual way to gain a 
post. The transfer of office, as opposed to its outright sale, is even more 
intriguing and revealing of the nature and actual operations of East Prussian 
government. Such transfers were often — but not always — to a relative. 
Personal or family links were another way of acquiring posts. Nepotism 
was not a new phenomerf^either within the Kingdom or in Europe as a 
whole. All early modern governments depended upon clientèles and 
personal and family links to provide administrative personnel. Indeed, 
without such sources of new administrative recruits, the filling of posts 
would have been very difficult. Personal and family contacts were the 
principal means by which potential new administrators were recruited in an 
age when more modern paths into govermnent did not exist. There were no 
entrance quahfication examinations and few university graduates with
l^ ^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 162, fol. 1.
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administrative training in East Prussia during this period, though Frederick 
William I began the practice of securing recruits of the latter Idnd. During 
the first decades of his reign, the traditional sources of recruits into the 
administration was depended upon.
Like the rest of Europe and the other HohenzoUern territories. East 
Prussia during the reign of Frederick William I also employed the practice of 
having sons follow their fathers into government. One should remember 
that in the eighteenth century this practice was viewed in a less severe light 
than it is today. For example, the general Graf von Dohna wrote to Frederick 
William I and requested that his son, the Obrist Lieutenant take over from 
liim the Amihaupttnannschaft of Amt Neidenburg and Soldau located in the 
most southern part of East Prussia. The King agreed, and instructed the 
General Finance Directory to finalise the details of the transfer.^®^ 
Furthermore, the practice of having sons follow their fathers into an office as 
well as the sums paid or deposited for posts lends credence to the Hlcehhood 
that these offices were viewed by the family to be at their personal disposal. 
There is nothing in the manuscript material that suggests such a transfer 
was unusual, especially when it involved figures so important as the family 
Dohna.
The major reasons, for and against, this practice were perhaps more 
clear cut than where the outright sale of positions was concerned. Above 
all, the King undeniably could not control directly all appointments in the 
territory. Konigsberg was difficult enough for the HohenzoUerns to manage 
effectively. Yet, the city's remoteness to Berlin was not the only problem 
Frederick William I required to overcome if he planned to establish his 
effective authority within the Kingdom. Frederick Wilham I also needed to 
extend his power into the even more remote areas of East Prussia and the
^(^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50.
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traditional authorities located there, notably the southern and eastern 
districts.
The practice of nepotism or selling an administrative title hindered 
the King's attempt to establish the appointment of candidates based purely 
on merit. Frederick William I was better able to control those officials in the 
Kommissariaten or Kammern, who were under more direct control. These 
were the institutions that often operated parallel to the institutions of the 
traditional elites, such as the Amthauptleute or Regierung, which were often 
unchallenged by the King. TMs had the permanent effect of re-inforcing 
traditional elite control.
Frederick William I clearly indicated his expectation of being closely 
involved in appointments although it was not always possible for him to 
realise his plans. This applied only to the range of institutions which he 
could control, underlines the extent to which traditional authority and 
practice endured. There are examples, as well, of families with a long 
history of service in one or more positions. The Dohna family, one of the 
most prominent families in East Prussia, is one such example. We have 
already seen the transfer of an Amthauptmannschaft from father to son in 
1719 witliin the Dohna family. Frederick William I approved this request 
in November 1719.^^ In 1726, another son of General Dohna, Christoph 
Dohna received the Amthauptmannschaft of Amt Pr. Holland.^^^
For the most part, nepotism "promoted continuity and stability" in 
government, as Rosenberg has n o t e d . S u c h  stability was nowhere more
^^See previous footnote,
^^Ibid.
^^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., II, Nr. 163, 2 March 1726. In addition, he had to pay the 
customary 30 Rt. to the king's Recrutenkasse in tliis later case but whether or not he had to 
do so in the first appointment noted earlier in 1719 is uncertain.
^^%osenberg. Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 81
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crucial than in the plague ravaged and remote territory of East Prussia. 
Frederick William I was successful with his attempts to make it loiown that 
many positions traditionally under the authority of the native East Prussians 
were technically royal and therefore, in the gift of the HohenzoUerns — even 
if only in name rather than in fact. This aided the growth of royal authority, 
as it linked the native elite more directly to the King.
A more practical consideration was that training for such positions 
was carried out by the local elite families themselves. Although this type of 
practical education often at odds with the King's ideas, it did contribute to 
the workings of govermnent in East Prussia. There was not a short supply 
of administrative personnel so much as a short supply of native East 
Prussians of like mind to the King. Frederick WiUiam I recognised that the 
Kingdom remained in a fragUe condition for many years after the onset of 
the plague in 1709. He also appreciated that the traditional authority had 
expanded their roles during and after this c r i s i s . T h e  introduction of 
institutions which ran parallel to those already existing in East Prussia was 
one significant way Frederick WiUiam I built up his authority in the 
Kingdom and reduced the earlier gains made by the provincial Junipers. Yet 
Frederick WUUam I could only weaken, rather than overturn, the authority 
of the East Prussian territorial eUte.
What concerned the King, therefore, was not nepotism as such but 
rather the fact of estabUshed East Prussian famiUes entrenching their power. 
As noted earlier, nepotism was an accepted and even necessary method of 
administrative recruitment in early-eighteenth-century Brandenburg- 
Prussia.
Transfers of administrative posts also occurred as a result of a simple 
trade between individuals who were not members of the same famUy,
also. Chapter 4.
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although this was, in general, rare and usually involved individuals of 
exalted social and/ or administrative standing. In August 1723, for example, 
the Ohei s^t Gerhard Ernst Graf von Lohndorf traded his Amthauptmannschaft 
of Insterburg for that of Loetzen which was held by Etats Minister and Ober- 
Burggraf ]oheirm Dietrich von Kunheim.^^^ There are two further examples 
of such exchanges after 1723 which will be examined more closely in the 
next chapter. Here it is important to note that this took place with Frederick 
William Fs knowledge and approval.
The general picture which emerges is of a hierarchy among the ehte 
of certain coveted administrative locations. Some Amthauptleute did not 
receive a salary while those that did all received the same amount. 
Superficially, then, salary did not appear to be a principal reason for the 
trade unless one moved from an unsalaried to a salaried post which would 
have been a considerable incentive. It was not only a question of salary, 
however, but of the potential for fees and other income. Certain 
geographical locations most certainly brought with them increased income, 
above all those closest to the population centres like Konigsberg.
Geographical location was always critical. The backward and 
continually depressed region of Insterburg — like those of Lohndorf and 
ICunheim which were also in the remote eastern regions — were considered 
remote and undesirable even by members of the native elite, who coveted 
those districts closer to Konigsberg.
The reforms in East Prussian government in this period also meant 
changes for the position of deputies and lower administrative officials. The 
Amtschreibers, for example, had established themselves as the deputies to 
Hauptmanner in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They carried out
HOg staPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpreufien, I, Nr. 224, fols. 2,18 August 1723. See also.
ABB, 4:1, p. 285.
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many day-to-day support functions under the Amthauptleute and Veiweser of 
their district.^^^ Until the enforcement of the introduction of the 
Domanenpachter scheme in the 1710s and 1720s, they often acted as the 
Amtmann in domain administration. These positions were traditionally 
filled through noble patronage, but merit increasingly became a prerequisite 
for appointment although of course. Incidentally, this is one example of a 
position which provided another outlet for lesser nobility to move into the 
ranks of the administration.
Like the case of the Amthauptleute, Frederick William I was also 
involved personally in more and more Verweser appointments after 1723. 
Before the setting-up of the General Directory, there is no specific mention of 
the King making such an appointment while the Regierung requested aU 
eight appointments that were made before 1723. After that date, however, 
the manuscript material shows that Frederick William I directly instigated 
on four occasions an appointment for the position of Veiweser, while the 
Regierung nominated three times. This was one administrative position over 
which the King managed to gain the arithmetical upper hand, and then very 
narrowly.l^^
m juhr, "Die Verwaltuiig des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," pp. 75-77, and, more generally Chapter 3.
^^^See above Table 5.1.
CHAPTER 6
East Prussia and the General Directory
The Origins of the General Directory
The setting up in January 1723 of the General Directory (General- 
Ober-Flmnz-Kriegs und Domanen-Direktormm) has conventionally been 
seen to be the centrepiece and pinnacle of Frederick William Fs 
administrative reform effort.f Prussia's king intended that the General 
Directory would be placed above the primary administrative authorities 
of the central government which were to be subordinate to it. It was to 
be responsible for most, but not aU, of the domestic, civil and military 
affairs of the entire Brandenburg-Prussian state. The purpose of this 
new and quite distinct body was to streamline and consolidate central 
administration. Indeed, few areas of government were not covered by 
the instruction which set it up. The General Directory oversaw civil and 
military administration as well as the financial affairs for each of these 
areas.
Certain kinds of business were excluded which were nonetheless
^See, for example, Victor Loewe, "Zur Griindungsgeschichte des 
General=Direktoriums," Forschungen zur Bmndetiburgischen und Preujlischen Geschichte, 13, 
1900, p. 243. See also, Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of 
Prussia, p. 163. See, too, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 39. 
Compare these verdicts to Hintze, who has a slightly different approach and did not view 
the establishment of the General Directory as tlie zenith of authority right away but rather, 
as a body that, in the words of Hintze's editor, "developed into the liighest bureaucratic 
authority in Prussia." Hintze, Historical Essays, p. 71. See also, pages 80, 82, 83,243, 244, 
and 272. Remarkably, it is tliis older approach wluch seems closer to tlie reality of tlie 
impact of the General Directoiy in tlie kingdom.
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important. The most significant such area was Brandenburg-Prussia's 
external policy. Until 1728, foreign affairs were handled separately from 
the General Directory and controlled by the King and his closest personal 
advisors called to his "cabinet." Prussia's diplomacy was largely 
controlled by Ilgen until his death in 1728. In that year, Frederick 
William I reorganised the handling of external pohcy and set up the 
Kabinettsconsell with three officials at its head in charge of foreign affairs.^ 
After 1733, it went by the more familiar name of Kabinettsministernm.
From 1728 to 1808, foreign policy was run through this agency which 
was quite independent from the General Directory.3 In a similar way, 
many legal, religious and, above aU, mihtary affairs were handled by 
separate departments which were quite distinct.
The General Directory has often been viewed as the single 
institution that provided the structure for Frederick William I's rule. To 
anticipate the argument of this chapter, however, although it contributed 
much as an agency of central government to the process which 
established absolutism, in itself it was unable to provide an institutional 
framework as effectively at the provincial level as it did at the central 
level. Primarily this was because it was, in scope and intention, only 
intended to reform the central institutions of Prussian government, and 
had at first no direct impact upon its local tier.
For the traditional East Prussian authorities during Frederick
^Reinhold Koser, "Die Gründung des Auswârtigen Amtes durdi Konig Friedrich 
Wilhelm I im Jahre 1728," Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preufischen Geschichte, 2, 
1890, pp. 161-197; Max Lelimaim, "Der Ursprung des preufîischen Kabinetts," Historische 
Zeitschrift, 63,1889, pp. 266-271; Hermann Hüffer, "Die Beamten des alten preufiisdien 
Kabinets von 1713-1808," Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preufiischen Geschichte, 5:1, 
1892, pp. 157-163; Meta Kolmke, "Das preussische Kabinetssministerium: ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte des Staatsapparat in Spatfeudalismus," Ph. D. Dissertation, Berlin: Humboldt 
University, 1968; Peter Baumgart, "Zur Grtindungsgesdiidite des Auswârtigen Amtes in 
PreuSen, 1713-1728," Jahrbuchfilr die Geschichte Mittel und Ostdeutschlands, 7,1958, pp. 229- 
248.
3See Appendix C, p. 354.
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William Fs reign, the significance of the General Directory was different 
from the perspectives provided by later historians. It was not that it 
completed the unification and centralisation of Brandenburg-Prussian 
administration, far less that it provided the structure for the 
development of royal authority on the crucial provincial level. Rather, 
its significance for the estabMshed East Prussian authorities was that it 
signalled that their hold on administration was being challenged and 
might prove fragile. With the establishment of the General Directory, the 
Junkers understood that the King was determined to challenge the 
hegemony which they possessed at the provincial and local level. The 
Junkers, however, reacted surprisingly slowly, primarily because older 
conflicts continued after 1723 and the General Directory was not at first 
seen as the most immediate threat to their position. The new central 
agencies of government set up by Frederick WÜHam I would be 
introduced directly in people's day-to-day lives, although not to the 
extent originaUy or even eventually proposed. Once the East Prussian 
Junlcers recognised the changes represented by the General Directory, the 
King found his authority being challenged.
The General Directory and the ruler were unable to weaken Junker 
authority quickly at the provincial and local level, where its impact was 
initiaUy relatively limited. It is important to underline that the General 
Directory was set up to solve perceived problems at the centre of 
HohenzoUern government, covering aU of the Brandenburg-Prussian 
provinces, hi local administration, the General Directoiy was less effective 
simply because it was not intended to have any impact there, or to address 
the subtleties and complexities of the regional issues.
East Prussia was the crucial territory for the evolution of Prussian 
absolutism, due both to its size and potential prosperity, and to the fact that 
it provided the HohenzoUerns with their royal title. Established variables.
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such as the remoteness of the Kingdom, the long-standing effects of plague 
and famine, together with the poor infrastructure, and its strongly 
territorial-minded native elite acted as significant barriers and obstacles to 
the development of absolutism. It was in this context that the General 
Directory was established in January 1723.^
From this point onwards, the King looked to the General Directory 
when assessing the effectiveness of his authority in East Prussia. The new 
body, however, was unable to respond comprehensively to the Kingdom's 
needs. Thus, it was a problem of ability to implement poHcies which could 
realise established goals and raise the standing of Frederick William I and its 
own subordinate officials in East Prussia. Meanwhile, the territory was for 
long teetering on the brink of chaos and collapse and Prussia's ruler could 
not risk policy failures which could lead to political discord at home and 
embarrassment abroad. Although there may, or may not, have been foreign 
policy constraints on the King's freedom of action, Frederick William I 
nonetheless had an image to uphold within Brandenburg-Prussia, to rulers 
outside his own territories and, in his own mind, ultimately to God.
Nobody was more aware of this than the King himself. The conditions in 
East Prussia haunted Frederick William I where his attention to the territory 
"grew to anxiety and sometimes amounted to obsession."^
The General Directoiy was created by the unification of the General 
Finance Directory and the General War Commissariat. These two 
authorities were merged as a result of long-standing administrative and 
jurisdictional conflicts between them. These two agencies had initially been 
created by the administrative changes of the seventeenth century and the
^ABB, 3, pp. 575-651.
3Walker, The Salzburg Transaction, p. 75. In addition, see a good summary of the 
relationship between Pietism and the Brandenburg-Prussian state and in particular the 
religious zeal of Frederick William I in Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth- 
Century Prussia.
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weakening of the Hojkammer which these brought about. The Hoflaimmer 
itself had been established to oversee the provincial domain administrations, 
civil finances, and regaUa (these profitable rights possessed by the ruler 
included, tolls, licenses, and mines) in 1689 during the reign of Frederick 
III/1.6 The corruption, administrative instability and confusion of the early 
1700s allowed for other central agencies essentially to overtake the 
Hoflmmmer that provided only theoretical unity.
The result was that financial administration at the central level was 
overseen by separate and competing individuals at the close of Frederick 
III/Fs reign as well as the inability of administration to act during the 
plague crisis of 1709/10. Shortly after his accession, Frederick WUHam I 
attempted to reform many of the financial agencies. Most significantly, the 
several individual bodies responsible for civil financial administration had 
been combined into one coUegial organised agency, the General Finance 
Directory on 27 March 1713.^
Collegial organisation had for long been characteristic of 
Brandenburg-Prussian administration. In this period, an office or 
department was not overseen by one minister, such as a minister of war or 
minister of justice. Indeed, the title of 'minister' was a formal administrative 
rank, not an office. It came not from being head of a modern-style ministry 
but rather, from the King as an award to favoured advisors. Instead, it was 
usual to have a small board or group of officials who held coUective 
responsibility for the affairs of a particular territory or for a particular part of
^Wilhelm Altmann, "Instruktion ftir die Hoflcainmer. [1689 April.]," Ausgewalte 
Urkunden zur Brandenburgisdie-Preussisdien Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte. 
Berlin: R. Gaertners, 1897, pp. 82-85. First published in Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur 
Gesch. der inneren Politik des Kurf. Friedrich Wilhelm v. Brandenburg, part 1, vol. 1,1895, 
pp. 414-417. See also. Doiwart.The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of 
Prussia, p. 123. One should remember that the Regierung also possessed such profitable 
rights which were also known as regalia. See Chapter 4, p. 168.
^ABB, 1, pp. 363-366
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government activity. Decisions were based on consensus and officials often 
were involved in the decision making process of more than one area of 
administration. Although these men may have been called ministers, the 
ministerial concept of a single person responsible for a single area of 
administration developed later and at the earliest during the reign of 
Frederick the Great.
Frederick William I exercised his authority not through an established 
**ministerium" but rather in a highly personal way and directly from his own 
chamber, or so-called "Kahinett" The various departments, boards, and 
directories were not ministries but a group of individuals who were, in most 
cases, collectively responsible for many areas of administration. The single 
exception to this structure were the affairs, primarily foreign policy, 
supervised by Heinrich Rudiger von Ilgen until his death in 1728. He, 
perhaps more than any other advisor to the King, approximated to a 
modern-style governmental minister.^
Very much in this tradition, the affairs of the General Finance 
Directory were divided among several of the King's advisors during the first 
decade of Frederick Wilham I's reign. Within the General Finance Directory, 
the issues concerning the forests were to be overseen by the Ober- 
Jagermeister, Samuel Freihen’ von Hertevelt. The ruler's private revenues, the 
so-called Schatulle and the income from the Orange Succession lands, were 
to be overseen by the Geheime Kriegsrat, Johann Andreas von Kraut. The 
postal service was under the privy councillor Grabe while affairs of 
Oeconomica in respect to the Schatulle were supervised by the Geheime 
Kammeirat von  Gorne and the Geheime Kammenat Mbrechi Ludwig Walter. 
InDorwarFs opinion, however, Frederick William I's particular confidence
M. Scott, 'The Rise of the First Minister in Eighteenth-Century Europe," in 
Royal and Republican Sovereignty, Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, and H. M. Scott, editors, 
pp. 26-27; Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederidc William I, pp. 47, 227, fn. 28.
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in Kameke marked him out from the others.^ This judgement is based on 
the fact that Kameke was entrusted with the confidence of the King to 
oversee many of the above mentioned areas of administration, the most 
important of which included the domains, the Schatulle, the Orange 
Succession lands, forestry, postal service and mint affairs, as well as the state 
salt monopoly, mines, foundries, tolls and licenses^®
There was a notable shift in personnel at the top when, in February 
1719, Frederick von Gorne became head of the General Finance Directory, 
replacing Kameke who was discredited by a court intrigue, the so-called 
Kléementschen Intriguen,^^ The Kléement conspiracy is one of the most 
important yet neglected aspects of international affairs during Frederick 
William Fs reign and also demonstrates the scale of discontent among 
Frederick William Fs principal advisors with his rule.
Kléement was a Hungarian who conspired with a few officials in 
Frederick William Fs court, all of whom were apparently discontented with 
the King's military imperatives and the almost total disappearance of 
"literary men", who had been prominent under Frederick William Fs father, 
Frederick IE/1, The apparent and astonishing intention of these officials 
was to organise an international coalition comprised of surrounding courts 
as well as the Imperial authorities to overthrow Frederick William 1. With 
definite plans and strategic maps of Berlin in hand, the two primary 
conspirators, Kléement and his Brandenburg-Prussian contact, Lehmann,
^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William L p. 125. Dorwart 
makes some interesting arguments on tliis point however he notes that Kameke's new 
postion "took on the appearance of a collegial ministry of finance." Tliis appears td%bre of 
a matter of interpretation on his behalf and finds little support in the manuscript material.
l^ABB, 1, pp. 363-366.
i f  Acta Borussica. Denkmaler der Preufiischen Staatsverwaltung im 18.
Tahrhundert. Die Briefe Konig Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt- 
Dessau. 1704-1740. Berlin: Paul Perey, Erganzungsband, 1906, pp. 31-44.
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went into the capital to organise the coup. In the meantime, its ringleader, 
Kléement, had gone to Frederick William I to divulge the conspiracy in 
return for money: Something that may have been his intention all along, 
although the evidence is unclear. He claimed that it was not his idea but 
rather that of the foreign powers. For a time, Frederick William I believed 
liim, but the King soon learned the truth and rounded-up all the 
conspirators and had them executed. !^ There is no detailed account of a 
trial having taken place, although it appears Kléement confessed at some 
point after the plot's detection by the King and his officials. Whether his 
confession occurred during his interrogation or in the course of a trial is not 
entirely clear. Gome was a native of Brandenburg where he had gained his 
financial experience primarily through his service as director of the 
Amtslmmner in Kurmark as well as the Hofrentei, the civil treasmy, financial 
administration and revenue collection authority, extending back to 1712.13  
His rise did not end with his appointment to president of the General 
Finance Directory as he became a vice-president and minister in the General 
Directory at its creation in 1723.1^
There was a change not only in the personnel at the head of the 
administration but also its structural competence. Gome's rise to the 
presidency of the General Finance Directory brought more authority and 
extensive functions to the agency as well as to himself. By 1718, the General 
Finance Directory had acquired more managerial responsibilities and
l^Leopold Ranke, Neun Bûcher Preufiisdier Geschichte. Berlin: Veit und Comp., I, 
pp. 175-177; Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschiclite der preufiischen Politik: Friedrich 
Wilhelm I. Kônig von PreuRen. Leipzig: Veit & Company, vol. 4, part 2,1869, pp. 229-247; 
Hintze, Die HohenzoUern und ilu' Werk. pp. 279-280.
13lsaacsohn, Gesichte des preufiischen Beamtentums. vol. 3, pp. 47-48; Dorwart, 
The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William L pp. 110-113,126 fn. 31.
l^ ABB, 3,143-146. Règlement wegen der Geschaftsvertheilung beim^ 
Generalfinanzdirectorium, Berlin, 21 Februaiy 1719. See also, Isaacsohn, Gesichte des 
preufiischen Beamtentums. vol. 3, p. 52.
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possessed more independent decision-making authority than previously 
had been the case under Kameke. The enlarged executive authority given to 
Gorne and his subordinate officials was evident in the fact that these men 
actually decided many of the affairs such as the utilisation of the forests and 
most importantly, the leases for the royal domain lands. No longer was the 
King's immediate involvement necessary on relatively minor matters. This, 
however, did not imply that Frederick William I did not take an active 
interest in lesser affairs. The King remained a keen micro-manager, 
although he appears to have trusted Gorne to an extent that he did few other 
officials.
It is important to remember that the General War Commissariat, the 
other agency merged into the General Directory, was a military body which 
had its origins in the war surrounding the Cleves-Jülich succession dispute 
in the early seventeenth century.i^ Its primary function, however, came to 
be the organisation and collection of the revenues from the various 
territories which retained independent local control over certain a f f a i r s . 1 6
The General War Commissariat had become a particularly crucial 
instrument for the Great Elector after the peace of Ohva in 1660 when he 
was able to maintain a peacetime standing army of four thousand men.i^ In 
addition, it was one of two agencies whose remit covered all the 
HohenzoUern territories and was therefore a functional rather than 
territorial agency of government. Its authority continued to increase during 
the years before 1723. Several tax coUection agencies grew in size under its
2, pp. 158-197 covers its development. See also, Dorwart, Tlie 
Adminisb’ative Reforms of Frederick William L p. 130.
l^lbid., p. 132. Isaacsohn, Gesichte des preufiischen Beamtentums. vol. 2, pp. 185- 
197. Interestingly Isaacsohn comments on this point that "hand in hand with the 
development of the Kommissariaten goes the Steuerverjassung."
l^Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der polibschen 
Geschichte: VierterTeil. Neuzeit. Berlin: Georg Sblke, 1920, p. 280.
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auspices as well as various mihtary treasuries which were ah separate from 
civh and territorial authorities. 13 These all became crucial reasons for the 
Great Elector's abihty to support a standing army since revenue cohection 
became more efficient and there was improved accountability for the ruler.
The development and the overlapping functions of these two central 
administrative institutions, the General War Commissariat and the General 
Finance Directory, led to significant jurisdictional disputes as detailed.l^ In 
many ways, these clashes paralleled those that occurred in provincial 
administration.
From the start of Frederick Wihiam I's reign, jurisdictional disputes 
between these two bodies, and even between their sub-authorities and 
individuals within each institution, were particularly apparent. A major 
source of these confhcts was that, throughout the reign's first decade, these 
authorities were not given a sufficiently clear definition of their duties. Even 
more problematical than this, however, was the fact that an agency or 
individual was given collateral functions which often overlapped with 
another body's or administrator's duties. The two most important agencies 
at the central level were not distinguished purely by function, which might 
have avoided duplication and competition. Rather, the primary distinction 
which was made was whether one was a civilian or a member of the 
military. This allowed jurisdictional disputes between the various civilian 
and military authorities to emerge, and is another example of the way m 
which government was still traditional and territorial in organisation rather 
than modern and functional.
There are several cases in wliich Competenzconflicte — as these clashes 
came to be known — were formally reported to Berlin by territorial civil and
l^Appendix A displays grapliically early Brandenburg-Prussian administration 
under Frederick William I.
3%ee above. Chapters 3,4, and 5.
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military authorities in East Prussia, Magdeburg, Cleve, and Kurmark, 
among other practices.^O Although the various authorities could agree on 
what needed to be decided, they differed on how and by whom such 
decisions should be made and executed. This primarily involved issues of 
tax collection, over which there were significant jurisdictional conflicts, as 
civil and military authorities claimed this function as their own. The 
jurisdictional debates, as detailed in the manuscript material, reveal an 
increasingly fractious tone between the parties. Interestingly, Frederick 
William I did not waiver from his resolve to put an end to these constant 
and widespread conflicts in the years before 1723.
By late 1721, the King clearly hoped for a negotiated settlement 
between the parties. One liistorian. Reinhold Dorwart, cites Frederick 
William Fs order from 12 November 1721 in which the King instructed that 
a settlement should be reached by the two agencies themselves in one 
particular dispute in Magdeburg. Furthermore, Dorwart claims that the 
King was personally introducing reforms.^l Advocates of this interpretation 
concluded that the ruler was decisive, exacting, and innovative in these 
reforms. The King's tone and intentions, however, require to be analysed 
more closely. Almost all of his efforts after the setting-up of the General 
Finance Directory were in fact a continuation and refinement of older 
practices and policy decisions. The assumptions underlying Frederick 
William Fs decisions were neither new nor original. In the following
^^See ABB, 1, p. 341 (Erlafi to the Wirklichen Geheimen Rath (Real Privy Councillor) 
von Creutz); vol. 2, pp. 178-186 (draft from the Generalkriegskommissariat concerning their 
jurisdiction), 202-204 (Magdeburg), pp. 226-228 {Competenzedict), pp. 310-313 (Magdeburg), 
pp. 371-375, and pp. 502-504 (East Prussia); Vol. 3 has numerous documents and summaries 
of documents in regard to the jurisdictional conflicts in many of the territories. Most of 
those included in vol. 3 refer to the formal conference that concluded with the princtpia 
regulativa and the establishment of the General Directoiy whidi is detailed below.
^^Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia, p. 162.
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passage from 12 November 1721, this becomes clear.37
It has been declaimed and We ourselves have noticed hitherto differences 
between your college/board and our General War Kommissariat often 
about one or another affairs that have arisen, whicli each admittedly 
through correspondence and letters as well as through oral interlocutions 
have been endeavoured, such that one or the other will not relent. 
Similarly, that Our Service can and must not be approved through 
contradictions of the Colleges under one another, but through unanimous 
disposition according to tlie fundamentals of the approved order. So that 
all of these difficulties may be remedied at one time, We order herewith 
that these Colleges meet together through deputies and consider all the 
affairs and discrepancies and should employ all diligence to accomplish in 
total from now until 1 January.
Frederick William I was well informed and he certainly was able to 
intervene and make a decision on this matter should he have wanted. One 
would thinl'v, in hght of the King's personality and reputation with 
historians, that after eight years of disagreement and conflict between the 
General Fmance Directory and the General War Commissariat the King 
would impose a decision himself or set down more precise and effective 
rules for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. The King, however, did 
not impose a decision and instead stubbornly followed his early directive to 
adhere to the "fundamentals of the approved order",23 directing the 
involved parties to resolve their differences by themselves, through 
consensus. He clearly was not eager to take matters into his own hands on 
either the provincial or central levels at this time.
Frederick William I's style of personal rule, which has since become 
synonymous with the phrase 'HohenzoUern absolutism,' was not apparent 
in what was clearly an important series of events, nor was it apparent at this 
relatively advanced stage in the King's reign. In this manner, Frederick 
WiUiam I maintained the direction of poUcy in East Prussia which
^^Translated from ABB, 3, pp. 377-378. 
23lbid.,p.377.
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inaugurated while he was still crown prince, in the aftermath of the crisis of 
1709.
In early January 1713, his predecessor, Frederick III/1, had ordered 
that the colleges and their associated departments of the 
Genemllcommissariaten and Geheime. Hoflaimmer were supposed to settle any 
differences and work harmoniously not least because they had the "common 
purpose" of service to their most gracious ruler.24 Frederick William I 
inherited this approach and continued it for over a decade without showing 
the decisive personal leadership and directed intervention in administrative 
disputes commonly associated with his style of kingship.
Negotiations began on 22 December 1721 between officials from both 
sides and lasted until the following spring when a resolution was issued in 
March 1722, the so-called principia regulativa?-^ Almost all of the principles 
set down in it pertained to the western HohenzoUern territories of Minden, 
Ravensberg, and Cleves. The disputes between the General Finance 
Directory and the General War Commissariat and their respective provincial 
representatives showed that jurisdictional disputes were not only occurring 
in East Prussia or in a particular region, but were widely scattered 
throughout the HohenzoUern territories. East Prussia at this time, however, 
appears to have had disputes which were more purely local in nature and 
did not involve officials of central administration from BerUn. Clashes 
between the estabUshed officials and those from Brandenburg appear to be 
far fewer in number in the Kingdom due to the heavy predominance of 
native East Prussians in administrative posts: there were fewer
24a bB, 1, p. 287,3 January 1713.
^^GSt APK, General Direktorium, General Department, Tit. I, Nr. 26a. See also the 
"Conference Protocol," GStAPK, Gen. Dir., General Department, Tit. I, Nr. 26a. This is cited 
from the transcription in Stolze, "Gesclrichte der Gründung des Generaldirektoriums," 
Forschungen zur Brandenburgische und Pretissiche Geschichte, vol. 21:1, pp. 226-230; ABB, 3, pp. 
400-411.
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representatives of wider Hohenzollern interests to be found in the 
Kingdom's government. Since more govermnent was conducted by native 
elites, any dispute was more likely to be between local officials. This is one 
further significant difference between East Prussia and other territories — 
especially with respect to the establishment of the General Directory. It is an 
important subject which involves the East Prussian Indigemtsrecht, or right 
of the native born, and will be discussed more extensively in the following 
chapter.
Frederick William I found that numerous disputes continued even 
after the general agreement reached in March 1722. It was only after tliis 
point in his reign, a decade after he became Idng, that Frederick William I 
intervened personally when it became clear to him that the March 1722 
agreement was not working. The eventual solution proved to be an 
amalgamation which created the General Directory. The individual 
responsible for the idea of the combination of the General Finance Directory 
and the General War Commissariat is not known, although it does not seem 
likely that it was an invention of Frederick William I himself. As will be 
demonstrated in the following section, however, many of the new 
institution's style and procedures for day-to-day operation are typical of the 
King's previous reforms, most notably the General Finance Directory.
The Establishment of the General Directory
The intention to set up the General Directory was not kept a secret. 
Although Victor Loewe has noted background reports of its establishment in 
a Viennese manuscript newssheet from as early as 10 October 1722, the idea 
of combining the General War Commissariat and the General Finance 
Directory does not appear to have been reported publicly in Berlin until 6 
January 1723.^^ More precise information about the setting up of the 
General Directory appeared in the first week of January, but this was not 
particularly significant. Many reports of its imminent establishment were 
circulating by this time. East Prussia, however, was sent official notification 
apparently no earlier than 24 January 1723, the date noted on the Instruction 
proclamation sent to Konigsberg from Berlin.
Whether other options than the amalgamation were considered is 
equally clouded in mystery. Established sources, such as the King's letters 
to his political confidant Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau in these months^^, as 
well as the Instruction for the General Directory itself,^^ give little insight 
into the reasons why the merger of the two agencies into the General 
Directory was the chosen solution. Frederick William I did discuss liis plans 
for the introduction of the General Directory with Leopold in December
^^Loewe, "Griindungsgeschichte des Generaldirektorlum," pp. 242-6. On page 
242, Loewe comments that this was from an unkown correspondent who handwrote a 
newspaper "from the quill." Loewe also noted that, at the time, this document could be 
found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. In addition, see Dorwart, Hie 
Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I. pp. 164-65, also cites Loewe.
^7Erganzungsband, Die Briefe Konig Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold 
zu Anhalt-Dessau. 1704-1740.0 . Rrauske, editor, in Acta Borussica. Denkmâler der 
Preufiischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. Tahrhundert. Berlin: Paul Perey, 1906.
ABB, 3, pp. 575-651; the background material and drafts of the instruction begin
on p. 532.
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1722 and in some detail on the 26th of that month, but no precise 
explanation for the change was given.^^ And although Leopold's role of 
in the conception of the General Directory may not be significant, 
he was to be an important figure in East Prussian affairs later in the decade.
To state as Stolze does, however, that the setting up of the General 
Directory came about as a result of the jurisdictional disputes between the 
Provincial War Commissariat and the Domain Board over the domain lands 
in Minden being waged at the time, ignores two fundamental aspects of the 
situation during this period.30 First, as detailed in previous chapters, there 
were other Hohenzollern possessions where Frederick William I found his 
authorities at odds with one another. The King was well aware of the 
conflicts and resistance he faced throughout his realm. Not only did 
Frederick William I have to concern himself with the resistance within East 
Prussia, he also had difficulties with reform initiatives in other territories, 
particularly Minden, where the established authorities and sub-officials of 
the General Finance Directory were at odds with the newer authorities of the 
General Kriegslcomrnissariat It is not surprising that the two agencies were in 
conflict. The General Finance Directory was focused on increased 
production for raw materials that would be exported. The General 
Kriegskommissariatf on the other hand, was focused on production directly 
for the military or consumption within Brandenburg-Prussia. This, in turn, 
would increase both the rural Kontiibntion tax as well as the excise tax on 
consumption in urban a r e a s . ^ i
Furthermore, in the west of the Hohenzollern monarchy and well
Erganzungsband, Die Briefe Konig Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten 
Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau. 1704-1740. p. 211.
^^Stolze, "Zur Gescbichte der Gründung des Generaldirektoiiums," p. 225-237, and 
p. 566 (Nachtrag).
^iNeugebauer, Die Hohenzollern. pp. 199-200.
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after the Frederick William Ts reign (between the 1740s through 1760s), such 
territories as Cleves, Mors, Gelderland, and especially the new acquisition of 
East Friesland (secured in 1744) effectively resisted some important changes. 
One of the most significant instances of this resistance, which during 
Frederick IFs reign occasionally became violent protest, concerned military 
recruitment and in particular, the Canton System over which clashes 
occurred well into the reign of Frederick 11.32 These territories had strong 
native traditions of their own, and their acquisition by Brandenburg-Prussia 
meant little to the local elite when faced with Hohenzollern reforms that 
directly affected their own established rights and privileges.
In the second place, the General Directory was initially and primarily 
introduced to curb such disputes within the central administration, not 
among lesser officials and authorities in the localities. The problems at the 
local level between the General Finance Directory and the General War 
Commissariat were apparent, but no attempt was made to solve them in the 
General Directory. Instead, an exact and effective solution was provided at 
the central level. Beyond Berlin, the General Directory was less precise in its 
diagnosis, prescription, and cure of Brandenburg-Prussia's acute regional 
problems.
In the early 1720s, disputes like those erupting in Minden had their 
counterparts elsewhere. Although Dorwart states that the General Directory 
was the high point of reforms for the decade, its impact was limited for 
several years after 1723.33 The administrative change and clarification that 
occurred under Frederick William I was a continuing process, not a single 
event. According to Dorwart, the King was able to produce financial and 
administrative consolidation through the introduction of the General
180.
32büscH, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. pp. 36-37. 
33Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederidc William I. pp. 163-64 and p.
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Directory, but this was something the King had sought and worked towards 
from the very start of his r e i g n . 3 4  in  Dorwart's view, "dualism was 
succeeded by uniformity and unity; conflicting aims, by singleness of 
direction; administrative schism, by solidarity of interests and p u r p o s e / ' 3 5  
This verdict is too optimistic, and to this extent misleading. There is no 
doubt that there was a continuation of this "dualism" throughout Frederick 
William Ts reign and even beyond, as established agencies retained their 
role in government.
There was a significant linlt between the General Directory and 
Frederick William Ts broader political objectives. From the very beginning 
of his reign, the King was determined to end Brandenburg-Prussia's 
dependence on foreign subsidies and the loss of political independence this 
entailed. He believed and strove for poHtical and diplomatic freedom of 
manoeuvre which would allow liim and his successors independence from 
any external control. It was to be upheld by an enlarged and powerful 
army. This would prevent Brandenburg-Prussia from remaining a pawn in 
European affairs as well as securing full control over its own policy. The 
establishment of the General Directory was seen as a way to help the King 
achieve this goal of self-sufficiency.
One nineteenth-century historian has cited the familiar anecdote that 
while crown prince and on a military campaign m Flanders, Frederick 
William I had been taunted by officers from other states with comments 
about Brandenburg-Prussia's reliance on foreign subsidies. It is said that 
the future King's response was to promise that Brandenburg-Prussia would 
support thirty thousand soldiers without s u b s i d i e s . 3 6
34lbid., p. 178-179.
35lbid., p. 179.
36whether tliis anecdote is true or not is uncertain. See for example, tiie anecdote 
filled history of Brandenburg-Prussia by Herbert Tuttle, History of Prussia to the Accession
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Whether this exchange actually occurred or not is unimportant. What 
is significant is that during the War of Spanish Succession, when Prussian 
troops had fought for allied subsidies, the crown prince had fought 
alongside his men. This was of particular importance and an issue about 
which he wrote in his instructions for his successor in 1722. He noted that if 
a Idng were to have the devotion and loyalty of his troops then that king 
must march and fight alongside them. Moreover, the King continued, the 
future Idng also must remember that his actions should not be for the goal of 
money but rather, for land and p e o p l e . 3 7  Such a prize, Frederick William 1 
believed, would add to the economic base of the state and therefore provide 
more resources to make Brandenburg-Prussia into a self-sustaining military 
power. The decisions to deploy one's own troops should not be taken 
lightly according to the King. "The welfare of a ruler," he told his successor, 
"is when your land is well populated, that is the true riches of one's 
possessions, when your army marches outside your territories, the excise 
revenue will not be a third of its level when the army is established in the 
p r o v i n c e s . " 3 8  Moreover, Frederick William I  had a wider aim, that of 
autarky (economic independence or self-sufficiency), which he believed was 
the only secure basis for the diplomatic freedom of action he craved.
This desire for financial self-sufficiency also was reflected in his 
instruction for the General Directory. Articles eight (Contribution Tax) and 
ten (Excise Tax) in particular had deliberate implications for both foreign 
and domestic efficiency and order. Frederick William I clearly stated this 
when discussing the Contribution.39 There was joint responsibiHty for the
of Frederic tlie Great Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1884, p. 379.
37Dietridi, editor. Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, p. 238.
3%id., pp. 238-9.
39aBB,3,p.591,
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Contribution to some degree but individual responsibility ultimately fell
upon the provincial c o u n c i l l o r s . ^ ^
There was a significant linkage between efficient revenue collection, 
the military, and foreign subsidies.^1 The efficient gathering of taxes was 
critical for the government to operate as the King had promoted autarky 
which necessitated a decreased reliance upon foreign subsidies. This 
provides the primary focus for Bruno Reuter's article on Frederick William I 
and the General Directory. In the first sentence, Reuter declares that the 
King "recognised very well that to preserve the security and independence 
for the state, a numerous and well trained (wohlgeiibtes) army is 
n e c e s s a r y ." “^ 2  Reuter claims that the failings of Frederick William Ts father, 
Frederick III/1 were to blame for the this not being carried out e a r l i e r . 4 3  
This is a point that has been expanded above with respect to Frederick 
William Ts instructions to his successor, namely, that the king's desire for 
economic autarky was to be the foundation for his freedom of diplomatic 
manoeuvre.
It was not accidental that Frederick William I placed together the 
sections which discussed the maintenance of the free and un-free population 
or the so-called, Conseivation der Untertanen, the collection of the Contribution 
and Excise taxes, toUs and commerce, manufacturing, and paper and cartons 
between matters concerning Fouragegelder vor die Kavallme" and '"Anhaltung 
der Deserteures." A  well organised and prosperous manufacturing and 
economic base would support a strong military which would render foreign
4%id.
41por example, see the Instruction for the General Directory in ABB, 3, pp. 591-592, 
595. The king's discussion of the treatment of and for peasants continues on p. 667. This 
illuminates tliis point to some extent.
^2Bruno Reuter, "Konig Friedrich Wilhelm I. und das General-Directorium, 
Zeitschriftfiir pretfssische Geschichte, 12,1875, p. 274.
43lbid.
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subsidies quite unnecessary. In this connection, one must remember the 
crucial role of subsidies in building up the Hohenzollern army under the 
Great Elector.
What Frederick William I was underlining by this placement of these 
issues in his instruction, at one level, was that the Brandenburg-Prussian 
state must reach a position of economic and political self-sufficiency. 
Moreover, the Hohenzollern Monarchy should not be dependent on or at 
the mercy of other foreign powers for part of the funding of its own military 
forces. In addition, the King did not want to leave the same financial 
difficulties to his successor wliich had been his own inheritance from his 
father, Frederick III/I. In the instructions to his successor in January 1722, 
Frederick William I explained that a Hohenzollern ruler must have ample 
financial resources stored up and at hand on which to fall back if 
necessary.^ In other words, he was telling his son to have a large cash 
reserve. Incidentally, Frederick William I left his successor some eight 
million talers stored in barrels in the vaults of the royal residence at 
Potsdam. Having such a cash reserve in turn was to be an axiom of 
Frederick the Great.
An increase in total revenue was crucial for Frederick William I. 
Section after section of the instruction for the General Directory was geared 
to increasing the revenue. The King clearly believed that a lean yet self­
sustained government, military and society were the keys to prolonged 
international success for the HohenzoUems. The King argues this in his 
Instructions to his Successor:
It is true, that I leave you a treasury that, at the moment, has a pretty sum 
of money in it. But, it is necessary for a Prince to have sudi money, then 
God preserves you for war, [and] plague. [If] some provinces totally fail [or 
you have a war] [they] talce a lot of money, when you, however, have a 
well-larded treasury, you can support these disasters. You also must set
^Dietrich, ed.. Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern. p. 233.
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aside to this treasury at least 500,000 taler per year, then you will provide a 
formidable army and a great treasury [for the army] in times of military 
mobilisation, then you can wield great respect in the world and converse 
with the otlier [Great] Powers.^
The administrative structure of the General Directory which aimed at 
autarky was also crucial for Frederick William Ts plans. The amalgamation 
of the General Finance Directory and the General War Commissariat into the 
General Directory produced four departments that in 1727 would be 
considered by Frederick William I "a supreme college or board right behind 
the king."^^ In fact, this was only true because Prussia' ruler named himself 
president of the General Directory. If one considers the de facto organisation 
and rank of the upper echelon of the administration, the privy councillors 
were directly below the King and immediately above the ministers of the 
General D i r e c to r y T h e s e  ministers did, however, report directly to the 
King about the situation in East Prussia and the other Hohenzollern 
territories. In other words, in 1723 and immediately thereafter, the General 
Directory's territorial functions were significantly more important than they 
had been under the General Finance Directory or General War 
Commissariat. This clearly is an important and often neglected point, and 
requires more detailed examination.
Each of the four departments was responsible for particular territories 
as well as particular categories of government business which covered all 
the Hohenzollern lands, primarily those that were economic and financial in 
nature. It is important to note that with regard to territorial jurisdiction, 
very little was changed from pre-1723 dispensations. There was a slight
ABB, 4:2, p. 140. In a matter concerning rank, the king noted on one document 
dated 31 January 1727.
^^See Appendix B, p. 353.
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shift with the General Directory toward a functional, rather than purely 
territorial, system of government, but no more than that. Crucially, the 
General Directory retained significant provincial functions and a territorial 
structure in practice. Each department was headed by an official who 
reported directly to the King about his territorial and functional 
responsibilities. Each department held regular and scheduled meetings on 
specified days of the week.^8 They were to meet until aU business was 
concluded. East Prussia, for example, was initially assigned to Joachim 
Friedrich von Grumbkow who was to meet with the officials of this First 
Department on Mondays. Other matters dealt with by the First Department 
were the affairs of Pomerania, Neumark, boundary matters and the 
reclamation of land by draining m a r s h e s . 4 9  Important affairs that remained 
separate from any department of the General Directory included education, 
religion, and affairs of justice. In fact, these were given their own agencies 
under the titles of the fustizstaatsrat alongside the l<Mhinettsministerhmi and 
under which were Spiritual and Judicial affairs.
In East Prussia, as well as in the other territories, the authority of 
the General Directory was introduced through the Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer. They were notified of the new procedures by the 
General Directory. Their main task was to oversee the royal domain 
lands, and they became Frederick William Fs agents in the Kingdom for 
the introduction of the General Directory.
Frederick William I set down in the instruction of December 1722 
the requirement that officials appointed to the provincial agencies be not 
only men of good character but also they were to be good publicans and 
themselves have been substantial landlords as well as royal officials.
^^GStAPK, General Direktorium, General Department, III - General Ober Finanz 
Kriegs und Domainen Direktorium, Nr. 1.
4%id.
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They were in addition to possess the abiHty to write well and a solid 
understanding of accounting and be vigilant and healthy people in 
g e n e r a l . 3 0  Reports were to be submitted directly from the provincial 
Kriegs und Domanenlaimmer officials to the departmental head of the 
General Directoiy. In the case of East Prussia, reports were to be 
submitted to Grumbkow for discussion on Mondays in the meeting of 
departmental heads. Frederick William I also intended that these 
territorial officials would continue to concern themselves with the 
management of the royal domains and, if their reports were falsified for 
whatever reason, the General Directory and, in particular, the 
department head would be held responsible.
Spying was central to this system of government. Frederick 
William I suggested that, besides personal correspondence, the use of 
informants and spies should be used to verify specific matters and 
conditions in the territories.31 The King specifically referred to East 
Prussia as an example of why and how espionage could and should be 
used to determine the quality of harvests, the exploitation of the land, as 
well as manufacturing, shipping, and trade in general. Spies provided 
additional reports, which enabled official versions to be verified. In 
addition, Frederick William I noted that the General Directory was to 
pay attention to what spies were saying about any organised effort 
among the East Prussian nobility to resist the Generalhufenschofi, the land 
based tax on the Kingdom's elite first imposed in 1715 and re-introduced 
in 1719.52
The attention to detail demonstrated by Frederick William I in the
58a BB, 3, p. 577, section 10.
51lbid., p. 644. Tliis will be examined more fully in the following section. 
52lbid., pp. 644-645, article 34, section 2.
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instruction was not new. The assignment of individual ministers to 
particular affairs was established practice within existing agencies of 
Hohenzollern government. A mere month after his own accession Frederick 
William I issued one of his earliest and most important decrees, that 
establishing the General Finance Directory on 27 March 1713.53 This 
incorporated the King's notion of assigning certain officials to particular 
duties, and more specifically, the idea that ministers should meet on 
particular days to deal with their affairs, subsequently a central feature of 
the General Directory.54 This exemplifies the evolutionionary process 
apparent in the framework of the General Directory, rather than its 
unexpected introduction in 1723. Table 6.1 demonstrates this considerable 
continuity, where the primary matters for both bodies and the day which 
they were to be considered:
Table 6.1
The General Finance Directory and the General Directory
Day 
of Week
General Finance Directory, 
established Mardi 1713
General Directoiy, 
established January 1723
Monday Notliing Scheduled Dept. Head Grumbkow: Prussia, 
Pomerania, and Neumark. 
Boundary Matters, Draining of 
Marshes
Tuesday Domains/Hof-Kammer Affairs. Nothing Scheduled
Wednesday Krautt: SdiatuUe and Orange 
Succession Lands
Dept. Head Creutz: Minden, 
Ravensburg, Tecklenburg, 
Lingen, Redienkammer and 
Provisioning of the Army
Thursday Domains and Hof-Kammer 
Affairs
Dept. Head Krautt: Electoral, 
Magdeburg, Halberstadt, 
Mardiing/Manoeuvre Matters, 
Caring of the Army
Friday Domains and Hof-Kammer 
Affairs
Dept. Head Gôrne: Gueldres, 
Cleves, Mors, Neuchâtel, Orange 
Succession Lands, Postal and 
Mint.
Saturday Grabe: Postal Matters Notliing Sdieduled
53abb , 1, pp. 363-366. In particular, article 2. 
54lbid. In particular, article 3.
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All business concerning the forests and mint were handled separately 
by other administrators. In particular, Frederick William I set out that 
Oberjagermeister Samuel Freihetr von Hertevelt was to be in charge of the 
royal forests. Johann Theodor Flottwell was appointed to oversee the affairs 
of money or so-called Mtinzwesen. Flottwell, incidentally, went on to 
become Privy Secretary in the Second Department of the General Directory 
on 23 January 1723.55
Although it has been argued here that the idea to combine the 
General Finance Directory and the General War Commissariat may not have 
been Frederick William Ts own suggestion, he was certainly familiar with 
the notion. The amalgamation of the two agencies was more of a trend of 
administrative refinement that continued to follow established precedent, 
that of combining existing departments to form new agencies and, by 
imphcation, followed naturally from evolution between 1713 and 1723. The 
General Finance Directory itself had been formed through an amalgamation 
of the primary civil financial agencies existing in 1713.56
The organisation of the General Directoiy clearly did not imply that 
Frederick William I planned to diminish his own personal involvement in 
government or his direct participation in the particular issues wliich the new 
body handled. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below shows a graphic representation of 
the differences between the General Directory and the institutions that came 
before it.57 In particular, one is able to see in Figure 6.1 the amalgamation of
55jbid.,pp. 364-365.
56lbid., p. 363.
52$ee Appendix B, p. 353, for a more complete grapliical representation of East 
Prussian Administration after the establishment of the General Directory in January 1723. 
The information in the above organizational chart is based on a number of sources, notably, 
Manfred ScWenke, Preufien-Ploetz: Preufiische Gesdiichte zum HachscMagen.
Freiburg/Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz, 1987, p. 43.
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the General Finance Directory and the General War Commissariat which 
provided the basis for the establishment of the General Directory in Figure 
6.2.
Figure 6.1 
Administration before 1723
General Finance Directory General War Kommissariat
Provincial Aintskanimem Provincial Kriegskommissariate
Frederick William I 
King in  Prussia
Departments for Justice 
and Relgious Affairs
Generalrechenkammer 
With the Kriegs- und  
Domanendepartment
Foreign Affairs
Figure 6.2 
Administration after 1723
Domanenkammern in the Provinces Kriegskainmern in the Provinces
Frederick William I King in Prussia
General Directory Foreign AffairsVarious Departments for Justice and Religious Affairs
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It also should be noted that Frederick Wilham I kept many of the 
most important military affairs separate from the General Directory. Actual 
command of the army and strategic planning of mihtary operations 
remained outside the competence of the General Directory, so too did some 
of its financial matters. Nevertheless, most all of the day-to-day peacetime 
administration for the nulitary was supervised by the General Directory.
Important revenues were collected by the Kriegs und Domanenkammer 
in the provinces, including East Prussia. As the Kriegs und Domanenfmmmer 
in the Kingdom was subordinate to the General Directory, these revenues 
necessarily passed through the General Directory and indeed were 
supervised by the Department responsible for East Prussia. Frederick 
William I, however, was adamant about keeping finances for the mihtary 
separate. In this way, its income would not become confused with finance 
for civil affairs or pohtics.
This extension of the authority of the General Directory into the 
Kingdom through the Kriegs und Domanenlcammer, however, at first made 
few significant inroads. The primary distinction between whether one was a 
civilian or a member of the mihtary continued to be stressed in matters of 
administrative competence and allowed jurisdictional disputes between the 
various civilian and mihtary authorities to continue. This wih be examined 
in the next section.
East Prussian Reactions to the General Directory
The Konigsberg Regieî’ung showed no inunediate concern about the 
General Directory when its establislunent was made known by instructions 
sent from Berhn at the end of January 1723. In fact, there was little 
immediate apparent discussion by the East Fmssian Regierung about the 
new body after word arrived on 12 February 1723. The jurisdictional 
conflicts which preceded the General Directory continued largely unabated 
after its estabhshment, though one target of the complaints had changed. 
The East Prussian authorities now directed their concern and frustration 
with the Kriegs und Doîiuinenkaimner to the General Directory.
During 1723 and 1724 the Regierung only slowly began to appreciate 
that the Kriegs und Domanenkammer officials were becoming a direct and 
increasingly powerful extension of central administration in Berhn, now 
controlled by the General Directory. The Kriegs und Domanenlmmmer 
technically held significant authority and was already diminishing that of 
the Regierung in some areas of East Prussian administration. Moreover, as 
the jurisdictional quarrels continued after 1723, the General Directory came 
to be seen as a threat by the Regierung when the enhanced power of its 
subordinate authority, the Kriegs und Domanenkammer, was appreciated.
This did not come about hnmediately, as it took some time for the full 
imphcations of the General Directory to become apparent within the 
Kingdom.
The royal instruction estabhshing and explaining the General 
Directory to the territorial governments and regional administrative 
authorities was followed by other initiatives concerned with its organisation 
which also affected the outlying territories, and, in particular. East Prussia.
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The extension of the General Directory into the Kingdom, however, 
remained incomplete until the middle of the eighteenth century. The full 
and effective subordination of the regional territories to the new agency in 
Berlin took at least two decades to achieve.
In his initial steps for the estabhshment of the General Directory the 
King was closely involved in the appointment of relatively low level 
secretarial staff, a further illustration of the level of personal royal 
involvement in the details of government. In the acts setting it up, one can 
find not only important drafts of documents regarding the organisation of 
this new institution but also exercises submitted by potential candidates for 
posts as secretarial copyists. Sample documents were submitted for review 
and on some Frederick Wüham I noted "poor hand," "good hand," or "this 
copyist wih be very good."^® These were ironic comments indeed for a King 
who not only wrote illegibly but moreover, could barely construct a 
grammaticaUy correct sentence in any language.^9 the eighteenth 
centuiy, legible handwriting was crucial for a would-be administrator and 
the King took a decisive personal interest in their appointment. It 
underlines the degree of royal involvement at the lowest level of 
government, in this case the choice of secretaries.
Yet, this interest in implementing the components of the General 
Directory is not matched by any correspondence which demonstrates that 
Frederick Wilham I was concerned with its introduction, let alone 
acceptance, within the Kingdom. This was also the situation among the 
royal officials in East Prussia, who — to judge by their correspondence — 
exhibited httle concern about the steps needed to estabhsh the authority of
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir,, General Department, in  - General Ober Finanz Kriegs und 
Domainen Kammer, Nr. 4. Generally, only the top few lines of a typical edict were 
supplied, for example, Won Gottes Gnaden Friedrich Wilhelm, Konig...."
^^For more on tliis subject see, Hummricli, "Beitrage zur Spradie Konig Friedrich 
Wilhelm I von Preussen".
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the new body in the Kingdom.^® It was, at the very earliest, a fuU year after 
the introduction of the General Directory that Frederick William Ts zealous 
interest in appointments, hke that with the copyists in Berhn mentioned 
earher, came to be appreciated in East Prussia.
As mentioned earher, the East Prussian authorities were not notified 
about the estabhshment of the General Directory — along with the other 
territorial Regierungen — until late January 1723 through the "Notifications 
Patent" of the 24th of that month.^^ Although Frederick Wilham I may have 
personaUy supervised the drawing up of the first draft of the General 
Directory instruction, there were numerous corrections and emendations 
made to it by his most senior officials, Grumbkow, Creutz, Kraut, Katsch, 
and Gorne. The final version of the Instruction reflected the significant 
contribution made by these high officials.^^
The instruction was finaUy ready to be sent out from Berhn by 24 
January 1723. It was despatched to the various authorities throughout 
Brandenburg-Prussia soon after this date as the East Prussian Regierung 
received their copy ten to fifteen days afterward on 12 February. Moreover, 
these officials apparently made last minute corrections up to and even after 
final approval.^3 For example, a partial explanation for the delay in sending
^^his conclusion rests upon a study of manuscript material that includes notes, 
correspondence, and other documents tliat originated from both the King and his officials 
in Berlin and Potsdam as well as other locations and the East Prussian officials in 
Konigsberg and elsewhere in the Kingdom.
^IcStAPK, Gen. Dir., General Department, III - General Ober Finanz Kriegs und 
Domainen Kammer, Nr. 4, fols, 001-004. For the printed version, see fols. 012-013 
Rückseite.
^^Ibid., fols. 001 and 008 (French version of Instruction). Much of the bundle of 
manuscript material tliat contains the various drafts of the instruction are not contained in 
the Acta Borussica. There is a great deal of important information contained in the 
manuscript material that is not included in the Acta Borussica and much of tliat is in this set 
of manuscript material.
63lbid., fol. 18.
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the Patent may be the last minute changes to which copy was to go to which 
territoiy as well as the time-consuming business of malting several copies by 
hand of a relatively long and complex document. On 12 February 1723, 
Harold and Theile of the Berhn Kammer sent an additional copy of the 
Notifications Patent to various territorial officials; this was commonly done 
some time after the initial announcement by the King. For the territory of 
Neumark, reveahngly the Patent was originally addressed to the Kriegs und 
Domdnenkammei\ This name was crossed out and replaced with '"Regierung". 
The last minute additions and corrections did not focus on minor details in 
the document but dealt with larger issues, such as the reasoning behind the 
setting up of the General D i r e c t o r y O n  the same day, 12 February 1723, 
the East Prussian Regieimng reported in an unremarkable manner, that they 
had received the instruction and would bring to everyones' attention the 
establishment of the General Directory
Overall, it does not seem to have been difficult for the East Prussian 
Regierung to accept the setting up of the General Directory. The rapid 
pubhcation by the East Prussian authorities of the printed version of the 
Notifications Patent, is further evidence that the they acted completely in 
accordance with the orders from the King, the General Directory, and the 
Kriegs und Domanenkammer.^^ The Regierung in Konigsberg was not 
concerned by — and certainly did not resist or protest against — the General 
Directory, at this point. The authorities in the Kingdom notified the General 
Directory in February 1723 that they would publicise the Instruction as 
instructed. The Regierung quickly began to correspond with the General
64ibid., fol. 1.
^^Ibid., fol. 019, Konigsberg, 12 February 1723. Signed by the Regierung, Dohna, 
Rauschke, Tettau, Ostau, and Wallenrodt.
66lbid.
67lbid., fols. 19-21.
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Directory on routine and more important issues concerning the Kingdom's 
government, confirmhig that it was not immediately seen as a threat in 
Konigsberg. Nothing in this period suggests that the Regierung would have 
increased problems with the Kriegs und Domanenkammer and the newly 
established General Directory. The jurisdictional confhcts with the Kriegs 
und Domanenlaimmer in particular lay some months in the future. For the 
present, the Regierung continued to concern themselves with the important 
issues and policy reforms which had arisen prior to the establishment of the 
General Directory. There is no evidence in the manuscript material of new 
conflicts during the first few months of 1723, when royal attention also 
focused on the other reforms under way in the Kingdom.
Since the beginning of Frederick Wilham Fs reign, the King had been 
pursuing initiatives which aimed to re-develop the Kingdom's 
infrastructure, economy, and agricultural output, as well as the 
administration of these matters. The majority of these reforms began in 1721 
and lasted tlirough 1728. The introduction of the General Directory was not 
the only innovation underway at this time. Its estabhshment — as 
significant as that may have been with the benefit of hindsight — was, in the 
overall context of the decade, simply one more reform which demanded the 
attention of the Kingdom's ruhng elite. In addition, the General Directory 
was at first, remote from East Prussia, since it was located in Berlin. It has 
loomed larger in the vision of historians than it did to contemporaries, in the 
Kingdom as elsewhere throughout the Hohenzohem monarchy.
Many of the eastern provinces of the Kingdom were still undergoing 
efforts to revive their economy. This was the region of East Prussia which 
had suffered the most serious devastation and de-population during and 
after the plague of 1709. The enduring results of natural disaster were 
evident in the 1720s with many abandoned farmsteads remaining vacant. 
The King undertook reforms to re-invigorate the territory. He also pursued
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a significant internal re-colonisation program primarily in the 1730s, the 
success of which will be discussed in the next chapter.
One of the most important reforms in East Prussia in 1723, and with 
more apparent significance than the introduction of the General Directory, 
was the dividing up of the larger districts of the eastern territory into several 
smaller areas, or special Âmter. In particular, the districts of Insterburg, 
Ragnit and Tilsit were targeted for sub-division by Berlin. The East 
Prussian Domain Commission drafted a plan for the division of the 
Insterburg and Tilsit districts which were sent on to the General Directory 
The Domain Commission was composed of Kriegs und Domanenkammer 
President von Bredow, von Schlublut, von Vefredt, von Lowenschneng, 
Neande, and Stollenfolt. These officials were to draw up such a plan for the 
King.
The division of the most eastern districts of East Prussia were among 
the most important reforms Frederick Wilham I carried out in the Kingdom 
for two reasons. First, a general survey of society, agriculture, and the 
economy was taken of the area which included the proposed name of the 
new Àmter, the number of land plots or Hufen (Huhen), as well as other civil 
and agricultural statistics.^^ Second, the Domain Commission prepared a 
map of the area, graphically detaihng much of the information contained in 
the general survey such as the location and size of the villages.70 This was 
to portray where each village would be located within the new Àmter. One
^^GStAPK, General Direktorium, Ostpreufien, Ill-General Department, Nr, 2141 
(Insterburg), GStAFK, General Direktorium, Ostpreufien, Ill-General Department, Nr. 6288 
(Tilsit).
^^Ibid., fols. 3 Rückseite-56. One Hufen is approximately 17 hectares or 42 acres.
^^Ibid., fols. 45-46. Finding such a map directly along side its particular document 
is rare. Tliis map is in excellent condition with good colour and detail. It appears many 
such maps were systematically separated from their original document and placed witliin a 
map collection. This one, however, remained witli its corresponding documentation. 
However, after my review of the map, the Berlin archive staff raised the question about 
w hether it would remain with its documentation.
Chapter 6 -  East Prussian Reactions to the General Directory__________ 281
result of this type of plartning was that the new Àmter borders were drawn 
so that no one Amt had a particular advantage in resources over another. 
Care was taken with the type of agriculture grown in the area, the number 
of villages resting in each planned new Amt, as well as the type of individual 
living in those areas, for example, service personnel and farmers.^!
There were therefore more immediate priorities for the East Prussian 
Regierung in 1723 than the General Directory. The Insterburg plan was 
submitted to Frederick WÜUam I on 26 March 1723 and became a 
particularly important source of discussion, upon which the Regierung in 
Konigsberg reserved their position. The plan was approved and would also 
apply retrospectively to the King's earher decisions approving domain 
leases. There were two minor problems raised, although Frederick William I 
simply noted that ah was to remain as it was with the proposed plan and 
existing leases.^^ The General Directory notified the Prussian Domain 
Commission of the plan's approval on 2 April 1723^3 while they notified the 
Prussian Kriegs und Domanenlmmmer of its approval a day l a t e r This is the 
same period as the introduction of the General Directory in the Kingdom. 
The final approval for the district of Tilsit, however, was not granted until 
the fall of 1723. The plans here were subjected to some detailed revision by 
Frederick William 1 himself.^^ The revised plan was sent to the Prussian 
Domain Commission on 9 October 1723 with Berlin's approval. A similar
^iService personell included Schultzen (high sdiool administrator), Pachnohren 
(leasehold estate unfree servant), Briejftragei- (letter carrier) und Drayner (mill worker for 
drainage operations), and Warthen (look-out, guard, or scout).
^^Ibid., fols. 57-57 Rückseite.
73lbid., fols. 61.
74lbid., fols. 62.
^^GStAPKy General Direktorium, Ostpreufien, Ill-General Department, Nr. 6288,4 
October 1723. General Directory to Frederick William I. The king's marginalia suggests he 
believed the plan to be a good one but he did amend specific portions.
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document, which concerned a request for a budget for the plan, was sent out 
from Berhn to the Kriegs und Domanenkammer7^
This provides the essential context to the introduction of the General 
Directory. As described earlier, the authority of the new body extended into 
the Kingdom and other Hohenzollern territories via the Kriegs und 
Domanenkammei'P'^ Their role in the creation of new districts in the eastern 
provinces of the Kingdom had been significant before and after the 
estabhshment of the General Directory in January 1723. This was prhnarily 
due to the fact that many of those involved in the plans for the new district 
scheme were officials of the Kriegs und Doimnenlaimmei\ Their authority 
was, at least on paper, strengthened after the establishment of the General 
Directoiy.
The role of the Kriegs und Domanenlmmmer in the territories has been 
compared to that of the French intendants7^ To suggest, however, that the 
functions of an official of the Brandenburg-Prussian Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer were new at the establishment of the General Directory and 
were modelled directly on the intendant system, is simply wrong. Although 
there are some striking similarities, there is nothing to suggest that for East 
Prussia there was a deHberate copying. Certainly the fact that like the Kriegs 
und Domanenlmmmer officials, the intendants in France were almost always 
not natives of the province to which they were sent, was important to 
Frederick WÜham I, but this was common in all governments of this period.
^^Ibid. 9 October 1723. On 20 October 1723, the Prussian Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer reported that they prepared a budget for the entire area that included the 
former districts of Insterburg, Tilsit and Ragnit.
3, pp. 575-651. Interestingly, in tlie Instruction for tl\e General Directory, 
there is no direct mention that this was the case. However, from the beginning of the 
Instruction, there are procedures for appointments and reports that clearly shows the role 
of the Kriegs und Domanenkammer as the extention of the General Directory in the various 
territories.
7%ee, for example, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 39.
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The level of authority commanded by the Kriegs und Domanenkammer in East 
Prussia was less than that wielded by the French intendants, primarily 
because of the way in wliich they were introduced and used. They were 
introduced to carry out functions that had for long been under the authority 
of the Hohenzohem rulers and largely hmited to mihtary affairs. Their 
overlapping and shadowing of the affairs of the native elites came about 
when their role changed and marlts a significant difference to their so-called 
counterparts in France.
French precedent is more evident in the case of another official, the 
Brandenburg-Prussian Steuerrat, who oversaw the royal cohection of 
taxation in the provinces for the Kriegs und Domanenkammer in a way 
strongly reminiscent of the Intendant. The authority of these men, along 
with that of the other crown officials in the Kriegs- und Domdnenrate, was 
significant, but it was not as important as Rosenberg has suggested until at 
least a decade or so after the establishment of the General Directory.79
These new officials brought with them into the provinces not just the 
support and control of the General Directory but, more importantly, the 
direct backing of the King himself. The Kriegs und Domanenrate were 
assisted by this royal support which went far to bolster their administrative 
confidence and their behef that they would be able to see a job through to its 
conclusion in the Kingdom. It is for these reasons that the Steuerraten and 
their link to the Kriegs und Domanenlmmmer has suggested a parallel with the 
French Intendants.
To bolster the image and prestige of the young monarchy, Frederick 
William I may have attempted to echo the administrative success of France's 
Louis XIV after 1661. The direct hhks to the crown and central 
administration which were now established were important as well. The
7%id.
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King stated this clearly in the introduction to the General Directory 
Instruction. The King made himself the president of the new body, "in 
order", he noted "to indicate more respect, authority and emphasis..,."^^^
More important, many East Prussian Regierung officials found 
particular difficulty with the more powerful roles and functions of the Kriegs 
und Domanenlcammer for two principal reasons. First, there was the simple 
fact that the Regierung and its many subordinate authorities found many of 
their administrative functions either shadowed or even made redundant by 
the activities of the Kriegs und Domanenlcammer. This was the case with 
revenue collection. Although it was not an immediate threat to the East 
Prussian authorities after the General Directory was set up, it did appear to 
rise to the top of their concerns approximately a year after the new body was 
estabhshed.
The second issue the East Prussian Regierung found problematical 
after the introduction of the General Directory were actions taken by the 
Kriegs und Domanenlcammer that violated the long-standing East Prussian 
Indigenatsrecht. This is a crucial theme when considering the reforms 
introduced into East Prussia and will be explored in the next chapter as this 
issue became more conspicuous in the late 1720s and early 1730s. There is 
no doubt, however, that Frederick WÜHam 1 tried to break this monopoly of 
provincial personnel throughout his reign and no more so than during the 
period after the General Directory was estabhshed.
A year before, Frederick Wilham 1 had devoted a substantial section 
to East Prussia in his Political Testament. The first few paragraphs appear to 
portray the Kingdom in a glowing light and the ruler wrote with optimism 
about improving the position of the Hohenzollern name over the territory 
(i.e., enhancing his own power) as well as generally improving the condition
30aBB,3,p .575.
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of those living there. The succeeding paragraphs, however, suggest 
Frederick WiUiam I was more pessimistic or, perhaps, merely realistic about 
the conditions existing there in early 1722, the time at which he wrote.®! He 
went on to note that, indeed, he had been unsuccessful at reforming his 
domain lands in the Kingdom but that his recent initiatives should improve 
the situation. The King continued with a list of his own failures and 
successes, and recommendations about what his successor should and 
should not do with regard to East Prussia. It appears that in 1722, Frederick 
William I was aware of his limited authority in the Kingdom and the failures 
of his reforms. At the same time, however, his prescriptions and predictions 
for East Prussia appear over ambitious, as the next few years would make 
clear. These years will be the focus of the next chapter.
^^Dietrich, editor. Die politischenTestamente der Hohenzollern. p. 227.
A Perspective on the General Directory
Within East Prussia, the introduction of the General Directory was 
less a threat to the traditional style of administration than to the established 
patterns of authority. Though its practical impact was at first limited, its 
theoretical implications were large. The challenge which it announced sent 
powerful signals to the Junkers that their role in military and administrative 
affairs was conditional and at the discretion of the HohenzoUerns. The 
independent traditions of many members of the East Prussian nobility posed 
a formidable challenge to the extension of state authority. These involved 
issues which only came to light after the General Directory had been in 
existence for several months. The new body was a serious effort to reform, 
initially, central government. Only subsequently were innovations to be 
introduced into the provincial administration. The General Directory was 
organised within the framework represented by existing agencies, that is to 
say, it had a collegial structure.
There was nothing new about the organisation, as has been made 
clear earlier. It had evolved from a long evaluation of administration carried 
out at the instigation of Frederick William I and with considerable input 
from his closest advisors. The General Directory was a central component in 
the evolution of HohenzoUern absolutism, but in itself it was not a complete 
answer to royal intentions about the government of East Prussia. Even after 
its introduction, similar disputes as those which had characterised pre-1723 
East Prussia continued and new ones emerged.
The ubiquity of spies within HohenzoUern government reinforced 
this situation. Frederick William I was quite open about the existence of his 
spy network and, at one point in the Instruction, told the members of the
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General Directory that as the King was dependent on the General Directory 
for correct information, the General Directory in turn must maintain its own 
network of spies in the territories so as not to receive false information from 
authorities there.®^ With respect to East Prussia, there is perhaps no more 
prominent illustration than that contained in the instruction for the 
establishment of the General Directory in 1723. In that document, the King 
declared the following:
We have already (above) ordered that the Directorate shall correspond 
diligently with the Commissariats and Chambers, and the members of each 
Department with the private informants and spies to be organized in the 
Provinces, in order that they may be informed in minutest detail of what 
goes on in the Provinces, eitlier in the Commissariat, Crown Property, 
financial. Provincial, or political fields; also new journals and all sorts of 
particulars of Provincial events. For example: in [East] Prussia... [t]here is a 
secret movement among the nobles to get rid of the general tax on holdings, 
strong resistance to this or that edict. Tliis or that nobleman is objecting to 
the land tax {Generalhufinschoss)..., Tl\e Royal Edicts and the substance of 
the instructions are carried out, or not.®®
It should be noted that Frederick WiUiam I had his own spies who 
reported directly to him scattered throughout the administration. The King 
also expected the General Directory, as shown here, to maintain spies, as a 
check upon its own officials. As a final note, it must be said that Frederick 
WiUiam I had successes as well as failures in East Prussia. The King had 
successfuUy coUected the Excise in the Kingdom and was able to use his 
experience there to introduce it in other territories.®^
The establishment of the General Directory did not cure the 
administrative iUs of HohenzoUern government in the 1720s. Indeed, its
®^ABB, 3, p. 613. Art. 18, § 29.
®®ABB, 3, pp. 644-645. Instruction for the establishment of the General Directory, 
Art. 34, § 2. This quotation cited from the English translation by Macartney, Habsburg and 
HohenzoUern Dynasties, pp. 307-308.
®^With the exception of Guelders, evidently due to a provision within the Treaty of
Utrecht.
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limited immediate impact is apparent from the fact that its introduction met 
less resistance from East Prussian Junkers than other royal reform initiatives. 
This, however, changed in subsequent years. A more clearly defined and 
prominent reaction by the East Prussian Regierung was not evident until 
1724 at the earliest.
CHAPTER 7 
The Impact of the General Directory
East Prussian Administration after 1723
The establishment of the General Directory opened the most 
productive decade for Frederick WiUiam Ts administrative reforms. Many 
of his initiatives only started to take effect in East Prussia during the later 
1720s and 1730s, Yet success, though significant, was far from complete. 
Many of Berlin's initiatives were only partially implemented, while other 
changes continued to be successfully thwarted by the Kingdom's native 
elite.
This chapter wUl examine Frederick WiUiam Ts policies as they 
applied to East Prussia during the decade after the estabUshment of the 
General Directory. These years saw a gradual sliift in attitudes on the part 
of the Kingdom's administrative eUte and society, as a consequence of the 
setting-up of the General Directory. More local and regional officials found 
themselves responsible for a limited range of matters which they could 
actually influence. This advanced centraUsation but also fostered more local 
initiative, or at least local control. These officials were ultimately subject to 
Berlin, but the changes to the territorial institutions which resulted from the 
establishment of the General Directory ultimately also gave these officials 
more autonomy and might be seen as a reform which produced 
decentraUsation.
In the end, however. East Prussian government was neither fuUy 
decentraUsed nor bureaucratised as a result of the General Directory.
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Division of labour was increasingly applied but individuals were not 
necessarily experts in their particular offices. Provincial authorities 
continued a system of patronage, as will be seen. In this respect, one may 
suspect that the poor communications and the general lack of infrastructure 
within the Kingdom permitted local authorities to remain independent to a 
large extent of Berhn and even Konigsberg. One solution Frederick William 
I found for this structural backwardness was to gain more control of 
administrative appointments and this was to prove effective to some degree. 
This lack of infrastructure — as SchmoUer argued — remained the biggest 
liindrance to the development of East Prussia after 1723.^ Unable to force 
through fundamental reforms to the structure of government, the King 
sought to exert control indirectly through the appointment of officials.
The General Directory was the agency which the King hoped would 
finally overcome all these difficulties. The most obvious structural change 
with its establishment was that control over domain affairs and the 
Kriegslcammer was united under one authority, the General Directoiy itself, 
rather than being split between two separate agencies. This change, 
however, did not add a new level of government since the old directing 
offices were simply merged into the General Directory. As a result, the 
organisation and structure of administration within East Prussia remained 
largely unchanged. More fundamental changes had been introduced two 
years earher when Frederick William I merged the territory's finance and 
domain affairs. The General Directory, although important for those 
authorities which the King already controlled, had relatively little impact on 
the overall operation, nature, and organisation of government in East 
Prussia. One noticeable consequence of its establishment was that it 
provided an administrative structure through which Frederick WilHam I
‘^ Sdimoller, ''‘Die Verwaltung Ostpreussens unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," p. 63.
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could maintain that close oversight which was his personal administrative 
style and was suited to his attention to the smallest detail. One way in 
which this can clearly be seen was through the King's personal and direct 
involvement in appointments in East Prussia.^ Once again, changes in 
personnel rather than new administrative structures were the means by 
which Berlin sought to increase its control.
The General Directory had initially been a response to the prevailing 
confusion in central administration. As will be seen, the King subsequently 
implemented refinements to the Krie^s und Domanenkammern, which 
became the primary arm of the General Directory in East Prussia after 1723. 
Considered within the total structure of the Kingdom's overall, let alone that 
of Brandenburg-Prussia as a whole, this amounted to no more than 
administrative fine-tuning. The intention was to adjust East Prussian 
government at the upper levels which the King already controlled. His 
rehance on the Krieg^ iind Donmnenlmmmern, however, eventually 
threatened the fundamental authority of the Kingdom's ehte.
The General Directory had not been introduced to challenge East 
Prussian traditions, and at first had little effect upon the estabhshed 
authorities. Before long, however, this situation began to change, as other 
important reforms, such as alterations to established appointment 
procedures, were introduced. During the 1720s and 1730s, Frederick 
William I was able to encroach with some success upon the territorial 
Indigemtsrecht, the most cherished East Prussian privilege. The 
Indigenatsrecht was to be found in all HohenzoUern territories and embodied
^See the material in GStAPK Rep. 7 ,18a. Tliis was not the case for liis successor, 
Frederick the Great. As a result of war and perhaps his desire, his attention to sudi matters 
in East Prussia was less than liis father's. Tliis also contains Krieges und Domanenkammer 
appointments as well as Amthauptieute and other traditional positions. Tliere is only one 
signature from Frederick II on a document to Etats Minister Mtinchausen in regard to an 
appointment dated 17 August 1764.
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each province's particularism. In the Kingdom, Frederick WilMam I's efforts 
to infringe on these rights enjoyed limited but relatively swift success, as he 
established new practices on the issue of appointments.
Traditional rights and privileges gave the East Prussian elites almost 
total control over the type and, more importantly, origins of persons who 
filled vacancies both in local and royal administration. Natives of East 
Prussia had dominated the Kingdom's administration at aU levels during the 
first decade of Frederick William Ts reign. A native of the territory of 
Brandenburg or Cleves, for example, was not legally permitted to hold an 
administrative position in the Kingdom. This situation gradually changed 
and, by the end of Frederick William Ts reign a clear shift was evident. The 
reforms associated with the General Directory fostered considerable changes 
through the appointment of individuals in the Kriegs und Domanenlmmmer. 
Less change is seen within other agencies.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, native East Prussians alone were 
permitted to serve in the Konigsberg Regierung, Although this never 
formally changed under Frederick William 1, the extension of the General 
Directory into the Kingdom through the Kriegs und Donnnenlmmmer, the 
primary rival to the Regierung, gradually brought about a change, though at 
first there were few significant inroads. Ultimately, the Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer was able to accomplish many of Frederick Wilham Ts 
intentions through its implementation of the consistent flow of edicts and 
directives which came from the General Directory. Imposition of these often 
required the compliance and cooperation of the Regierung and, since this 
was lacking at times, the King's efforts could be delayed or otherwise 
hindered.
It must also be remembered that, since the Indigenatsrecht was a 
formal law, it therefore had legal force and was part of the unwritten 
constitution of the Kingdom, established by time and tradition. Just as the
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native ehtes of the other HohenzoUern territories coveted their exclusive 
dominance over territorial titles and positions, so too did the East Prussians. 
This had been the case in the Kingdom for generations prior to the reign of 
Frederick William I. Such laws had existed, particularly during the 
seventeenth century, in most, if not aU, of the HohenzoUern territories.
What was unique in East Prussia was that the Indigemtsrecht lasted for so 
long and survived long into the eighteenth century. This feature of the 
Kingdom's law primarUy sets the territory apart from the other provinces.
In a real sense, this is a manifestation of the province's enduring 
distinctiveness and semi-independent nature.
The issue of the East Prussian Indigemtsrecht is an important issue 
underlying the King's reform effort which affected almost every level of 
government, from members of the Kriegs und Domanenkammer to the General 
Domanenpachter to the traditional native institutions and elites, that is to say 
the Regierung, Amthauptleuten, and Verwesern. Administrative structures 
might not have been fundamentally altered, but important changes came 
about in the personnel who staffed them. This key theme runs through 
much of the present chapter, which demonstrates how the Indigemtsrecht 
related to the Junkers' maintenance of their status relative not only to their 
own past traditions but also to new and royal officials who emerge after 
1723 in the Kingdom's affairs. The General Directory's impact upon the 
institutional structure of government in the Kingdom may have been 
gradual and limited. But Frederick WüHam I hoped and intended, by 
overcoming the Indigemtsrecht, to change the personnel and thus indirectly 
enhance the degree of control which he could exert.
IGovernment after 1723 !
Since the role of the General Directory remained limited throughout 
Frederick William Ts reign, the appointment of administrative personnel 
and their loyalties were crucial. There is a separate clause within the 
Instruction for the General Directory which specifically pertains to the 
choice of administrators within the HohenzoUern territories. This provision 
was clear and unambiguous, and it aimed to break the dominance of natives 
over the Ring's government of their own province. When there was the 
need for a replacement of Kommissariaten and/ or Kammern officials in the 
provinces, the following procedure was to be followed:
When a vacancy arises in East Prussia, the proposed replacement made to 
Us by the General Directory, shall be subjects of Cleves, the Mark, or 
Pomerania, but not Prussia....In a word. Our most gracious intention is that 
no person shall be suggested to Us for the filling of the provincial Kammern 
and provincial Kommissariate that was born to that province where the
vacancy is again to be filled.^
What is interesting about the prescribed appointment procedure is 
that it was a direct though limited assault by the King upon the principle of 
the Indigemtsrecht It was to apply to vacancies in the Kommissariaten and 
the Krieges und DomanenJoimmern. As has been emphasised throughout this 
study, these positions were never a traditionaUy strong location of East 
Prussian natives, but were often filled by individuals who had been born 
outside the Kingdom. The original intention of the Instruction did not, nor 
was it intended, to refer to the Regierung or other traditional East Prussian 
agencies. This was intended as an unabiguous signal to the officials of the
^Translated from ABB, 3, pp 577-78. See Section 11.
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Regierung and the other members of the native ehte that he did not plan to 
overhaul these agencies or to interfere directly in appointments to them.
This provision happened to single-out the Kingdom first, but it 
applied to all the territories of the HohenzoUerns as was made clear by 
subsequent clauses in the Instruction. Furthermore, although this was an 
early signal that one of the province^ most cherished traditional rights was 
to be undermined, it remained no more than an intention. The appearance 
on paper of who should or should not be appointed to particular positions, 
no matter how clearly and directly worded, was not a guarantee that this 
policy would be foUowed in practice or appUed to the real power centres 
within East Prussia.
This instruction, of course, only appUed when vacancies arose, and 
there was no challenge to the existing personnel. Therefore, its impact was 
both delayed and, limited. In general, vacancies only arose through death or 
acute infirmity and in rare instances, dismissal. There were occasional 
promotions which were drawn primarUy from the ranks of the estabUshed 
eUte.^ Thus, there were relatively few vacancies and/or movement within 
these bodies, and this ensured that structural and personnel changes came 
about very slowly.
Though this particular part of the Instruction did have an impact on 
appointment procedures in the Kingdom, it it did so only for the agency 
directly subordinate to the General Directory, the Kriegs und 
Doimnetdaimmer. Although this was an important part of government, too 
much should not be made of the King's growing control over East Prussia. 
The traditional elites retained considerable influence and prestige, and long 
dominated the Kingdom's agencies of government. Frederick WUham I had
^See Chapter 5 for the peiiod prior to 1723, and Chapters Six and Seven for 
appointments after that date.
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to struggle against this bastion of traditional East Prussian opposition to 
Berlin's control in other ways. Principal among these was his abiUty to 
intervene directly in the appointment of lesser officials. This, as we shall 
see, was not a direct consequence of the establishment of the General 
Directory and produced limited results. His ability to appoint officials 
personally in areas other than the Kammern or provincial Kommissariate did 
not increase significantly in the years after 1724. This was the case 
particularly for appointments at the Amthauptieute level as well as for many 
of their subordinates, notably, the Verwesern, The nominal increase in actual 
appointments made by the King which will be seen was more due to 
Frederick WiUiam Ts personal and day-to-day attention to the affairs of the 
Kingdom than to the impact of any Instruction or edicts, or to other reform 
measures. The General Directory was only one influence upon East 
Prussian administration during the 1720s. It may not have been the most 
decisive: here, the King's personal intervention was more potent than the 
new institution's authority.
One case in which this can be seen is also an example which shows 
the complex relationship between the native territorial elite and their 
HohenzoUern ruler. After the death of the Generalfeld Marschal Burgginf 
und Graf zu Dohna in February 1728, his position of Amthauptmann in Amt 
Mohrungen went unfilled for almost a year.^ This was not due to a delay on 
the King's part since all the candidates presented to the ruler were put 
forward by the Regierung. The King continued to expect nominations for 
such posts to be put forward by the Bast Prussians. Rather, as the Regierung 
frankly reported on 9 October 1728, so few people apphed for the position 
that the Regierung had no acceptable candidate to nominate. To paraphrase
'^Rrollman, Altpreufiische Biographie, vol. 1, pp. 140-141. Burggrafund Graf 
Alexander zu Dolma was born in Genf on 5 February 1661 and died in Konigsberg on 25 
February 1728.
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its words, there were few appropriate candidates inside their circle of 
clients, contacts, and acquaintances.^
At first glance, this would appear to call into question the endurance 
of the Indigemtsrecht. Surely the East Prussians would have someone 
available to fill the position, especially since Amthauptieute positions were 
part of the Kingdom's traditional government, and often remained within 
one family? The Dohna family was one of the Kingdom'^most dominant 
lineages and its members were to be found throughout the ranks of 
government both in Konigsberg and Berhn. In fact, one of Frederick 
WiUiam I's closest advisors was a member of the Dohna family, Christoph 
Graf zvL Dohna. From subsequent manuscript material, however, it appears 
that the Regiei’ung continued to have considerable influence on these 
appointments, as wiU be demonstrated later in this chapter. In the end, 
Frederick WUUam I appointed the next in line for this Amthauptieute position 
from liis own short-list of potential candidates. However, the man chosen 
was a native-born Junker who was acceptable to the established eUte and, in 
particular, to the Regierung. He was also a member of the Dohna family 
which was traditionaUy more loyal to the HohenzoUerns than many other 
East Prussian elite famUies.
Even though there is no formal mention of the chosen candidate until 
very late February 1729, the General Directory notified the Regierung about 
who was to pay the salary of the new official on 6 November 1728 — all 
consistent with the manner in which appointments were normaUy 
completed. Shortly thereafter, the Regierung reacted with some surprise. 
This was not only because the Kriegs und Domanenlaimmer was given many 
detaUs and considerable authority in the appointment procedure but also 
because the Regierung did not yet loiow who the successful candidate was
^GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 47, 9 October 1728.
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and therefore sought clarification. In other words, the Regietnng was upset 
because an agency that had traditionally been less important but was now of 
enhanced status and under greater royal control, was being treated by the 
King as the more significant institution in practice. Although the Regierung 
may have given Frederick William I the right to make the appointment, they 
apparently did so in the confidence that it would be in accordance with 
custom and the Indigenatsrecht. Moreover, it was talcen to be done according 
to age old traditions in the particular Amt in which the vacancy occurred.^ 
With the other institutions now becoming increasingly involved, there was 
an opportunity to appoint an official who may not have been a native East 
Prussian.
There are three aspects of this appointment which are important here. 
It does, at first glance, appear that the Regierung may have given up their 
right to appoint to a position traditionaUy consistent with the East Prussian 
constitution and in particular, the Indigenatsrecht. However, Captain 
Alexander Amylium Burggraf und Graf zu Dohna was the official 
selected with the same pay as other Amthauptieute and in accordance with 
the Etat.^ Second, it appears more than likely that the Regierung created the 
fiction of having no candidates to put forward for the position in order to 
allow Frederick WiUiam I to appoint the next Dohna family member. Since 
the Dohnas were native East Prussians, there was no break with the 
Indigemtsrecht. The Regierung certainly had no problems putting forward 
candidates for other positions in the territory at this point in Frederick 
William Ts reign.
There was a final factor of importance and one which was more 
characteristic of Frederick WUUam Ts reign. The succession of one Dohna to
^Ibid., 48-51, Correspondence of 6 November 1728 through 28 February 1729. 
^Ibid., fol. 52. Relation of 24 January 1729.
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another Dohna family member for this Amthauptmannschaft is suggestive of 
older, that is, territorial and famiUal, administrative practices. This 
continuation of the traditional operation of government in the Kingdom, 
rather than the brave new administrative world he attempted to implement 
five years earher in the General Directory, appears to have survived well 
after 1723. Frederick WiUiam I Icnew, for example, he could more often than 
not rely upon the Dohna, a provincial native eUte. This example underUnes 
the point about personnel being the key to administrative control after 1723. 
An additional issue, that of the supremacy within the territory of either the 
Regierung or the newly established and emerging authority of the Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer remained to be resolved in early 1729,
The exact established procedure for Dohna's appointment appears to 
have been foUowed near the end of the long vacancy as the Kriegs und 
Domanenlmmmer and the Regierung both jostled for supremacy. Each side 
claimed the other was delaying the procedure. EventuaUy, details about the 
candidate's salary and oath were finahsed after he paid his customary fee to 
the Rehiitenkasse.^ Dohna does not appear to have been involved in a 
bidding war with another potential candidate and the available manuscript 
evidence reveals nothing out of the ordinary.
Another obUgation was the taking of an oath which promised of good 
service to the King. The swearing of such oaths by miUtary and civilian 
servants of the HohenzoUern monarchy in East Prussia was not always 
carried out but appear to have been more often than not. Oaths were not
^Ibid., fol. 48. Special Befelil, from Krie^ und Domanenkammer to Regierung, 6 
November 1728. Once again it is important to remember that in addition to almost 
everyone receiving approval for an appointment from the Frederick William I, the 
Rekrutenkasse was at the king's private disposal, i. e., he determined when, where, and how 
it was spent. However, it is clear that the appointment was urged in Berlin and among the 
officials of the General Directory and Kriegs und Domanenkammer in the kingdom.
^%ee the previous footnotes which relates to Dohna for the precise locations of 
these manuscript materials.
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only to the King. That administered by the Regierung in East Prussia 
reflected the fundamental convention that local territorial government was 
resolutely rooted in its regional and local traditions, which administrators 
swore to uphold. Throughout Frederick William Ts reign, the King tried to 
change which officials administered the oaths and wanted 'his' officials to 
adminster them. As far as the Amthauptieute were concerned, these always 
seem to be administered by the Regierung with other Amthauptieute perhaps 
acting as witnesses. The Verwesern often had their oaths administered by the 
Regiei'ung, but not always. In a few instances there appears to be the 
administering of an oath by the Kriegs und Domanenlcammer. Such cases 
appear rarely and there is only one case where the evidence is ambiguous 
and relates to an individual under its direct authority. The swearing of an 
oath was widespread in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Brandenburg- 
Prussia. Oaths also appear to have been specific to individual posts. That is, 
their content set out the duties and expectations of the particular position. 
There was no general oath of allegiance which was taken by all 
administrators. Within East Prussia, however, there was a general emphasis 
on honest work, a promise not to accept bribes, and the requirement to 
further the cause of the HohenzoUern ruler.
The rare case of an oath adminstered by the Kriegs und 
Domanenkammer was significant, however. It centred around the survey 
commission that emerged after the imposition of the Generalhufenschofl. A  
survey of land and its ownership had to be undertaken before this could be 
introduced. It was a progressive tax based on the extent and value of land, 
and it appUed to the nobUity as weU as to other social groups in the 
countiyside.^^ Two Verwesern were appointed in Amt Sehesten and their
^^For the wider context and background to this important tax, see Chapters 4, pp. 
143-47 and 155-61 and Chapter 6, pp. 269 and 287. As noted in these previous chapters, the 
survey took years to complete.
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appointment appears very much tied to this new tax and in particular to the 
survey, which they were asked to undertake. Although many of the oaths 
were left unchanged and continued to reflect the outlook of the East 
Prussian traditional rights, the one these men took appears to have been a 
drastic revision of a standard oath.^^ It essentially attempted to reinforce 
the fundamental premise that their loyalty and work was for the King in 
Berlin rather than for any East Prussian body or individual. Certainly the 
standard loyalty clauses to the King were the same but there were additional 
clauses that referred to their declaration to carry out support duties for the 
new tax. In addition, like almost aU oaths of all ranl<s, the officials promised 
not to take gifts which were a likely source of additional wealth for the office 
holder as well as a matter of bribery and administrative corruption. As for 
the two officials in question, however, the manuscript material suggests that
^^GStAPK, EM 130k, Nr. 31, fois. 2,2  Rückseite, and 3. " k h ... gelobe und sdiwere 
zu Gott dem allmaditgen, dafi, nadi dem Pr. konigl. Magest. in PreuEen, mein 
allergnadigsten Konig und Herr midi allergnadigst beordnet, beÿ der zu ein riditig des 
General Huben Sdioses in dero Konigreidi Preufien angeordneten Commission zu seÿn, Idi 
nadi meinem besten Wifien und Gewifien der Güther Hire ad und pertnentien wohl 
notizen, die walire bonitast des Adcers, die eigentlidie und warhafftige ni dit aber 
imaginirte und unfundirte Conservation derer Untertlianen vor Augen haben, so wiel einer 
moglidi auf die Vermehrung Pr. Konigl. Magest. Contributions Revenüen selien, alle Wir 
wifiende und beÿ Wohnende Umbstande und besdiaffenheit derer Güther anzeigen, die 
Classification, nicht weniger aber die Taxation derer Huben oluie Ansehen der Persohn 
nadi meinerem besten wifien und Gewifien machen, keinen aus Freund oder Freundscliafft, 
nodi aus abfulit Freund blut oder an verwandtschaft, viel weniger aufifurdit oder umb 
Geschencke (?) nodi gebe, etwas thun wil(?), wodurcli Pr. Konigl. Magest. holies Intéressé 
koime wer absamet (?), oder der Contribuent ruiniert werden, sondern Ich wil vielmelir in 
allem anlegenheiten midi wie einem Treuen Vasallen eignet und gebühret auffüliren, und 
auf alle wege, soweil(?) das konigl. Intéressé alfi das aufnehmen der Contributenten 
besonderen helffen(?), alle umiothige Ch. Camer(?) Retardaments um notliige weitlauffig 
seiten verweÿden, und allés Wir ersdiienliche beÿtrag, wo durch die Konigl. Commission in 
Hirer arbeit konne geholsten(?), und Pr. Konigl. Magest. Intéressé besondert werden, so 
wahr p." The oath continues with a testimonial about who was present at his swearing-in: 
"Vorstehenden Eÿd haben Wir endes unterschreibene in gegenwalirt des Konigl. 
Preufiischen Commissariats Presidenten und Würkhchen Kammerern des Herr Carl 
Heinridis des beÿl. kom. Reichs Erb Trudifies und Graffen zu Waldburg dan auch derer zur 
General Huben Commission verordneten Iliren(?) Commissarien alfi herrn Majorn und 
kreÿfi Rath von Boddenbrok, Hire Hoff und Commissariats Rath Werner, Ihrem Kammer 
Razthen Drohten und Kah6dehnen(?), Herrn Kreigs commissary Adler, Herm Oberland 
Schope Reinke, Herm Burgermeister Liedtke und Herrn Schofieinnehmer Hedn Prastegente 
des Herrn Hoff Raths Wernern Würklich in dato abgeschworen solches haben wir 
liirdurucli Attestirn wollen Sehisten. 26 Jan 1719. Hirscli. Stecli. v. Gotzheim.
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their role in the new tax was limited. In the event, they probably only 
participated in gathering of the survey information for their district. These 
appointments are the only ones of their Idnd. We know that the 
implementation of the Generalhufenschofi encountered stiff resistance and 
was never fully realised under Frederick WUham I, something which 
requires much fuUer discussion.
The Beginnings of Legal Codification
East Prussia's traditional rights and privileges were deeply rooted in 
the native legal machinery and in the administration of justice within the 
Kindom — as was the situation in all other HohenzoUern territories. 
Frederick WiUiam I's attempted reforms within this sphere were less 
effective and successful than other areas. Legal reform only began in 
earnest after 1740, and it was only formaUy completed after Frederick the 
Great's death with the so-caUed Allgemeines Landrecht, finally issued in 
1794.13 In general, fundamental legal and administrative authority 
remained with the traditional native East Prussian eUte throughout the reign 
of Frederick WiUiam I and into that of his son. Frederick WiUiam I began a 
process, which took two generations to reach fruition: the complexities of 
legal reform made it a slow-moving process everywhere in eighteenth- 
century Europe, and the HohenzoUern Monarchy was no exception. Legal 
codification implied the introduction of one uniform legal code for the 
whole monarchy which came about in 1794. This, in turn, impUed a modem 
notion of sovereignty and a modern idea of the state. In this sense, legal 
codification went far in promoting the so-called Gesarntstaat^^
Frederick WiUiam I certainly laid some of the groundwork for what 
would eventually culminate with the Allgemeines Landrecht in 1794. An
^^Hans Hattenhauer and Günther Bemert, editors, Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
Preufiischen Staaten von 1794. Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag, 1996.
^^For some useful comments on this process in an Austrian context, see Grete 
Klingenstein, "The meanings of ’Austria' and 'Austrian' in the eighteenth century," in Royal 
and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in memory of Ragnliild 
Hatton, edited by Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, pp. 423-478.
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overview of tliis work in Chapter Four noted important patterns which were 
developing in the Kingdom before 1723 which began at the very beginning 
of his own reign.
The pinnacle of Brandenburg-Prussian legal codification, however, 
was the document of codified laws known as the Allgemeines Landrecht, 
finally issued only in 1794. This was an enormously complex project and 
underlines the slowness behind the reform impetus. In general, legal reform 
was a very slow process because of the complexities involved in drawing-up 
a revised and uniform code which would cover aU the HohenzoUern 
territories, aU with their own distinct law codes and legal systems. This 
codification covered the entire HohenzoUern state, including East Prussia. 
As significant as this might sound, the fact remains that the Allgemeines 
Landrecht essentiaUy confirmed almost all of the traditional rights and 
privileges enjoyed by the various territorial elites. It "confirmed the 
corporate order" which helped to integrate the traditional elite into the 
Brandenburg-Prussian state and it enunciated tliis order for the first time.^^ 
However, its significance did not stop there. The HohenzoUerns (and even 
Frederick the Great), as rulers of the emerging Brandenburg-Prussian state, 
openly recognised the traditional elites' authority and their established 
privUeges. Conventionally, Frederick the Great would be seen as more of a 
defender of the established social order than even his father. Dietrich 
Gerhard rightly argued that not only did the territorial nobiUties become 
more integrated into the Brandenburg-Prussian state but the influence of 
these groups was legitimised as weU as welcomed, since the provincial 
Estates had to approve the increased salaries and other costs that came with
^^Gerhard, "Assemblies of Estates and die Corporate Order," p. 45. See also 
Hattenhauer, Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preufiischen Staaten von 1794. p. 541.
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legal reform.^^ Their influence on the actual drafting of the Allgemeines 
Landrecht was significant — indeed they contributed specific suggestions to 
the minister initially responsible for the reforms, Samuel von Cocceji. The 
Allgemeines Landrecht clearly confirmed the Junkers' dominance within 
society and the state.
This must be borne in mind when further consideration is given to 
Frederick William I's attempts to appoint other officials. As wül be 
demonstrated, the King was never wholly unsuccessful or without authority 
in East Prussia where such appointments were concerned: contrary to what 
the above may lead one to anticipate. He was able to make appointments, 
some of them to important provincial posts, although the total number of 
these do not appear to rise significantly enough to conclude he was more 
successful than prior to the establishment of the General Directory. In fact, 
such successes as he achieved probably had more to do with the increased 
personal attention he paid to the Kingdom and to these matters, as will be 
seen.
One notable illustration of this was provided when Herzog Friedrich 
Ludwig von Holstein-Beck died in early March 1728. The Regiefimg asked 
the King on 8 March, the day after Holstein's death, whom Frederick 
William I would Mke to appoint as a replacement for the position of 
Amthauptfnann in the East Prussian district of Amt Brandenburg.^^ 
Holstein-Beck had had a long career in the Brandenburg-Prussian army, 
which had begun as long ago as 1671, and retained influence in various 
capacities over East Prussian military affairs until his death. He had been a 
very close advisor to the Great Elector but had a reduced role and more
^^Gerhard, "Assemblies of Estates and tl\e Corporate Order," p. 45. 
l^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6, fol. 2. 8 Mardi 1728.
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distant relationship with Frederick III/1.^^ It appears that he was re-located 
to East Prussia against his will and afterward never returned to active 
military service.^^ There are, however, indications that he may not have 
been popular amongst many members of the Kingdom's ehte. In 1709, he 
was apparently critical of the authorities of the local East Prussian 
municipahties over how best to protect the province against the plague. 
Nevertheless, he served the HohenzoUerns' in various capacities for over 
fifty-seven years, and upheld the ruler's influence in Konigsberg. His 
connection to the HohenzoUerns' was more than professional, as he was 
married to the Hei zogin Louise Charlotte von Holstein-Sonderburg- 
Augustenburg, the niece of the Kiirfiirstin Dorothea von Brandenburg. Tliis 
was obviously crucial for his relationship with the HohenzoUern femiily.
Frederick WilUam I personally signed the order naming Hei'zog Peter 
August Friedrich Holstein(-Beck) Amthauptmann in Amt Brandenburg on 7 
April 1728.^^ He was the son of the former Amthauptmann, Hei'zog Friedrich 
Ludwig Holstein. This order contained nothing unusual and set out the 
standard provision that Holstein was, for example, to defend the territorial 
integrity of the Kingdom and not aUow the administration of justice to be 
damaged. As the son of Friedrich Ludwig Holstein and daughter of 
Louise Charlotte, Peter August also was personally well connected to the 
King. This connection had been strengthened by his own career. He 
married twice, both times to weU estabUshed famUies. His first marriage
®^Ki”ollmami, Altprexifiische Biographie. I, p. 286, on winch the following 
discussion is based.
l%id.
^%StAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6, fo l 6.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I - Bestellungsadien, Nr. 165, fol. 2; Krollman, 
Altpreufiische Biographie. I, p. 286. Peter August Holstein was born December 71697 in 
Konigsberg and died 25 February 1775 in Reval.
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was to Princess Sophie of Hessen-Philippstal in 1728. After her death, he 
married again in 1742 to Gràfin Natalie Colo win. It was through his son by 
this last marriage, Karl Anton August, that Holstein was related to the 
Herzoge of Holstein-Clücksburg and the King of Denmark-Norway and 
future first King of modern Creece, Otto of Wittelsbach, in 1832,^^
Frederick WUham I rewarded his loyal officers. Not only was 
Holstein personally selected by the King for this appointment, but in a 
highly unusual move which underlines his special status, he reHeved 
Holstein from the obligation to make the customary payment the 
Relcrutenkasse.^^ In addition, Holstein was to receive 500 talers yearly and 
paid in quarterly instalments of 125 ta le rs .A lth o u g h  Holstein's initial 
appointment went ahead smoothly and swiftly, it was to be January 1729 
before he was actually confirmed in the position by the Regierung?-^ The 
reason for the delay is not clear. None of the surviving manuscript material 
suggests that there was a problem beyond the usual slow pace at which 
government worked, other than the possibility that the delay was caused 
because he was not to pay the customary contribution to the Rekrutenkasse?-^ 
Peter August Holstein's appointment is also important in that it 
shows how tied certain positions located in specific geographic locations
% id .
^^GStAPK Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I - Bestellungsadien, Nr. 165, fol. 8, 6 November 1728, 
the General Directory to the Regierung. Here the king noted “nichts bezahlen, FW' next to a 
section inquiring whether Holstein should be required to pay the "Recruten Gelder/'
^%StAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6, fol. 7. Draft document dated 3 April 1728.
^^Ibid., fol 9.4 January 1729.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir, Ostpr., I, Nr. 165, fol. 8. Here the General Directory wrote to 
the king on 6 November 1728 enquiring what to do about the fact that they have not 
received Holstein's contribution. The implication was that sudi a payment was standard 
procedure for appointment, even for someone as liighly ranked as Holstein, Frederick 
William I replies in the margin that he does not need to pay. Tlie king's personal permision 
was the only authorisation acceptable for abatement of tiie Rekrutenkasse payment.
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were to particular families at this time. Many historians consider such 
appointments to be a strict continuation of the practice of sinecure which 
was common one among military officers, of whom Holstein was one.^^ His 
father has been noted by one historian to have received the first such 
position.^® The King was using administrative posts as a form of pension 
for elderly military officers. Frederick William Ts increased use of such 
posts, not so much as sinecures, but rather because he had increased 
influence over these appointments for officers, left the Regierung with very 
little effective means to fill a vacant position. The King's ability to appoint 
to these posts led him to use them as a way of extending his own influence 
through the appointment of military men, who were seen as more rehable. 
Frederick William I did not overhaul the Kingdom's administrative structure 
and organisation. In fact, he did the opposite by attempting to increase his 
personal involvement in appointments carried out in the traditional way.^^ 
There was one final, curious dimension to Holstein's appointment. The 
widow of the former Amthauptnwnn, Friedrich Ludwig Holstein, was to 
continue to receive his salary through to the end of the year from the salary 
of Holstein.®® At the bottom of the order instructing Holstein's 
appointment, there was the note stating the continuation of his salary which 
was to go to his predecessor's Widow: who was in fact his mother. Not only 
did Frederick William I provide members of his own elite with positions
^^Joacliim Krause, "Die kurftirstlidie Verwaltung im Herzogtum Preussen am 
Ende des 17. Jalirhunderts," Ph. D. Dissertation, Bonn: Rheinisdien Friedridi-Wilhelms- 
Universitat, 1973, pp. 40ff.; Otto Büsdi, Militarsystem und Sozialleben imalten Preufien, 
1713-1807. p. 131; Juhr, 'Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 
1713-1751," p. 49.
^^Krause, 'Die kurftirstliche Verwaltung im Herzogtum Preussen am Ende des 17. 
Jalirhunderts," p. 40.
^®Juhr, 'Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," p. 49.
®®GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr, I - Bestellungen, Nr. 165, fol. 4,1 April 1728.
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with work, although with substantial support staff, he continued to pay the 
heirs of certain of them after their death. The King's increased intervention 
during in the later 1720s was equally as visible in the appointment of lesser 
officials, which will now be examined.
The Selection of Territorial Officials after 1723
The practices which were established at the higher levels of East 
Prussian government appear also to have been characteristic of its lower 
levels. Royal influence, predominant within bodies under Berlin's direct 
control, increased in the choice of officials within East Prussian territorial 
government. There is no clear evidence that Frederick William Ts influence 
in the selection of lesser officials also increased, though this seems likely.
The Regierung did not carry out the appointment in full and, indeed, had 
recognised that the King had a part to play in the selection. The Regieiimg^ 
however, did carry out the administration involved in appointments 
including any determination of qualifications, notifications, and so forth.^^
The Regierung continued to appoint salaried officials during Frederick 
William Ts final decade. This was particularly true for the subordinate 
positions in local and provincial government. For example, in Amt 
Rastenburg, when the sitting Adelichegeiichtschreiber Theodore Frohlich died
V'in 1732, the Regierung immediately addressed minister Cocceji proposed that 
their suggested replacement would pay 100 Rt. into the RelcrutenlmsseP- 
Their choice was Gottfried Heiligendorfer who at that time was the 
Adelichegerichtschreiber in Barten which was a nearby Amt lying
^^See GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 13. Tliese documents contain numerous cases of 
appointments for Amt Molirungen and Liebstadt and document well how the the lower 
offials were appointed and the extent to which the Regierung and Frederidc William I were 
involved.
% StAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 59,12 November 1732, fols. 2-12. FroWich died on the 
evening of 10 November 1732, having been ill for some time. The Regierung wrote to Berlin 
again on 15 November 1732 and tliis time to the Idng on 15 November 1732. They 
requested, as before, that Gottfried Heiligendorfer replace the deceased FroWich at the 
position of Adelichegerichtschreiber.
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approximately 25 miles north of Rastenburg. Though he retained the same 
position, HeÜigendôrfeTs move was in other respects a promotion. 
Rastenburg was the more important Amt in that region of East Prussia. 
Frederick William I signed the order for Heiligendorfer's appointment 
under the usual conditions that he was only to be confirmed after he paid 
into the Relcrutenlcasse and took the customary oath.^^
This appointment demonstrates that from start to finish the Regierung 
was involved in the appointment process. The fact that it moved so swiftly 
to nominate a candidate who was already acceptable to Frederick William I, 
due to past service, allowed the Regierung to take the initiative. The King, 
therefore, had a choice when presented with their candidate. If he did not 
support their choice, he risked increased resistance from the Regiertmg. The 
King had to be selective in the administrative battles he fought. The 
Regierung's involvement throughout the appointment process also extended 
to the formal appointment procedures: it was to ensure that the candidate 
paid his Relcrutenlmsse obligation as well as satisfying any applicable tests 
and taking any necessary oaths. Ultimately, the King's approval was 
necessary and, to this extent, he retained their final choice. Frederick 
William 1, in this case, appeared to have been mostly concerned with the 
Rekrutentaisse payment. The Regierung oversaw this appointment 
throughout.
On the other hand, the fact that Frederick William I was involved at 
all in such a relatively low level appointment showed his interest in East 
Prussia and the extent of royal involvement in the detailed work of 
government. Although the King recognised the role of the Regierung, he was 
more than a distant spectator. From the perspective of Berlin, he might have 
had to allow the Regiei'ung its role in this selection. Frederick William I was
%StAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 59,5 December 1732, fol. 9.
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at least able to ensure that this appointment and in a wider sense, the 
authority of the Regierung, came at the price of enforcing payments to the 
Reb'utenkasse. In addition, the King and Regierung never made reference to 
the salary for Heiligendorfer and he presumably received none.^
Therefore, he was reliant upon fees that came with his administrative 
appointment, something that will subsequently be discussed.
By the end of Frederick William Ts reign, the East Prussian Regierung 
clearly began to acknowledge and concede to the King's increased 
involvement in the selection of personnel. It was almost as if the Regieimng 
luiew they would have their candidate for a post accepted by the King if 
they could nominate a plausible candidate quicldy and, that the candidate 
had the financial ability to pay a substantial sum to the Rekrutenkasse. Also, 
there was a relatively small number of candidates for lower posts from 
which to choose and, for such a selection to be made from distant Berlin 
would have been even more difficult. Therefore, a plausible and swift 
nomination was more likely to succeed, provided the requisite payment 
could be made.
Although Frederick William I did not noticeably increase the number 
of officials who advanced to the liigher posts in East Prussia's established 
govermnent, he did exert a moderate degree of influence on who would 
move up through the administrative ranlts.^ The King personally 
appointed lower officials who, if they subsequently moved to a new 
position, would carry with them a direct link with the ruler, who had been
3%id.
number of institutions that were introduced throughout his reign, however, 
did increase tlie number of officials operating in the territory. These included such 
institutions as tlie administration for the General Domanenpachter, certain military tax 
agencies, as well as the Kriegs iind Domanenkammer officials. These institutions left the core 
administrative control of the Idngdom under the autliority of the Regiertmg and its sub- 
authorities.
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responsible for their appointment. This is not to suggest that Frederick 
William I set out deliberately to establish a pool of lower ranking officials 
whose principal loyalty was to liim. By the late 1720s, however, this was the 
result of growing royal involvement in selection procedures. His increasing 
personal involvement was therefore important in shaping the careers of 
officials and, over time, the contours of the administration as a whole.
The role of the Venoeser was of critical importance in East Prussia. He 
was the individual who, under normal circumstances, saw through the day- 
to-day administrative duties under the responsibility of the Amthaupttmnn 
under whom he served. The Amthauptleute came from the nobility and 
possessed a different social, political and adrninistrative prestige. The 
ultimate responsibility for actual work was th e i^  alone as will be 
demonstrated shortly. In addition, not all Amthauptleute had the advantage 
of having a Veriveser, and the position of such officials will be considered 
shortly. The Venoeser were clearly important and carried out many of the 
functions under the Amthauptleute. One must remember, however, that the 
Verweser only carried out the routine day-to-day work for the Amthauptleute. 
Such work was clearly important for the operation of government but it did 
not bring with it nor could it match the social and political status of the 
Amthauptleute. In fact, with the growing number of appointments 
determined by Frederick William I, there should be a measurable increase in 
the number of Venoeser appointments in which the King was personally 
involved, as was the case with the Amthauptleute.
To some extent this was true and will be shown subsequently with 
respect to the developed appointment process. The fact remains, however, 
that far from all Amthauptleute were fortunate enough to have the services of 
an appointed Venoeser. The General Directory issued an Immediatbericht 
soon after its establishment concerning this matter. Of the twenty-seven 
Amthauptleute in East Prussia in November 1722, only eight — less than one
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third — were provided with a Verweser by Frederick William I on the 
administrative establishment, as is apparent from Appendix The 
remaining nineteen either had to pay for a Vetiveser privately or carry out 
their official duties themselves. If one examines the geographical spread of 
the eight Verwesern, one wÜl notice that they are spread more or less evenly 
throughout the Kingdom and every region of East Prussia had at least one 
Verweser in it, whether he was paid by Frederick William I or not.
These eight given a Venoeser were Major Graf von Lehndorff (Memel), 
Kommissariatsprasident von Lesgewang (Ragnit), Generalmajor Prinz von 
Holstein (Labiau and Neuhausen), Capitdn Graf von Finckenstein (Barten), 
Generallieutenant Graf von  Donhoff (Oletzko), Obrister von Marwitz (Lyck), 
Obrister Graf von  Dohna (Neidenburg and Soldau), GeneralfeldmarschaU Graf 
zu Dohna (Mohrungen and Liebstadt). All of these individuals were 
noblemen and either in military administration or holders of military rank; 
six out of the eight also held higher titles of nobility. Furthermore, they and 
their families had close personal ties to the Hohenzollern rulers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as previous chapters have 
demonstrated.
The King noted his complete support for the appointment, or 
retention in post, of retired military officers to the position of Amthaiipttnann 
when he noted in the Randverfligiing that those from a military background 
were to get a Verweser wliile non-officers "should administer themselves or 
pay an Verweser from their Amthauptmami s a l a r y N o t  all Amthauptlerite 
who were army officers, however, received Venvesern. Those Verwesern who 
were approved by the Idng were given a salary of 80 talers per year, a fact
Adapted from ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-8. Immediatbericht des General-Directoriums, 
Berlin, 28 January 1723.
^ I^bid., p. 7.
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which was confirmed in the Immediatbericht of 28 January 1723 mentioned 
above. There are no definitive accounts in the manuscript material about 
how many Amthauptleute who were not officers actually hired private 
Verwesern. A study of signatures upon correspondence from the 
manuscript material would suggest that none did, though this is far from 
definitive evidence. These Amthauptleute signed correspondence, even if a 
assistant would have likely drafted the documents. In addition — and as is 
well known — the King strongly supported the appointment of former 
officers. Nonetheless, he was also selective within this group. In other 
words, military experience was not enough in itself. One must have 
distinguished themself in a way for the King to talte notice of their 
service. Many were still actively serving in this period.
The fact of being an army officer did not in itself entitle an
Amthaupttmnn to the services of a Verweser. Sevon Amthauptleute held
military titles as high as GeneralfeldmarschaU and yet were not given an
V erw eser .As one can see h om Appendix E, holding a military rank did
not necessarily mean the King designated all military officers in the position
of Amthauptmafin to receive a i Verweser. In fact, Frederick William I did not
designate the following: Obristet‘ Graf von Lehndorff (Insterburg), Brigadier
von Canitz (Angerburg), Capitdn Graf von Finckenstein (Johannisburg),
Obristlieutemttt von Gaudecker (Ortelsburg), Generalmajor von  der Groben
(Marienwerder and Riesenburg), General von der Infanterie Grafzu Dohna (Pr.
Holland), and GeneralfeldmarschaU Prinz von Holstein (Preufiisch-Eylau and
SBartenstein). Incidentally, the size of the disticts varied. The status of an 
Amt appears to have been based less on size with rather more importance 
placed upon its potential for productivity and profit as well as its 
geographical location.
38Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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The families of Canitz, Dohna, Dohnhoff, Finckenstein, Groben, and 
Holstein, were all among some of the most influential noble families in the 
Kingdom and privided high-ranldng military officers who were also an elite 
group of Amthauptleute at the time. In fact, few other noble families held as 
much authority in East Prussia. Their influence has not been as widely 
known but they were perhaps equal in status to the families of Creutzen, 
Tettau, Waldburg, and Wallenrodt.^^
Not all of these family members were given the assistance of a 
Veiweser even though they came from one of these families and held a 
military title. The Dohna family, for example, exactly illustrates this point.
It embodied a tradition of service to the ruling family extending back over 
generations and, as with other important lineages, its members were the 
ones who were rewarded in such cases.^® The other members who were not 
appointed to be an Amthauptmann, or who were but did not receive an 
Veiweser, appear to be more independent of Frederick William I and not as 
popular as the other family members.
Nevertheless, it appears that both the Amthauptleute and the 
Verwesern were increasingly retired officers as Frederick William Ts reign 
progressed. There was a gradual but discernible trend towards the 
appointment of more retired officers. One can see more and more leading 
officers retiring with an Amthauptleute or Veiweser administrative title even 
though their appointment came at the request of the Regierung and not as a 
result of the direct influence of the King. Unfortunately, the manuscript 
material wliich is currently available does not allow further examination of 
this aspect during this reign.
^%ee also Rosenberg, Bureaucracy. Aristocracy and Autocracy, p. 53. Rosenberg 
discusses some of these families.
^^Not all individuals with tlie name Dohna were of the family wielding sudi 
influence within the kingdom or with the king.
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The King, however, was not responsible for every Amthauptmann or 
Verweser appointment in the Kingdom, whether permanent or temporary.
In Amt Rastenburg, for example, the Regierung allowed an Amthauptmann to 
delegate a "temporary deputy" during an absence. On 20 July 1725, the 
Amthaiipttnann in Rastenburg, Graf von  SchHeben, wrote to the Regietmng 
asking if he might have a temporary official take his place while he travelled 
to Holland Von Schlieben had received the essential authorisation to 
travel from the King two weeks earlier on 6 July: at this period, noblemen 
required royal permission to leave Hohenzollern territory. The Regierung 
responded to von Schlieben six days later on 26 July. Although Frederick 
William Ts permission must have implied the appointment of a deputy, 
which the Regierung were simply putting into effect, the temporary 
appointment would potentially remain in active service for several months 
of the year. In the correspondence of 20 July, the Regierung cited Frederick 
William Ts permission to travel and, most notably, the implicit royal 
intention that Schlieben himself may deputise someone to take his place. 
Although there is no confirmation in the manuscript material of which 
individual was confirmed by SchHeben, there is a mention at one point that 
Lieutenant Colonel von Hohnsdorff was selected.^^
In the end and without any dispute, Amthauptmann Schlieben was 
permitted by the Regiei'ung to have von Hohnsdorff as his deputised 
Amthaupttnann. Such acts of deputation were rare. Formal permission came 
from the Regiei'ung; although they must have told Frederick William I after 
the selection, it did not ask the King before making its decision for Schlieben, 
believing his permission had been given. The likely period of absence for
^^GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 25, fols. 1-2.
^%bid, fol. 1. Only in the correspondence's customary summary description noted 
by the Regierung is there reference to von Holmsdorff.
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Schlieben is important but difficult to determine precisely. His journey 
certainly took him to Berlin but it also appears that he planned and, 
crucially, had approval from Frederick William I to travel to Holland after 
his visit to the Brandenburg capital. Therefore, it was likely his trip 
occupied a period of months rather than days or even weeks.
By 1730, fewer appointments for the positions of Amthauptleute and 
Verweser were being made by the Regierung than in previous decades.^^ The 
cases described above were those which best demonstrate how Frederick 
William I used his personal influence on an increasing basis and the 
consequently reduced role of the authorities in Konigsberg. The Regierung 
no doubt continued to fill these positions but its involvement had decreased 
since the beginning of Frederick William Ts reign. This decline was 
particularly marked after 1730. The requests to Frederick William I to 
appoint some Amter became routine by the end of his reign.^ By 1740, the 
Regierung was unable to secure aU the appointments they desired, but they 
did not stop contesting such decisions.^
Although the Regierung always retained some influence, and rather 
less authority, its role was greatly reduced during the 1730s in large part due 
to increasing royal control over the appointment process. In the end the 
King was better able than any previous Hohenzollern ruler to fül many 
positions in East Prussian government with his own nominees.^^ Frederick 
William Ts ability to appoint officials in the Kingdom was never complete. 
The change was not that the selection of candidates shifted from being a
^%videnced through a comparison of appointments made during Frederidc 
William Ts reign. See Appendix D, p. 355 and Appendix E, p. 376.
^See, for example, GSTAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 2, 8 June 1739. In addition, see above 
and specifically those appointments relating to Amt Brandenburg.
^^In addition to those detailed here, see also, GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 5.
^^See Appendix D, p. 355 and Appendix E, p. 376.
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decision primarily made by the Regiertmg to one made by the King, but 
rather in the degree of influence each exerted on the choice of candidates. 
The growth of royal authority thus reduced but did not remove that of the 
Regierung. Often, the King simply approved the candidates the Regiei'ung 
suggested and Frederick William I even asked for a name on occasions, as 
has been demonstrated, both before and after 1723.
In addition, many of those officials in the critical support positions to 
the Amthauptleute and Verweser, if not they themselves, were the sons or 
other close relatives of the office holder. Sons following fathers, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, was a practice that continued after 1723 
and indeed throughout Frederick William Ts reign.^^ In one particularly 
detailed case from August 1727, the current Adelichegerichtschreiber in Lyck, 
Andreas Mansvetus, wrote to the Regierung requesting that his son succeed 
liim in his post at his death. At this time, he was sixty-two years old and 
had been Adelichegerichtschreiher for twenty years (since 1707). He was 
concurrently occupying the position of Amtscreiber (also in Lyck), a position 
he had held for twenty-four years (since 1703).^^ His son, Ludvich 
Mansvetus, had studied philosophy at Konigsberg University for three 
years.^^ In addition, he had also studied juridica for three years under 
Professor Jason(?) Adam Gregorvig.^® He was clearly a well-qualified 
candidate. This also shows the relatively high standard for such a relatively
'^ F^or example, see, GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 18h, 30 August 1727.
^^Ibid,, 28 September 1727, Beylage A.
^^Dorwart, however, notes that the University of Konigsberg was in a "poor" 
condition during the reign of the Great Elector. See, for example. Reinhold August 
Dorwart, The Prussian Welfare State before 1740. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 
1971, p. 205. Nonetheless, the university survived when others did not and went on to 
produce Emanual Kant, among others, in the eighteenth century.
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 18h, 28 September 1727, Beylage A. Cited as "Doctor 
Gregorovio Frequentiret".
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low administrative position which was potentially the first step towards the 
higher reaches of the East Prussian government. One should also remember 
that with such poor prospects for a well-rewarded career, attending the 
university in Konigsberg was a popular option.
Andreas Mansvetus also suggested he would pay 40 Reichtalers to 
the King's Relmitenlcasse and would like the salary of 80 Reichtalers annually 
to continue for his son. The correspondence was extensive and detailed and 
involved many individuals, some at the highest levels of the Regiei'ung and 
central Hohenzollern administration, notably the future legal reformer 
Samuel von Coc^l. In all the discussions which took place over detailed 
points of the request, the propriety or otherwise of what might seem 
nepotism to later observers was never discussed. This was simply the most 
efficient and logical method at the time.
The correspondence produced by this case also sheds light on the 
operation of lower level govermnent during the later 1720s. After the initial 
request by Mansvetus, wide-ranging discussions took place within the 
administration in both Konigsberg and Berlin. The Regierung, who received 
the initial request, passed it on to Coccfôji. Mansvetus's request suggested he 
would pay the Rekrutenkasse fee and as a result this appears to have required 
the approval of finance officials in Berlin who received a copy. Finanz Rat 
von Marschall^^ and the Collegi officials around the King determined that 
150 talers should be paid into the Relmitenlcasse for the appointment to move 
forward. This was a very high figure, far above the standard of a fraction 
(often a half) or even equivalent of their first year salary, in this particular 
case 80 talers. Mansvetus might have been expected to live for some years 
and this might have influenced the high level of payment into the 
Relmitenlcasse although no explanation is given in the manusript material.
51t u ;Ibid., note of 7 September 1727 stated, "Finantz Rath von Marchai."
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The question of the amount to be paid into the Relcrutenlcasse was not 
the end of the discussion, however. The Regierung asked Hofint Advocatum 
Fisci War then and Mandatarium Fisci Rat Bekliern to examine Mansvetus's 
son in his knowledge of administrative and legal measures. This was to 
supplement Wilhelm Gottfried von Tettau and Professor Gregorvig's 
recommendations for him. These were in support of his competence at 
University and his study of law and it appears the Regierung wanted a 
Adelichegerichtschreiher competency exam as well.^^
In the end, it appears the son was indeed qualified for the job. The 
request for the position was a curious mix of the father's desire for his son to 
succeed him and to pay the required amount to the Relcrutenlcasse as well as 
submit his son to a rigorous examination of his competence. This, as is seen 
throughout many other parts of Europe in this period, was also the case in 
the local and remote areas of the Brandenburg-Prussian Kingdom. This case 
does support the proposition that qualifications were of importance but 
nothing to suggest that examination and references, together with selection 
by merit, was new. The East Prussian Regierung was the body who 
requested the examination and oversaw it, although it was not common 
practice.^^
There is little doubt that there were clearly defined methods of 
appointment but the consequent decisions were reached in a more varied 
way. The fee was fixed for payment to the Relcrutenlcasse, and this appears to 
be strictly observed by both the highest officials in Konigsberg and those in 
Berlin. Even the East Prnssmn Regierung did not question this policy. In 
addition, the Manvsvetus case did not involve the King directly in any
26 May 1727. Tlie status determined by the examiners was "causae" and
'Beschied."
53Ibid.
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correspondence and this, as has been demonstrated, was rather unusual, 
since Frederick William I was personally involved in most appointments.
Salaries for both the Amthauptleute and Venveser/\were proposed as 
part of a larger budget by the Regierung and adjusted by the King, with 
changes often being made in his own hand. Frederick William I was 
involved personally in this area of government, which was part of his 
unending search for economies and his renowned frugality. As early as 
1714, he substantially reduced salaries on budgets with his own hand and 
made them equal for all district captains or their administrators.^^ In this 
example which occurred early in his reign, he noted that he was to be sent a 
revised copy for review. Clearly the King was attempting to implement a 
procedure which he would supervise and hopefully make his 
administration more systematic. Essentially, the King set the salaries for 
District Captains at 500 talers per year. This was the standard salary, and it 
remained the same until the last decade of liis reign. Not surprisingly, 
however, relatively few documents exist which are similar for later years: 
they were unnecessary if the salary was not being changed. Similar 
documents prescribing the salary level exist for other officials in the 
Kingdom, notably for the Kriegs und Domanenkammer in later years.^^ It 
appears clear that, once the King set the salary, it was not altered. He only 
adjusted the salaries of other positions. This would also suggest that, 
although he may not have had complete authority over the candidate for the 
Amthauptleute or Verwesmpositions, as has been seen, he apparently did 
have the final say where salary levels were concerned. One may notice that 
the discussion here has focused on who was appointed and whether or not 
they received a salary, rather than the level of that salary. There was no
^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 157.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., IT-Materien, Nr. 1849; ABB, 4:1, p. 637.
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discussion about receiving a higher salary but rather, whether one was 
received at all. For a King to be involved in, far less make personal decisions 
about, such relatively minor matters was extremely unusual in this period. 
This makes the nature of Frederick William Ts rule aU that more 
extraordinary. The personal nature of his kingship comes through very 
strongly in such examples.
Frederick William I was able to utilise the property under his direct 
control, above all the royal domain lands, in East Prussia, as well as minor 
assets. The most interesting of these included the Kanzler Wohnung, which 
was the house used by the Kammer President in East Prussia. In addition, 
the King employed the more mundane but crucial tactic of limiting office 
materials and firewood, and even the number of draft horses for a particular 
project, both to exert control over East Prussian officials and to save money: 
frugality was a royal preoccupation. Frederick William I also withheld basic 
necessities from East Prussian administrators. Writing materials, firewood, 
and horses are only three examples. Throughout his reign, the King tightly 
regulated the amount of firewood and writing materials and draft horses 
which could be supplied to officials in the Kingdom.^^
In the East Prussian district of Schaaken, the Landvogt Bredow had a 
miserable winter in 1724/ 25 due to the lack of firewood for his office heating 
during a particularly cold winter in that region.^^ East Prussian winters, in 
general, were harsh. Bredow wrote to the Regierung in November 1724 
stating that the current allowance (which in any case he apparently had not
^^See, in relation to Schreibmaterial, GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 5, EM 137b, Nr. 62, 29 
October 1726, and EM 137b, Nr. 63. For documents relating to firewood, see, GStAPK, OF 
14701,23 January 1723, GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 5, GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 157 
(covers a similar incident as described above in year 1717). For an incident early in his reign 
noting his marginalia on issuing draft horses for a minor building project in the kingdom 
see GStAPK, Gen, Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 157.
^^GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 5.
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yet received) would be insufficient to get him through the winter months. 
The Regiertmg, in turn, notified the Kriegs tmd Domanenkammer who 
responded with a brief statement that the amount of firewood was fixed.
This matter dragged into the typically cold months of January and February 
of 1725 without a satisfactory resolution for Bredow. In fact, the matter 
becomes more alarming when we learn that he had gone some months 
without any firewood whatsoever for heating. The market where he was 
instructed to buy his allotment had been sold-out since 5 or 6 December
1724. What this clearly shows is that Frederick William Ts strict regulations 
were established for even the most routine, day-to-day work of local 
government. Moreover, the King was determined to economise wherever 
possible — even if it meant pursuing frugality over firewood and writing 
materials! His success in these types of regulations is striking — particularly 
when one remembers that there was a notable native timber trade in East 
Prussia.
This case also reveals the involvement of the Regierung in such 
matters. Their initial correspondence contained copies of Bredow's request 
as well as a brief note explaining the situation in summary form. As the 
months passed, however, the Regierung became ever more involved on 
behalf of Bredow. By the end of the run of correspondence in the spring of
1725, it was writing significantly more to the Kriegs und Domdnenlcammer and 
emphasising what it believed to be essential action — namely, increasing the 
allotment and ensuring it was provided. The Kriegs und DomanenJmrnmer, for 
their part, never wavered from their typically brief statements which noted 
that Bredow's allotment would not change and there was no mistake.^^ It 
should be noted, however, that once they learned of his complete lack of 
firewood, they did requisition the supply of part at least of his allowance.
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Unfortunately, the run of relevant correspondence ends in the spring of 1725 
and we are unable to establish the final outcome although we do know 
Bredow made it through the winter.
Regulations such as the above were not exclusive to East Prussia and 
appear to be characteristic of Frederick William Ts actions throughout the 
Hohenzollern territories, as well as in the central administrative agencies. In 
a similar episode, officials in the administrative auditors' office 
(Oberrechenkammer), a Berlin central financial agency, requested additional 
firewood to be allocated so they would not have to borrow against the 
following year's allotment in order to fuel their five heating ovens in their 
offices. Frederick William I responded that rather than burn more wood, the 
officials should and must get along with what firewood they were allocated 
and "should make gentle fires."^^ Frederick William I appears to have taken 
the same interest in administrative minutiae at both the central and local 
levels.
Finally, documentary evidence survives which reveals that the 
Regierung resisted some of these impositions by the King. The manuscript 
material shows that the Regiei'ung was responsible for the Kanzler house, 
while the Kanzler was not required to pay compensation for it throughout 
the later part of Frederick III/Ts reign.^® Reference first was made to this 
responsibility on part of the Regiei'ung on 31 July 1710 while it appeared to 
be an on-going custom not to charge the Kammer President rent.
These practices appear to have been continued through the early 
years of Frederick William Ts reign. However, a serious challenge to this 
practice, inaugurating a decade-long debate, arose in April 1721. The 
current Kammer President, von Münchow, had been given the house
4:2, p. 440, Immediatbericht des General-Directoriums, 26 February 1729, 
^^GStAPK, EM 121b, Nr. 130.
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outright as a permanent gift by order of Frederick William I in October 
1718.^^ This royal generosity produced a debate which touched not only the 
root of East Prussian foundations but more significantly, fundamental 
Hohenzollern principles.
It was not until more than two years after the King gave this gift to 
von Münchow that Rauske, Tettau, Ostau, WaUenrodt, Waldburg, all as 
members of the Regierung, wrote to the King with their grievance in May 
1721.^^ They did not understand how Frederick William I could have given 
away the house as a gift when, according to his famous Patent of 13 August 
1713, the King declared aU domains and so forth to be inalienable. The 
Regiei'ung was testing one of the first and most important decisions 
Frederick William I made during his reign: the inalienability of the 
Hohenzollern possessions.
This was a debate which centred around one of the first actions 
Frederick William I had taken after ascending the throne in 1713. He 
attempted to ensure the long-term survival of Brandenburg-Prussia by his 
declaration that aU royal lands were indivisible and inalienable. This had 
the symbolic effect of preventing royal Hohenzollern property from being 
sold or given away by the HohenzoUerns to Junkers, for example, and also 
by being taken unofficially by the nobility. Land, however, continued to be 
leased. In short, this Patent was meant to keep the Brandenburg-Prussian 
physical state together and not left to the disposal of the HohenzoUerns or 
other individuals at a particular moment.
As noted earlier, this Patent provided a strong basis for the survey of 
East Prussia for the purpose of the GeneraUiufenschofi, the tax on the 
nobility which was proportional to the size and quality of land.
^^Ibid., fol. 16.26 October 1718. 
^^Ibid.,27Mayl721.
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Approximately one-third of the land, it was determined by the survey, was 
found to be inappropriately held by the East Prussian nobility, who had 
annexed portions of the royal domains over the years. This was due to a 
number of factors, but the lack of supervision or enforcement, and in 
particular, inaccurate record keeping were the primary reasons that allowed 
the East Prussian Junkers to appropriate land that did not belong to them.
This Patent was an important theoretical statement of principle for 
the state of Brcmdenburg-Prussia, but it was not always followed in practice. 
The response to the Regierung's report came in the form of a special royal 
order. The order was brief and upheld the King's gift on the grounds that 
the house was inter bona Domanialia.^^ It was not until February of 1722 that 
the Regierung responded. The Regierung argued that the King acted against 
the 1713 Patent and could not "dispose" of the house and it should be 
considered like all other domain property Frederick William I re p e a l  his 
previous order after which the Regiei'ung appears to have also acknowledged 
the decision's v a l i d i t y T h e  King recognised the case presented by the 
Regiei'ung, but was determined to continue with his original intention for the 
house in question. The Regierung presented a simple but powerful argument 
and Frederick William I appears to have infringed his own Patent of 1713.
It was quite common for nobles in the East Prussian administration to 
receive additional salaries or other forms of income. The nobility as a group 
dominated the ranks of the officer corps as well as the higher levels of local 
and regional administration. Being from the ranks of the nobility, then, was 
another characteristic that by and large made-up the corporate group of 
traditional elites. The combination of these factors entitled these men to
30 May 1721.
10 February 1722.
^^Ibid., 20 October 1723 tlirough 23 May 1724.
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opportunities which enabled them to more than a single source for income. 
These combination of factors wÜl be examined in the next section.
The East Prussian Tunker as Military Commander
The dominance of the Kingdom's nobility over its government has 
been a central theme in this study. Yet there was another dimension to the 
relationsliip between the East Prussian elite and the emerging Hohenzollern 
state: the royal army, which expanded notably during Frederick William Ts 
reign, doubling in size from around 40,000 at the King's accession to over 
80,000 by the time of his death. The enlarged force was almost entirely 
officered by the nobility, and East Prussia's Junkers found careers and 
income serving in Brandenburg-Prussia's military forces.
The Kingdom's elite came to benefit from tliis link, which furthered 
the nobility's integration into the Hohenzollern state. One important source 
of income other than any salary enjoyed was the profits associated with 
one's military position. Otto Busch and Fritz Redlich have written on 
aspects of this topic. While Redlicli concentrates on the period surrounding 
the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), Busch examines the Brandenburg-Prussian 
Junkers primarily during and after Frederick William Ts reign.^^ Busch's 
conclusions will be the focus of this section, although a few words about 
Redhch's findings are necessary f i r s t .Red l ich  has illuminated the various 
means by which officers received income from their military position in the 
early modern period, during the heyday of the military enterpriser. He has
^^Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in 
European Economic aiid Social History. 2 vols., VieHeljaltrschnft flir Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beihefte 47 and 48, Wiesbaden, 1964 and 1965. See especially vol. 2; 
Otto Btisch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alien Preussen. 1713-1807.
^^Aithough Busch is mainly focused on the territory of Brandenburg, he does point 
out important details and figures for the entire Brandenburg-Prussian state wliich are used 
here. These are used in conjuction with examples from East Prussia.
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studied the military officer as an entrepreneur and businessman in so-called 
Kompagniewirtschaft. This was an important element in the developing 
armies of the Holy Roman Empire as well as for East Prussia which lay 
outside direct Imperial authority. Although Redlich's main subject, private 
military contracting, was at an end by 1648, remnants of this system 
persisted within Brandenburg-Prussia's army until the later eighteenth 
centuiy. This was especially so in the way officers remained financially 
responsible for their regiments, from which they derived considerable profit. 
Junkers benefited from this Kompagniewirtschaft by which they acted both as 
colonels and proprietors of their regiments.
Redhch has explained the origins of some important developments 
which become important factors during Frederick William Ts reign. The 
most important form of revenue was company ownership 
{Kompagniewirtschaft), Here, company refers to its military definition of a 
corps of troops. One simple example of how this worked was when the 
lower ranks of the company had to pay the captain a portion of their 
earnings, which would increase significantly upon promotion; it might, for 
example, amount to several month's salary.^^ There were also more 
traditional payments made by the lower ranks to officers above the rank of 
Captain which supplemented their other income and wages, such as the 
mandatory "New Year" fees. Here a payment was due at the start of each 
year.^^ It was to be used for wages and the company commander was 
supposed to distribute it.
From sources such as these, the officer also had to pay out for certain 
necessities, for example, uniforms, food, and so forth, for troops under his
^%edlich. The German Military Enterpriser, vol. 1, pp. 27-66. See, in particular 
pages 29 and 55.
^ I^bid., vol. 2., p. 29.
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command. These basic necessities for his soldiers were often met and what 
was left over was considered profit and an addition to any basic salary the 
officer may have received. Therefore, the colonel became proprietor of the 
regiment.
Common soldiers became a commodity. Not only were men coerced 
into military service against their will but it was also common for "captains, 
or higher officers m their capacity as company commanders, [to discharge] 
men for money, [to sell] them to other companies or regiments for money, 
[to exchange] them with other troops, or [to give] them away as a matter of 
c o u r t e s y F r e d e r i c k  III/1 forbade this practice, but his efforts were 
unsuccessful and it appears to have continued throughout Frederick 
William Ts reign and into Frederick the Great's, as there were edicts issued 
against this practice in 1743 and 1748.^^ It should be noted, however, that 
the development of cantonal recruitment significantly reduced its incidence 
under Frederick William I, especially after the crucial cantonal reforms of 
1733.
The regiments, in many cases, were considered private property and 
could be transferred by purchase. The extent to which this occurred in East 
Prussia is unclear. Clearly such sales did take place. Gm/Alexander von 
Dolma (1661-1728) bought the Brandenburg regiment for 2,000 talers at a 
time when he was its regimental commander.^^ The price of this regiment 
underlines just how much was expected of officials who paid in to the 
Relcrutenkasse as discussed earlier in this chapter. It was sold to him by 
Prince Ferdinand of Kurland (1655-1737) who originally had it bequested to
^^Ibid., p. 48.
^ I^bid.; Curt Jaiiy, Gesdiichte der Preufiisdien Armee. vol. 2, pp. 77,240. Jany 
quotes several of the orders.
^^Redlidi, The German Military Enterpriser, vol. 2, p. 50.
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him by his brother Prince Alexander who was killed in battle/^ In another 
case, Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow (1678-1731), who was the son of 
Joachim Ernst, bought a regiment from Colonel Friedrich von Sydow for six 
thousand talers in 1704.^^ A few years later, in 1709, Grumbkow would 
become a favourite of Frederick William I at the start of the plague crisis in 
East Prussia. These cases, however, were before the reign of Frederick 
William I and during that of his father. Curt Jany has pointed out that 
Frederick 111/1 did abolish the practice of selling regiments in the 
Kingdom.^^ The extent to which the private sale of regiments continued 
during the reign of Frederick William I is uncertain and cannot be 
definitively estabHshed, although it clearly occurred.
There is nothing to suggest East Prussia did not correspond to these 
eighteenth-century practices. In fact, the manuscript material from the 
period shows that Frederick William I sanctioned the activities of the East 
Prussian military entrepreneur. On 2 March 1728, the King signed an order 
stating that the Prinz von Holstein, a major, shall have the revenues from his 
regiment as he requested, beginning at the start of April 1728.^^ The sale of 
a regiment was quite a different thing from being its proprietor. It was the 
extension of the role of the East Prussian regimental commander as a 
company proprietor to which the focus will now turn.
Frederick William I allowed military entrepreneurship to flourish 
among his administrative officials and private Junker landlords and is even 
linked to a few positions within the Amthauptleute. The Amthauptmann in
7%id.
74ibid.
^^Jany, Geschidite der Preussischen Armee. p. 50.
^^GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpreufien, I-Beste!limgssachen, Nr. 165, Potsdam, 2 March
1728, fol. 1.
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Amt Brandenburg, for example, has traditionally been considered a position 
of sinecure since the Regierung asked Frederick William I for the name of a 
replacement in several cases. If one considers the Holstein case referred to 
on the previous page, the Regierung wrote to Frederick William I and 
reported the death of General Field Marschall Herzog von Holstein six days 
earlier. The secondary point of the Regierungs report was a request for a 
name from the King for the appointment to replace Holstein as 
Amthauptmann in Amt Brandenburg.^^ It is important to mention here that 
when Frederick William I ordered the approval for Prinz von Holstein to 
receive revenues from his regiment, the King also named him to replace the 
Herzog von Holstein. Curiously, this was ordered six days before the 
Regierung drafted its initial report for the King.
Although there are clear links between the company commander
Vdescribed by Redlich the system as it operated in East Prussia, there is one 
crucial difference: the changed role of the state by the start of Frederick 
William Ts reign in 1713. More precise links have been more fully examined 
by Otto Btisch.^® The financial incentives for the Junker company 
commander came as the proprietor (Inhaber) for company business, which is 
the source of the term Kompagniewirtschaft. To be granted the rank of 
Captain as a company commander was particularly important to East 
Prussian Junkers. Since the Kingdom's native Junkers were not, on average, 
as wealthy as their Junker counterparts from other territories, and without 
the additional incomes as company proprietors, the East Prussians would
^^See above for the circumstances of this appointment
^%iisch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-180Z pp. 113-134. 
The following discussion is based on Busch's account.
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typically have a meagre existence/^ During the eighteenth century colonel- 
proprietors benefited to the extent that, after the Seven Years' War — a 
period of considerable potential for profit among regimental commanders — 
contemporary observers cited the discrepancy between the life of luxury and 
pleasure of the upper ranks and the indigent hving conditions among the 
lesser officials: many of whom — of course — were not paid during the 
Seven Years' War.^®
Nevertheless, among the regimental coimnanders, a lucrative, let 
alone secure income was not assured by being a company proprietor. 
Provisioning a company was a matter of considerable expense and 
regiments were regularly passed on to the next commander encumbered by 
debt. Typically, upon receiving the company, the coimnander would 
receive a single, once-off payment from the Kriegslcasse in order to bring it 
up to strength. This was intended to pay for additional men and equipment. 
In addition, there was an annual budget that was fixed by Frederick William 
I personally with the assistance of his close friend and military advisor, 
Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau. The budgets were calculated down to the most 
trivial item and for years in advance. This is just one more example of the 
way in which Frederick William I tried to be personally involved in the most 
minute of administrative and financial details. He was able to provide a 
reward and incentive to the poorer East Prussian Junkers, who typically 
made their money outside the auspices of the agencies which oversaw 
regional and local regimental commanders, notably, the Kriegs- tmd 
Domanenkammer. Furthermore, the King sought to budget the expenses of
^^One may consider, however, the nobility of Pomerania and even Brandenburg
poorer.
^^leodor Goltz, Die landliche Arbeiterfrage und ihre Losung. Danzig: A. W. 
Kasemann, 1872, p. 180. Report of Marzuis de Toulongeon. Cited in Busch, Militarsystem 
und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807., p. 113.
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the regiments for basic needs years in advance. He could plan his 
expenditures according to a budget and have a good chance that he would 
not go over-budget during periods of peace. It was up to the company 
commander to make sure his company was well-enough equipped and 
trained for the yearly mustering and so-called "revue." Therefore, 
everything which Frederick William I did not provide was left to the 
company commander. The Kriegslmsse provided a sum of money according 
to the King's budget and from this the commander attempted to meet his 
supply for uniforms, training and equipment, food, and recruitment. All of 
the soldiers were to be provided with a basic level of suppHes.
This was an arrangement that apparently worked well and changed 
little before 1733. Frederick Wilham I consoHdated the cantonal system of 
recruitment in that year. The canton system was based on the number of 
fireplace hearths and varied greatly by province. East Prussia had a total 
64,720 fireplaces.®^ This was divided into 5 regular (i. e., standing) infantry 
regiments of between 7600 and 7900 men each. Cavalry units contained 
between 3800 and 3870 horses and men. In addition, there were two 
regiments of dragoons totalling 3530 men each.®  ^ The number of men in the 
various East Prussian military branches was larger than those of other 
territories. For example, in Brandenburg, the average infantry regiment 
contained about 5000 men while in both Pomerania and Magdeburg- 
Halberstadt, 5900 men was an average sized infantry regiment. Only a few 
individual regiments contained more men.®® As this system was based on
®^Curt Jany, "Die Kantonverfassung des altpreuSische Heeres," in Moderne 
Preufiisdie Gescliichte 1648-1945. vol. 2, p. 784 (first published under tlie title ^T)ie 
Kantonverfassung Friedrich Wilhelms I," in Forschungen ztir Brandenburgischen mid 
Prmfiischen Geschichte, vol. 38,1926, pp. 225-272).
®%id.
®®Ibid.
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population, and since population density varied enormously within the 
Kingdom, the size of the districts varied. Clearly the eastern district was the 
largest while western and northern areas much smaller.
Before the start of the canton system in 1733, however, the 
arrangement between reghnental commander and the King's officials could 
be considered positive for both sides. The King relinquished some authority 
at the local level and over certain commercial interests. He strengthened the 
loyalty among the Junlœrs who found a potentially lucrative way to escape 
their typically meagre standard of Hving. Finally, his increased control over 
the mihtary was assured. His troops were required to have training and to 
show their abilities at least once per year.
It was the soldier's furlough which was reformed significantly in 1733 
but, before tliis, a commander would routinely furlough a group of soldiers. 
This meant in practice that the troops would be sent back to being peasant 
labourers, sometimes even to the estate of their regimental commander or 
once back on the estate, the Junker landlord. Since the regimental 
commander did not have to pay liis soldiers while on furlough, the Junior 
was able to pocket the savings. Tliis practice was reformed under Frederick 
William 1 in 1733 both to even out some of the incomes of regimental 
commanders and also to provide a better trained force. In short, Frederick 
William 1 merely attempted to reduce the blatant profit-taldng at the 
expense of maintaining a trained standing army.
Precise figures are only available for a much later period. Busch has 
claimed that at around the end of the eighteenth century and after aU 
expenditures were made for the maintenance, training, and so forth, of a 
single Freiwachter, the company commander made a two talers profit per 
soldier. Generally, much of this profit went to the maintenance of foreign 
mercenary soldiers in the hnmediate period of their use, namely just prior to 
and at the annual muster revue. However, there were more savings for the
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commander from the furlough arrangement. If he had, for example, fifteen 
Freiwachter, he would make 2 talers each or thirty talers. In addition, he 
would save the costs of maintenance, food, and care as well as other 
equipment and armament supply which Busch notes as an additional 
income of 177 talers per month.®^ In addition to this, there was the profits 
from the small equipment stipend or so-called, “Ideinen Mundieningsgeldern." 
This totalled 2 talers 22 groschen per man per year and was intended to 
cover such items as repair to boots, especially the front piece, soles, and 
buckles, shirts and undershirts, pigtail hair ribbons, and neckerchiefs. This 
was an allotment from the King. It appears that only about half of this 
actually was spent and in essence, this was an additional 150 talers per year 
for a typical squadron of 144 men. At the end of the eighteenth century, it 
has been estimated, a company commander apparently could earn 
approximately 2270 talers per year.®® Busch notes that these are similar 
figures as those found during the reign of Frederick William 1 for the early 
decades of the eighteenth century. One must grant, though, that the 
Brandenburg-Prussian army changed significantly after Frederick William 
Ts reign and prices rose more sharply after 1750.
That was not aU the potential income, however. This total does not 
include the salary of the officer as well as the Douceursdtze^ which one could 
consider a reimbursement fund. Salaries were approximately 275 taler per 
year with an additional 180 talers to be used for ten rations of provisions for 
their horses. A squadron commander, the next higher ranlt above company
®^Büscli, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807.. 119. Büsdi 
dtes in addition an anniiA figure of 2132 talers. Unfortunately Busch and the source he 
cites are unclear on this point. Not only is tliis figure an incorrect calculation, but such a 
yearly income was impossible to acliieve since the soldiers were unable to be on furlough 
for a 12 month consecutive period.
®®Ibid. See previous note about annual salary in BüsclVs figures as they may 
represent an inaccurate sum.
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commander earned 836 talers per year with 396 talers which allowed for a 
better fed horse which was allowed sixteen rations. In addition, they were 
the lowest rank permitted to make certain purchases that could be 
reimbursed from the Douceur up to a total of 1540 talers per year. The 
commander in the royal dragoons, which commanded 10 squadrons and 
was of a rank just above that of squadron commander, would have earned 
the same salary but could expense an additional 1433 talers per year. 
Essentially, as the rank and responsibiHties rose so did the fmancial benefits 
and potential earnings. Once again, estimates do not appear too different 
for the reign of Frederick Wilham 1, although it should be mentioned that 
the Douceur amounts do appear to rise faster during the reign of Frederick 
the Creat. Finally, as Büsch emphasises, all salaries in this period had the 
added benefit for commanders to be paid one quarter of their salary in gold, 
Icnown as Talern Courant. Tliis was essentially an added 13.33 per cent to 
salaries as gold currency was more valuable, even in the same 
denominations, than the more common silver composite currency. As a 
result, some Junker commanders were able to approach an annual income of 
8000 talers per year although this figure was hkely not to be free from debits.
The bulk of income for the commander, as proprietor, came from 
other less formal, even legally questionable business of the company. In 
addition, some of these transactions were only tangentiaUy related to 
company affairs and welfare. As one contemporary critically noted about 
the higher officers in East Prussia: "The spirit of the company commanders 
completely tainted everything that was good. In truth, the lords saw in their 
relationship to the company nothing more than as a relationship of a owner 
to his plantation. They saw the so-called recruited soldiers as their slaves. 
What they could steal from them, accrued to their advantage, and therefore, 
they even pinched as much as they could from all that which the state gave
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for these recruited soldiers' maintenance/'®^ What becomes clear is that the 
view of a despised landlord by his peasant labourers was now finding its 
way mto the ranks of the mihtary. The Junker lord was also now the hated 
company officer.
If this was not sufficient, the company commanders often cut comers 
on their provisions and outfitting of the company. One example of this is 
winter clothing. Even though the Brandenburg-Prussian commander did 
not have to provide his company with winter overcoats, the coats and 
clothing he did provide were often shortened with the savings in material 
and tailoring going to — who else — the company commander.
Systematic fraud must also be added to the practices of the 
regimental commanders. This was particularly the case when figuring the 
additional sums of money a commander received to compensate for the 
higher expense of procurement and pay when he recruited and maintained a 
'foreigner', (i. e., a soldier from outwith the Hohenzollern territories). To get 
this additional money, a commander would simply account his recruit a 
foreigner if he was bom outside the recruiting district. This appears to have 
been more prevalent after 1733 when the Canton system of recruitment was 
introduced by Frederick Wilham 1. With these reforms, the King divided 
Brandenburg-Prussia into districts with a sub-division of those districts 
down to the local estate level. Furthermore, commanders in special 
regiments, for example, the cavalry, would convert cavalry into more than 
the permitted number of Freiwachter. This allowed the commander to 
furlough these recruits and then keep their pay when they had no job to 
return to in civilian life which was presumably the reason the King limited 
the number that could be furloughed. Many such troops resorted to 
begging. As mentioned above with respect to this tactic, some commanders
86Ibid., p. 123.
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even considered begging a profession in order to justify officially their 
furlough procedures. And although Büsch cites this as a situation which 
existed after 1740, he does note that it certainly was seen during Frederick 
William Ts reign.
As has been made clear, the recruiting of soldiers, although it often 
required a large outlay of money, was a potential source of profits for the 
regimental commanders. For all but a twenty-three year period in the 
eighteenth century, the recruitment of soldiers was left to the regimental 
commanders themselves.®^ Therefore, Recruiting was paid for through the 
use of fixed budgetary allotments from the Kriegslmsse or, if necessary, from 
savings the company commander accrued from his furloughing of the 
Freiwachter. The amount given by the Hohenzollerns to the regimental 
commanders for purposes of recruiting fluctuated, never more so than 
during periods of war when recruits were hard to come by and therefore 
fetched a higher price. Moreover, company commanders engaged in the 
forcible abduction of fit men in order to avoid having to give the soldier the 
standard enlistment bonus. This was particularly the case if a young man 
had a height over six feet four inches. Such giants were automatically a 
candidate for Frederick Wilham Ts regiment of tall grenadiers. Complaints 
were common not only throughout Brandenburg-Prussia but also, all across 
Europe. This practice was so common that Voltaire mocked it in his fictional 
tale. Candide. One may recall the passage where Candide was travelHng 
and became extremely hungry and tired whereupon he stopped at an inn in 
the town of Waldberghofftrarbk-dikdorff. While there, one of two men in
®^During the years 1763-86, Frederidc tlie Great took direct control over the 
recruiting of foreign mercenaries and this resulted in a significant decline in the number of 
mercenaries serving in the Brandenburg-Prussian army. Some historians believe this may 
have been due to the king's desire to reduce the extraordinary profits regimental 
commanders were taking under the old system. See Dennis Showalter, The Wars of 
Frederick the Great. London: Longman, 1996, p. 334.
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matchmg blue uniforms — the Brandenburg-Prussian uniform was of course 
blue — clearly to be understood as recruiting officers from the army of 
Frederick William T, exclaimed "here is a well-built young fellow, and of 
proper height." After inviting Candide to dinner at the inn. Candide asks 
whether or not he has to pay his share for the drink and meal, again one of 
the men dressed in blue responds that "people of your appearance and of 
your merit never pay anything: are you not five feet five inches high?"
After Candide answers affirmatively and soon after, the three drink to the 
King of Bulgarians, a veiled reference to Frederick Wilham T. Suddenly, 
they took Candide away to his new regiment.®®
Many of these practices were frowned upon by Frederick Wilham 1 
and Ihs highest military officials. However, rarely was strong action taken 
even in high profile cases of fraud or other illegal activity in company 
business. In fact, as Büsch notes, several cases were condemned by 
Frederick Wilham 1 but nonetheless, the officials charged went on to 
complete long and successful careers in the mihtary. Frederidc Wihiam 1 
appears to have been most comfortable as long as he loiew his 
Oberrechenlmmmer successfully completed its regular account audits of the 
books maintained by the company commanders. Embezzlement was taken 
seriously by Frederick Wihiam 1 when such fraud directly affected the 
mihtary income and/ or the standards prevaihng in the regiments. His 
budgeting was so precisely calculated that any unauthorised or unaccounted 
loss could produce significant negative consequences. Therefore, many of 
the practices described above did not have direct or adverse consequences 
for the King or his budgets. Büsch notes iUegal activity occurred within the 
day-to-day operation of company business and was directed by the Junker. 
In addition, even though the King had a notorious 'Old Testamenf sense of
Voltaire, Candide, New York: Dover Publications, 1991, pp. 3-4.
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justice, he allowed many of these activities to develop. As mentioned, his 
failure to severely punish the responsible Junlcer commanders in high 
profile cases shows that Frederick Wilham 1 not only tacitly consented to 
their actions but also had the potential abihty to control illegal company 
business.
CONCLUSION
The early years of Frederick William Ts reign has traditionally been 
seen as a period when Hohenzollern government first acquired a clear 
hierarchical division of duties. Although this may have happened to some 
degree at the central and highest level, prhnarily through the mechanism of 
various administrative departments after the establishment of the General 
Dhectory in 1723, duplication and ill-defined distinctions of responsibilities 
existed between individuals and separate institutions in East Prussian 
government throughout Frederick Wilham Ts reign. This was not shnply a 
legacy from Frederick III/1. Frederick Wilham Ts imiovations at times 
actuaUy increased governmental duplication and confusion. A prime 
example of this duphcation is seen through the established territorial 
Konigsberg Regierung which was competing and conflicting with the 
Kommissariat and its subordinate agencies in the Kingdom.
Although Frederick Wihiam 1 attempted such broad based reforms, 
they were far from ah successful, nor were they adhered to by both the East 
Prussian Regierung and Kommissariat. In fact, one may confidently say that 
few of the King's initiatives which affected in a fundamental way the 
territory's traditional pohtical structure were either introduced, accepted, or 
executed smoothly. Whether Frederick Wilham 1 attempted to intervene 
over a particular case or problem, or reform the general administrative 
procedure in East Prussia, he often encountered significant resistance in 
words and action by the Konigsberg Regierung^ which in turn drew verbal
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retaliation from the ruler in BerHn. It is perhaps no coincidence that by 1720 
the East Prussian Regierung complained to the King about the badly 
dilapidated condition of their headquarters, the Obermtsstuhe. They had 
been forced to carry out business in a building exposed to wind and rain as 
a result of rotten beams.^ Such neglect did not occur overnight; the failure 
to put it right expressed the King's hostiUty towards the Regierung and those 
who staffed it.
Even after the introduction of many of Frederick Wüham I's 
administrative reforms and, in particular, the General Directory in 1723, the 
operation of government in East Prussia remained confused, as old and new 
authorities jostled for supremacy. The traditional institutional structures 
maintained a role in essential administration and even in areas where 
Frederick Wilham 1 had recognised the competence of other authorities. As 
a result, there were numerous and lengthy jurisdictional disputes, as weh as 
sustained resistance mounted by the East Prussian Regierung.
From a legal standpoint, the King's reforms became a major issue for 
the East Prussian Regierung. The constitutionahty, so to speak, of the Kriegs- 
und Donianenkammer, a royal agency that often held paraHel authority to the 
Regierung, quickly became a major focus of debate and dispute. In some 
significant cases, Frederick Wilham 1 was able to circumvent the Regierung's 
traditional authority. Yet, to a large degree, his reform efforts resulted in 
government that was both inefficient and ineffective, and only generated 
administrative conflict and confusion.
The continual bickering and complaining between the bodies 
involved continued throughout this period. In fact, as was demonstrated in 
chapters five, six and seven, it never really ceased, even after 1723. The
^GStAPK, EM 121a, Nr. 78, Konigsberg, 26 September 1720, Johami Paul Zilcher to 
the Regienmg. The cost to repair the damage was estimated at 50 Rtlr, a relatively trifling
sum.
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records of the Regierung show that Frederick William I did not attempt to 
carry out fundamental reforms but instead intervened only in selected cases. 
His efforts therefore established no wider precedent, only a particular result. 
Instead, the King employed a broad-brush approach and ordered wide- 
ranging procedural and administrative reforms combined with attempts to 
alter particular personnel. He must have known the broader procedural and 
administrative reforms had little hope of being fully implemented or 
reahsed. This had the effect of persuading Otto Hintze that the reforms of 
Frederick William I were a Hohenzollern revolution from above.^ Hintze 
estabhshed this notion, which influenced other, later historians.
Finally, the list of officials appointed by Frederick Wihiam I 
throughout his reign to investigate or lead reform commissions in East 
Prussia shows a significant number of names that went on to high ranking 
careers for the state. For example, Waldburg, Ilgen, and Cocceji were all 
involved with significant reform efforts in the territory. This came about 
despite any one official's initial success with respect to reform in East 
Prussia. Frederick Wihiam I understood what he faced and what his 
limitations were m the territory. Waldburg had the most success with the 
introduction of the Generalhufenschofi. After this, however, his reforming 
initiatives encountered a series of setbacks. Cocceji remains the most 
significant judicial reformer of eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia. 
Under Frederick Wilham I, however, his efforts never advanced beyond 
paper proposals. Very few judicial reforms were successfully implemented. 
Even the formidable Ilgen was unable to queh the confusion and conflict at 
both the central and provincial levels during his period in charge of the 
affairs of East Prussia. Local Junker authority remained extremely resistant
See, for example, Hintze, 'The Commissary and His Significance in General 
Administrative History: A Comparative Study", in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, p. 
273. In addition, see Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und Ihr Werk, p. 204.
Conclusion________________________________  346
to reform, as was demonstrated in chapter five. As was seen in chapters six 
and seven, the King gradually influenced personnel appointments in the 
Kingdom although never completely. People, not mstitutions, were the key 
to government at this time, as this study has underlined.
Much of the reason for Frederick William Ts lack of success with 
regard to appointments was the continuation of traditional rights and 
privileges of the native East Prussian elite, so-called standisch endurance.
The stdndische values and authority over the administration in the Kingdom 
remained in the hands of the estabhshed elites weh into the final decade of 
Frederick Wilham Ts reign. The Junkers' status continued to come through 
their dominance over government, which in turn enabled them to cohect 
taxation although this had been reduced on the royal domains, and those 
which related to the mihtary were increasingly collected by the officials of 
the Kriegs und Donmnenlmmmer, namely the comrnissarius loci or Steueirdte. As 
significant as this may have been, the shnple facts remain that the East 
Prussian nobility continued to possess primary authority over justice, local 
administration, important military matters, as well as religious questions.® 
They did not lose their authority as a group until the 1750s when significant 
judicial and district administrative reforms were introduced. These were 
arguably the most significant reforms to take place at one time. Even with 
more rapid reforms by the mid-1750s, Frederick the Great did not appear to 
eliminate the district's influence over some of their affairs.'^
The personal intervention and gradual control acquired by Frederick 
Wihiam 1 over provincial appointments, however, was a major dimension of 
the reform effort. Common procedures did exist although often based on 
unwritten rules, or, perhaps more hkely, the age old traditions and
®Neugebauer, Politisdier Wandel im Qsten. p. 77. 
' I^bid., pp. 76-85.
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privileges of the East Prussian Junipers. Progress in breaking down these 
privileges and increasing Berliu's control during Frederick William Ts reign 
came about not because of any formal institutional reform but rather, 
because of the King's increased personal intervention, particularly in 
appointments. The ruler was never able totally to dominate the 
appointment process for the most established positions in the Kingdom 
which ran much of the day-to-day administration. In this sense there were 
always limits to the authority of Frederick William 1.®
Despite the King's claim that he travelled to all the Hohenzollern 
territories each year, he actually travelled to East Prussia only five times 
between 1713 and 1731.^ In fact, Frederick William 1 did not travel to the 
Kingdom between 1716 and 1726 — a period which included the 
introduction of significant reforms, for example, the Règlement of 1716 and 
the General Directory.^ His travel within East Prussia did not focus on the 
centre of territorial affairs in Konigsberg but rather the more remote areas of 
the Kingdom including Memel, Ragnit, Rastenburg, and Mohrungen, among 
several other locations which were in a continual state of ruin. The ruler's 
lack of personal presence in the territory — the source of the royal title for 
the Hohenzollerns — further highhghts the problems in an age when 
political authority was strongly personal in nature.
There was also a noticeable change in the way in which recruitment 
was undertaken.® Reform took several years and involved several initiatives
®See Julir, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," p. 36.
^GStAPK, Rep. 5, Tit. 13, Huldigen, Reisen, hohen Herrschalten, Nr. 1 (1716), Nr. 2 
(1726), Nr. 3 (1728), Nr. 4 (1731). Almost all of the surviving manuscript material relates to 
the planning and necessary supplies for the King's travels to East Prussia. For Frederick 
William Ts claim, see Dietrich, ed.. Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern. p. 232.
^In regard to the Règlement of 1716, see pp. 168-80 and pp. 247-288 for more on this 
point with regard to the General Directoiy.
®Büsch, Militarsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen. 1713-1807. p. 14.
Hinrichs, "Der Regierungsantritt Friedridi Wilhelm I," pp. 219-223. Hinrichs dtes Frederick
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over recruitment before the innovative Canton Regulations of 1733 were 
finally introduced by Frederick William I. The Canton System brought and 
secured the army and its accompanying military authority to the estate level. 
The Junker found himself acting as lord and mihtary officer simultaneously. 
The Junker-peasant relationship, however, was more complex than this.^ 
Throughout Frederick Wilham Ts reign the growing interdependence 
between the Junlcers and peasants allowed the Junlœr to feel Ihœ a natural 
leader who could transfer and expand the estate social structure where the 
Junker was the ruler to the more powerful, emerging public, and external 
army. Thus, the relationship between officer and soldier was similar to that 
of lord and peasant. The peasant soldier's role remained the same, that is, 
simply to obey.
The East Prussian traditional authorities continued to believe it was 
their right to retain the privileges they held after the emergence of the 
General Directoiy. These behefs were defended by those at almost all levels 
of the Kingdom's administration. To these East Prussian officials, this was 
what has become laiown as the Indigenatsrecht, or right of the native born.
To use a term found in defence of traditional elite rights in other 
Hohenzollern territories which (unlike East Prussia) were within the Holy 
Roman Empire, these officials believed they held the right to their position 
because it was their "well earned righT' {wohlerworbenes Recht).^^ To the East
William Ts edicts of 9 May 1714 aiid 17 October 1713, both cited in Otto Mylius, Corpus 
Constitutionum Marcliicarum. vol. 3, Berlin: Zufinden in Budüaden des Waysenliauses, 
1755, Christian OttoMylius, Corpus Constitutionum Marcliicarum. vol. 3, Berlin: Zufinden 
im Buchladen des Waysenhauses, 1755, nrs. 360 and 349 respectively.
% id., pp. 104-108.
^^Carol Rose, Empire and Territories at the End of the Old Reich in Tlie Old Reich: 
Essays on German Political Institutions. 1495-1806. edited by James A. Vann and Steven W. 
Rowan, Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of 
Representative and Parliamentaiy Institutions, vol. XLVIII, Bruxelles, Les Editions De La 
Librairie Encyclopédique, 1974, p. 73. Tlie term, wohlenoorhenes Recht, was not a term used 
by the East Prussians although there is reference in the manuscript material to the right of 
the native born.
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Prussians, their nativeness was their well earned right. Although the 
Kingdom of East Prussia was located outside the Holy Roman Empire, the 
native officials stiU were able to justify their high position in administration 
and society at large just hke the traditional elites of other territories inside 
the Holy Roman Empire. They did this by citing their own traditional rights 
and authority even though as East Prussians they were obviously unable to 
appeal to the Imperial courts.
The East Prussian claim to the Indigemtsrecht remained strong and 
was used to a successful degree in justifying the elite's arguments against 
Frederick Wilham I's intervention and reforms in the Kingdom. Throughout 
all of Frederick Wilham I's reign, the traditional East Prussian elite were not 
at the mercy of the King's absolutism. As a corporate organisation, these 
elites were not "vanquished The ancient notion about territorial elites 
that Dietrich Gerhard presents, namely that "[t]he prince was regarded more 
as the guarantor and administrator rather than as giver of law" is one that 
was still true during the reign of Frederick Wilham I.^  ^ The King made 
significant inroads into East Prussian traditional authority but he was stih 
obhged to respect and uphold the native rights of the East Prussians.
One of the major hindrances weigliing in favour of the East Prussian 
traditional elite and against Frederick Wilham I s reform effort in the 
Kingdom was the fact that the King had so many separate territories with 
which he had to deal. Even though East Prussia was not able to use many of 
the defences available to other HohenzoUern territories, especially those 
above the level of the prince at, for example, the Imperial courts level, the 
East Prussians were weh able to protect their interests to a large degree 
through use of their own institutions. They held the territory which was the
^^Dietrich Gerhard, "Assemblies of Estates and the Corporate Order," p. 39.
^ I^bid., p. 40.
Conclusion____________________________________________________ 350
principal source of the royal title, and thus of status and power for the 
Hohenzollerns, and they made life very difficult for the King if their 
interests were subjected to too great encroachment. In addition, their native 
rights were strongly entrenched. This last point was similar to many other 
HohenzoUern territories which made it very difficult for Frederick WiUiam I 
to confront all at once. The King was forced to deal with each territory 
separately although this was a position he may not have wanted to change 
even if he could have.
The drawback of this situation for the Hohenzollerns' was two fold.
If, for example, Frederick WiUiam I wanted to have changed the 
fundamental organisation of the territorial elites throughout all his 
territories he would have had to have gone through a fundamental shift in 
thinking that would have affected the very foundations of social and 
political structure which had for so long existed. A change m approach to 
not recognising any territorial native rights was outside the general 
conception of the fundamental order. The inherent hierarchy was not an 
area any HohenzoUern questioned, nor was it an area a prince could have 
effectively changed. The resistance and cost would have been far too high a 
price to pay, the outcome unpredictable and the benefits unquantifiable.
Frederick WUUam I was forced to keep the aims of the various 
territories divided which at times was desirable. Although Frederick 
WiUiam I wanted to unite much of the administration throughout the 
scattered lands, there is no evidence to suggest he changed his thinking and 
ever thought of uniting the separate territorial eUtes into one large elite 
covering all the territories even after 1723. The poUtical testaments of both 
Frederick WUUam I and Frederick the Great make clear distinctions between 
the territories and emphasise that they should be treated differently.^® This
^®Ridiard Dietrich, ed.. Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern. For
Frederick William Ts comments on East Prussia in 1722, see pp. 227-229. He focuses on
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had the added crucial effect of maldng any concerted effort among the 
various eUtes of the Hohenzollern territories extremely difficult. Allowing 
the Junkers to maintain their focus on more local affairs meant that the King 
did not have to focus on a unified front among the Junkers. Furthermore, 
setting up military and certain fmancial agencies was easier on paper than in 
actual practice: as we have seen, implementation was less certain. In the 
words of Dietrich Gerhard, "[t]he princes — the Hapsburg (sic) or the 
Hohenzollern, for instance — had to deal with them separately, even in 
smaller composite states attempts at administrative centrahzation were 
rarely seconded by fusion of previously separate estates." No 
Hohenzollern ruler in the eighteenth century would have wanted to have 
faced an opposition consisting of unified territorial elites. In addition, they 
surely would have seen the King purely as 'theif Idng 'in  Prussia' and not as 
ruler of any other Hohenzollern territory. In other words, the particularist 
viewpoint was common to the ruler and territorial elite. Finally, there is no 
evidence to support the proposition that corporate groups of one territory 
sought the advice, suggestions, or support from a different territorial 
corporate group.
both institutional differences and collective personal characteristics and how one should 
treat the peoples of eadi province. In Frederick the Great's political testament of 1752, on 
the other hand, he sprinkles regional variations throughout and focuses more on the need to 
unify institutional differences whidi potentially contribute to any collective or personal 
characteristics wliidi is also tlie case for his political testaments of 1768,1776, and 1784. In 
reference to the people of East Prussia, Frederick tlie Great comments (p. 275): "The 
population there is very indolent/lazy."
'^^Dietiich Gerhard, "Assemblies of Estates and the Corporate Order," p. 44.
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Appendix D -  Amthauptmannschaff: Table^
Amthaupt»
mannschaft
Âmt
Angerburg
von
Lesgewang,
169Q2
Julius Ernst von 
Tettau, 1701- 
1711®
Joachim 
Heinrich Erb- 
Trusefi zu 
Waldburg, 
1712-1718®
Brigadier 
Melchior Ernst 
von Canitz,
1718-1730^
Gotthard 
Christoph von 
Schlieben, 1722- 
1731®
Heinrich Carl 
Ludwig Hérault 
von
Hautcharmon, 
General- 
Lieutenant und 
Chef eines Inf.- 
Regts. u., 1730- 
1757^
Amt Balga
Trib. Raths 
Christoph Amd 
von Rôder, 
1696-17251®
< < How
Salary Appointed
Amt
Verweser
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Johann
Christoph von 
Grabowski, 
Verweser, 
1730-1740^
500 Rt. Regiming 
per yr.
Wolf. Fried.
Truches,
Grafen
Waldburg,
17187
100 Rt. 
per yr.
Frederick 
William I
n /a n /a
Regierung
Regiei’ung
requested
355
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Amthaupt"
mannschaft
Friedrich 
Wilhelm von 
Det\dtz, 
General- 
Lieutenant, 
Chef des Leib- 
Cuir-Regts u., 
1725-173611 
General Major 
Dewitz, Aug172512
Johann Jobst 
Heinrich von 
Buddenbrock, 
General-Lieut., 
Chef des 
Cadetten-Corps 
u., 1736-178115
Amt Barther|l^
Fabian von
Knobelsdorf,
1687-1714
Bogislaus 
Friedrich 
Reichsgraf von 
Donhoff, 
General-Major 
u., 1714-1721 — 
Donhoff, 28 
Aug 172020
<-
Salary
80 Rt. 
pery r
< How 
Appointed
Regiming
Amt
Verweser
Friedrich
Winckehnann,
172513
<-
Salary
<- How 
Appointed
n o n e l ^  Regiming
Wilhehn 
Albrecht von 
Massenbach, 
Verweser, 
1737“
Christian 
Friedrich von 
Winckehnann, 
Verweser, 
174012
Reinhold 
Christian von 
Parck, 
Verweser, 
1740-17531®
Christoph von 
Elditten, 
Verwesser, 
1695.1712.
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Friedrich Ernst 
Bernhard 
Reichsgrafen 
von
Finckenstein,
Oberst-
Lieutenant,
1721-173521
Christoph Ernst 
von Rôder, 
Oberst, 1735- 
1754
< -
Salary
< How 
Appointed
Regierung
Amt
Verweser
Wilhehn 
Ludwig von 
der Grôben, 
Verweser, 1718
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
80 Rt. 
per yr, 22
Alexander von
Elditten,
Verweser,
1721.1734.
Hans Ernst von 
QueiB, 
Verweser, 
1743-1751
Amt
Bartenstein and 
Pr. Eylau
Melchior von 
Tettau, 
Verweser, 
1686-1699
George Dietrich 
von der 
Grôben, 1686
Hans George 
von Tettau, 
1686-1713
Wolff Christoph 
von Hackebom, 
General-Major 
u., 1713-171923
Gen, Major 
Hackborn, 13 
Sept. 171424
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Heinrich 
Albrecht von 
Kalnein, 1736- 
1754.
Amt
Brandenburg^®
Friedrich 
Wilhelm von 
Canitz, 1697- 
170626
Ludwig von 
Ostau, 1706-171127
Julius Ernst von 
Tettau, 1711^ ®
Sigismund von 
Wallenrodt,1711471929
Friedrich 
Ludwig Herzog 
von Holstein- 
Bock, General- 
Feld-Marschall, 
January 1719-172830
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Amt
Verweser
< -
Salary
< How 
Appointed
Wilhehn 
Gottfried von 
Tettau,
Verweser, 1737
First
candidate
suggested
by
Regieurng 
may not 
have been 
approved 
by
Frederick
WflUamlSl
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Amt
Verweser
< <- How
Salary Appointed
Friedrich 500
Wilhelm Thaler
Herzog von per year
Holstein-Bock, to be
Oberst, Herzog, paid 125 
1728-1729?®  ^ Thaler
per 
qtr.®®
Tribunals Rat 
von Chaise,
17297-17??, 
replaced 
Holstein during 
absence®®
Regierung 
asked 
Frederick 
William j34
Amt
Fischausen
Blankensee^®
Vogt von 
Tettau, 172341
Insterburg
Obriste Truches 
Graf von 
Waldburg, to 
1719
Regierung Tribunals Rat 
suggests to von 
Frederick Grabowski, 
William l36 1730-17??32
Johann 
Friedrich von 
Keith, 1740. 
1750®®
Christoph 
Albrecht von 
Auer, 1740. 
1750.®9
Schlieben, 
welcher nach 
SKM befehl, 
wegen der gar 
grofien
Weitlauffigkeit 
des Ambts, 200 
tal. bekant.^7
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Fürstl. Hesen- 
Cassel'schen 
Obristen, Graf 
von Lehndorff, 
171943
Kunheim,172345
Baron Cotter
Amt
Johannisburg
Dobreczinsld 
resigns in 
171646
Captain Graff 
Finckenstein 
takes over, 11 
May 1716-171847
Salaiy
< How 
Appointed
Regief‘ung
Regierung
500 Rt. 
per yr
Regierung
Amt
Verweser
Gotthardt 
Christoff Graff 
von
Dohnhoff^
< < How
Salary Appointed
Wolfgang
Friedrich
Reichs
Erbtruchess
und Graff zu
Waldburg,171948
Amt Labiau & 
Neuhausen4^
Obrist des 
Printzen von 
Holstein, 17195»
Gen. Maj. von 
Lottum, 13 Juni 
1723^4
Boddenbrock,
15 July 172953
Regierung
none Probably
Regierung
Major von 
Dudersberg,171952
100 Rt. 
per yr.
Regierung
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Lyck
< <- How
Salary Appointed
Obrister von
Marriotz
(Marwitz),171955
Amt Memel53
Gen. Maj. Brion, 
up to 1719?59
Major Grf. von 
Lehndorff, 
1719-Jan. 1723^4
Ernst Graff von 
Lehndorff,172462
Bonin, June172763
Amt
Mohrungen 
und Liebstadt64
General Feld 
Marschall Graff 
von Dohna,171965
500 Rt. 
per year
Graf and 
Grafen Donha 
to 172871
Probably 
Frederick 
William I
Amt <~
Verweser Salary
Heinrich 
Albrecht von 
Kalnein, 1714^4
extraordinair 80 Rt 
Hoffgerichts per yr^^
Rath von
< How 
Appointed
Lesgewang56
Ehas Daniel 
von Canitz,I 7196O
100 Rt.
per yr.
Regiei'ung 
(via Brion 
and
Lehndorff)
Fabian von 
Kunheim, died 
29 December 
172066
unlcnownprobabl
y 100 Rt.
peryr.6^
also left
notable
inherit-
ance63
Obrist Lt. von 100 Rt. Request by 
Reichau, 1721- per yr.^^ Regierung.173269
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Cap. Alexander 
Amyhum 
Burggrafen und 
Grafen zu 
Dohna, Jan172972
<“
Salary
500
R t/yr
125/ qt
<- How 
Appointed
Kriegs und
Domanenka
rnmer'^^
Amt
Neidenburg
und Soldau^6
General Graf 
von Dohna, to171977
Obrist- 
Lieutenant 
Graff von 
Dolma, 171978
Regiei'ung
Amt Oletzko^^
Graff von 
Donhoff, to 
172385
Amt
Verweser
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Captain 
Frederick 
William von 
Komg, 1733-17??^4
80 Rt 
per
Regierung
year,75
none through 
171979
Obrist Lt. 100 Rt. Amts
Boÿen, 1720^ ® per yr. Kammer
one approved 80 Rt. 
by Frederick per yr 
William I in 
1723
Baron Leydens, 
to 171383
Capitain 
Johann 
Christoff von 
Hirsch, 1713-®^
Ordered one 80 Rt.
approved per yr
81
Regieinmg
86
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A m t h a u p t ­
m a n n s c h a f t
G e n e r a l  M a j o r  
v o n  E g e l ,  1 7 2 3 -17??87
A m t  O s t e r o d e
B a r o n  v o n  
K e t t l e r ,  t o
171988
K a m m e r  J u n l c e r  
F r i e d r i c h  
R e i n h o l d t  v o n  
R o s e n ,  1 7 1 9 ^ 0
G r a f f e n  G e o r g  
A d a m  v o n  
S c h l i e b e n ,172q92
v o n  R o s e ,  t o
1 7 ? ? - 1 7 2 3 ^ 5
G r a f e n  v o n  
S c h l i e b e n ,  1 7 2 3 -
1 7 ? ? 9 4
A m t  P r ,
H o l l a n d
G e n .  M a j o r  G r a f  
v o n  D o h n a ,  t o  
1 7 2 6
C a p .  G r .  
C h r i s t o p h  v o n  
D o h n a ,  1 7 2 6 %
A m t  P r .  E y l a u
Gen. Maj.
Hackborn^^, 13
Sept 1714^9
<
S a l a r y
<  H o w  
A p p o i n t e d
P r e s u m ­
a b l y  E g e l  t o  
Regierung
n o n e
n o  Regierung
5 0 0  R t .  P r o b a b l y  
p e r  y r .  F r e d e r i c k  
W i l l i a m  I
5 0 0  R t .  Regierung 
p e r
y e a r ,95
U n k n o w n
F r e d e r i c k  
W i l l i a m  I
A m t
V e r w e s e r
T r i b u n a l s  R a t  
v o n  G r o b e n ,
1 7 1 9 - 1 7 2 2
M a j o r  J o h a n n  
F r i e d r i c h  v o n  
B r u m s e e ,  
172291
M a j o r  v o n  
Deppen^^
<-
S a l a r y
<  H o w  
A p p o i n t e d
w a s
p a i d
p r i v a t -ety89
Regierung
( v i a
G r o b e n )
1 0 0  R t .  Regierung
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Henrich 
Albrecht 
Kalnein, 1714- 
172Q400
Gaudecken4^4
Amt Ragnit
Commissariatsp 
rasident von 
Lesgewang4^2
Amt
Rastenburg464
Groben dies 
Dec 1717405
Friedrich 
Wilhelm Prinz 
vom Holstein 
succeeds, 5 Dec
1717-17181%
Ernst Sigmund 
Graff von 
Schlieben, 1718- 47??108
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Regierung
Regieî'ung
Amt
Verweser
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
Capitain von 
Perbandt403
8 0  Rt. 
per yr.
Regierung
(appears
Amthaupt-
mann
Holstein
influences)
Wolff F. 
Truchess 
Graf ten von 
Waldburg,
1718-1719107
Major
D u d e r b e r g 4 0 9
Regieinmg
no
pay110
Regiet^ung
Amt Schaaken
Johann Henrich 
von Bredow, 
1711-1717111
Friedrich 
Wilhelm von 
Bredow, 1717- 
1739112
Wilhelm 
Ekenrich von 
Pappe, 1739-1751144
ordered not to 
have one443
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
Amt Sehesten
Carl Ludwig, to 
1714445
Friedrich 
Emanuel von 
Troben, 1714- 
17??446
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
500 Rt. Probably 
per Regimmg 
yr.447
Amt
Verweser
Capitain
Stacl\440
Capitain 
Johann 
Christoff von 
Hirsch, to1718449
<- <- How
Salary Appointed
100 Rt. 
per
yr.™
Obristen von 
Bredow, to
1 7 1 7 ? 1 2 1
Canitz, Sept. 
1717-172617^
George 
Heinrich von 
Groben, 1726-1729127
von Kreutzen,1729128
Amt Tapiaull® 
Adam
Christoph Graf 
von
Wallenrodt,
1716-1718430
Landrat Georg 
Ernst von 
Schlieben, 1718-
1724131
Probably 
Frederick 
William I
request first 
to Regierung
500 Rt. Frederick 
per yr William I
Frederick 
William I
Biittner, 1718-1724122
Joh. Georg 
Büttner, 1724-1727125
Regierung
100 Rt.
per
yr.423
100 Rt. 
peryr.4^6
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Amthaupt­
mannschaft
<-
Salary
<- How 
Appointed
Adam 100 Rt. Probably
Chritstoph Graf per yr Regierung
von
W c d l e n r o d t ,
June 1724432
Amt Taplacken
Graff von 
Creÿzen, dates 
unknown434
Graf Christoph 
von
Wallenrodt435 
Amt Tilsit 
Creutz436
Dockum, July1729438
Rec'd
un­
deter­
mined
amount
per
quarter
500 Rt. 
per yr
Unknown
Frederick 
William I
Amt
Verweser
ordered not to
have o n e  4 3 3
< <“ How
Salary Appointed
Hof- und 
Kammer Rat 
von Perbandt, 
bekomt von 
SKM Verweser 
nichts437
Notes
These include as much information, biographical and otherwise, as can be reliably 
accertained.
^GStAPIs General Directory, Ostpreufien, III-Àmtersachen, Nr. 2285.
3A. Miilverstedt, "Verzeiclmifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landiichter, Landschoppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenherren, Fisdimeister, Jagermeister, 
Mühlmeister u. in PreuEen. 1525-1806," Pretifiische Provinzial-Blatter, Konigsbei'g, Band 10, Neue 
Folge, July-December, 1856, p.33.
% id.
5lbid,
6jbid.; See also, GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 227 
for 1726 and GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr, 50 (1 April 11718). See also GGStAPK, General Directory, 
Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 229. Tlùs mansucript material notes a "Canitz" but the 
postition is not linked to any particular Amthaiiptmannschaft. See also, GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, 
15 January 1718. Canitz was in line to receive this position and requested it (see correspondence 
of 16 April 1718).
^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,15 March 1718. He is the son-in-law of General Lieutenant 
Graf Truches von Waldburg who had recently died and had been replaced by Canitz. It is clear 
this was an influence in appointment to this position. Frederick William I supports his decision 
by tire use of the word "Prarogativ '^ wliicli the Regienmg recognises. See also Amt Rastenburg.
^Miilverstedt, Werzeiduiifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landriditer, Landsdioppen, Ober-Kastenherren, Kastenherren, Fisdimeister, Jagermeister, 
Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," p. 33. Mülverstedt states that Schlieben was 
Amihaupttnann during this period for Amt Angerberg. This is dearly not the case.
^Ibid. Konig FWI hob die Amthauptmaimschaften als Behorden auf und Conserbirte 
nur einenTheil der Einkünste, wlche nebst dem Titel verdiente Officiere, slir selten hoere 
Civelbeamte, erliielten. See also, GStAPK, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 227.
^^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 5, fol.l. For liis death, see GStAPK, General Diredory, 
Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 161. See also, Mülverstedt, "Verzeichnifi der 
Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, Landrichter, Landsdioppen, Ober- 
Kastenherren, Kastenherren, Fiscluneister, Jagermeister, Mühlmeister u. in Preufien, 1525- 
1806," p. 34.
44lbid.
42cStAPK General Diredory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 178.
43lbid., 26 November 1725.
4^Ibid. Regierung requests for same salary as Dewitz receives for Wincklemann. 
Frederick William Fs response was: "soil nits haben FW". Other attempts appear to have been 
tried without success for Wincklemann.
^^Mülverstedt, Werzeiclinifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landrichter, Landschoppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenlierren, Fisdimeister, Jagermeister, 
Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," p. 34.
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46lbid.
4%id. 
4%id.
4^After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in tlie 1722/23 budget that the 
Amthauphnan  ^in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Molirungen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See OF 14702, vol. 10, fols. 184,19 
November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
^%ep7,Nr. 50.
^4purdiases position. GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,19 July 1720. Frederick William I'^ s 
marginalia on the document next to where the request to allow Finckenstein to purchase 
Amthauptschajft notes, in typical brevity: "gut". See also, documents dated 22 and 28 July 1720. 
The latter of which contains tire receipt of FinckenstieiTs payment to the General Charge Casse 
for the amount of 30 taler.
^^ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
^^Mülverstedt, "Verzeidinifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landridrter, Landsdioppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenherren, Fisdimeister, Jagermeister, 
MüWmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," p. 186.
^^See also Amt Pr. Eylau.
^^Mülverstedt, "Verzeichnifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landrichter, Landschoppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenlierren, Fischmeister, Jagermeister, 
Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," pp. 185-6. Tlie most prominant Hauptamt of the four 
"special" (bevorzuglen" Hauptamt districts in East Prussia. The other districts were Fischausen 
(Vogten), Schaalcen (Landvogt), and Tapiau (Hauptamt). These were also members in the 
Regierung. The Brandenburg Amthaupileute were eventually synonomous with Landrats 
Direktor in the Regienmg.
26jbid., p. 186.
% id .
% id .
% id .
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, January through June 1719. For death, see, GStAPK, EM 17b, 
Nr. 6, fol. 2; GStAPK, OF 1269, fol. 28. "... den herzog von Holstein verliehen HMschafft 
Brandenburg...."
34gSTAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 4, fol. 47. Archive material is not dear on this point although 
there is a brief mention of Baron von Kettler as a potential candidate. It also appears he died in 
1716. See also Juhr, "Die Verwaltung des Hauptamtes Brandenburg/ostpreussen von 1713- 
1751," p. 59, fn. 3.
^^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6, fols. 2-9; GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I- 
Bestellungssachen, Nr. 165; Mülverstedt, Werzeichnifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, 
Amtsmanner, Landrichter, Landsdioppen, Ober-Kastenherren, Kastenlierren, Fischmeister, 
Jagermeister, Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," p. 186.
Appendix D — East Prussian Àmter Appointments______________________369
^^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6, fol. 7,3 April 1728; GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, 
I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 165. In addition to tMs salary, Holstein was also allowed to have the 
revenues generated from tliis position. In a highly unusual move, Frederick William I also 
ordered that Holstein did not have to pay the customaiy fee to the Recruten Casse.
^^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 6., fol. 2 and 6,7 April 1728.
^^GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 7, fois. 18-20. Replaced Holstein during his absent as Vice- 
Amthauptfnann.
36cstAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 7, fol. 4,25 July 1729.
37GStAPK, EM 17b, Nr. 7, fol. 22, 27 April 1730. Regierung to Cocejji.
^^Mülverstedt, "Verzeidinifi der Amtshauptleute, Erbamtshauptieute, Amtsmanner, 
Landrichter, Landschôppen, Ober-Kastenlierren, Kastenherren, Fisdimeister, Jagermeister, 
Mühlmeister u. in Preufien. 1525-1806," p. 186.
3%id.
"^^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssadieii, Nr. 225 
^4abb , 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des GeneraI=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
^^ ^GStAPK, Rep. 7., Nr. 50, 27 November 1719. It is likely that this is Gerhardt Ernst 
Kriegs Graff von Lehndorff: GStAPK, EM llOg, Nr. 31, fols. 4-5. From tlie "Vassaltabellen" of 
1724 (the EM manuscript material) we know that he was 38 years old and also held the title of 
Obrist over a Regiment of Grenadiers. He lived in Cassell and had no children. See also, 
GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
^GStAPK, EM llOg, Nr. 31, fols. 4-5. From the "Vassaîtabeîlen" of 1724 (the EM 
manuscript material) we know that he was 51 lived on liis Gutt in liis Amt and had one 8 year 
old son who lived at home.
^GStAPKy General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 226. Kunheim, 
formerly of Amt Loetzen, and Lehndorff traded Amthauptmannschaft positions. Frederick 
William I personally approved request on 18 August 1723.
^^GStAPR, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,12 July 1718. He resigns under "gewifien Condihonen" 
although there is no further description.
"4^ Ibid.; GStAPK OF 1269, fol. 15,12 July 1718, Finckenstein resigns his position after 
purchasing position for 5000 taler. See also, GStAPK Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 
1719, where Finckenstein is still listed for 1719. In addition on 10 March 1718, Finckenstein via 
the Regierung appeals to Frederick William I to allow his Amthauptmannschafft to be combined 
with the, up to that point, vacant Afnthauptmannschaji of Pr. Marck. There is no comment on the 
document and it apparently was not approved.
^^GStAPK EM llOg, Nr. 31, fols. 4-5. From the ''Vassaltabelleif of 1724 (the EM 
manuscript material) we know that he was 46 lived on his "Gutt," and had 9 cMdren: 5 sons 
(ages 13,6,5,3,1) and 4 daughters all of whom lived at home; see also, GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, 
Specification of 8 September 1719.
"4^ After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that the
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Amthauptmanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Molirungen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
5®GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 24, fol. 3; Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specificiation of 8 September 1719.
This document only lists names of current holders of tlie Amthauptleiite and Verweser positions.
54oStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssadien, nr. 159,22 June 1723. 
Lottum asks to be appointed and in correspondence to Berlin, Frederick William Ts marginalia 
states: "Jali".
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719. See also document dated 15 
May 1719.
^^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 159.
5^Ibid., 13 September 1714.
55jbid., Specification of 8 September 1719.
56lbid.
1723.
5^ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
^^After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that the 
Arnthauptmanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Mohrungen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
5^GStAPK, Rep. 7., Nr. 50
6®Ibid., Specification of 8 September 1719. See also documents dated 15 December 1718 
and 11 January 1719. Tliis appointment apparently carried through to Lelmdorff's tenure. The 
appointment originated with the RegienmghvA was supported by Lehndorff in 1719.
64jbid.; ABB, 4:1, p. 7.
^^GStAPK, EM llOg, Nr. 31, fols. 4-5; GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I- 
Bestellungssachen, Nr. 177, From the "Vassaîtabeîlen" of 1724 (the EM manuscript material) we 
know that he was 30 years old and also had tlie title of Obrist. Lt in the Finckenstein Regiment. 
He lived in Kônigsberg, had two children, both daughters.
^^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 228, Takesover 
Lehndorff, in Finck. Regiment.
6^After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that tlie 
Amthaiipbnanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Mohrungen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See GStAPK, OF 14702, Bd. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
^^GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 39,1 March 1721. "...Fabian von Kunheim 29ten dieses 
Monaths umb 3 Uhr nacli mittage mit einem Verntifftigen Tliristlichen Abscheid diese Welt 
gesegent...."; see also, GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
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6^CStAPK Rep. 7, Nr. 50.
6%StAPK EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 39,1 Mai'di 1721. According to his will of 18 April 1712, 
all of his land (Gutter) was to go to his cliildren while the revenues of his "Magdeburg Gutter" 
were to go to his wife, Anne Sophia (born Ostau). It also appears she was to receive 10,000 
gulden.
6^Ibid., fol. 41,31 December 1720. Request appears to be in the handwriting of Ostau. 
Approval of this request made by Frederick William Fs signature in order to Regierung on 29 
January 1721, see fol. 43
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50. See also, ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des 
General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January 1723. This position was approved and with a salary 
of 80 Rt. per year acording to the document contained in the Acta Borussica  ^however, other 
manuscript material suggest 100 Rt. was to be paid per year.
^^GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 47 and Gen. Dir., Ostpr,, I, nr. 164,
^3jbid., fol. 52; GStAPK, General Directoiy, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 164. 
Frederick William I personally approves salary.
^^QStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 51, no date, received by Regierung on 28 February 1729. 
Captain Alexander Graf von Dohna '^s name is first mentioned by the Kriegs und Domanenkammer 
but it should be noted that for the previous months (since Graf and Grafen Dohna died in 
October 1728), the manuscript material shows more concern by Frederick William I and the 
Kriegs und Domanenkammer about the Recrutencasse payment not having been received than with 
any concern about a particular candidate. This Dohna could have been suggested, therefore, by 
the Regierung although there is no documentation to support this.
'^^ GStAPBC, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fols. 57-57 Rtickseite. Dietrich Albrecht von Lesgewang 
made known liis desire for appointment to the Regierung. In this document, he wanted the 
Regierung and king to be reminded of the fact tliat he had "served for fifteen years in times of 
Wcir as well as in difficult military campaigns." A month later, the Amthauptmann Dohna was 
notified by the Regienmg that "der Hauptmann zu Liebstadt und Mohrungen soil jemanden zur 
dorhgen vacantzen Verweserschaft in Vorsclilag bringen." His first choice was rejected by the 
Regierung (the current Vemeser in AmtVr. Holland, Captain von Saudcen). His second dioice, 
and liis second dioice tliat was fiist suggested to liim by tiie Regienmg was accepted and 
apparently confirmed by Frederick William I in early 1733 although there die manuscript 
material from Frederick William I is not available. The directives from tlie Regierung that 
typically follow such a confirmation are available and show he was appointed. In addition, tlie 
Regierung in July 1734 appointed Lieutenant Friedrich von Braxein to temporarily fill-in for 
Konig while he travelled to Halle.
^^GStAPK, EM 96b, Nr. 5, fol. 87. After some discussion about the exad amount he was 
to pay into tlie Recrutencasse as well as how that money would be divided once in the 
Recruttencasse, it was determined he would receive normal salary for tliis position. Tliis case 
gives an interesting account of what happened to the money once it was paid into Frederidc 
William Fs Recrutencasse. According to the manuscript material, 20 Rt was to go directly into 
the Recrutencasse while anotlier 10 Rt was to go to the Geheimte Etats Cantzeîeÿ zu Berîin. He paid 
1 Rt as "Stempel geld." There was also 48 gulden payment for postage. He paid, therefore, a 
sum of 31 Rt and 48 gulden for a position that would pay him 80 Rt. per yeai* for as long as he 
worked in tliat position (usually for life).
^6After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that the 
Amthauptmanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Molirungen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See GStAPK, OF 14702, Bd. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
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^^GStAPK, Rep. 1, Nr. 50, November 1718. Dohna requests permission to give the 
Amthaupttnannschafft to  liis son. Frederick William I approves this request.
^^GStAPK, OF 1269, fol. 29 Rückseite, 25 November 1719; Rep. 7, Nr, 50, Specification of 
8 September 1719.
^^Ibid. "Verweser, nadi keiner bestellet und wird vor denselben, von dem 
ObristLeutenant grafen von Dohna, das Verweser Inhalt gesucht, welches zu Preuss, Marck 
vacant geworden." Frederick William Fs marginalia directly below this states: "Soil weis der 
(or dieser) schreiben FW". I believe, however, that this refers to the entire document rather than 
this last description of the Specification. In this particulai' case, I believe further that Frederick 
William Fs marginalia is not particularly important.
3%bid., 1 and 9 February 1720. Frederick William Fs marginalia notes of the 
suggestion: "guht FW".
34 abb , 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatheridit des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
3^After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that the 
Amthauptmanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lydc, Neidenburg, and Moluimgen 
were to have a Verweser with an annual salary of 80 Rt, See GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
33GStAPK EM 103b, Nr. 21.
'^^GStAPK Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
35GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 11, fol. 66,16 June 1723. Donhoff was apparently allowed to 
trade Egel for his position in Colberg, Pomerania. "Nachdem Wir im Gnaden gewilliget dafi 
unser General Lieuteneint Graff von Donhoff die Ambtshauptmannsdiaft Colberg in Pommern 
so der General Major von Egel hat, vertauschen dürfte: Alfi haben Wir euch solches liiermit 
allergnadgist zu Wifien fügen wollen, und habt Hir, wenn gemeldter seiner Introdudion sich 
beÿ Euch melden wird, sodann thun...."; See also, GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 
September 1719.
36abb , 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
3^GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 11, fol. 66,16 June 1723; GStAPK, General Directory, 
Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 225,14 and 16 June 1723.
33GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719,
3^Ibid. According to tliis document: "...bekant von SKM nichts, sondem wird von dem 
von Kettler bezaldet."
^^CStAPK, Rep 7., Nr. 50,23 September 1719. Kettler asks to sell Hauptmannschaft to 
Rosen. Tliere exists a receipt from October confirming the sale.
^4jbid., 22 March 1722. In addition, Brumsee notes: "...dafi der Baron von Ketler als 
Hauptmann der Ambter mir nicht gerne müfien wil." It also appears he paid 400 Rt. to gain the 
position.
^^Ibid., 10 April 1720. Major in Stillischen Regiment.
^^Mentioned in GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 4, fol. 134, 8 April 1723, as released from
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service for poor performance. "Die bisherige Amthauptmann von Rose... seiner dienst verlafien 
.... So viel an ihm ist abwenden, warnen und verhüten soil, abforderlich had er daliin zu sehen, 
dafi denen unterthanen prompte und sdileunige Justiz administriret dieselben von denen 
Ambtsschreibern mit keinen ungebuhrlichen Geridits,, kosten, oder anderren exactionen 
beleget sondern vielmehr vor ihre Conseroation und befieres Aufnelimen auff all weise gesorget 
werde...."
^^GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 4, fol, 134, 8 April 1723.
^^He was also allowed to live in the "Amhthause" for free.
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719; GStAPK, General Directory, 
Ostpreufien, II-Materien, Nr. 163,2 March 1726. Son of Gen. Major Graff Dohna. Christoph 
Dohna had to pay 30 Rt. to tlie Recrutten Casse.
^^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719. "...und haben SKM in 
einem an gedachten General grafff von Dolma abgelafienen, und der Regierung communicirten 
hand Schreiben festgesetzet, dafi die 100 tal. Verweser gehalt, beÿ dem Ambte bleiben sollen.
^^See also Amt Bartenstein.
^%StAPK,Rep.7,Nr.50.
100
1720.
Ibid.. See also Amt Bartenstein. Former Verweser to Lyck. Appears to have died in
461ibid., 7 May 1720, Regienmg to Ilgen.
43^Ibid., Specification of 8 September 1719,
433GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
104After 19 November 1723, Frederick William I ordered in the 1722/23 budget that the 
Amthauptmanner in Memel, Ragnit, Labiau, Barten, Oletzko, Lyck, Neidenburg, and Molirungen 
were to have a Venoeser with an annual salary of 80 Rt. See GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 10, fol. 184, 
19 November 1723. Total budgeted was 640 Rt.
405Rep.7,Nr. 50.
46ÔGStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 22, fol. 2; GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,5 December 1717. This 
document suggests that it was in the notification of Groben's death that Holstein was suggested. 
Interestingly, Krollmann, fol. 285, notes he was not born in East Prussia but rather, Potsdam.
407QStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 23, fol. 2,31 March 1718; GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,2 May 1719. 
Waldburg appears to have left vacant this position in 1719 (reason unclear). The Regierung and 
Lithuanian Kammer jointly suggest that tliis position be filled in a document dated 2 May 1719.
l^^GStAPK, EM 119b, Nr. 24, fol. 3, 25 August 1718.
40^GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,2 May 1719. Suggestion by Regierung and Lithuanian 
Kammer. Frederick William I approves: "duderberg soil sein...."
446aBB, 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
44lGStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 2.
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Also appears that he was appointed to Kriegs und Domanenkammer in East 
Prussia on 13 April 1723. See GStAPK, OF 14702, vol. 4, fol. 140,13 April 1723.
1723.
443abb , 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
444GStAPK, EM 126b, Nr. 2.
445GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50,16 October 1714.
446jbid., 20 Januaiy 1714.
8 February 1714. In a receipt from the General Charge-Casse, Troben paid 62
Rt., 12 gulden.
443GStAPK, EM 103b, Nr. 21.
44^GStAPK, EM 103b, Nr. 21. See also Amt Oletzko. Held botli Amthauptmanschaffl 
positions until 1718 when he gave up the Amt Sehesten position. When the Regierung 
questioned tliis practice, Hirsch responded: "Weilen der Verweser zu Oletzko sicli ratione des 
Ampts Oletzko nur vor dem Capitain Stach gefürhtet, dieses aber nunmehro verstorben, S. K.
M. auch das ampt Sehesten vor wenige Zeit dem Cammer Junker von Canitz gegeben, und also 
abzuwarten seyn wird, ob derselbe besagtes Ampt Selbst administiren, oder auch bey Sr. K. M. 
sich einen Verweser ausbitten wolle; alfi hatt die Regierung befehlen diesen bericht nur ad acta 
zu legen, olme dafi eine Relation deshalb an S. K. M. abgestattet verdi(?) 22 Dec: 1717".
4%StAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50.
4^4q5|apK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 223. Tliere is only 
an indirect mention of von Bredow as the holder of this position prior to Canitz. It is not clear 
from the manusrciprt material when and for how long he held tliis position, should he have 
held it at all.
4%StAPK, EM 130b, Nr. 68
423GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50
4^^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssaclien, Nr. 223. Also appears 
from the manuscript material that Canitz purchased tliis positionfor 5000 Rt. with Frederidc 
William Fs approval (although the Icing apparently did not remember granting approval or it 
was pre-maturely granted whidi from a reading of other manuscript material appears possible). 
On 25 March 1726, The General Directory reports to the Icing that "we want you to know how 
mudi Kammerherr Canitz paid for the Amthauptmannschaft to Sehesten...5000 Rtlir." Note that 
tliis is after the 1725 order by Frederick William I that tliese positions in East Prussia were no 
longer to be sold. For that order see, Gen. Dir., Ostpr., I, Nr. 162, fol. 1.
423GStAPK, EM 130b, Nr. 69.
426GStAPK, Rep. 7, Nr. 50. See also ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des 
General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January 1723. Tliis document shows Frederick WilHam I 
declared no salary for this Amt. Tliis is clearly different than what other manuscript material 
shows.
4^^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 223. Groben 
requests to receive next available Amthauptinannschaft position and in particular, Amt Sehesten. 
He received Frederidc William Fs approval and the position in September 1726.
 ^Nr. 229. This however is questioned because Canitz was still hving in 1729
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and protests that this is liis position as he paid 5000 Rt. for it. He requests that he maintain this 
understanding in order that he does not lose his "capital". See document dated 23 July 1729. It 
appers Frederick William I upholds this request and does not appoint Kreutzen.
4%StAPK,EM137.
430lbid., Nr. 18. Wallenrodt died, however, in 1741.
43lGStAPK, EM 137b, Nr. 18, fol. 7,25 August 1718, Special Befelil. Was issued for the 
transfer of the postion to Wallenrodt in 1724; GStAPK, OF 1269, fol. 21. Authorisation for the 
transfer was sent from Kameke to the Regierung on 25 August 1718.
43^GStAPK, General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssachen, Nr. 160. This appears 
to be the same Wallenrodt as the one who held tliis position before Schlieben. The course of 
events and cirucmstances in wliicli this office transfered are not available through the 
manuscript material. The manuscript material, however, does shed light on the fact that 
Wallenrodt asked for an annual salary of 600 Rt. and was granted 100 Rt. salary. There was 
apparently some discussion as late as 1730 as to whether the 600 Rt. should be granted and paid 
from an account under the authority of the Regierung since they were either in support of this 
salary or candidate. The manuscript is unclear on tlùs point although it suggests they probably 
were the instigator of tlie re-appointment.
433a bb , 4:1, pp. 6-9, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 January
1723.
434GStAPK, EM 137c, Nr. 67. Reference is made to tliis individual only briefly. He was 
not allowed to engage in "foreign service."
435GStAPK, EM 137c, Nr. 67.
436q5j-apk, Rep. 7, Nr. 50, Specification of 8 September 1719.
43^jbi(j, Perbandt received 600 Rt. per year as Hof- und Kammer Rat.
433GStAPK General Directory, Ostpreufien, I-Bestellungssadien, Nrs. 223 emd 229.
Appendix E - Amthauptleiite and Verwesern in 17224
Amthaupt­
mann
Major Graf 
von 
Lehndorff
Amts-
hauptmann
von
Creutzen
Conuniss-
ariats-
prasident
von
Lesgewang
Obrister 
Graf von 
Lehndorff
Amt
Name
Memel
Ver-
wese
App­
roved
Yes
Held
Milit­
ary
Title
Yes
Tilsit No No
Ragnit Yes No
Inster-
burg
No Yes
General- Labiau
major Prinz and Neu- 
von hausen
Holstein
Landvogt Schaak-en 
von Bredau
Yes Yes
No No
G eneral 
Locat­
ion in 
East 
Prussia
North
North-
East
North-
East
North-
East
North-
Central
Direct 
Involve­
ment in 
Veiweser 
Appoint­
ment by 
Regierung 
or
Frederick 
William I
n /a
n /a
n /a
n /a
Name of 
Verweser
Elias
Daniel
von
Canitz
Hof- und 
Kammer 
Rat von 
Perbandt*
Capitain
von
Perbandt*
Gotthardt
Christoff
von
Donhofft
North- Regierung Major von 
Central Duders­
berg*
n /a ordered 
not to 
have one
4Adapted from ABB, 4:1, pp. 6-8, Immediatbericht des General=Directoriums, Berlin, 28 
January 1723. For further detail, see Appendix D.
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* = appointment was prior to 1722, position after 1722 is not completely 
certain
t  = appointment probably prior to 1722 although the exact date is not 
completely certain which is also true for their position after 1722
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Amthaupt­
mann
Amt
Name
Ver-
wese
App-
roved
Held
Milit­
ary
Title
Gen-eral 
Locat­
ion in 
East 
Prussia
Direct 
Involve­
ment in 
Verweser 
Appoint­
ment by 
Regierung 
or
Frederick 
William I
Name of 
Verweser
Vogt von 
Tettau
Capitan 
Graf von 
Fincken­
stein
Amthauptm 
arm Graf 
von 
Schlieben
Fisch-
hausen
Tribunalsrat Tapiau 
Graf von 
WaUen-rodt
Barten
Rasten­
burg
No
No
No
No
Yes
No No
Kâmmerer Sehest-en 
von Canitz
Amthauptm 
arm von 
Foller
Brigadier 
von Canitz
Rhein
Anger-
burg
No
No
No
North-
West
North-
Central
Yes Central
Central
No South-
Central
No South-
Central
Yes Central
n /a
n /a
n /a
n / a 
n / a
Frederick 
William I
n /a
ordered 
not to 
have one 
in 1723
WiUiam 
Ludwig 
von der 
Groben*
Regierung Major 
Duder­
berg*
Büttner*
n /a
Wolf.
Fried.
Truches,
Grafen
Waldburg
General- 
lieuten-ant 
Graf von 
Donhoff
Oletzko Yes Yes East- Regierung Capitain 
Central Johann
Christoff
von
Hirsch?*
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Amthaiipt- Amt
mann Name
Ver- Held 
wese Milit- 
App- ary 
roved Title
Gen-eral 
Locat­
ion in 
East 
Prussia
Direct 
Involve­
ment in 
Verweser 
Appoint­
ment by 
Regierung 
or
Frederick 
William I
Name of 
Veiweser
Trib­
unalsrat von 
Kunheim
Obrister von 
Marwitz
Capitan 
Graf von 
Fincken­
stein
Obrist-
lieutenant
von
Gaudecker
Obrister 
Graf von 
Dohna
Kâmmerer 
von Rosen
Lotzen
(Seh­
esten)
Lyck
No No
Yes Yes
South-
Central
East-
Central
n / a n / a
Johann­
isburg
No Yes South-
Central
Ortels-
burg
Neiden­
burg and 
Soldau
Oster-ode
and
Hohen-
stein
No Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
South-
Central
South-
West
n /a
n / a
n /a
Amts
Kammer
Extraord­
inair 
Hoffger­
ichts Rat 
von 
Lesge- 
wangt
Wolfgang 
Friedrich 
Reichs 
Erbtruch­
ess und 
Graff zu 
Waldburg 
t
Capitain
von
Perbandt
Obrist Lt. 
Boÿen*^
South- Regierung Major
Central Johaim
Friedrich
von
Brumsee
^Verweser approved by Frederick William I in 1723.
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Amthaupt­
mann
Amt
Name
Ver- Held 
wese Milit- 
App- ary 
roved Title
G eneral 
Locat­
ion in
East
Prussia
Direct 
Involve­
ment in 
Verweser 
Appoint­
ment by 
Regierung 
or
Frederick 
William I
Name of 
Verweser
General- 
major von 
der Groben
Tribunalsrat 
Graf von 
Fincken­
stein
Marien-
werder
and
Riesen-
burg
Preufi-
isch-Mark
No
No
Yes
No
East-
Central
East-
Central
n /a
n /a
n / a
n /a
General von PreuR- 
der Infant- isch-
erie Graf zu Holland 
Dohna
General- 
feld- 
marschaU 
Graf zu 
Dohna
Tribunalsrat 
von Rôder
Mohr­
ungen 
and Lieb­
stadt
Balga
No Yes East- Regierung Major von 
Central Deppen*
Yes Yes East- Regierung Obrist Lt.
Central von
Reichau*
No No North- in 1725, none 
West Regierung appear
until 1725
General- 
feld- 
marschaU 
Herzog von 
Holstein
Brand­
enburg
Geheimer PreuR-
Kriegs-rat isch-
von Kalnein Eylau and 
Berten- 
stein
No
No
No North-
West
No Central
n /a
n / a
none 
appear 
until 1730
none 
appear 
between 
1699 and 
1737
I
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Appendix F 
East Prussian Amthauptmannschnften 
Oberland District
G erm nn 
Sam land 
District 
(see p. 380)
Oberland
District
G erm an
O berland
District
Kreis Kreis
M ohrungen Neidenburg
Pr. H olland- 
Behlendorff
L iebstadt-
M ohrungen
Amt
Holland
Amt
M tihlhausen
Amt
Liebstadt
Amt
M ohrungen
O sterode-
H ohenstein
Amt
O sterode
Erbam t
Deutsch
Eylau
Amt
H ohenstein
East Prussian Lithuanian
Kam m er- Kam m er-
depnrtm ent departm en t
(see p. 383)
G erm an  
N a tan g en  
D istrict 
(see p. 381)
H aup tam t
Neidenburg-
Soldau
H aup tam t
O rtelsburg-
Willenberg
Amt
Neidenburg
Amt
Soldau
Amt
O rtelsburg
Amt
Willenberg
Amt
PnssGirheim
Erbam t
Gilgenburg
Amt
Gilgenburg
H auptam t
M arienw erder-
Riesenburg
Amt
M arlenvverder
Amt
Bischofsiverder
Kreis 
M arienw erder
H aup tam t
Pr. M arkt-
Liebemühl
D ollstadt
Amt
Saalfeld Liebemilhl
Erbamt
SchonbergRiesenburg
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